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Attack on PAF Base Minhas

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Why weren't these AWACS kept in Hardened Bunkers?

Why are they left in the open to be exposed like this?

If we ever go to war, these planes will be sitting ducks to a missile bombardment or aerial attack without shelter.
 
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Why Blackwater is behind suicide bombings in Pakistan. - YouTube

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(Watch all 3 parts of following.)
Guantanamo bay is one of many such breading grounds for terrorist...
After Psychoanalysis, US picks up ppl who can be good terrorists & then implant them accordingly ...

Satanism and Pedophilia Crimes of The Global Elite with Director Sean Stone 1/3 - YouTube

This is what I want to say since all these attacks that other agencies are involved in it and we should have upgrade our bases at for most.
 
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It does not mean that - even PNS Mehran attack wasn't very close to losing a fight. It just shows one thing - the commander led from the front.



So who said LTs and 2LTs didn't part-take in the fight?



He had three check posts in place, which were breached but the base was not breached. The problem does not lie with the base commander which serves 2-3 years on this post at most. The problem lies in the overall security policy of the country. The Pind Makkhan population did not grow right up to Kamra during his tenure. This sort of massive population re-arrangement away from security zones is the responsibility of the government.


There is appreciation to be given to the person who runs towards the sound of gun fire.


We all know the competence of the people jinki pant gheeli hojati hai on the sound of a fight. So please, the guy took a bullet for this country and then some more, whatever he stinks off, the foul smell of your words are drowning it.

I can't believe the drawing room experts who give such absolute statements jese uss pata nahi security and strategy ki Quran and Hadith unho ne hi likhi ho.

Hi,

You know why the nation is a loser---because of thinking like this----you fail and then you want to justify the failure---. A base commander belongs in the command and control room of he base to take charge of the situation---give directives---ask for assistance and the word you people don't know----DESIGNATE AUTHORITY----.

See---I keep forgetting my roots---. This ideology of officer leading from the front keeps the rankers subjugated. Truthfully---in the end---the rankers feel impotent without their officers even though the rankers are as capable a warrior as there maybe---the sepoy who laid his life for the cause---what a warrior---.

You men praise those of doing the job of 10 people---it is a terrible pakistani indian mindset---. Successful businesses and conglomerates train each individual to do their jobs---indeed tghe leasders amongst them will carry the show----but you don't need the base commander to lead when there are 8 insurgents attacking---.

As I stated----the things must be close to terrible---the base commander saw his carreer going down the drain for not doing enoug prior to the attack---he decided to go down fighting---.

And about those lt's and 2nd lts---thing---I keep telling you people----when you read my post and your eyes start seeing red and the blood starts to boil---please step back and read it again---I bet you---you will find it different that what you originally thought---it is just a mind game.

ASIM -------it is you people's choice---you can listen and learn from me if you chose to and I guarantee if enough of you did---you will see a surprising change in you, in your perception about certain things---and if you don't---the rock is still there for you guys---you can keep banging your head against it---it ain't going anywhere---about you guys head---I can't say much about it.
 
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This attack was most probably conducted on the lines of Irish republican Army...

9 men with heavy weapons trespassing populated villages on the night when most or many villagers were awake isn't possible,and couldn't have gone unnoticed....
The Attackers (I am using the word Attackers not terrorists) must have been "Dumping" weapons and equipment near the wall of the base over extended period of time..Same way as IRA used to do..They never had one big movement of men and ammunition at single time..Instead they did it bit by bit and that way avoided raising suspicion.
Say a random guy strolling in the fields or hills outside the base with half a part of RPG under his shawl or bean bag and then dumping it at a pre agreed and well hidden point....wont raise any suspicion and even if caught wont be much of a loss for the would be Attackers,as they lost one man and half an RPG..
Like that over a few weeks or even months large amount of munition,wire cutting tools and ladders which were transported bit by bit and the assembled on the night of attack...

So i am not sure about inside help...
But there looks like a lot of "Outside help" from local area
I have one question that has not been answered in this thread. Regardless of whether the terrorists intended to target the AWACS or not, since the time of attack, why were these important assets not "taken away". I mean at the first sign of trouble, should the have not flown off the base and be safe from a ground attack? Agreed it is fraught with danger in itself with any shoulder fired missiles, but in the case of an big assault by an enemy, would these not be sitting ducks?
Whats the use of force multipliers if they can be taken out at bases by teams of 9-10 terrorists. If there was a bigger team say 20 terrorists? would the outcome have been different. What if they carried any shoulder fired missiles?
 
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So foolish post by Mastan Khan...please wakeup from your dream world where everything you are assume happens.

The information I have gathered from some "men in blue" is that before Ramadan Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) was conducted in Minhas. Based on the Intel reports, this time theme was not a traditional air-strike rather a terrorist attack..similar to PNS Mehran.

Each and every person of the base participated in the Exercise, even PAC hospital (situated there) took part. The operational readiness level achieved by this recent ORI and bravery of Sepoy were the two main reasons why PAF was successful in this operation.
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Kid,

My boy---I don't have a problem waking up---the problems is---are you ready to wake up and see the real world----. It is a part of my job---to learn and understand new issues---to think on my feet---to stop on a dime and change directions---to change directions in mid stride---I am programmed to do that in my every day routine---are you---.

I may not be successful many a times---but I try----. Are you game to to new ideas---are you game to leaving your secured surroundings and looking at things thropugh a different looking glass.
 
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I have one question that has not been answered in this thread. Regardless of whether the terrorists intended to target the AWACS or not, since the time of attack, why were these important assets not "taken away". I mean at the first sign of trouble, should the have not flown off the base and be safe from a ground attack? Agreed it is fraught with danger in itself with any shoulder fired missiles, but in the case of an big assault by an enemy, would these not be sitting ducks?
Whats the use of force multipliers if they can be taken out at bases by teams of 9-10 terrorists. If there was a bigger team say 20 terrorists? would the outcome have been different. What if they carried any shoulder fired missiles?

Hi,

You are so right---what if there were 20 terrorists----seems like they fcked up this time---if there were 20 of them---the paf base would be a toast---and thank you for bringing that out----.

Irfan---Asim---Njam---what iif there were 20 of them---what would have happened then.

It is being stated that the sepoy who died---gave them 10--20 minutes time to get together to respond---has any body caught onto that---10 minutes in a fire fight is a life time---20 minutes is an eternity---.

What that means---is that there was absolutely no preparation to counter the strike---. My god----how pathtic---you people are hounding on me---it is you whom you should be hounding at---you specially Asim---and you too Najam---other kids---hehnnnn---you are too innocnet.
 
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DAWN

THURSDAY’S attack on the airbase in Kamra shows that terrorist groups in Pakistan have developed a level of resilience that has survived the killing of several high-profile leaders.

It is for another day to consider why this attack failed where others have caused considerable material damage to security forces.

After the killings of Ilyas Kashmiri, a self-styled expert in multilayered terrorist attacks, Qari Hussain, who was known as ustadul fidayeen (master of suicide bombers), Badar Mansoor, chief of Al Qaeda’s operational network in Pakistan, and Abu Laith al-Libi, strategic mastermind of Al Qaeda in the country, it was presumed that the terrorists were losing their destructive edge.

There were indications that they would need time to recover from these losses. Terrorist attacks decreased by 46 per cent in the first half of the year compared to the same period in 2011.

At the same time, a change in the nature of attacks reflected that the terrorists were under some pressure or lacked human resources. Their reliance on target killings grew. There was a clear decline in the number of suicide attacks in the first quarter of 2012: 13 attacks occurred during that period, a 65 per cent drop over the same period in 2011.

These factors provided reason to believe that the space for terrorists in Pakistan’s tribal areas was shrinking amid the ongoing military campaign and US drone strikes against them.

The Taliban appear to have quickly realised that the erosion of high-value resources could lead to the annihilation of their movement. First, they combined their scattered forces and formed a shura-i-murakeba to resolve their internal disputes.

Al Qaeda took the initiative and brokered an alliance among the Haqqanis, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and militant groups led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir.

The shura also resolved differences between TTP head Hakeemullah Mehsud and his deputy, Waliur Rehman. Members of the shura-i-murakeba agreed to cease attacks against Pakistani security forces and focus their attention on Nato forces in Afghanistan.

After this alliance came about, the strike on the airbase in Kamra is a major assault aimed perhaps at impressing upon the people and the military that these terrorist groups still have the capability to launch substantial operations against high-profile installations.

In order to identify the true potential of the threat they pose, it is important to consider how they managed to evolve a recovery mechanism after heavy losses.

As far as the objective and selection of the target is concerned, it was obvious that they wanted to convey they could target and breach the military’s defences and, perhaps more importantly, make these seem vulnerable. As TTP spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan claimed, they will continue to attack security installations “until the establishment of a true Islamic state in Pakistan”.

The pattern indicated that Al Qaeda was involved in the attack at a certain level just as Saiful Adil, Al Qaeda’s strategic mastermind, had allegedly been involved in the GHQ and Mehran naval base attacks along with Ilyas Kashmiri.

The question is, in the absence of key masterminds, how was the attack managed and by whom?

Initial investigation has focused on, among others, Adnan Rasheed, a former employee of the air force who was sentenced to death for his role in an attempt to assassinate Gen Pervez Musharraf. He was among those who escaped from Bannu jail in April this year.

It is possible that Rasheed was part of the planning team, as he could be aware of details about security at the airbase and could have sympathisers inside the base, but it is yet to be established if he could have managed a high-profile attack. If that is the case, some to follow in Ilyas Kashmiri’s mould may be available to the terrorists. An even more important question is the identity of the strategic mind behind the attack, especially when al-Libi has been killed.

Anyone including Farman Ali Shinwari, successor of Badar Mansoor as Al Qaeda’s operational chief in Pakistan, Ustad Farooq, head of the so-called Punjabi Taliban, Abdul Shakoor al-Turkistani, a powerful Al Qaeda leader, Saiful Adil, who operates from Iran, or Hakeemullah Mehsud could have been the mastermind.

Although the terrorists failed to show the level of destructive skill in the Kamra attack that they did under Kashmiri’s supervision in the Mehran base, GHQ and Lahore police academy attacks, the emerging pattern reflects that they will continue to try.

Besides collaborative operations, the terrorist groups are also looking for a replacement for Qari Hussain, and the Darra Adam Khel Taliban have reportedly taken responsibility for filling this void.

The unity among terrorist groups is not the only source of their strength. They also gain strength from fragmentation and confusion over the war against terrorism among the security, political and civil society leaderships in Pakistan.

The spread and reach of terrorists has become a critical challenge for the state, and yet ambiguity on the issue of terrorism pervades society. The collective mindset reflects a state of out-and-out denial.

Although the army chief’s speech on Independence Day was encouraging, as he stressed clarity on the issue of extremism and terrorism, the political leadership has not shown commensurate enthusiasm.

Ahead of the general elections, political parties do not appear to be ready to take any clear stance because of the uncertainty over the issue and its external linkages. Parties are staying on the sidelines despite a dire need for a national security policy that security experts have been crying themselves hoarse about for many years.

In order to avoid external and regional caveats, the security and political leadership ought to at least be able to agree on an internal security paradigm and mechanism that should be based on close vigilance and appropriate response in view of the threat perception.
 
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^^^^^^^^^^^
I am in agreement with Mastan Khan here....Look the point is really simple....There is a reason that general's don't actually fight in the war and the reason is simple....they are there to handle the strategy part of it(and much more)....Similarly in this incident commander is there to plan about how to deal with insurgents and not fight them....Commander actually taking arms in his hands should have been the last resort not the first one....lastly irrespective of how much heroics he showed, he still failed in performing his duty and is subjected to court martial....

P.S : Think from this perspective...to defeat terrorist who are Pakistani forces/American forces after??? Leaders or just the cadets??
 
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A good news to share.

PAF team said
Two mobile phones, a Blackberry and Nokia X 2 each, were recovered from the Minhas Base attack incident site, which were in the use of terrorists. The cell phones have been handed to an intelligence agency to get the call records, officials said.
PAF disowns Malik
And also ask Rahman Malik to shut up ..

@Mastan I am totally agree, It was two soldier who played vital role in this situation. One was attentive in wireless room and second the martyr hero , who keep these guys engage few minutes. Which was more then enough to call special force.
 
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wonder how 9 TTP members were able to get past PAF security, if they cannot even protect there own military installations how can they protect anything else from these swine?
 
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hijacked PAF jet??/ didn't understand.... but their will be proud for giving birth to brave soldiers.....

Bengali instructor hijacked the trainer T-33 air craft and wanted to go to India , he failed because he hijacked the wrong pilot Rashid Minhas , he crashed the air craft before it could enter Indian air space. Both died , one went down as a traitor in the dustbin of history , second was hailed as a hero , the only Nishan -e- Haider winning member of PAF.

Rashid Minhas - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
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Pakistan has no anti terrorist law. Our judiciary and parliament is bunch of chicken. I would say Pak judiciary is biggest terrorist ,who let go over 900 proven terrorist arrested by Pak army and hand over to police and our judges let them go.
 
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Hi,

You young pakistanis need to learn---when a base commander--- ( a general ) has to pick up arms and join the fight---that means it is very close to losing the battle----general officers give directives and orders----picking up weapons for a base commander is a last ditch effort---showing that there were not enough people to take charge of the situation.


ICARUS---you active millitary----your post says that---. The officers you are talking about---they are LT's 2nd LT's captains majors Lt col's----but not base commanders----.

The base commander joined the fight because he knew that he had fcuked up----he had not beefed up the security that was needed---timing of the attack was not calculated----seeing his failures in front of his eyes---he tried to salvage his career by jumping into the fire fight---.

Why does a base commander need to jump into a fight where there are supposedly 100's of soldiers on the base protecting the assets----unless there were hardly any soldiers protecting the base.

The base commander---his whole action stinks of incompetence.



I don't know about you and those who thanked your cynical & derogatory post towards PAF. As far as i am concerned its called "leading by the example from the front" , it means PAF Generals are not obese , alcohol drinking , disco going morons as many lunatics project on the board. It means that the general had pure milk running through his vain and his father had balls of steel , it means he proved the worth of his training by leading from the front and taking a bullet.

Thats what i think , hit me back & riddle me that !
 
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