Assessment of the Chinese air threat to India in 2000

[Joe Shearer]

I'll come back to this thread in detail tomorrow but will just to say that if India want to attain self sufficency in a reasonable timescale, she will have to do as china did, meaning by hook or by crook.

CardSharp, old buddy, you are a rat fink. It's been more than a tomorrow; where the hell are you?

2. How will this doctrine be implemented on the ground? In strategic terms?

China has shown an inclination to bargain her occupation of Aksai-Chin. The bargain involves a quid-pro-quo with the Indian border state of Arunachal Pradesh to which China also lays a claim. She also disputes some Indian territory in the central sector. During the last war in 1962 there was extensive ground action in both Aksai - Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. After the cease fire the Chinese withdrew in the Eastern sector to the position they were during the start of the war. In the Aksai Chin sector China still holds the areas captured during the 1962 war. In the central sector barring minor skirmishes, no large scale military action took place. China considers vital the retaining of the Line of Communication passing through Aksai-Chin that links Sinkiang with Tibet. Therefore she is likely to hold a defensive position in the Aksai-Chin sector and launch offensive operations in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.

This puts us in an anomalous position.

Aksai Chin lends itself to an open set-piece battle, with strong points adequately defended by artillery and armour (tanks have operated successfully at Zoji La, and the PLA has itself dedicated a number of mechanised infantry formations to this - Lanzhou - military district), and the possibility of air support. There is asymmetry, in the sense that the PLA has an apparent overwhelming superiority in cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, to be used tactically. But the bottom line is that the equation is far more balanced in this sector.

Arunachal is not so good for the Indian Army.

For starters, the terrain is hilly, ranging on mountainous forests, thick forests at places, and tropical in nature, infested with leeches and wet and miserable in the valley bottoms, cold and freezing on the ridge tops. Not as cold as Aksai Chin, but bad enough. It is not that the Indian Army cannot cope with this, it is that the PLA has in the past coped better.

Secondly, there is a steep descent from the Tibetan plateau down to these foothills in this sector, all along the boundary. Descent is easier, physical exertion being the problem that it is at those elevations. In addition, troops already camped at high altitude will be to that extent better acclimatised than troops at a lower altitude.

Thirdly, the logistics infrastructure is maddeningly against India in this sector, in spite of the repeated warnings and the repeated promises made. Multiple road-tracks, avoiding the old military trap of single paths easily dominated by ambush parties, and spur rail lines running up the river valleys from the main line running parallel to the Brahmaputra, are obvious solutions, and with only a little effort, the PLA road- and railway-building exercise can be matched and outdone very, very easily. But until it is done, it remains to be done, and meanwhile, the PLA has the advantage.

Fourth, in the years between 62 and today, the concentration has been on addressing small tribal revolts in other parts of the north-east. Arunachal has always been steadfast in its loyalty, but the forest-dwellers in the Brahmaputra Valley, rebelling partly against the Ahom superior classes of the valley, and more visibly against the government structure at state and country level that gives this domination tangibility, are an on-going problem. So, too, are the Nagas, quiescent now, the Mizos, the Kukis of Manipur, and a multitude of small tribes, each with its grievance against the neighbouring larger tribes, each with a dogged and wholly mistaken belief that if they took to arms, they would get equal treatment as their oppressors. Most of these difficulties are on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, and the north bank is only partly troubled by the Bodos, the forest-dwelling Assamese.

So building a capability to oppose the PLA will mean a sharp and clear departure for the IA. For starters, it does not use aircraft or aircraft armaments, artillery or armour against the insurgents, many segments of which are very heavily armed. Everyone knows who is doing this arming, nobody wants to say the name out loud. This very large super-power in the making is the proverbial elephant in the room. And incidentally, has a direct bearing on this discussion.

The IA must un-learn whatever it has learnt in counter-insurgency, and learn to use its available weapons to the fullest. It must also fight at greater formation levels than the norms of counter-insurgency demand.

Fifth, we still do not fight the shifting, moving battle of separate marching and joint battle-fighting that the PLA used so effectively in 62. This has to be thought through, but 'fortress' defences are unlikely to be useful now as they were then. The question is whether the PLA itself has returned to this Maoist doctrine of warfare, or has other systems and policies in place now; they had certainly lost these skills in Vietnam.

There are several other points that come to mind, but it would be appropriate to mention them after checking their applicability.

The conclusions from this are fairly clear. The tasks that have to be achieved are also very clear, and we only have to join the dots to see the picture.

 

[CardSharp]

I'm really sorry, I forgot about this thread and the 'my replies' function has been on the fritz.

CardSharp, old buddy, you are a rat fink. It's been more than a tomorrow; where the hell are you?



This puts us in an anomalous position.

Aksai Chin lends itself to an open set-piece battle, with strong points adequately defended by artillery and armour (tanks have operated successfully at Zoji La, and the PLA has itself dedicated a number of mechanised infantry formations to this - Lanzhou - military district), and the possibility of air support. There is asymmetry, in the sense that the PLA has an apparent overwhelming superiority in cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, to be used tactically. But the bottom line is that the equation is far more balanced in this sector.

I agree, I remember in the memoirs I've read of Indian officers who served during 1962, they lamented lost opportunities in that sector most of all. They were of the opinion, in this sector with better leadership and planning, more success could have been had. However my understanding was the PLA was largely on the defensive on this sector
​

Arunachal is not so good for the Indian Army.

For starters, the terrain is hilly, ranging on mountainous forests, thick forests at places, and tropical in nature, infested with leeches and wet and miserable in the valley bottoms, cold and freezing on the ridge tops. Not as cold as Aksai Chin, but bad enough. It is not that the Indian Army cannot cope with this, it is that the PLA has in the past coped better.

Secondly, there is a steep descent from the Tibetan plateau down to these foothills in this sector, all along the boundary. Descent is easier, physical exertion being the problem that it is at those elevations. In addition, troops already camped at high altitude will be to that extent better acclimatised than troops at a lower altitude.

Altitude acclimatization could indeed be a very important factor, a full 1-2% if not more of the troops rapidly deployed to those altitudes can be expected to be out of action, in this regard India might be better off (there's no plateau on your side). I have heard tell of special oxygenation tents and train cars to help with rapid deployment of PLA troops to those areas but I am dubious about their ubiquity and utility.

Also to note more than one author has pointed to Chinese troops being acclimatized 6 month prior to 1962 as a factor in winning that war.
​

Thirdly, the logistics infrastructure is maddeningly against India in this sector, in spite of the repeated warnings and the repeated promises made. Multiple road-tracks, avoiding the old military trap of single paths easily dominated by ambush parties, and spur rail lines running up the river valleys from the main line running parallel to the Brahmaputra, are obvious solutions, and with only a little effort, the PLA road- and railway-building exercise can be matched and outdone very, very easily. But until it is done, it remains to be done, and meanwhile, the PLA has the advantage.

I think this is a problem that Indian leadership is well aware of, but I think progress there is slow for the same reason why infrastructure project all over India is slow.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-...000-km-roads-five-airfields-tibet-antony.html
​

Fourth, in the years between 62 and today, the concentration has been on addressing small tribal revolts in other parts of the north-east. Arunachal has always been steadfast in its loyalty, but the forest-dwellers in the Brahmaputra Valley, rebelling partly against the Ahom superior classes of the valley, and more visibly against the government structure at state and country level that gives this domination tangibility, are an on-going problem. So, too, are the Nagas, quiescent now, the Mizos, the Kukis of Manipur, and a multitude of small tribes, each with its grievance against the neighbouring larger tribes, each with a dogged and wholly mistaken belief that if they took to arms, they would get equal treatment as their oppressors. Most of these difficulties are on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, and the north bank is only partly troubled by the Bodos, the forest-dwelling Assamese.

I doubt these tribes can be organized or subverted in the case of a limited war (was that your worry?) but it might mean that the PLA if it is cultural deft can avoided native partisans if it advances that far (which would be very far indeed)

Also I had been told by others in the forums that the IA does not handle counter-insurgency and it is left to police and paramilitary

​

So building a capability to oppose the PLA will mean a sharp and clear departure for the IA. For starters, it does not use aircraft or aircraft armaments, artillery or armour against the insurgents, many segments of which are very heavily armed. Everyone knows who is doing this arming, nobody wants to say the name out loud. This very large super-power in the making is the proverbial elephant in the room. And incidentally, has a direct bearing on this discussion.

The IA must un-learn whatever it has learnt in counter-insurgency, and learn to use its available weapons to the fullest. It must also fight at greater formation levels than the norms of counter-insurgency demand.

This is actually the same worry many US military thinkers have about America's current situation, they are afraid that given the urgent need to focus on counter-insurgency that the US is losing it's ability to do conventional combined arms operations that it was trained for before Afghanistan and Iraq.
​

Fifth, we still do not fight the shifting, moving battle of separate marching and joint battle-fighting that the PLA used so effectively in 62. This has to be thought through, but 'fortress' defences are unlikely to be useful now as they were then. The question is whether the PLA itself has returned to this Maoist doctrine of warfare, or has other systems and policies in place now; they had certainly lost these skills in Vietnam.

This also weighs on my mind. Though the PLA is much more modern and better equipped today, it may have lost some of its elan and espirte de corp that drove it to victory against material odds in its earlier days (Chinese civil war, Korea). I think it is hard for any developed nation to provide men of that caliber. As life becomes more valuable in our perception, and as our societies continues to encourages personal greed, it will be harder and harder to ask men to charge a single footbridge against concentrated machine-gun fire, like it was asked of certain PLA units during the siege of Luoyang. To charge a bridge after you saw with your own eyes, how many have died trying take it....

In the war classic 'the naked and the dead' by Norman Mailer, General Cummings in a soliloquy reflected how the easier the life in a society is, the worse soldiers that society produces. I've often thought about what makes a nation produce good soldiers and what makes men fight, for whatever reason what General Cummings said in that book stuck with me.
​

There are several other points that come to mind, but it would be appropriate to mention them after checking their applicability.

The conclusions from this are fairly clear. The tasks that have to be achieved are also very clear, and we only have to join the dots to see the picture.

 

[CardSharp]

I suppose my post above was sort of all over the place. I'll try to post more on the actual balance of air power in the sector.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Bang on as usual.

I'm really sorry, I forgot about this thread and the 'my replies' function has been on the fritz.

I suppose my post above was sort of all over the place. I'll try to post more on the actual balance of air power in the sector.

Not at all! I thought it was pretty focussed! But of course, if you're going to weigh in with a better version, I would be nuts to stop you. That'd be fun.

Looking forward to it.

 

[CardSharp]

My impression of the air war

Though the PLAAF has become the focus of western media attention and fear, I think it is still going play a supporting role in an action against India. The PLA is still the supreme arm of the Chinese armed force, its general still make up the majority of the central military commission (though this is starting to change). It is still where China sees it's tactical edge. Thus I see ground forces as dominant at the forward edge of battle, the air force playing the role of providing air cover, logistics support and lastly CAS and in that order of importance. Strategic air offensive against Indian targets will be shared between air strikes and missiles, because China does not have assets to achieve complete air superiority.


this perhaps is in contrast to the America way of war and perhaps how most people have come to think about the war (because they've seen the American way of war everyday on TV), where air power dominants the forward edge of battle, where strikes against strategic targets are done mainly by guided bombs (since America can be assured of complete air superiority)

lastly, I think we are all ignoring the political situation that would surround a war, which likely will dictate strategic decisions on the ground just as much as tactical consideration. (after all China did abruptly withdraw its forces in 1962 for political reasons.)

 

[sanibhagwan]

@Cardsharp & Joe Shearer. Brilliant observation. Your posts make reader(s) believe they are in Aksai-chin/Arunachal pradesh rather than in front of their computer screens.

kudos. enjoyed reading your posts.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This puts us in an anomalous position.

Aksai Chin lends itself to an open set-piece battle, with strong points adequately defended by artillery and armour (tanks have operated successfully at Zoji La, and the PLA has itself dedicated a number of mechanised infantry formations to this - Lanzhou - military district), and the possibility of air support. There is asymmetry, in the sense that the PLA has an apparent overwhelming superiority in cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, to be used tactically. But the bottom line is that the equation is far more balanced in this sector.

I agree, I remember in the memoirs I've read of Indian officers who served during 1962, they lamented lost opportunities in that sector most of all. They were of the opinion, in this sector with better leadership and planning, more success could have been had. However my understanding was the PLA was largely on the defensive on this sector

It seems to me that the operations in 62 were significantly different in three sectors of warfare:

• Aksai Chin: Chushul
• Arunachal: Kameng - Tawang and Bomdi La
• Arunachal: Lohit - Walong

The biggest failure was in the middle sector, Arunachal: Kameng - Tawang and Bomdi La. The biggest strategic errors were made here, the worst operational planning and disposition was here, the worst links between the Corps level, even the Division and the troops and their officers at Battalion and Brigade level, were here, and finally, after initial stiff resistance, the sudden breakdown of morale and panic retreat occurred here.

Arunachal: Lohit - Walong was bad, but not without mitigation. The loss of self-confidence due to a loss of confidence in the Corps commander did not set in here; the Brigade and the Battalions held their ground; detachments were overwhelmed, but died fighting, they did not retreat in panic; and there was far less loss of strategic ground, men or materiel than happened in Kameng.

Against the general trend, the Indian Army fought hard in the Aksai Chin sector. In fact, on dispassionate examination, there is reason to believe that but for the idiotic dispositions inherent in the unfortunate misadventure, the Forward Plan, we would have seen a better account even than the draw favouring the PLA that may be the fairest way to describe the outcome.

Ironic; where the PRC had the most interest and the best claim, it did the worst; where it had a rather weaker case, in Arunachal, it did far better, completely crushing the Indian Army in one of the two combat sectors.

This needs bearing in mind. There is little doubt, from the accounts written, that the Indian Army has come to more or less the same conclusions as indicated above, and that these conclusions will weigh on the minds of the planners for any future occasion.

Arunachal is not so good for the Indian Army.

For starters, the terrain is hilly, ranging on mountainous forests, thick forests at places, and tropical in nature, infested with leeches and wet and miserable in the valley bottoms, cold and freezing on the ridge tops. Not as cold as Aksai Chin, but bad enough. It is not that the Indian Army cannot cope with this, it is that the PLA has in the past coped better.

Secondly, there is a steep descent from the Tibetan plateau down to these foothills in this sector, all along the boundary. Descent is easier, physical exertion being the problem that it is at those elevations. In addition, troops already camped at high altitude will be to that extent better acclimatised than troops at a lower altitude.

Altitude acclimatization could indeed be a very important factor, a full 1-2% if not more of the troops rapidly deployed to those altitudes can be expected to be out of action, in this regard India might be better off (there's no plateau on your side). I have heard tell of special oxygenation tents and train cars to help with rapid deployment of PLA troops to those areas but I am dubious about their ubiquity and utility.

Also to note more than one author has pointed to Chinese troops being acclimatized 6 month prior to 1962 as a factor in winning that war.

Obviously, 6 month acclimatisation at Tibetan Plateau levels, higher than Tawang, Thag La or any other high peaks on the border, is unattainable for the Indian Army, except in stretches of Siachen and parts of the Karakorum Range. Perhaps also in portions of the Himalayas that fall within Sikkim and the upper reaches of Uttaranchal. This is going to be an insuperable obstacle. But it is an obstacle for ground troops, not for the air force.

The air force, indeed, has an advantage over the manned aircraft of the PLA Air Force. We have already seen that height is a disadvantage for an attacking force, insofar as it reduces the load-carrying capacity of aircraft. It is possible that air force detachments equipped with modern, powerful aircraft, with BVR equipment which brings the airfields in Tibet within range, will be able to hold off the bulk of the multiple raids by inexpensive attack aircraft that will undoubtedly be mounted, if any air attack is mounted.

Where might the PLA AF use air power?

CardSharp has already given the answer: air cover, logistics support and lastly CAS and in that order of importance. Where? in both likely sectors? (We are not considering another four sectors of possible hostilities - Burma, Nepal, Himachal/Uttaranchal and the Pakistan Northern Territories, only Arunachal and Aksai Chin).

Clearly, given the terrain and ground conditions, this is the likely inventory of skills and competencies which may be deployed in either sector:

Aksai Chin

• Air cover
• Logistics support
• Combat air support

Arunachal Pradesh

• Air cover
• Logistics support
• Combat air support

Here it is necessary to point out that air cover is provision of protection against hostile air force elements, in other words, interception or achievement of air parity or air superiority. Combat air support is air force activity against ground elements, not necessarily against air elements. What we have omitted to consider is interdiction; it does seem as if the major role of the PLA AF will include some measure of interdiction, typically off-battlefield interdiction, what might be loosely termed tactical interdiction off the battlefield or strategic interdiction. So the final list reads thus:

Aksai Chin

• Logistics support
• Air cover
• Interdiction
• Combat air support

Arunachal Pradesh

• Logistics support
• Air cover
• Interdiction

Thirdly, the logistics infrastructure is maddeningly against India in this sector, in spite of the repeated warnings and the repeated promises made. Multiple road-tracks, avoiding the old military trap of single paths easily dominated by ambush parties, and spur rail lines running up the river valleys from the main line running parallel to the Brahmaputra, are obvious solutions, and with only a little effort, the PLA road- and railway-building exercise can be matched and outdone very, very easily. But until it is done, it remains to be done, and meanwhile, the PLA has the advantage.

I think this is a problem that Indian leadership is well aware of, but I think progress there is slow for the same reason why infrastructure project all over India is slow.

China has built 58,000 km roads, five airfields in Tibet: Antony
​

Fourth, in the years between 62 and today, the concentration has been on addressing small tribal revolts in other parts of the north-east. Arunachal has always been steadfast in its loyalty, but the forest-dwellers in the Brahmaputra Valley, rebelling partly against the Ahom superior classes of the valley, and more visibly against the government structure at state and country level that gives this domination tangibility, are an on-going problem. So, too, are the Nagas, quiescent now, the Mizos, the Kukis of Manipur, and a multitude of small tribes, each with its grievance against the neighbouring larger tribes, each with a dogged and wholly mistaken belief that if they took to arms, they would get equal treatment as their oppressors. Most of these difficulties are on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, and the north bank is only partly troubled by the Bodos, the forest-dwelling Assamese.

I doubt these tribes can be organized or subverted in the case of a limited war (was that your worry?) but it might mean that the PLA if it is cultural deft can avoided native partisans if it advances that far (which would be very far indeed)

Also I had been told by others in the forums that the IA does not handle counter-insurgency and it is left to police and paramilitary

The point here was slightly different. It was that the territory adjoining the probable future battlefields was fairly clear of insurgency, and would allow the Indian Army to plan and implement its strategy. All the trouble is on the south side. This is an advantage for the Indian Army, but a risk as well.

The location apart, even with trouble restricted to the south side of the river, the Army is split into little penny packets, supporting the para-militaries which pursue the campaigns now. This has its own burdens and penalties, which has been pointed out by the Army over the decades, and which has taken some effect finally.

About the respective roles of the Army and the para-military: in the early days, there was only a Crown Reserve Police, later re-named the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), armed with muskets and intended for quelling civil disturbances - communal riots and the like. The Border Security Force was developed after the events of 65 demonstrated that Pakistan had built up a formidable armed adjunct to the Army, which was capable of light infantry manoeuvres and had no hesitation in using LMG and 2" mortar fire whenever its tactical commanders deemed necessary. They were faced by state Armed Police, armed, at one time, with smooth-bore muskets, intended to minimise civilian casualties in case of firing being necessary against a civilian riot. That brought about the formation of the Border Security Force. The BSF holds the borders on the Pakistan and the Bangladesh sides; the borders with China are separately dealt with. The CISF handles guarding of installations and industrial plants, and airports and other places to be secured. There is a separate Railway Protection Force.

When pressure on the borders of Burma and of Kashmir became very high, two additional forces were raised or reinforced. The existing Assam Rifles were strengthened and tasked with looking after insurgency operations in the east, east of Bengal, which was left to the Eastern Frontier Rifles; a new force was raised for Kashmir, called the Rashtriya Rifles. The purpose of all three forces was to take pressure off the Army, and to avoid calling in the Army except to act against external enemies. However, against a major threat, the CRPF still has to be called in, and they had taken the lead against the Maoist insurgents in the central Indian forests.

Besides this, most Indian states have armed contingents of their own, small in number, effectiveness being between a SWAT team and a National Guards team. None of these has been seriously tested.

So building a capability to oppose the PLA will mean a sharp and clear departure for the IA. For starters, it does not use aircraft or aircraft armaments, artillery or armour against the insurgents, many segments of which are very heavily armed. Everyone knows who is doing this arming, nobody wants to say the name out loud. This very large super-power in the making is the proverbial elephant in the room. And incidentally, has a direct bearing on this discussion.

The IA must un-learn whatever it has learnt in counter-insurgency, and learn to use its available weapons to the fullest. It must also fight at greater formation levels than the norms of counter-insurgency demand.

This is actually the same worry many US military thinkers have about America's current situation, they are afraid that given the urgent need to focus on counter-insurgency that the US is losing it's ability to do conventional combined arms operations that it was trained for before Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fifth, we still do not fight the shifting, moving battle of separate marching and joint battle-fighting that the PLA used so effectively in 62. This has to be thought through, but 'fortress' defences are unlikely to be useful now as they were then. The question is whether the PLA itself has returned to this Maoist doctrine of warfare, or has other systems and policies in place now; they had certainly lost these skills in Vietnam.

This also weighs on my mind. Though the PLA is much more modern and better equipped today, it may have lost some of its elan and espirte de corp that drove it to victory against material odds in its earlier days (Chinese civil war, Korea). I think it is hard for any developed nation to provide men of that caliber. As life becomes more valuable in our perception, and as our societies continues to encourages personal greed, it will be harder and harder to ask men to charge a single footbridge against concentrated machine-gun fire, like it was asked of certain PLA units during the siege of Luoyang. To charge a bridge after you saw with your own eyes, how many have died trying take it....

In the war classic 'the naked and the dead' by Norman Mailer, General Cummings in a soliloquy reflected how the easier the life in a society is, the worse soldiers that society produces. I've often thought about what makes a nation produce good soldiers and what makes men fight, for whatever reason what General Cummings said in that book stuck with me.

There are several other points that come to mind, but it would be appropriate to mention them after checking their applicability.

The conclusions from this are fairly clear. The tasks that have to be achieved are also very clear, and we only have to join the dots to see the picture.

My impression of the air war

Though the PLAAF has become the focus of western media attention and fear, I think it is still going play a supporting role in an action against India. The PLA is still the supreme arm of the Chinese armed force, its general still make up the majority of the central military commission (though this is starting to change). It is still where China sees it's tactical edge. Thus I see ground forces as dominant at the forward edge of battle, the air force playing the role of providing air cover, logistics support and lastly CAS and in that order of importance. Strategic air offensive against Indian targets will be shared between air strikes and missiles, because China does not have assets to achieve complete air superiority.


this perhaps is in contrast to the America way of war and perhaps how most people have come to think about the war (because they've seen the American way of war everyday on TV), where air power dominants the forward edge of battle, where strikes against strategic targets are done mainly by guided bombs (since America can be assured of complete air superiority)

lastly, I think we are all ignoring the political situation that would surround a war, which likely will dictate strategic decisions on the ground just as much as tactical consideration. (after all China did abruptly withdraw its forces in 1962 for political reasons.)

This analytical passage deserves a detailed reply, drafted in full detail. I shall work on it.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is country fit for armour, no doubt about it.

 

[CardSharp]

Thank you for the information on the paramilitary in India, the PAP plays a similar role in China, where they are battle trained as light infantry and would theoretically be used in the event of an invasion. Though I have my doubts about the usefulness of paramilitary supplements of either country in the case of a real war.

I also take your point about the Tibetan plateau allowing for better acclimatization. My original thought was if the India army fell back it would be affected by altitude problems, but I guess if that stage were reached the battle would have been decided.


@ your comments about tactical and strategic interdiction.

I was looking a the map and it seems if I were looking at a strategic air offensive, the narrow corridor at Sikkim would make for an ideal target both for strikes against rail and road and air interdiction.

The Chinese border is very close and neither Nepal or Bhutan can oppose a violation of their air space. All supplies must supposedly flow through this corridor.

If air defenses can neutralized and the PLAAF gain partial air superiority over this area, it would make reinforcement very difficult. What do you think? What about a first strike aimed at the air defenses there?

 

[CardSharp]

This is country fit for armour, no doubt about it.

That is beautiful terrain for armour. Is that Aksai Chin?

 

[CardSharp]

I also have some question about Indian air defence around the conflict area.

Planeman (a forum member on a lot of defense forums prepared an excellent over view of Chinese air-defence.

Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress China

Including some of China's new air-defense systems.

Some of them have the range (200km ) to possible cover the Sikkim air gap, if deployed near the border.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Thank you for the information on the paramilitary in India, the PAP plays a similar role in China, where they are battle trained as light infantry and would theoretically be used in the event of an invasion. Though I have my doubts about the usefulness of paramilitary supplements of either country in the case of a real war.

As it happens, none of the para-military forces named by me are trained for light infantry roles in case of hostilities, although both the Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles are upgradable over a period of two to three years (needed to train them thoroughly to regular military standards).

There is also a case in India for introducing national service. This would immediately solve certain problems faced by the country, too many to enumerate here in depth, too disparate to mention in this thread. This would include both military service and other service, with individuals segregated according to health and moral status, including service as para-medics, barefoot teachers, logistics workers, distributors of foodstuffs and vital consumption products, construction workers working on infrastructural assets, and the like. The entire approach being to introduce vocational training and create a trained cadre who have fought their battles, including those off the battlefield. Military service would be one year shorter than other service, ensuring a lack of reluctance. National service would be mandatory for those seeking election, higher (tertiary) education, in the country as well as abroad, government service, and any kind of adult life which is worthwhile and meaningful.

It has been suggested in certain circles that this could be the basis for creating a Peoples Guards contingent, which could provide the kind of mobile, hard-hitting formation needed to meet a force using Maoist doctrine.

Numbers are available in plenty. Those races which conquered huge swathes of territory, against very able and competent opposition, have still contributed only fractions of their eligible population to military service, and yet ironically those races also suffer from endemic under-employment. A Peoples Guards formation with its members medically examined and then medically and in terms of health management dealt with in a remedial regime, drilled to a well-honed physical fitness, trained to move without trucks and highways, and armed and trained on the use of light weapons of the sort that can be carried by individuals - in my opinion, we need such a formation to supplement the efforts of the army, navy and air force

I also take your point about the Tibetan plateau allowing for better acclimatization. My original thought was if the India army fell back it would be affected by altitude problems, but I guess if that stage were reached the battle would have been decided.

It is increasingly clear that only a retreat from the boundary, defence of isolated hot spots and creation of a robust reserve force, able to move even under strict air interdiction, combined and implemented with audacity and strategic fairlessness, will avert defeat in the eastern sector.

@ your comments about tactical and strategic interdiction.

I was looking a the map and it seems if I were looking at a strategic air offensive, the narrow corridor at Sikkim would make for an ideal target both for strikes against rail and road and air interdiction.

The Chinese border is very close and neither Nepal or Bhutan can oppose a violation of their air space. All supplies must supposedly flow through this corridor.

If air defenses can neutralized and the PLAAF gain partial air superiority over this area, it would make reinforcement very difficult. What do you think? What about a first strike aimed at the air defenses there?

There are two spots called Chickens Neck, usually by generals who think they have a sense of humour, one being in Kashmir, just south of the mountains, leading up from the plains, through which the only road from the rest of India to the Vale of Kashmir runs. This was twice the target of determined Pakistani attack, in 65 at the hands (initially) of Major General Akhtar Hussain Mallik, in 71 the attacker being Major General Eftekhar.

This one that you have spotted can be viewed in different ways.

There is a 40 to 50 kms stretch in the plains centred around the town of Siliguri, which has Nepal on one side, Bangladesh on the other. You can definitely spot it on the map by locating the point where the Nepalese and Bangladeshi borders are closest together. 50 kms.; that's all there is. But three points:

1. This point is a constant in every military appreciation, and everyone is aware of the danger;
2. Siliguri is the HQ of XXXIII Corps. This well-known formation was the one superseded, by another formation, IV Corps, commanded by B. M. Kaul in the 62 debacle; XXXIII Corps is the formation in the Indian Army with the strongest institutional memory of the events of 62, and all that comes with that;
3. The Army and the Air Force have both taken this logistics bottleneck into account and have decided to stockpile everything in the north-east.

A well-understood problem, and addressed in various ways; some may work.

Another weakness is the notch right on the northern boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. This is known as Nathu La, and the Indian Army has had more ulcers about the salient sticking into Sikkim than about any other part of the borders. However, it is stiff with troops, around and about, as is the rest of the XXXIII Corps area of operations.

You have pointed out correctly that air interdiction is the likeliest to get results for a Chinese military plan.

That is beautiful terrain for armour. Is that Aksai Chin?

Yes, indeed; it shows why AMX tanks were airlifted there, with beneficial effect, in 62.

 

[DesiGuy]

damm...too many geeks on this thread. i am gone from here....

 

[Pak_Sher]

India should not exagerate the threat from China to accumulate large quantities of arms. Plus India should not do military exercises with Japan and US closer to Chinese waters, it should try to improve its relations with China

 

[CardSharp]

There are two spots called Chickens Neck, usually by generals who think they have a sense of humour, one being in Kashmir, just south of the mountains, leading up from the plains, through which the only road from the rest of India to the Vale of Kashmir runs. This was twice the target of determined Pakistani attack, in 65 at the hands (initially) of Major General Akhtar Hussain Mallik, in 71 the attacker being Major General Eftekhar.

This one that you have spotted can be viewed in different ways.

There is a 40 to 50 kms stretch in the plains centred around the town of Siliguri, which has Nepal on one side, Bangladesh on the other. You can definitely spot it on the map by locating the point where the Nepalese and Bangladeshi borders are closest together. 50 kms.; that's all there is. But three points:

1. This point is a constant in every military appreciation, and everyone is aware of the danger;
2. Siliguri is the HQ of XXXIII Corps. This well-known formation was the one superseded, by another formation, IV Corps, commanded by B. M. Kaul in the 62 debacle; XXXIII Corps is the formation in the Indian Army with the strongest institutional memory of the events of 62, and all that comes with that;
3. The Army and the Air Force have both taken this logistics bottleneck into account and have decided to stockpile everything in the north-east.

A well-understood problem, and addressed in various ways; some may work.

Another weakness is the notch right on the northern boundary between Sikkim and Tibet. This is known as Nathu La, and the Indian Army has had more ulcers about the salient sticking into Sikkim than about any other part of the borders. However, it is stiff with troops, around and about, as is the rest of the XXXIII Corps area of operations.

You have pointed out correctly that air interdiction is the likeliest to get results for a Chinese military plan.



Yes, indeed; it shows why AMX tanks were airlifted there, with beneficial effect, in 62.

Figures if rank amateurs can spot the problem the army must have done something about it. But yeah you're right I wasn't think about an invasion by the narrow land route but air interdiction and attacks on infrastructure, though as you say the North east is probably is self-sufficient in equipment and materiale.