And what is this?
A Plan For Taking On Pakistan - The Philadelphia Bulletin Archives
By John Tsucalas, For The Bulletin
Wednesday, May 06, 2009
In my previous two columns, I proposed that India should take part in the fight against jihadists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater by attacking Pakistan. This column expands on the idea by discussing one way India can do it successfully.
The earlier columns, found at
The Bulletin - Philadelphia Family Newspaper, were published on April 20, titled: “India: The Missing Factor In Afghanistan, Pakistan,” and April 27, titled: “The President’s Policies And The Overstretching Of The American Military.”
Our situation in Afghanistan could be improved without NATO and Pakistan being a part of it. To accomplish this, India would attack Pakistan, removing it from the equation. I caution, however, that since both countries have nuclear capability, a battle between the two could escalate into a nuclear war, started by the losing side, naming Pakistan as the first that would use such a capability.
Because of the danger of the nuclear factor, President Barack Obama and his senior advisers would have to carefully and seriously consider involving India. However, our NATO allies, a part of the coalition against jihadists, have proven themselves inept on the battlefield, and the same goes for Pakistan, also.
In fact, the latter is too cozy with jihadists, so much so that it has acceded to Muslim law (Shariah) in parts of Pakistan and has given it approval at its federal level. With regard to our NATO allies, we should thank them for their help, while asking that they leave the coalition as soon as practicable. It has to be done in this gentle way of guile because the Europeans are very sensitive.
The Taliban is resurgent, and al-Qaida likely will also be in the not too distant future. Only one way exists to reverse a tide running against us in the joint battle-theater of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it is to invite India to attack Pakistan.
Such a mission would have to be classified, so that there is “plausible deniability,” code for: lying, by e.g., rejecting any notion that we had anything to do with this.
The first attack point should be at the port of Karachi on the Arabian Sea, the most important place on the Pakistani coast of 650 miles. Karachi is the port where most imports arrive and exports depart. A successful attack here would bottle up commerce in and out of Pakistan. It must be an amphibious assault in conjunction with aerial attacks by MiG-29s on two airfields, a short distance from the port to the northeast. Because of the commercial importance of the port, the aircraft based at the airfields are probably F-16s, providing added defense for the port.
The former has the rationale of sweeping north and taking as much Pakistani land area as possible early in the war. The latter has the objective of simultaneously taking out two airfields, the coordinates to which and the number of F-16s, if in fact based there, on the tarmac, ideally all of them at home, can be easily ascertained by Indian intelligence before the attack. Passed on to the Indian Air Force, it can launch its MiG-29s.
The superior Pakistani F-16s would be immediately deployed, except for those, if any, destroyed on the ground. India must destroy as many as possible on the tarmac; the Pakistanis have a tremendous type of aircraft in the F-16. At this point, I would start worrying about a nuclear first-use option by Pakistan.
In the north, another Indian Army has to attack simultaneously and take the capital of Islamabad. There, it must, supported by MiG-29s, demolish the headquarters of the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (DISI) and kill or capture the preponderance of agents. The same army should turn north, moving toward Kashmir, but leaving enough forces behind to hold Islamabad and the DISI, as well as military, prisoners. The effect on Pakistani forces and people should be devastating with the loss of their capital, which is why commanding generals take and hold them.
Again simultaneously, another Indian Army should leave northern India with one objective: take Kashmir. Softening up Kashmir should be Indian MiG-21s and MiG-29s, ahead of the two advancing Indian armies. Expectedly, Pakistani F-16s would seek to intercept the Indian aircraft. More air dogfights would ensue.
Now, two Indian armies would advance toward Kashmir, accompanied by MiG-21s and MiG-29s, thus more air dogfights. This may not be bad if the Pakistani leadership mistakenly thinks that Kashmir is the only Indian target of acquisition, and nothing else. As both armies move toward their objective, they could have a point and time when they join together, thus adding strength to their attacks.
The Indians should expect to be engaged by Pakistani forces and aircraft all the way to and in Kashmir. In any event, more air dogfights would follow. The air battle would be massive, with hit aircraft on both sides screeching toward the ground, their descent culminating in explosions of loud noise, shooting up bright red fires of an inferno. The skies would be full with ejected, parachuting flyers.
There are three political elements in Kashmir: pro-Indian, pro-Pakistani and pro-independent. The largest percentage support by the Kashmir people is the last named; India is second in support; with, Pakistan last.
In the final analysis, the war will be won in the air as are most, especially when using conventional weapons and, thus, the associated strategies and tactics. Obviously, either the Indian MiG-21s or MiG-29s will prevail or the Pakistani F-16s. Thus, a short discussion of the aircraft on each side now seems in order.
First, I’m biased in favor of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, second in combat capability only to the stealth F-22 Raptor. In writing this column, I was tempted to root for it, as you may be as you read along. After all, the F-16 is American manufactured, while the MiG-21 and MiG-29 are both Russian made in the era of the Soviet Union.
The MiG-21 was used by the enemy in the Vietnam War to impressive results in air dogfights. Against American pilots, the results achieved are rendered even more extraordinary. Aged as it is, the Indians understand the value of upgrades, new parts and excellent maintenance. So, the Pakistanis should not, and will not, underestimate the MiG-21.
The MiG-29 had its maiden flight in 1977. It, too, is old. However, with upgrades, parts replacements and excellent maintenance by Indian flight-line crews, it is not to be undervalued in capabilities.
The Pakistanis need maintenance and parts for their F-16s right now. Nonetheless, whether or not we embark on this mission, don’t send money for it to pay expenses of aircraft upkeep, not with its unfavorable record with us. Because Pakistani pilots are trained by American ones, they have seen pictures of the two MiG aircraft from every angle and know their strengths as well as weaknesses in battle. In any event, with the F-16s, the Pakistanis have the advantage, thus making the job a tough one for Indian pilots. An Indian victory can come in the air, but only after hard work, along with sweat and adrenaline. The last is induced by fear, something only natural.
Now, here are some downsides. Our forces are in Afghanistan and Pakistan, too. Because the latter serves as a sanctuary for the Taliban and al-Qaida, our Special Forces (SF) do pursue and do battle them in their safe havens. In the case of a nuclear exchange between the two countries, we must take our forces out of harm’s way immediately, meaning before the Indians attack. Our forces consist mostly of SF and United States Air Force (USAF) pilots and air support personnel, both men and women. We can’t take all out.
Because the enemy has to continue to think that we’re strongly engaged in battle, we have to leave some there, but only volunteers. Given the character of American fighting men and women, a lot will do so. My biggest worry is the direction of prevailing winds and breezes, as they can carry nuclear fallout. If they’re blowing to the west toward Afghanistan, it’s a big problem for us and the Indians, too.
Another concern has to be China. Since it has good and close relations with Pakistan, it may intervene on its side. However, I doubt that it will. Nonetheless, to keep China on this track of thinking, the United States Navy (USN) must have a large and diversified presence in the Indian Ocean. If this is not deterrent enough, bottle up the Strait of Malacca in Indonesia, the shortest route to the South China Sea and the Chinese Coast, especially crucial to its oil demand, for which it has an unquenchable thirst. As a part of the planning through the end of the war, I would advise that our CIA determine the amount of Chinese oil reserves, if any, and keep count until it’s all over. The reason is simple: as Chinese reserves rise, our leverage in the Indian Ocean falls.
Importantly, if we don’t do this mission, the odds are that we’ll wake up some morning to find that the DISI has control of Pakistan’s government, along with its nuclear weaponry. This could mean that jihadists would probably gain access to some of that weaponry. There is a greater danger in not having a clean up by India of the bad situation in the area by moving on the plan contemplated by this column.
If we go forward with that plan, at zero hour plus 5 minutes, a full alert at the highest level would be announced to our forces through the public address system at each military installation of all branches worldwide, while sirens are blaring forth. The words would be something along the following line: “This is not a drill; it’s real; good luck.” The president must authorize this! One doesn’t know what can come our way anywhere!
If we do it, and we should because it would be strategically decisive in the war against jihadists and keep home another 30,000 troops that otherwise would be fighting in Afghanistan at risk of life and limb; we’ll get through this, too.
