Bangladesh: Coup??

[idune]

the calculation is universal

No it isn't there are at least three different methods of calculating GDP. You once again caught with your pants down and running your mouth.

 

[scholseys]

No it isn't there are at least three different methods of calculating GDP. You once again caught with your pants down and running your mouth.

Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) | Data | Table

now shut up

 

[scholseys]

self delete

 

[scholseys]

ok according to arrested l.colonel Ehsan Yusuf and Major AKM Zakir , objective of the coup was to restore Bismillah , Obligatory Hizab, Islamic Banking, Shariah Law, Zakat Fund etc and coup planner Ishrak had backings from China.

Thank god those radicalist mongrels got caught....hope they hang for such an act of treason!

 

[livingdead]

No it isn't there are at least three different methods used in calculating GDP. You once again caught with your pants down. You do not have any proof of your claim ther Bangladesh GDP calculation is infaltion adjusted yet running your mouth.

As long as bangladesh is calculating GDP in same way as previous year, the real growth can be calculated by anybody including you and me.
So why not check the GDP figures, and calculate yourself.

 

[scholseys]

idune, you are quite thick arent you?

 

[kobiraaz]

It mentions about mbi munshi:: কালের কণ্ঠ :: প্রথম পাতা :: এখনো সক্রিয় মেজর জ&#2

 

[scholseys]

can somebody tell me what the above article says in english...in summary..would be highly appreciated.

 

[Maira La]

It mentions about mbi munshi:: কালের কণ্ঠ :: প্রথম পাতা :: এখনো সক্রিয় মেজর জ

দেশ কলিং ডট ব্লগে এ লেখাটি পোস্ট করেছেন জনৈক এমবিআই মুন্সি। মুন্সির পরিচয় অংশে জানানো হয়েছে, তিনি ঢাকায় থাকেন এবং তিনি পেশায় আইনজীবী, ব্যাংকার ও লেখক। এতে তাঁর ছবিও রয়েছে। কিন্তু গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ধরণা, তাঁর নাম, ছবি ও পেশাগত পরিচয় ভুয়া।
আরো সন্দেহজনক তথ্য হচ্ছে, ওই ব্লগটিতেই বহুল আলোচিত 'বাংলাদেশ সেনাবাহিনীর পক্ষ থেকে নতুন বছরের উপহার-মধ্যম সারির অফিসাররা অচিরেই বড় ধরনের পরিবর্তন আনতে যাচ্ছেন' শীর্ষক লেখাটিও ১০ জানুয়ারি অভ্যুত্থান চেষ্টার আগেই প্রকাশিত হয়। এসব কারণে ওই অভ্যুত্থান প্রচেষ্টার সঙ্গে বিদেশি কোনো গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ইন্ধন রয়েছে বলেই ধারণা করা হচ্ছে।

Munshi's a raw agent.

---------- Post added at 12:37 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:36 AM ----------

can somebody tell me what the above article says in english...in summary..would be highly appreciated.

I summarized above.^^

 

[scholseys]

lol i always knew munshi was a fake......

 

[La Hore]

দেশ কলিং ডট ব্লগে এ লেখাটি পোস্ট করেছেন জনৈক এমবিআই মুন্সি। মুন্সির পরিচয় অংশে জানানো হয়েছে, তিনি ঢাকায় থাকেন এবং তিনি পেশায় আইনজীবী, ব্যাংকার ও লেখক। এতে তাঁর ছবিও রয়েছে। কিন্তু গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ধরণা, তাঁর নাম, ছবি ও পেশাগত পরিচয় ভুয়া।
আরো সন্দেহজনক তথ্য হচ্ছে, ওই ব্লগটিতেই বহুল আলোচিত 'বাংলাদেশ সেনাবাহিনীর পক্ষ থেকে নতুন বছরের উপহার-মধ্যম সারির অফিসাররা অচিরেই বড় ধরনের পরিবর্তন আনতে যাচ্ছেন' শীর্ষক লেখাটিও ১০ জানুয়ারি অভ্যুত্থান চেষ্টার আগেই প্রকাশিত হয়। এসব কারণে ওই অভ্যুত্থান প্রচেষ্টার সঙ্গে বিদেশি কোনো গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ইন্ধন রয়েছে বলেই ধারণা করা হচ্ছে।

Munshi's a raw agent.

---------- Post added at 12:37 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:36 AM ----------

I summarized above.^^

They also mentions that this coup might have some relation with Pakistan Intelligence.

 

[Md Akmal]

দেশ কলিং ডট ব্লগে এ লেখাটি পোস্ট করেছেন জনৈক এমবিআই মুন্সি। মুন্সির পরিচয় অংশে জানানো হয়েছে, তিনি ঢাকায় থাকেন এবং তিনি পেশায় আইনজীবী, ব্যাংকার ও লেখক। এতে তাঁর ছবিও রয়েছে। কিন্তু গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ধরণা, তাঁর নাম, ছবি ও পেশাগত পরিচয় ভুয়া।
আরো সন্দেহজনক তথ্য হচ্ছে, ওই ব্লগটিতেই বহুল আলোচিত 'বাংলাদেশ সেনাবাহিনীর পক্ষ থেকে নতুন বছরের উপহার-মধ্যম সারির অফিসাররা অচিরেই বড় ধরনের পরিবর্তন আনতে যাচ্ছেন' শীর্ষক লেখাটিও ১০ জানুয়ারি অভ্যুত্থান চেষ্টার আগেই প্রকাশিত হয়। এসব কারণে ওই অভ্যুত্থান প্রচেষ্টার সঙ্গে বিদেশি কোনো গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ইন্ধন রয়েছে বলেই ধারণা করা হচ্ছে।

Munshi's a raw agent.

---------- Post added at 12:37 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:36 AM ----------

I summarized above.^^

THE PEELKHANA MUTINY AND MASSACRE

(The following is a document consisting of 15,400 words. It is circulating via email from various sources. The reader should view the contents of the article with discretion as DeshCalling is not responsible for its accuracy or veracity and was not involved in its compilation. )

AN OLD BRIGADIER GENERAL


Preface


The day before the mutiny at the Peelkhana headquarters of the BDR started, I came back to Dhaka after a short visit to my district town in North Bengal. I have retired from the Bangladesh army almost a decade ago. Since then, I have been living the life of a pensioner, enjoying a life of leisure playing golf, reading books and journals and doing a bit of charitable work. On that day, as usual, early in the morning after Fazar prayer and a quick cup of tea, I went to play golf and came back home around half past nine. After shower, while having breakfast with my wife and browsing the morning paper, there came a telephone call. My wife took the call at the other end of the drawing-dinner. There was nothing unusual in having a telephone call or two at this hour of the day. I continued sipping tea and going through the newspaper without lending my ear to the conversation my wife was having. But she came back to the dinning table wearing an anxious look on her otherwise radiant face. I gave her an asking glance.


It was Nazma, our niece who lives in Dhanmondi, on the phone. Apparently, a mutiny has broken out at the BDR headquarters, next to Dhanmondi. Apart from giving us the news, Nazma was anxious to know whether our only son, a lieutenant colonel posted at the GHQ in Dhaka, was likely to be on the harm’s way. Even if there was a mutiny and the army were to be sent to suppress it, there was no particular reason to worry about the safety of our son. My wife and I had spoken to him the previous evening. He was due to leave Dhaka for Comilla early in the morning on official duty. Moreover, had he remained at the GHQ, it would have been most unlikely for him to be sent out to battle against the mutineers.


However, a mutiny by the principal para- military force of the country, if true, was an altogether different matter. It was an outrageous act of indiscipline, which no government could conceivably tolerate. Moreover, in the given political condition of our crisis-ridden country, it could not have been seen anything other than an ominous disloyalty to the newly elected govern-ment. It deserved to be quelled quickly, as was done in the case of the Ansar mutiny at Shafipur several years ago, regardless of whether their grievances had any merit or not. My immediate reaction was to rush to the TV to make sure that the news was true. After all, Dhaka is a city of wild rumours and since the national election it had become more so. The sordid news was, indeed, all over the BTV, the government owned channel.


I was sure in my mind that soon the army would be sent in and the mutineers would be quickly brought to their knees. Nothing of its kind happened. Instead, in the afternoon we saw the PM personally meeting the leaders of the mutiny at her official residence and offering them a blanket amnesty, together with an assurance that all their grievances would be looked at sympathetically. The Home Minister and other grandees of the government even went inside the BDR HQ to speak to the mutineers and oversee their agreed surrender. A number of mutineers were even allowed to justify their action before the TV camera. The next day we learnt, that instead of surrendering all the mutineers had melted away from the unguarded Peelkhana in the darkness of the night, leaving a horrific scene of utter carnage behind. Understandably, the army officers were outraged by the needless loss of so many colleagues and friends and the country was shocked by the despicable barbarity of the mutineers towards their commanding officers and their wives and daughters.


From the beginning, the government’s handl-ing of the mutiny looked strange. I do not know of any mutiny, military or paramilitary, any where in the world, which had been dealt with in the manner the Bangladesh government had dealt with the BDR mutiny. The government treated it, as if it was a kind of industrial dispute involving a discontent unarmed workforce with no one’s life and limb on the harm’s way. It was, to say the least, injudicious and inept. Although as a military man I had no doubt that the army, with a show of readiness by the air force to bomb if necessary, could have ended the mutiny within half an hour, I, like many at that point in time, thought this softness of the leaders of the govern-ment towards the mutineers was due mainly to their inexperience in handling such a matter as well as a well-meaning but misplaced eagerness to avoid bloodshed, borne out of their populist bend of mind. Furthermore, I thought the PM’s insecure grip on power and her deep-seated distrust of the army may have also played a part in her velvety approach towards ending the mutiny. I could not be more wrong.


The way the government proceeded with the inquiry with three parallel bodies and even before having their reports started talking loudly about de-linking the BDR from the army under a newly created officer crops recruited through the CSC and resetting it up under a new name and a new uniform started to give the sordid mutiny a new complexion. Moreover, the new DG BDR’s promotion to the rank of Major General and his hasty journey to New Delhi for the expressed purpose of thanking the Indian BSF for their magnanimity in protecting our borders during the mutiny looked odd to me. Even if that was his purpose, instead of leaving his station where his constant presence was needed, he could have telephoned or sent a letter of thanks to his Indian counterpart. If on the other hand, our government wanted to thank the government of India, the DG BDR was, as per protocol, patently a wrong person. More importantly, the mystrious absence of Sohel Taj, the Deputy Home Minister, from the day of the mutiny onward and the subsequent mysterious dash of Jahangir Kabir Nanak, the Deputy LGRD Minister who had acted as the principal negotiator on behalf of the PM during the mutiny, out of the country immediately after the arrest of Torab Ali, the AL president of Ward 48 of Dhaka and a former BDR Havildar, by the RAB utterly perplexed me. My disquiet grew further when a young relative of mine brought to my attention an investigative report in a New York based electronic media. It set out a detailed accusation against Sajeeb Wajed Joy, the PM’s son, of masterminding the mutiny together with a number of foreign intelligence agencies. It was difficult to think that Joy would seek to undermine the authority of his mother’s government. But a few years back he was at the head of a failed move to replace her from the leadership of the AL. Besides; in Bangladesh politics there is hardly anything straightforward. After all, our political stratagems have always been modelled on the game of chess. I felt, I must find out the truth, however unpalatable, for the sake of my beloved country.


I decided what I was going to do: start my own one-man inquiry commission. I started teasing out the relevant facts from a number of highly placed friends within the civil service, army and police by way of casual conversation about the mutiny and its inquiries. Through a writer friend, I also obtained from a prominent national daily a photocopy of all the relevant media clippings that it had. I then subjected all the gathered facts to systematic crosschecking and analysis. The findings were astounding and their implications profound and disturbing. To be double sure, I took my main findings in the form of a number of disjointed information to one of the current leaders of the army, who had served under me as a young captain and to whom I remained a well regarded fatherly figure ever since. I choose him not simply because he would never betray me. It was also dictated by the twin facts that he happened to be the most discerning source of information within the present army high-ups and my visiting him at his home would not raise any eye brow, since we regularly visit each others’ family. After reading my list, he handed them back with a gentle smile. When I asked, which of these he would cross out as untrue, he simply said ‘not many’. I did not see any further need to pursue the matter with him: I have what I wanted. After a little while I got up and bade his wife and children farewell. As usual, he walked me up to the car. But before taking his leave and closing the car door, I heard him saying in a low voice: ‘Believe me Sir, like you I’m deeply worried about the country’. During my drive back home, a dark fear overtook me, I started praying silently: Oh God Almighty, save this poor country of ours.

 

[Md Akmal]

দেশ কলিং ডট ব্লগে এ লেখাটি পোস্ট করেছেন জনৈক এমবিআই মুন্সি। মুন্সির পরিচয় অংশে জানানো হয়েছে, তিনি ঢাকায় থাকেন এবং তিনি পেশায় আইনজীবী, ব্যাংকার ও লেখক। এতে তাঁর ছবিও রয়েছে। কিন্তু গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ধরণা, তাঁর নাম, ছবি ও পেশাগত পরিচয় ভুয়া।
আরো সন্দেহজনক তথ্য হচ্ছে, ওই ব্লগটিতেই বহুল আলোচিত 'বাংলাদেশ সেনাবাহিনীর পক্ষ থেকে নতুন বছরের উপহার-মধ্যম সারির অফিসাররা অচিরেই বড় ধরনের পরিবর্তন আনতে যাচ্ছেন' শীর্ষক লেখাটিও ১০ জানুয়ারি অভ্যুত্থান চেষ্টার আগেই প্রকাশিত হয়। এসব কারণে ওই অভ্যুত্থান প্রচেষ্টার সঙ্গে বিদেশি কোনো গোয়েন্দা সংস্থার ইন্ধন রয়েছে বলেই ধারণা করা হচ্ছে।

Munshi's a raw agent.

---------- Post added at 12:37 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:36 AM ----------

I summarized above.^^

@ How come MBI Munshi is a fake !!!!! He has written a well renowned book, "The Indian Doctrine " which is available in the market.

 

[Md Akmal]

THE PEELKHANA MUTINY AND MASSACRE

This small booklet is the result of my self-appointed one-man inquiry commission on the Peelkhana massacre. Obviously it is not the whole truth. Nonetheless, it is the bare bone of the truth. I am confident if and when we are able to know more about the incident, this bare bone truth would continue to stand up.


In bringing this bare bone truth and its ill omen to light, I have taken grave personal risk. This I have undertaken for the sake of our beloved country and its 140 million freedom loving people. If it serves as a wakeup call to the patriots of Bangladesh, regardless of their creed, vocation and/or political affiliation and helps them to see the dangers awaiting us all with added clarity, I shall consider my toils and risk taking worthwhile. Let Allah, the Almighty, be our witness and protector.


1. The Plan


The campaign for the Peelkhana mutiny and massacre began in earnest in November 2008, nearly two months before the general election and Sheikh Hasina’s rise to power. Surprisingly, it was done with her and her son Sajeeb Wajed Joy’s consent and connivance.


It is worth recollecting that the caretaker government of the former bureaucrat and World Bank official Fakharuddin Ahmed, which the elected government of Sheikh Hasina had replaced, was put in power by the CAS General Moeen U. Ahmed, in violation of the country’s constitution as well as his oath of commission, at the behest of a cabal of Indian, US, UK and EU diplomats. It came in the wake of Sheikh Hasina’s violent political campaign and, more importantly, with her agreement. She not only blessed it by her cheerful presence at its oath taking ceremony, on several occasions publicly described it as being the ‘fruit’ of her political campaign.


General Moeen and some of his foreign instigators had, on the other hand, justified their action by claiming that they were motivated solely by the desire to save Bangladesh from a civil war. It was all bunkum. These diplomats, for their own national interests, wanted a weak and subservient government in Bangladesh and used Sheikh Hasina’s violent campaign as their handle. They got Moeen’s service by promising him the ultimate prize, provided he could manage to crown himself ‘democratically’. That means he were to


(1) Vanish both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina;(2) Buy or drive out their ardent supporters out of politics; and(3) Assemble his own climbing ladder in the form of a new party.


The much-publicised anti-corruption drive against politicians was meant to facilitate these. He was patently unsuccessful in achieving any of these objectives.


Meanwhile, since the life of the caretaker government could not be prolonged beyond 2008 without risking wide spread disaffection, even upheaval, the involved foreign powers were left with no option, other than to choose either Sheikh Hasina or Khaleda Zia. With India pushing, they went for the flexible Sheikh Hasina. It was also a relief for Moeen, for he had much to fear from Khaleda Zia, who had made him CAS and whose two sons were made physical wrecks by his henchmen. With the real election done, the general election went ahead.


It was in this context, preparations for the Peelkhana mutiny were taken up in earnest by the Indian RAW and the Israeli MOSSAD in the full knowledge of, and possibly with a nod from, the USA’s CIA. An article bearing the name of Sajeeb Wajed Joy and a certain Carl Siovacco, which was published in the USA in November 2008, signalled Joy and his mother’s readiness to go ahead with the planned massacre. In that article Joy accused Bangladesh army and other military and paramilitary forces of recruiting thousands of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.


This type of patently anti-state concoction by the son of a prospective PM, and that too, in the middle of a general election campaign, would have, elsewhere in the world, ruined the electoral prospect of the party and dashed its leader’s hope of gaining power. But not in Bangladesh; here Sheikh Hasina and her AL have always claimed the sole proprietorship of the Liberation War of 1971 and with it, her and her party’s right to run the country as they deem fit. In fact, to strengthen their claim they had often accused their opponents as unpatriotic and anti-liberationists. Moreover, as soon as the USA started its crusade against the so-called Islamic terrorism and both India and Israel joined in that crusade, they latched in and became its ardent subscriber. The phantom of the JMB mischief-makers enabled them to harp on the baseless fear of Islamic terrorism in Bangladesh.


In fact, Joy in his article maintained this very line and emphasised that the army and other paramilitary forces of Bangladesh needed to be cleaned up of the Islamic terrorists and reshaped, so that they could never obstruct the AL’s efforts to rescue the nation from the anti-liberationists and turn it into a secular haven. With Moeen underwriting AL’s victory at the general election, Sheikh Hasina and her son had no difficulty in signalling their willingness to go ahead with the mission of neutering the country’s security forces. In his article, Joy, who is married to a Zionist woman, reaffirmed his personal commit-ment to the Indo-Israeli cause by asserting that he envisaged a Hindu PM leading the secularised Bangladesh within the next 20 years. Sheikh Hasina’s connivance was bought by kindling both her voracious appetite for power and welknown fear and distrust of the army. But, in doing so the RAW and the MOSSAD planners were driven by their desire to neuter the army for undermining Bangladesh itself. Since the 1990’s the RAW had been actively working towards this end. Over the period, several retired army intelligence chiefs of Bangladesh have publicly spoken about it. Yet the irony is that instead of being mindful of such warnings, the sitting army chief and some of his lieutenants were now ready to connive in this nefarious game of our enemies.


In Bangladesh General Moeen and his lieute-nants’ unsavoury activities from the imposition of emergency onward had lowered the army’s standing before the common people. Taking advantage of the common people’s lack of awareness about the CAS and his lieutenants’ role in putting Sheikh Hasina in power, her followers among the intellectuals renewed their campaign to malign the army with a fresh vigour. Suddenly in February JMB operatives were arrested from a number of places and a section of the media started ballooning again the spectre of Islamic terrorism. But their target was the army. Abdul Gaffar Choudhury, a London-based AL columnist with long standing Indian connection, even said, if 30 per cent of the army were made up of Hindus, there would be no problem left. Following this assertion, Waliul Islam, a former civil servant-cum-diplomat, whose wife is a former AL MP, even claimed to have discovered, through his research, that about one third of all army recruits of the previous seven years were madrasa educated. The underlying implication was that


(1) The Islamic educational institutions were the breeding grounds of terrorism;(2) The army is its godfather; and (3) For stopping Bangladesh becoming a terrorist haven both have to be drastically clipped.


The campaign reached its peak on the 24th February, that is, only a day before the mutiny, when certain AL parliamentarians led by Mohi-uddin Khan Alamgir savagely criticised the army and demanded that it be put on leash. During the mutiny, a section of our pundits continued with the same propaganda and immediately after it, the Commerce Minister, Lieutenant Colonel (rtd) Faruk Khan, echoed what Sajeeb Wajed Joy had said before hand.


When the mutiny broke out, a new DG, Brigadier General Moinul Islam, was already waiting to take the charge of the BDR. After he joined the BDR immediately after the mutiny he was promoted to the rank of major general and made a member of the government inquiry commission on the mutiny. In a matter of days, he begun proposing that to remove the stigma of the bloody mutiny, his security force be renamed and given new uniform and insignia. It should also be de-linked from the army and its command should go to a new cadre of officers recruited by the CSC. His proposal of getting rid of army officers from the command positions of the reconstituted border force was also the core demand of the mutineers. But here it was given a new rationale. It came from a member of the government appointed Inquiry Commission, which was yet to start its inquiry! What is more, the caretaker government had postponed the celebration of the annual BDR week indefinitely. It was given the go ahead by the new government once this would-be DG’s appointment had been finalised and the BDR week ended up in the massacre of army officers. Clearly, the BDR’s was not an ordinary mutiny; nor its new DG’s advance appointment or his paranormal ability for super quick prescriptions unbefitting of it.


The plan for the Peelkhana massacre was in two parts. Plan-A, an overt plan, was to create a hostage situation in the BDR Darbar Hall during the celebration of the BDR Week 2009. Accord-ing to this plan, disaffected BDR soldiers would make all officers attending the annual darbar on the 25th February hostage and put forward their 22 demands concerning ration, pay, UN mission etc, including the withdrawal of army officers from commands. The PM would then send CAS Moeen, Home Minister Sahara Khatun and Deputy LGRD Minister Jahangir Kabir Nanak to negotiate with the mutiny leaders. The soldiers’ demands would be met, making all their negoti-ators heroes.


The sitting DG BDR Major General Shakil knew part of this plan. He had no choice other than to accept the risk. Otherwise, he would have faced trial for his wife’s failed attempt to leave the country with Tk 6 crore in the late 2008. Naznin Moeen, the wife of General Moeen, had rescued her and her husband’s staff officer Major Mahbub. Mahbub was later allowed to resign his commission and leave the country. Moeen had an obvious share in that money and his wife’s abuse of her husband’s position and power in rescuing the culprit and covering up the crime had left him and his wife exposed to criminal charges as well. The tricky part of the plan, not known to the DG BDR, was that he and the DDG Brigadier General Bari could be shot in the legs, if the soldiers’ demands were not met immediately.


General Moeen, Major General Molla Fazle Akbar (DG DGFI), Major General Monir (DG NSI), Lieutenant General Sina Ibn Jamali (CGS), Lieutenant Colonels Quamruzzaman (communi-cation-in-charge, BDR), Shams (CO 44 Rifles), Mukim and Salam (Paramilitary wing, DGFI) knew about the Plan-A. Most BDR soldiers stationed at Peelkhana also knew about this plan. They were ready to create a hostage situation and demand withdrawal of army officers and realis-ation of other 21 demands. Their grievances against army officers were framed on a piece of paper that was to be faxed on the 25th February to the CAS’s secretariat, the offices of the DG DGFI and the PM and other important government establishments as well as the media by Lieutenant Colonel Mukim. But this plan was primarily a decoy.


Major General Shakil also had advance sign that the conspiracy was on course. Lieutenant Colonel Amin (CO Rifles Security Unit), who was later martyred, got the soldiers’ subversive leaflet on the morning of the 21st. He rushed to him immediately and showed the leaflet. He told Amin to quickly make a counter leaflet and circulate it. On the 23rd, it was discovered that three SMGs were missing from the armoury. Following that discovery, officers were put on duty at the armoury – a precaution never taken unless the situation is grave. Still the PM visited Peelkhana on the 24th!


The standard practice is when a PM visits a military or paramilitary outfit the SSF ensures that the firing pin of all weapons on duty are removed. Even officers posted as guard commanders for the PM are not allowed to have a weapon that can be fired. Only the PGR and the SSF officers carry usable weapons with ammuni-tion. Given the level of security for a PM visit, one might ask, how come the PM visited Peelkhana, where subversive leaflets were found circulating and three SMGs were reported missing?


Major General Shakil had no need to worry about the PM’s safety on the 24th. He knew that the PM had already taken care of it herself and cancelled her dinner appointment of the 26th night. This she was able to do, because she knew the script of the waiting drama by heart!


The brains and masterminds had a different plan of their own. That covert plan, which for clarity’s sake I shall call the Plan-B, was vintage RAW. Reportedly the RAW pumped in about Rs 60 crore for the entire operation. About 15 foreign gunmen were hired for the execution of the army officers. The RAW operatives and their Bangladeshi assets responsible for handling finances met at the International Club in the Gulshan suburb of Dhaka early in January, soon after Sheikh Hasina became PM. In that meeting the younger brother of Sohel Taj, the Deputy Home Minister, was also present. Both the organisers and the providers of the hired killers, which included a number of Indians and a Russian under-world boss by the name of Lazar Shybazan, met at the Hotel Bab-Al-Shams in Dubai on or just before the 19th. There they finalised the operational plan for the hired killers and their payment arrangements.


The hired gunmen entered Bangladesh not on the 11th January as reported by certain Dhaka dailies but after the 19th February. A few of them made their way through the Benapole border on the 21st, when it was open for five hours for the people of both sides wanting to exchange greetings. They carried 16,000 sweets to Dhaka out of the 100,000 sweets offered by the West Bengal government on the occasion of Ekushey February. How and through which border(s) others slipped in has remained unknown.


The plan was deadly but simple. The hired gunmen would get their fake BDR uniform as well as lethal weapons and ammunition before the operation. While BDR soldiers would execute Plan-A, these killers, taking advantage of the panic and chaos, would suddenly move in and kill about half of the red-tapers (that is, colonel and above). Then they would force other mutineers (Plan-A party) to join them in the killing spree. They were to use a Bedford truck and enter through Gate 4. A pick-up would be used to take in the arms and ammunition they were to use.


Frequent meetings took place involving BDR ringleaders and AL MPs Mirza Azam, Haji Salim, Jahangir Kabir Nanak, Fazle Noor Taposh and Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir. Torab Ali acted as a link between BDR soldiers and Taposh, Nanak, Azam and Sohel Taj.


Being the local MP, Taposh’s involvement was logistically vital. He got involved during his election campaign. About 5,000 BDR voters were registered under the Dhaka-12 constituency of Taposh. BDR ringleaders contacted Taposh through Torab Ali, a former BDR Havildar and the sitting AL president of Ward 48 under the Dhaka-12 constituency. They assured Taposh that the ‘Boat’ would win at Dhaka 12 and all BDR voters would vote for him. At that point in the election campaign, when Khaleda Zia was drawing far greater numbers at her public meetings than Sheikh Hasina, 5,000 voters meant a lot to the novice AL candidate facing a renowned lawyer and highly regarded sitting MP, Khandkar Mahbubuddin. In return, the BDR representatives wanted their demands to be met. Taposh agreed. While the planning for the mutiny was being finalised, Taposh agreed that he would assist BDR soldiers so that they were safely through with the mutiny and their demands realised. This he undertook, because as a member of the Sheikh family and being an orphan of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, who was assassinated during the 15th August 1975 coup d’etat by the young army officers, he had a strong personal grudge against the army.


The last meeting before the mutiny and massacre was held at Torab Ali’s house in the evening of the 24th. On the same night, about 24 BDR killers took their final oath at the Dhanmondi residence of Taposh.


The covert plan was known to the PM, her cousin and Taposh’s uncle Sheikh Selim MP and Abdul Jalil MP, besides Nanak, Taposh, Sohel Taj, Mirza Azam, Haji Selim, Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir and a few other members of the PM’s inner circle. At least one meeting was held at the Banani residence of Sheikh Selim on 13th February. Sohel Taj, also a resident of Banani, joined the meeting. It finalised some outstanding issues and Sohel Taj’s duties. It was not without reason that Sheikh Selim stayed away from his house on the 25th and the 26th.


Alamgir, Nanak and Azam were in favour of total annihilation of army officers. As they approached the PM, she was initially hesitant about the mass killing. However, she gave her nod for eliminating the DG, his wife and Colonel Mujib (sector commander Dhaka) one week before the deadly mutiny. While interrogating the arrested BDR ringleaders on the night of 12th April, officers of the RAB at TFI Cell extracted this piece of information and later established its authenticity. They also learnt that General Moeen was told not to be emotional if the DG and his wife were accidentally shot dead. His silence indicated his acceptance and approval.


The ensnared general had good reason for approving the killing of the DG and his wife, for it also meant the elimination of his partners in crime in the failed attempt to smuggle out illicit money. Then no one could link him and his wife with that crime. Key BDR ringleaders, including DADs Towhid, Jalil and Habib, also knew about the Plan-B.


It was Jahangir Kabir Nanak’s responsibility to ensure the complete annihilation of army officers inside Peelkhana, while Fazle Noor Taposh’s task was to ensure the escape of the BDR killers through Hazaribagh and Jhigatola area. Nanak was also responsible, along with Taposh, to ensure a safe exit for the hired killers by ambulance on the 25th night and the escape of the entire Peelkhana killers by the 26th. On their way to the airport, the killers would be trans-ferred to microbus. Sohel Taj was given the responsibility to ensure their safe return to the Middle East, UK and USA. It was decided that BG flight 049 would be used for the purpose and, if required, delayed.The success of Plan-B hinged on (1) The ability of the government to prevent the army from going in for a military solution; and(2) Maximum obliteration of evidence of murder from Peelkhana.


That is why Nanak, who had the reputation of possessing the cool-blooded murderer’s instinct and was a guest of the RAW in their safe house during the emergency, was given the responsibi-lity to assume command inside Peelkhana from the mid-day of the 25th, even though his duty as the Deputy LGRD Minister did not call for any role on his part during the mutiny. He is the person who ensured that the BDR sweepers cleaned the Darbar Hall and most bodies were buried into mass graves during the darkened night of the 25th and the 26th.


As noted before, the CAS was expected to keep the army inactive. But in the case of his failure to do so, the plan was that he, together with officers involved in the army intervention, would be sacked immediately and BDR soldiers in border posts would start killing their army commanding officers. Then the government would declare that they are faced with a ‘civil war’ situation and the Indian army would start moving in by air. With such a possibility in mind, to generate sympathy abroad, Joy told world media early in the morning on the 26th (UST) that the mutiny was due to the corruption of army officers.


To make sure that the BDR soldiers would do their bits, about Tk 15-17 crore was distributed in Peelkhana between early and late February. Tk 4 lac was fixed per officer’s head. The ringleaders had a much larger payment. The killers who joined later enthusiastically did not receive any additional payment during or after the massacre. The distribution of money for the Plan-A parti-cipants was made mainly through the channels of Taposh and those for the DADs and their followers handled by Nanak. Sohel Taj and Joy arranged payment for the hired killers. Some advance payment was made earlier in Hotel Bab-Al-Shams in Dubai.


Contingency plans were also made in case the army could not be stopped from storming Peel-kahan or the AL involvement become known. In case the PM was unable to stop the army from storming Peelkhana, the Indian army, with the help of the Indian air force, was to get in as an assisting force in response to the PM’s SOS. This, together with the mutiny by BDR units across the country, would destabilise entire Bangladesh. The outside world would see it as a civil war situation and give the PM’s cry for foreign help a favourable nod.


Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherji had subsequently disclosed that had there been a distress call from our PM, the Indian army would have come to her government’s assistance. According to Indian newspapers, their air force was ready at Jorat air base in Assam with heavy and medium lift aircrafts to carry 30,000 assembled Indian soldiers. Of course, the Indian Foreign Minister did not say how the Indian authorities divined that Sheikh Hasina’s govern-ment was going to come under threat and made their army ready ahead of the mutiny. Nor the Indian newspapers sought its answer. The mutineers could hardly threaten the government; nor they did. Had there been a potential spoiler, it was the feared army intervention. The fact that India stood ready in anticipation was indicative enough of their prior apprehension that the mutiny might meet obstacle.


As stated before, in case the PM was unable to keep the army inactive, the contingency plan was for her to immediately sack the CAS along with other generals and officers participating in the feared military intervention. Following that the dismissed CAS would be put on trial for disobeying government’s order and also for the crimes he had committed during the state of emergency.


Alongside such trials, a propaganda campaign would be mounted against the army with the help of selected journalists, accusing its leadership of defying the lawful government with maligned aim and causing unnecessary death to innumerable innocent BDR soldiers for voicing their genuine grievances against corrupt army officers. Tk 5 crore was kept aside for this contingent propa-ganda campaign.


Besides, an all out effort would be made to create a fake link with the JMB, Jamat and BNP to the massacre. For this, helpful officers among the RAB, DGFI and Police would be posted in strategic positions within their respective organis-ations.


The appointment of an entirely inexperienced Sahara Khatun at the Home Ministry was part of this well thought out elaborate contingency plan. The key conspirators used Hotel Imperial, owned by her and her family and run by her wheeler-dealer brother, for several of their secret meetings. It was a pre-planned trap. If inad-vertently AL link with the killers becomes known, Sahara would be made the scapegoat. She would be removed from her post, leaving her deputy Sohel Taj in charge to plug the holes.


The Plan-A and Plan-B, together with the Contingency Plan, made the entire plan for the Peelkhana massacre. One cannot but admire the ingenuity of the planners behind these plans.

 

[Md Akmal]

THE PEELKHANA MUTINY AND MASSACRE

2. THE EXECUTION


The entire Plan was executed with astonishing cunning and ruthlessness. Bangladesh will have to carry the painful agony of this fratricide for a long time to come. In the nine months of the war of independence a total of 55 armed forces’ officers were lost. Not all of them got killed in action; some died in road and other accidents. No sector commander was among these fatalities. Whereas in the mutiny 57 officers -- 1 major general, 2 brigadier general, 16 colonel, 10 lieutenant colonel, 23 major, 2 captain, 3 medical corps officers—were butchered in two days. The murdered accounted for two-thirds of the officers present. Before we think about the consequences of this horrendous episode, it would be appro-priate to examine how the Bangladeshi conspi-rators and connivers played their parts in executing the massacre.


On the night of the 24th February, between 10 pm and 11pm one Ataur, owner of a filling station at Jhikatala in Dhaka, made a telephone call from his mobile to the DG BDR. He told Major General Shakil, ‘Sir, apnakey kalkey Peelkhanay mere felbe. Apni kalker onushthaney jaben na.’ (Sir, tomorrow you will be killed in Peelkhana. You don’t go to tomorrow’s function.) The conversation was overheard by the RAB headquarter and Ataur was immediately taken into custody. Later he was released. Colonel Rezanur (ADG RAB) officially gave this piece of information to the TFI cell. Yet, the incident was left unmentioned, as far as I could gather, in any of the inquiry reports. It is inconceivable that the TFI cell could have ignore such a potential lead. While it was not possible to determine at what level the records relating to the incident were removed, that a cover-up did take place cannot be doubted. As we shall see, this was part of an extensive effort from within the very heart of the government to hoodwink the country and protect the culprits.
At about 8:45 am of the 25th, NSI informed the PM that in a few minutes’ time the mutiny would begin. The same information was also given to the CAS. The PM did not react. The CAS also kept quiet. Their inaction was an important clue about their willingness to allow the mutiny to take its planned course.


At Peelkhana itself, responding to the initial incident involving a single soldier, the DG BDR phoned the PM, the CAS and the DG DGFI and he was promised immediate help. Colonel Gulzar (?) also spoke to the CGS and the DMO and asked Lieutenant Colonel Zaman (CO RAB 2) to send five soldiers to help contain the situation. The bluffed DG ordered Colonel Mujib (commander, Dhaka sector), Lieutenant Colonel Enayet (CO, 36 Rifle Battalion), Lieutenat Colonel Badrul (CO, 13 Rifle Battalion) and other senior Peelkhana officers to go to their units and cool down the soldiers.


Although the DG knew that there would be a disturbance, had he and his officers present at the Darbar Hall knew that soon hell would be let loose and they were going to be made the sacrificial lamb surely they would have acted differently. Among them there were a number of trained commando officers, including the veteran Colonel Emdad (sector commander Rajshahi). They could snatch a few SMGs, break into small groups and mount counter attacks from different points and scatter, if not suppress, the mutinous soldiers. A number of officers’ wives also phoned Naznin Moeen, General Moeen’s wife, for help. They were told she is not receiving any in-coming call. Her disinclination was a further indication of her husband’s devious stand.


At 10:30 officers of RAB 10 arrived near Gate 5 of Peelkhana with its low-height perimeter wall separating the BDR HQ from the nearby civilian area. It was the most suitable place for storming into, and a quick extrication from, Peelkhana. But at around 11:30 Colonel Rezanur (ADG RAB) ordered RAB 10, through its CO, to move away to Beribadh area, about 3km from Peelkhana. The question to be asked: on whose asking or advice he issued this order, and what for? Strangely, none of the inquiries looked into it. A cousin of Bahauddin Nasim, one of the closest sidekicks of the PM, she personally knows Rezanur. It is most likely that the Colonel was either asked by the PM or a member of her AL inner circle to do so. It suited the plan, since it enabled the mutineers to despatch looted arms and ammunitions to the house of the ward commissioner Torab Ali for onward distribution to BCL cadres and, more importantly, ensured the BDR killers unhindered escape through Hazaribag and Jhikatola. That it was a strategic redeployment in favour of the mutineers could be gleamed from the fact that alongside RAB 10, RAB 2 and 3 were also sent to Peelkhana at about the same time. RAB 2 and 3, who had taken position on the Dhanmondi side, were left unmoved.


The DG BDR was killed at about 10:30 am. The Indian TV channel Chabbish Ganta (24 Hours) reported his and his wife’s death in its scroll at 11:00 am. Another Indian TV channel, NDTV, showed the same news in its scroll at 12 pm and telecasted it in its news bulletin at 12:15 pm. Yet, this news was suppressed in Bangladesh until the evening of the 26th. Besides, the bodies of Colonel Mujib and Lieutenant Colonel Enayet were recovered at 2:30 pm of the 25th.


Yet, the PM received, in the full glare of the media, a team of 14 BDR, brought out by Nanak, at her official residence at 3:30 pm. The meeting lasted, amidst tea and biscuits, for about 150 minutes! Midway into the meeting, the PM received a phone call. After that she told the BDR delegates: ‘Tomra ta DG k mere felecho.’ (You have already killed the DG.) To this, the leader of the BDR delegation, DAD Towhid, replied, ‘Ta halle shambobata DG mara gachan.’ (Then probably the DG has got killed.) It is hardly believable that until then neither the PM nor her guest knew about the DG’s killing. After all, the news was on the Indian TV screen from 11 am onward and since than it was the talk of the town. Nor it is remotely likely that the PM was so supercilious to think that she could create such an impression. In all probability, it was some kind of a coded message for the assembled. The fact that after the phone call they resumed their meeting, as if nothing of consequence has happened, is indicative of this.


In keeping with this undisturbed calmness, throughout the remainder of the meeting, not even once the PM enquired from the BDR delegation about the fate of the DG’s wife and children or that of other officers and their families. Nor did she call for their safety. And, this was despite the fact that after the killing at Darbar Hall started, several times the National Monitoring Cell informed her about torture of officers’ families. They had also informed the CAS about conversa-tions between BDR soldiers and outsiders. In many of these conversations, soldiers were heard narrating how they were killing officers and torturing their families. Instead of seeking an end to this barbarity, the CAS asked the officers of the National Monitoring Cell to ‘stay calm and not be emotional.’


In keeping with the tacit connivance of her, and that of the CAS, the PM gave the BDR killer a general amnesty, together with an assurance of looking favourably at their demands. With the approaching nightfall, the smirking delegates went back to the BDR HQ, accompanied by Nanak, as brave and successful defenders of their right cause. Shortly afterwards, Taposh told the waiting media that DAD Towhid would hence-forth act as DG BDR. This announcement by the PM’s nephew appeared on the scrolls of TV channels. The killers and their abettors now knew, the apprehension of any army intervention had gone. Later Taposh went inside and asked BDR soldiers to complete the mopping up. In effect, it was a licence to kill. As we know now, it was not missed.


Colonel Emdad was alive in one of the toilets of the Darbar Hall. He offered his zohar prayer at his hideout and there after talked to his wife on his mobile. Colonel Aftab (sector commander, Rangpur) sent three SMS to his colleagues, one Brigadier and two Colonels, at 4:30 pm stating ‘I’m alive in darbar hall, pls rescue us.’ Gravely injured Major Mosaddek’s frantic calls for help were initially responded to with promise of help. He died from over-bleeding at about 5:30 pm. There was none out there to undertake the army officers’ rescue. Those who were meant to ensure their safety were busy discharging their duties towards a different patron.


Early in the night ambulances were seen taking ‘the injured’ out of Peelkhana. Under this innocent cover the hired killers were in fact taken out of the killing ground. On their way to the airport, the killers were transferred, as per the Plan, to waiting microbus. The BG flight 049 flew them out and they safely made their way to their various destinations in the Middle East, UK and USA.


That evening the IGP, Nur Muhammad, desperately wanted to get inside Peelkhana to rescue his newly married daughter. He asked Home Minister Sahara Khatun’s permission a number of times. But he was refused. Distort and desperate, he offered to go alone. At this point, Sahara staged the drama of receiving arms surrender and rescuing officers’ families. Actually she only visited Otoshi, the building where the IGP’s daughter was. Apart from the IGP’s daughter, she also brought out the wife of Colonel Qamruzzaman, a conniver, and Mrs Akbar. In fact, Sahara did not go above the first floor of Otoshi and left most of its inmates, along with the rest of Peelkhana, to their fate.


Colonel Aftab was killed soon after Sahara Khatun left Peelkhana. Apparently, believing that the Home Minister’s presence in Peelkhana meant that a settlement had been reached, he came out from hiding to look for his wife and daughter. He knew they were in the Officers’ Mess. But, by then, they were taken to the Quarter Guard. While approaching the Quarter Guard, he was gunned down. Colonel Reza (?) was killed after 3 am. Colonel Elahi was also killed after the departure of Sahara Khatun, when he came out from his hiding inside a manhole. In the like manner, a lot of officers died during the night.


Betrayed by the head of their country’s government and their own army chief, the lives of these defenders of the country’s security were cut short. Their helpless and humiliated comrades in the army could do nothing for them, except shading a few drops of tears in silent rage.


While these abominable killings were in progress, Mirza Azam was heard frequently talking to his BDR contacts inside Peelkhana on cell phone. He specifically instructed the killers to gouge out Colonel Gulzar’s eyes and break his spinal cord. His morbid order was, in part, to avenge the death of his brother-in-law Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the hanged JMB chief. Colonel Gulzar, at that time posted in RAB as its Director of Intelligence, had led the arrest of Abdur Rahman from a house in Sylhet rented by an AL activist. He had also earned the Jubo League president Nanak and general secretary Azam’s enmity by establishing their role in deliberately burning alive 11 innocent passengers of a BRTC bus near Sheraton Hotel, using gunpowder for the first time in the history of hartal in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina gave the two Jubo League top brasses this task under her dictum, ‘yield power or else roads would be soaked with public blood.’ While in RAB custody in 2008, it was Gulzar who extracted from Sheikh Selim a detail confession about that murder and Sheikh Hasina, Nanak and Azam’s role in it. The audio clip of this confession of the PM’s cousin is now available in youtube (search ‘Sheikh Selim confesses of setting fire on bus Part I and 2&#8217. By sending Gulzar to a horrible death they have not only taken revenge for his insolence but have also put all patriots on notice.


While the afternoon shilly-shally at the PM’s residence was going on, Nanak, through loud-speakers, had already instructed that all residents around a 3km radius of Peelkhana to stay away. Later in the night he ordered electricity in the BDR HQ be switched off. Keeping Peelkhana dark was necessary to allow the killers to com-plete their tasks and make their escape. Through Torab Ali and his son ‘Leather’ Liton, a reputed thug and illicit arms dealer who had been freed from the RAB custody in January at the intervention of Taposh, Nanak had already kept civilian cloths and travel money for the escaping BDR ringleaders ready. During the night 7 to 9 white speedboats were used to let the fleeing BDR killers cross the Buriganga. Haji Selim, on whose pitch the crossing point is, coordinated the entire effort. Local civilians were asked to move away from the scene by the associates of Haji Selim. One of the Dhaka TV channels reported this incident at its 1:00 am news on the 25th night. In this TV report eyewit-nesses told the reporter that they had seen a few speedboats plying across the river but some political workers forced them out of the scene.


Haji Selim was also the man who in mid February bought the arms and ammunition used by the hired killers from abroad. A journalist of the Dhaka daily Prothom Alo spotted this. He went to the NSI and informed them that something was cooking up against Peelkhana involving the BDR and the AL politicians. As expected, NSI asked him not to talk to anyone else. However, without enquiring its veracity, the NSI hushed it up.


Next morning, Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Mirza Azam told the just rescued wives/families of the officers, ‘Don’t talk to media because your husbands are still inside.’ By injecting a fresh dose of fear mixed with hope to the already terrorised and disoriented, the duo wanted to


(1) Stop the country hearing immediately about the torture, rape and other barbarities that went inside Peelkhana; and (2) Make sure that there was no army interference as the tasks of removing the dead bodies and obliteration of evidence needed more time.


During the night of the 26th Nanak again kept Peelkhana dark. Hindu BDR soldiers were used for removing bloodstains from the Darbar Hall and burning slain officers’ bodies to eliminate evidence. Monoranjan, who is in custody now, was such a soldier. The Hindu soldiers were used, least the Muslim soldiers find burning dead bodies too disagreeable. The same night these cleaners and the rest of the mutineers made their escape. It was a job well done.