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AIP vs nuclear submarines

The 214 is the the 209 plus AIP, ask the portugese navy.
The Germans wanted to give it a more modern and attractive design to look like the "mysterious" 212-A. But it is bigger and with less fuell cells power than the German exclusive 212-A. it has nothing to do with the latter, it is more about modernizing and redesigning the outloks of the very "export successful" and efficient 209 platform with AIP as a value plus and for not to be left behind other platforms competing against it with the AIP add-on.
 
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Or because their role within NATO was blocking the Baltic, and you don't do that in the Atlantic. As the role of NATO changed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, so did Germany's and Germany's navy's tasks change and so they required a different boat.
I dont see a change. 212 is still Baltic optimized.

The Swedes have been producing and operating 209 sized subs in the Baltic for decades (Sjöormen, Näcken- and Västergötland classes.) and these are not using nonmagnetic steel: there simply is not an argument against using 209 in the Baltic, although that is not the area for which it is optimized.
Swedish submarines are shorter than 209 and have X shape tail for agility. As for magnetism - well they simply cant make one.

HOW EXACTLY are 209s not suited to the Baltic?
Its not non-magnetic and not agile enough.

HDW Class 214The HDW Class 214 is the continuation of the success story of the HDW Class 209. A design specifically for the export market, which can be made both in Germany and in the buyer's country. A design and its technical expression moves with the times.
212A and Dolphin are both totally new designs. 214 is obviously derived from 209.
 
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I dont see a change. 212 is still Baltic optimized.
So, essentially, you are saying the Italians bought a lemon with the 212A for the Med?

TKMS: Die Uboote der HDW Klasse 212A zeichnen sich durch ihre Fähigkeit aus, tief getaucht fernab jeder Küste oder aber in extrem flachen Gewässern zu operieren. Sie sind den Herausforderungen neuer Aufgaben und Einsatzbereiche mehr als gewachsen.'

Swedish submarines are shorter than 209 and have X shape tail for agility. As for magnetism - well they simply cant make one.
Which 209?
209/1100 = 54.1 metres (1,207 t submerged)
209/1200 = 55.9 metres (1,285 t submerged)
209/1300 = 59.5 metres (1,390 t submerged)
209/1400 = 61.2 metres (1,586 tsubmerged)
209/1500 = 64.4 metres (1,810 tonnes submerged)

Sjoormen (1,400 t submerged) = 50m
Nacken (1,150 t submerged) = 44 m
Vastergotland (1,150 t submerged) = 48.5 m

The point is that they are all significantly larger than 201/5/6/7 and to approach 209 size. Yet specifically designed for sallow water, short range ops.

And, as for the rest: so what? Swedish subs are not amagnetic, like 209. and you do not clarify why/how X-tail and being shorter makes them more suitable specifically for Baltic.

Its not non-magnetic and not agile enough.
By you own statement, Swedish subs aren't non-magnetic either. Neither where the 207 Kobben Norway used and passed on to the Danish and Polish navies.

201: 450t, 42 m
205: 508 t submerged, 43.9 m
206: 498 t submerged, 48.6 m
207: 485 t submerged, 47.2 m
(so what does that say about length....)

[/quote]212A and Dolphin are both totally new designs. 214 is obviously derived from 209.[/QUOTE]

Re 214 you are arguing something that isn't disputed. As I indicated:
SHIP_SSK_HDW_Sub_Evolution_lg.jpg

Of course, the absent relative here in this pic is the 210. Dolphin is very similar to the 210mod, if larger. See TKMS page Type 210 (Ula) is about 1,150 tons submerged and 58.4m.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems

Some sources connect Type 800 - suggesting it is Dolpin I (first three) - to Dolphin II (last three).
 
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So, essentially, you are saying the Italians bought a lemon with the 212A for the Med?
Why?

Which 209?
209/1100 = 54.1 metres (1,207 t submerged)
209/1200 = 55.9 metres (1,285 t submerged)
209/1300 = 59.5 metres (1,390 t submerged)
209/1400 = 61.2 metres (1,586 tsubmerged)
209/1500 = 64.4 metres (1,810 tonnes submerged)

Sjoormen (1,400 t submerged) = 50m
Nacken (1,150 t submerged) = 44 m
Vastergotland (1,150 t submerged) = 48.5 m
As u can see, Sjoormen is almost 10 m shorter than equal size 109/1300.

Of course, the absent relative here in this pic is the 210. Dolphin is very similar to the 210mod, if larger. See TKMS page Type 210 (Ula) is about 1,150 tons submerged and 58.4m.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems

Some sources connect Type 800 - suggesting it is Dolpin I (first three) - to Dolphin II (last three).
210 is two deck and chisel nose. Dolphin is 3 deck and drop shape.

Square noses:

209:
nose 209.jpg


210:
nose 210.JPG


214:
Nose 214.jpg



drop noses:

Dolphin:
nose dolphin.JPG


212
212a.jpg
 
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Oh, so you are saying it doesn't matter for Med ops that the sub is optimized for Baltic?


As u can see, Sjoormen is almost 10 m shorter than equal size 109/1300.[/quote] And, as you can see, the newer Vastergotland (1,150 t submerged) = 48.5 m compared to 209/1100 = 54.1 metres (1,207 t submerged) and 209/1200 = 55.9 metres (1,285 t submerged). Which is a far smaller difference. And again, the main point remains that size (tonnage or length) per se does not disqualify the 209 for Baltic ops. Which you conveniently ignore.

The original Type 210 (Ula) design for Norway is about 1,150 tons submerged and 58.4m. Of course, that country borders the Atlantic rather than the Baltic.

210mod (Type 210 upgrade)
TYP_210_150131_02.jpg


Dolphin
hbeig20120320211817487.jpg


In common: X-tails, tower shaping, diving plane position.

It is nice to point out these features, but you are not explaining how they (dis)qualify a boat for operations in a certain area. And we find a variety of boats which a different mix-and-match of features, both for open ocean and coastal (including Baltic) ops.. So, you are not making a point, just arguing.
 
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Oh, so you are saying it doesn't matter for Med ops that the sub is optimized for Baltic?
Thanks to relatively big size and AIP it can be good for deep sea too.

Its sail is too small for deep waters though.

And, as you can see, the newer Vastergotland (1,150 t submerged) = 48.5 m compared to 209/1100 = 54.1 metres (1,207 t submerged) and 209/1200 = 55.9 metres (1,285 t submerged). Which is a far smaller difference.
Sjoormen is 19% shorter than same size 209/1300
Nacken is 23% shorter than same size 209/1100
Vastergotland is 12% shorter than same size 209/1100

So they all are considerably shorter + have X tail for better agility.

And again, the main point remains that size (tonnage or length) per se does not disqualify the 209 for Baltic ops. Which you conveniently ignore.
I did not say size disqualifies. I said agility and magnetism.

The original Type 210 (Ula) design for Norway is about 1,150 tons submerged and 58.4m. Of course, that country borders the Atlantic rather than the Baltic.
Thats why its so long and thin.

210mod (Type 210 upgrade)
TYP_210_150131_02.jpg


Dolphin
hbeig20120320211817487.jpg


In common: X-tails, tower shaping, diving plane position.
210 is direct derivative of the 209: same 2 deck layout, same square nose shape. Just X tail added to improve agility.

Dolphin is a new design, not related to 209.
 
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Of course 205s were not nonmagnetic, nor were 207s, 210s and they still operate effectively in the Baltic. Don't recall these (except 210) have trouble in the Baltic due to their conventional + shaped tail.

I was comparing 2310mod with Dolphin, not 210 per se. As you can see, 210mod is much more similar to Dolphin than the Original 210.

You are simple discussing things that are not under dispute. For the sake of argument.

There is nothing that prevents 209 from operating effectively in Baltic.
There is a reason Bundesmarine didn't opt for 209 (i.e. nonmagnetic export model)
Smaller 206s did quite nicely in North Sea as well
Period.

210, Dolphin, 212A, 214 etc are all newly designed boats, for a specific user or target market requirement. IN that sense none are 'connected' as suggested by overview images. That does not preclude however, that one can see the onfluences of one desogn on the other. The rest is semantics.

Cherio.

Mysterious ‘Russian sub’ off Sweden may be Dutch – Defense Ministry source - Intellihub
Wonder what this far larger than 209/1500 Dutch Walrus was doing in the Baltic, being big (2,650 t submerged, 67.73 m ) and magnetic and all.... Or, Polish [Orzel] and Russian Kilo's [B-227, B-806, B-871, in any case 2 Kilo and these days possibly 1 Lada] (3,000-3,950 t full load, submerged, Length: 70.0–74.0 m) for that matter.

Dolfijin.jpg

A rigid-hull inflatable boat approaches the Royal Netherlands Navy attack submarine HNLMS Dolfijn (S808) June 15, 2013, in the Baltic Sea during Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2013. Saab and Damen Shipyards are teaming to offer a Walrus replacement to the Royal Netherlands Navy. DOD photo
Saab and Damen Team for Walrus-class Replacement and More | Defense Media Network
 
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There is nothing that prevents 209 from operating effectively in Baltic.
It can, but much worse than 206 (magnetism, agility).

There is a reason Bundesmarine didn't opt for 209 (i.e. nonmagnetic export model)
Smaller 206s did quite nicely in North Sea as well
It can, but much worse than 209 (range, speed)

210, Dolphin, 212A, 214 etc are all newly designed boats, for a specific user or target market requirement.
210 and 214 are direct derivatives of 209. Dolphin and 212A are new designs.
 
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class_chienlung_hailung.jpg

ZWV2004.jpg

How many decks? 2.620 t submerged, 66,9 m x 8,4 m
Dutch Submarines: The Zwaardvis (2) submarine class

walrusklasse-tekening.jpg

2800 t submerged, 67.73 m x 8.4 m x 6.6 m > frequently operating in the Baltic.
Dutch Submarines: The Walrus (2) submarine class

210 and 214 are direct derivatives of 209. Dolphin and 212A are new designs.
The Ula class submarines are among the most silent and maneuverable submarines in the world. So by extension .... Also, all export boats therefor. And back to square one (page 4)
 
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Nuclear vs. Diesel Submarines
Nuclear vs. Diesel Submarines | Center for Strategic and International Studies
6258219449_c5f14aba02_m.jpg


By Jonah Friedman

In recent months there have been a number of calls for building diesel-powered submarines for the United States Navy. In two separate Defense News articles in June and September Gary Schmitt and J. Scott Shipman, respectively, urged the Navy to build such vessels. They cite a number of advantages for diesel subs, both operationally and in terms of cost. However, while diesel submarines may enjoy some advantages over nuclear bots, the significant drawbacks to this form of propulsion should be kept in mind as well.

Schmitt and Shipman highlight some of the most important benefits of diesel submarines compared to their nuclear-powered counterparts. Perhaps chief among these is cost. They both note that one of the biggest challenges facing the Navy today – and one which it will continue to face in the coming years – is a lack of submarines in sufficient numbers to maintain a presence in areas of interest to the United States. Shipman in particular points to the need to augment the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean to deal with piracy, and in the western Pacific to monitor a rising China. Leaving aside the question of how effective submarines would be in fighting piracy or how many are truly needed in the Pacific, the concerns surrounding a shrinking navy is a legitimate one. One of the chief causes for this contraction is the extremely high cost of nuclear-powered submarines. As Schmitt and Shipman note, the cost of a Virginia-class submarine is in the area of $2 billion, whereas the cost of a diesel boat is around $500 million. Given these prices, the U.S. Navy could certainly procure more submarines (and have a correspondingly greater presence around the world) if it pursued diesel instead of nuclear versions.

The other major benefit conferred by diesel subs relates to their operational capabilities. While early diesel technologies greatly impinged on the length of time a submarine could remain submerged and deployed, new technologies have improved this time. Through the Second World War, submarines needed to either surface or use snorkels in order to obtain the oxygen needed to recharge their batteries and continue operating. This both left them vulnerable to attack and reduced their range, since they could only be submerged for several days at a time. Modern diesel submarines utilizing air-independent propulsion can remain submerged for about a month. Moreover, as Schmitt points out, unlike a nuclear-powered sub, a diesel sub can turn off its engine and sit on the ocean floor “deadly silent, while monitoring whatever passes over and around it.” (Although it should be noted that a nuclear sub could also switch off its propellers and also remain extremely quiet)

Finally, proponents of diesel submarines note the large number of other states which use diesel subs, and the potential for the U.S. to enter this market and benefit economically. Both Schmitt and Shipman argue that our allies who use such vessels would be happy to purchase U.S.-made diesel subs. Shipman in particular cites the benefits for the domestic economy and the revitalization of industrial infrastructure that a boom in diesel submarine construction would create.

While these advantages are notable, the disadvantages of diesel subs (at least as compared to their nuclear counterparts) are significant. Although the cost of nuclear submarines per unit may be more than diesel boats, the numbers given by the latter’s proponents may not be realistic. While we have a good idea about the cost of, say, Virginia-class subs (since we have already built several of them), diesel boats have not been built in this country in decades. Shipman notes that it is possible that the $500 million estimate for a diesel sub could be overly optimistic given our current procurement practices. He cites some Navy sources that have put the cost of a diesel submarine at about $1 billion. This would still be cheaper than a nuclear version, but significantly less so.

Operationally, there are advantages which nuclear subs possess which cannot be matched by diesel boats. The most obvious of these relates to the amount of time they can remain submerged and deployed. Whereas air-independent propulsion technology allows submarines to remain submerged for a few weeks, there is no limit to the amount of time a nuclear submarine can remain submerged (barring the limits of the crew). This allows for nuclear subs to be deployed and submerged for far greater periods than diesel boats, and it has implications for their operational performance as well. While the Navy could build more diesel subs to enhance its presence in certain parts of the world, those subs would necessarily need to refuel and recharge more frequently than their nuclear counterparts. The amount of time they could spend completing their missions (such as reconnaissance or tracking other submarines) would therefore be reduced. Although there would be fewer subs in the fleet if they were all nuclear, these vessels would be able to devote a greater proportion of their time to their missions, and they would be less vulnerable and more efficient. Additionally, the greater power output provided by nuclear reactors allows nuclear submarines to travel significantly faster than their diesel counterparts.

With regard to the interest of other states in purchasing U.S.-built diesel subs, it may be that there is a market for such vessels in which the U.S. could excel. However, it is also true that other states see the value of pursuing nuclear propulsion for their submarines, and have been making efforts to develop it. The Nuclear Threat Initiative cites Brazil and India in particular as enthusiasts for nuclear-powered subs, and notes that India plans to eventually build about half a dozen of them as strategic nuclear weapon platforms. Argentina is another state which has recently announced its intention to develop nuclear submarine propulsion. Shipman mentions that “modern diesel submarines have proliferated over the last 25 years,” and that “as many as 39 countries have diesel boats.” The implication might have been that the proliferation of diesel submarines shows that other states have recognized their advantages while the United States continues to ignore them. Yet it seems clear that at least some of these states (such as the ones mentioned above) would have nuclear propulsion for their submarines if they could do so.

It is important to keep these disadvantages in mind, as well as the significant benefits derived from nuclear propulsion, and to consider the most appropriate uses for diesels. Diesels are best used in areas closer to shore, and their comparatively shorter range and endurance make them somewhat less suitable for long-term reconnaissance missions or for traversing vast expanses of open ocean to fulfill their missions. Their slower speeds might make them more appropriate for defending against other vessels closer to their bases. The need for the U.S. Navy to project power around the world limits the usefulness of diesel subs, given these drawbacks.

The Navy’s nuclear submarines provide both a virtually invulnerable deterrent force in the form of its missile boats, and a persistent attack capability in the form of its attack subs. These assets should continue to form the core of the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet. Yet Schmitt and Shipman are correct in their assessment of the strategic challenge the Navy faces in ensuring it has enough vessels to fulfill its tasks. An alternative to the diesel option (mentioned, but not favored by Schmitt) might be unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). These would be cheaper than building more nuclear subs, and would be able to fulfill “’dull and dangerous’ missions” that are currently done by some attack submarines. Although the effectiveness of UUVs have yet to be fully realized, investment in this area may make more sense than building a new fleet of diesel submarines. A realistic and balanced assessment of the capabilities of various alternatives vis a vis nuclear subs should yield a better sense of which benefits can be achieved by their adoption.
 
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Here is a question for the in-house military experts.

SSN we know are the last answer in submarine technology. They have an unlimited endurance, greater submerging depth and can be deployed anywhere. But countries like Germany had come up with a unique tech of their own - AIP or air independent propulsion.

Diesel-electric submarines need to surface every now and then to recharge and thus are at a disadvantage against SSNs. But AIP powered SSKs do not have the disability, they are powered by fuel cells (if I am not mistaken) and hence don't need to break cover.

Unlimited endurance of SSN sounds good on paper but there is a hitch. Humans who run the SSNs have a limited endurance. An SSN may run continuously for 10-50 years but the humans will need supplies eg. food. So as AIP powered SSKs get more advanced will the gap between the two become obsolete?

Plus in the shallow waters who hold the edge? Bigger submarines tend to have issues in shallow waters and SSNs have a relatively bigger size compared to SSK. Also SSKs are more silent in comparison to SSN.

So what should a navy aspire for, the big SSN or the more quieter AIP powered SSK?
 
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Here is a question for the in-house military experts.

SSN we know are the last answer in submarine technology. They have an unlimited endurance, greater submerging depth and can be deployed anywhere. But countries like Germany had come up with a unique tech of their own - AIP or air independent propulsion.

Diesel-electric submarines need to surface every now and then to recharge and thus are at a disadvantage against SSNs. But AIP powered SSKs do not have the disability, they are powered by fuel cells (if I am not mistaken) and hence don't need to break cover.

Unlimited endurance of SSN sounds good on paper but there is a hitch. Humans who run the SSNs have a limited endurance. An SSN may run continuously for 10-50 years but the humans will need supplies eg. food. So as AIP powered SSKs get more advanced will the gap between the two become obsolete?

Plus in the shallow waters who hold the edge? Bigger submarines tend to have issues in shallow waters and SSNs have a relatively bigger size compared to SSK. Also SSKs are more silent in comparison to SSN.

So what should a navy aspire for, the big SSN or the more quieter AIP powered SSK?

There are some SSNs which can attain speed of 40 Knots.

Plus SSNs can carry more payload than SSKs.

Till a SSK can do it, possiblity of what you have suggested will not happen.
 
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There are some SSNs which can attain speed of 40 Knots.

Plus SSNs can carry more payload than SSKs.

Till a SSK can do it, possiblity of what you have suggested will not happen.

A fast submarine has its risks, detection by sonar. A still submarine is the hardest to detect. I believe subs move as slow as possible. In any case 40 knots cannot outrun modern anti-sub weapons.
 
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Here is a question for the in-house military experts.

SSN we know are the last answer in submarine technology. They have an unlimited endurance, greater submerging depth and can be deployed anywhere. But countries like Germany had come up with a unique tech of their own - AIP or air independent propulsion.

Diesel-electric submarines need to surface every now and then to recharge and thus are at a disadvantage against SSNs. But AIP powered SSKs do not have the disability, they are powered by fuel cells (if I am not mistaken) and hence don't need to break cover.

Unlimited endurance of SSN sounds good on paper but there is a hitch. Humans who run the SSNs have a limited endurance. An SSN may run continuously for 10-50 years but the humans will need supplies eg. food. So as AIP powered SSKs get more advanced will the gap between the two become obsolete?

Plus in the shallow waters who hold the edge? Bigger submarines tend to have issues in shallow waters and SSNs have a relatively bigger size compared to SSK. Also SSKs are more silent in comparison to SSN.

So what should a navy aspire for, the big SSN or the more quieter AIP powered SSK?
SSK In shallow or regional water I would prefer SSK over SSN as they are more quiet & stealthy than SSN. Due to AIP SSK move only at 4 or 5 knot/hour so, they are incapable in escort but good in silent hunting.

SSN are queens of open seas . They can do escort, reconnaissance, land attack etc many other role.
 
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It really depends on what your nations naval strategy is. For example the U.S. Navy uses an all-nuclear force because it wants to have a global presence. And since an SSN has longer endurance, VLS for cruise missiles, Intelligence gathering, special forces insertion, and higher speeds, it fits their requirements while still being very quiet (somewhat like AIP subs) because of advanced tech in noise reduction. SSs and SSKs do not. However if we look at the Russian navy they do not want to have as much as a global presence as the U.S. Navy therefore they have a mix of advanced SSKs (i.e Lada,Kilo-class) and SSNs (i.e Yasen,Akula-class, Which are still very quiet like the ones the USN has). Keep in mind that SSKs are hunter-killer subs, they can't go fast or deep so they wait silently in shallow water for their prey approach, and then ambush. I hope this answered your question.
 
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