Deepening Crisis in Afghanistan
Najmuddin A Shaikh
In my column last week, I had expressed the fear that the allegations of election fraud would further divide Afghanistan rather than give added legitimacy to a re-elected President Karzai. Developments over the last week have only strengthened the basis for this apprehension.
Abdullah Abdullah has been able to bring to Kabul a group of leaders from the Bariz tribe from the Shorabak District of Kandahar province to make the allegation that even while not a polling station opened in the district and not a single vote was cast, the ballot boxes had been stuffed by officials working under the direction of the presidents brother Ahmad Wali Karzai. The results communicated to the Election Commission showed that 23,900 votes had been cast in the district in favour of Karzai with not one vote going to his opponent Abdullah Abdullah, who ten days earlier had received an endorsement from the Bariz tribe the principal inhabitants of Shorabak District.
These claims may be an exaggeration. Even Karzais brother must have known that such results could only be regarded as fraudulent but the large grain of truth that the allegation undoubtedly contains gives a fair indication of how Karzais supporters and officials have sought to make assurance double sure.
This has also made largely irrelevant the complaints that the Karzai campaign has made about vote rigging and ballot stuffing in Panjshir and other northern districts by Abdullah supporters even thought there is no doubt that this too has happened albeit in a smaller area and with far less effectiveness. The charges against Abdullah are important, however, because they show that Marshal Qasim Fahim, Karzais vice-presidential candidate was not able to prevent vote rigging in favour of Abdullah despite his theoretical clout in the Panjshir Valley and other northern districts.
The number of complaints registered has risen from the 650 I talked of last week to more than 2,650, and in place of the 50 that were considered serious enough to affect the election outcome, there are now 650 that are seen in this light. The election commission has now said that it will entertain no more such complaints.
The declaration of results from partial vote counts has also been delayed. The last result, with 60 percent of the vote counted on Tuesday evening put Karzai comfortably ahead with 47.3% to 32.6% for his opponent. It seems however that the election commission will not be in a position to announce the final results by September 17 as originally envisaged because this would require the investigation at the very least of the 650 serious complaints. Even the completion of the vote count by September 7 appears to be in doubt.
Most importantly, Abdullah Abdullah and other contenders have emphatically rejected suggestions that they join a Karzai-led government; something I felt the Americans would work towards. At the same time, while Abdullah Abdullah has said that he will pursue all legal means to contest the alleged fraud; his supporters in Mazar-e-Sharif hitherto regarded as a Dostum stronghold have threatened mass demonstrations. This, as also Gen Dostums departure from Afghanistan immediately after the conclusion of the elections rather than waiting for the results, showed perhaps that Dostums hold on the Uzbek vote has weakened and that Mazar-e-Sharif and Shibergan were no longer areas where he could dictate election outcomes.
The reports of Richard Holbrooke having had a stormy meeting with Karzai have been denied but one thing is clear. Holbrooke did suggest that a runoff between the two principal contenders required under Afghan law if no candidate emerged with a clear majority would possibly help quell the concerns about vote rigging etc.
Talking to the press before the meeting of the Afghan envoys in Paris, Holbrooke again said that the United States would have no problem with a runoff election. Is this what is likely to happen? The Afghan Independent Election Commissions map shows that while the vote count in the North and the West has been between 60% to 90% the vote count from much of the Pashtun dominated South and East of the country is less than 46%. One can assume that unless the Commission starts a massive rejection of votes from this area, Karzai will easily get the 50% + 1 that he needs for a first round victory.
The question then will become whether the examination of the complaints becomes the basis for calling for a runoff, and if so, what will be the consequences.
The difficulty of holding another election will be formidable. The very fact that a runoff is taking place would boost the standing of the Taliban. In a largely oral society, anecdotes of the horrific punishments meted out by those who had dared to vote will ensure that voter turnout is much lower than the 30% reported this time. Most of these votes would be cast in areas that are non-Pashtun and the election would then become unrepresentative. Can this problem be overcome, and if it is, what will happen?
In the August 20 election, Abdullahs seeking of votes may have been helped by the disillusionment of the people with the corruption and ineptitude of the Karzai administration and hatred for the occupying forces, but the Pashtun had the choice of rejecting Karzai by voting for a host of other Pashtun contenders most prominently Ashraf Ghani, whose performance has been surprisingly abysmal. The fact that Abdullah Abdullah had a Pashtun father could not detract from the perception that he was the nominee of the Tajiks and an Iran-financed remnant of the Northern Alliance.
The fact that Abdullah Abdullah got an endorsement from an important tribe of a Kandahar district was a singular exception to the rule that votes are cast in Afghanistan on tribal and ethnic lines. It would not be surprising if reports now emerged of large sums of money having been expended by Abdullah Abdullah or his patrons to secure this endorsement
On the other side, Karzai was not totally rejected in the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara areas, only because of his allies Fahim, Dostum and Khalil and because of the fairly substantial Pashtun pockets in the North. These allies may still stand with him in a runoff and in that case he is likely to get the majority of votes. As regards the Pashtun vote, to paraphrase an old American foreign policy dictum, the Pashtuns are likely to take the view that he is a corrupt and inept SOB but at least he is our SOB.
The elephant in the room however is going to be the problem of ensuring turnout in the Taliban areas, which have grown substantially and where the recent operations such as Operation Panther Claw have not been able to reduce the ability of the Taliban to intimidate and coerce the population.
For the Americans and their NATO allies, the election fiasco has come at a particularly difficult time; more on this in my next column. Despite the developments of the last week, strong misgivings about Karzai, about his reduced legitimacy, about the international ridicule this would invite, and most importantly the prospect of instability, the Americans will opt for using their influence to persuade Abdullah and others to accept the result of what was clearly a very flawed election. This would an imperative to maintain even the dwindling support that President Obama has for what he calls a war of necessity.
The writer is a former foreign secretary