India, on the other hand, was slow to condemn the invasion and that gave more fuel to the United States’ rationale in pouring aid into Pakistan and also making it appear that India had a Soviet tilt. India was upset with the United States’ decision to funnel arms via Pakistan and accused it of starting an arms race in the region. The U.S., however, did make attempts to give India a similar deal to the one that was made with Pakistan. In fact, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington attempted to persuade Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that India faced a greater threat from Soviet forces in Afghanistan than from the U.S. attempting to strengthen Pakistan's defense. Nevertheless, India and the U.S. differed over how to react to the invasion — “the Indians refused to condemn Soviet policy, urged restraint, and told Carrington they were more worried about an American arming of Pakistan than about Soviet troops in Kabul” (Rosenbaum, 1992, p. 21). Throughout the period of Pakistan and U.S. alignment, India has always had a concern that money and arms that were being given to Pakistan would ultimately be used against her (Chary, 1995, p.164). For Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the issue of arming Pakistan was a higher concern than the effect of the Soviet role on India's security.
Another concern for India was how the U.S., during this timeframe, turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The United States had an on-off relationship with Pakistan in terms of helping with her pursuit of nuclear weapons. When India first tested its nuclear weapon in 1974, Pakistan became adamant about becoming nuclear itself. From the 1950s into the 1970s the U.S., under the “Atoms for Peace” program, provided Pakistani nuclear scientists with technical training (Weiner, 1998, p. A6). Later as the Chinese assisted Pakistan in the development of nuclear and missile technology, the U.S. knowingly watched on: “It is also reported, but not confirmed, that China may have assisted Pakistan in its development of nuclear and missile technology” (Baxter, 1998, p.397).