Assessment of the Chinese air threat to India in 2000

[CardSharp]

Well, if IAF assessing threat means IAF is not weak. We may have numerically lesser number of fighter jets. But We have higher quality and tested fighter jets.

Anyway I am out of this thread.

This is the sort of bravado I don't understand.

 

[CardSharp]

I also like this : "'Peoples War' − A war fought more biased towards numbers rather than quality"

Mao's idea of people's war was just that, A total mobilisation of the people with no distinction between civilians and the military. This meant arming the entire populace, in such situations there is choice but quantity over quality

Just because the PLA under Deng Rethought the concept doesn't change what peopl's war was.

 

[Tin Man]

the most interest thing is indians talking about Chinese products quality.

india bought 45 Harrier fighters in total, 34 crashed during non-combat operations.

the entire world knows your fancy tradition.

Try not to troll please. I know you can do it. As for the report, the threat preception seems to be accurate. Reading the emerging reports it seems like the indian air force is rapidly filling the holes. My question is, can they really hold their own when assaulted from two fronts? And, can it be sustained in the event of a long struggle?

 

[CardSharp]

Try not to troll please. I know you can do it. As for the report, the threat preception seems to be accurate. Reading the emerging reports it seems like the indian air force is rapidly filling the holes. My question is, can they really hold their own when assaulted from two fronts? And, can it be sustained in the event of a long struggle?

An imported arsenal is india's biggest liability in a prolonged conflict, that said there is not much chance they will face a two front war or a prolonged war.

 

[tanlixiang28776]

An imported arsenal is india's biggest liability in a prolonged conflict, that said there is not much chance they will face a two front war or a prolonged war.

Yes it would be hard to wage war when you only have a 1000 LGBs stockpiled

 

[CardSharp]

Yes it would be hard to wage war when you only have a 1000 LGBs stockpiled

The problem isn't the lmited bombs, it's the uncertain ability to buy more in a protracted war

 

[GORKHALI]

Yes it would be hard to wage war when you only have a 1000 LGBs stockpiled

1000LGB care to provide link here mate ??

 

[GodlessBastard]

India manufactures its own LGBs.

 

[indianpatriot]

you are not capable of understanding what I mean?

I mean 15 years after publishing this report, it has been proved that the basic content of this report is just a joke. They mentioned a list of aircrafts which were said to enlist into PLAAF, none of them were introduced. At the same time, the report failed to even mention J-10/JH-7 which was at its final design stage at that time (mid 1990s).

probably time to read the following article?
IQ and Global Inequality - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

oh sir you just proved the reality and depth in the facts that shown your country with the highest IQ!

 

[GORKHALI]

LGB Is nothing but to guide the unguided dumb bomb with the help of LGB conversion kit for precise bombing ..

 

[tanlixiang28776]

India manufactures its own LGBs.

Whats it called?

 

[tanlixiang28776]

LGB Is nothing but to guide the unguided dumb bomb with the help of LGB conversion kit for precise bombing ..

Some are and some were purpose built like the paveway.

 

[Mike2011]

Try not to troll please. I know you can do it. As for the report, the threat preception seems to be accurate. Reading the emerging reports it seems like the indian air force is rapidly filling the holes. My question is, can they really hold their own when assaulted from two fronts? And, can it be sustained in the event of a long struggle?

It can't be prolonged war. If it is prolonged and we can't hold it then what is the use of our nukes.

As long as we have enough nukes and reliable delivery system. No one can dare for prolonged war. IMO

 

[tanlixiang28776]

It can't be prolonged war. If it is prolonged and we can't hold it then what is the use of our nukes.

As long as we have enough nukes and reliable delivery system. No one can dare for prolonged war. IMO

I think you are talking about a war of invasion.

prolonged wars by themselves do not lead to nuclear asset use.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Certainly a good read

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE AIR THREAT
TO INDIA IN THE YEAR 2000​

I "ve just posted part of the document ,for more refer the doc.

Even though its a 16 year old assessment(1995) ,
How much relevance does it have today and
Have the short coming of the IAF been addressed?

In order to answer your question, we need to re-examine the appreciation of Chinese capabilities in the article, as well as examine critically the assessment made in that article.

1. What will the PLA do in case of hostilities?

The PLA’s current strategy hinges on ' Peoples War under Modern Conditions'.19 The strategy basically relates to active defense and consists of taking tactically offensive action within a basically defensive strategy. It hinges on the land strategy of forward presence and perimeter defense. The defending forces undertake offensive operations in order to wear down the enemy while the enemy is strategically on the offensive and attacking.

2. How will this doctrine be implemented on the ground? In strategic terms?

China has shown an inclination to bargain her occupation of Aksai-Chin. The bargain involves a quid-pro-quo with the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh to which China also lays a claim. She also disputes some Indian territory in the central sector. During the last war in 1962 there was extensive ground action in both Aksai - Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. After the cease fire the Chinese withdrew in the Eastern sector to the position they were during the start of the war. In the Aksai Chin sector China still holds the areas captured during the 1962 war. In the central sector barring minor skirmishes, no large scale military action took place. China considers vital the retaining of the Line of Communication passing through Aksai-Chin that links Sinkiang with Tibet. Therefore she is likely to hold a defensive position in the Aksai-Chin sector and launch offensive operations in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.

3. How will the strategy be implemented on the ground? In tactical terms?

In any future conflict China will find it difficult to break through the present Indian defense positions in the two important sectors of Aksai-Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. This is because the mountain ranges in both sectors provide a formidable defense potential with critical choke points by way of high mountain passes. It is an accepted fact that to move and maintain large bodies of personnel in such terrain requires domination of these choke points. During the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict in the Eastern sector, the Chinese moved small bodies of soldiers via trekking routes to cut off the lines of communications of Indian troops. Though tactically sound and feasible, their success in this case was more as a result of poor leadership of the Indian forces rather than the maneuver itself.21 Consequently, other than air transported operations it would be very difficult for offensive land forces to move large bodies of supply and troops through mountainous terrain. A possibility in using maneuver to advantage would be to move heliborne forces that could sustain themselves for a short duration of time and could dominate vulnerable lines of communications in the rear areas. This facet of air land operations would see increasing application in such terrain.
Weather and terrain are other factors that would govern the intensity of air operations. The North East sector of India has heavy rainfall during the monsoons. If the pre monsoon and post monsoon seasons are included, then between March and October only restricted air operations can be done. Relatively, the Aksai-Chin region is a high altitude desert and gets meager rainfall. The Tibetan terrain poses severe limitations in aircraft operations. Aircraft operations from airfields with average elevations of 13000 feet would reduce the maximum weapon load. This problem could be offset to a large extent if strike aircraft take off with a combination of minimum fuel and maximum weapon load and are air refueled once airborne. China's procurement of this force multiplier would considerably offset such a limitation. Thus, not only would her strike forces be able to operate almost unencumbered from such bases, but they would also benefit by way of increased Radii Of Action (ROA). This would permit them to engage targets deep inside Indian territory. For air defense operations this would improve the already awesome capability of the vast numbers of Su-27's and MiG-31's that the PLAAF would be operating by the year 2000. Accordingly, were the PLAAF to use her strike and air defense elements in the role that she foresees she would have remarkable flexibility. Long term interdiction of targets in the plains of India bordering the Himalayas could prove very advantageous.
The PLAAF lays heavy weightage on CAS. However for most periods of the year in the North Eastern sector the weather would impose severe limitations on the ability of jet aircraft employed for CAS operations. Terrain would be another factor hampering operations in the mountains. Utilization of attack helicopters in such terrain could compensate the shortcomings of fixed wing aircraft. These could be employed not only in CAS operations but also short term interdiction. The forest cover in the Eastern sector provides ideal country for guerrilla type operations. Guerilla teams could be infiltrated/exfiltrated as well as re-supplied by helicopters.

4. Are we likely to see a difference in approach in the western and the eastern sectors?

Common aspects and characteristics of warfare in the west and the east:

In any future conflict China will find it difficult to break through the present Indian defense positions in the two important sectors of Aksai-Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. This is because the mountain ranges in both sectors provide a formidable defense potential with critical choke points by way of high mountain passes. It is an accepted fact that to move and maintain large bodies of personnel in such terrain requires domination of these choke points.

Consequently, other than air transported operations it would be very difficult for offensive land forces to move large bodies of supply and troops through mountainous terrain.

A possibility in using maneuver to advantage would be to move heliborne forces that could sustain themselves for a short duration of time and could dominate vulnerable lines of communications in the rear areas. This facet of air land operations would see increasing application in such terrain.

Weather and terrain are other factors that would govern the intensity of air operations.

The Tibetan terrain poses severe limitations in aircraft operations. Aircraft operations from airfields with average elevations of 13000 feet would reduce the maximum weapon load.

This problem could be offset to a large extent if strike aircraft take off with a combination of minimum fuel and maximum weapon load and are air refueled once airborne.

China's procurement of this force multiplier would considerably offset such a limitation. Thus, not only would her strike forces be able to operate almost unencumbered from such bases, but they would also benefit by way of increased Radii Of Action (ROA).

This would permit them to engage targets deep inside Indian territory.

For air defense operations this would improve the already awesome capability of the vast numbers of Su-27's and MiG-31's that the PLAAF would be operating by the year 2000.

§Accordingly, were the PLAAF to use her strike and air defense elements in the role that she foresees she would have remarkable flexibility.

§Long term interdiction of targets in the plains of India bordering the Himalayas could prove very advantageous.

Utilization of attack helicopters in such terrain could compensate the shortcomings of fixed wing aircraft. These could be employed not only in CAS operations but also short term interdiction.

Characteristics of operations peculiar to the west:

Weather and terrain are other factors that would govern the intensity of air operations....Relatively, the Aksai-Chin region is a high altitude desert and gets meager rainfall.

Characteristics of operations peculiar to the east:

Weather and terrain are other factors that would govern the intensity of air operations. The North East sector of India has heavy rainfall during the monsoons. If the pre monsoon and post monsoon seasons are included, then between March and October only restricted air operations can be done.

During the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict in the Eastern sector, the Chinese moved small bodies of soldiers via trekking routes to cut off the lines of communications of Indian troops. Though tactically sound and feasible, their success in this case was more as a result of poor leadership of the Indian forces rather than the maneuver itself.21

The PLAAF lays heavy weightage on CAS. However for most periods of the year in the North Eastern sector the weather would impose severe limitations on the ability of jet aircraft employed for CAS operations.