Jungibaaz
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jul 4, 2010
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Thanks for the mention, I agree with a lot of points you made and accept them as fact. However, let me preface by saying that none of us know internally what is actually going on:
We don’t know the true state of Saudi Pakistan relations, our top civilian and army leadership are the only ones in the loop and aware of the facts. We don’t even know from where SMQ’s remarks came, are they a definite shift in policy? Or are they his own thoughts said in a less than careful manner at the inopportune moment? We don’t even know to what extent the the government and the army are behind SMQ’s remarks. If even they’re at all behind them or even one the same page as we hear so often. We also don’t know why the deposits were returned early and on who’s wishes, ours or theirs?
What I mean to say is that we are speculating. All of us are, including me.
It could well be that the government are behind SMQ, and the army supports their stance. But we can’t be certain at this stage, so we must operate on what we know.
So that is the preface over and done with.
On the KL conference, it’s not a case of whether it was morally right to go there, it plainly was, nobody denies that. Nor is the Kashmir cause the wrong cause to promote internationally, we should absolutely promote it. My gripe with our decisions around KL were that it was a political mis-step and we were made to look foolish.
We already knew how the Saudis viewed our relations with certain allies of ours. And we knew that they’d be displeased. If we were able to take the heat, or exercise our own independent (not cost free but independent) foreign policy initiatives without succumbing to Saudi pressure via their financial leverage on us, then we should have gone and not backed out. If we were not able to take the heat, we shouldn’t have gone.
Certainly we shouldn’t have committed to two other allies and thrown in our own political capital, only to be browbeaten to back out by another ally. This spoke of poor planning and assessment.
On the latest developments, it is unprecedented in the history of our relations with Saudi. If you look at one of the things that Pakistan historically done well in order to cast a larger shadow internationally than our size, or to survive/thrive in the face of adversity; it’s our alliances and finely balanced foreign relations. Whether it was alliance with the US in the decades gone by that allowed us to developed more quickly, to obtain hardware and diplomatic support above our stature. Or the same today with China. And we have enjoyed lots of Saudi and other support from brotherly relations. I may not be an expert on foreign relations, but it seems SMQ’s remarks were definitely unprecedented and perhaps lacking finesse. There’s an old adage somewhere that also applies to diplomats, to be like a swan, graceful and calm on the surface, yet hard at work and paddling manically below the surface. I don’t know what’s below the surface and neither do you, but here we saw the quiet part said loudly on national tv.
Now on the reality of our affairs with Saudi. Whether we like it or not, their support historically and as recently as last year has helped us get through tough times. In this relationship, I believe they have far more leverage on us than we do on them, but we have not looked at this in those terms, we view them as brotherly relations with some obvious red lines for self respect. For example, we all saw and I applauded our vocal refusal to be involved in the Yemen conflict. But on Kashmir, what really can we do to force Saudis? If we’re making another OIC, the question stands, is this in empty threat that we’ll have to grovel and apologise for at a later date and renege in as we did at the KL conference or will we carry it out? And if we carry it out what will it change anything materially for Kashmir. I’m sorry but if we can’t convince close allies in the GCC, Muslim countries to speak on behalf of Kashmiris, whatever that may say of their character, what hope do we have convincing the euros, Americans and others?
And on the moral argument, I’m afraid we cannot dictate such things on others. Saudis ideally would stand against oppression of fellow Muslims. I agree with this sentiment. But is this reasonable to expect? Take our relations with China for example. We are the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, our people pride themselves as keepers of the faith... do we dare speak up against China for treatment of Uyghurs? If we did, we’d stand to gain nothing and lose everything, and even for moral reasons, our noises wouldn’t cause any positive change there at all. If we can be allowed to overlook morals for national interests, I don’t think we can reasonably ask our close allies to do it for us. And other countries too operate on foreign policy on selfinterest and realpolitik, can we call out the Saudis? I’m torn on the subject. And even if we could call out the saudis as we did, do we have the required leverage to build support, and will this achieve anything real in the long run, and even if so, what is the cost?
The answer to the moral question may be nuanced and maybe to our liking. But the answer to the second and third questions definitely throws cold water on our aims. Simply put, not counting all the things we don’t know behind the scenes... SMQ’s remarks seemed rash, and even if they weren’t, we don’t have the capability to do what’s needed to achieve our objectives elsewhere, and the cost of doing so might massively outweigh some little and immaterial benefit to the Kashmir cause if we hurt relations with Saudi in an otherwise futile attempt to promote Kashmir cause.
Let me know if some of this didn’t make sense. I have a tendency to ramble and write too much without concision.
@Blacklight
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