Afghanistan, in a new light

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Americans argue they have the most benign of motivations for being in Afghanistan, that they want to help Afghanistan be a nation-state --lets grant the American all of this - so why is it that the American faces such opposition?

Some have argued that what the American has done by intervention in Afghanistan is basically taken a side in a civil war and that this is the reason the US has been unable to make bigger strides in Afghanistan.

On our own forum, there are a variety of explanations, with the Pakistani element arguing that it is the alienation of the Pashtun majority that is a problem the US has not been sensitive to, others have argued that it is Pakistani intelligence services that stoke insurrection and resistance, still others have argued that Islamist international is to blame.

Does the piece below help us understand the situation any better:

Note to readers:= The author is well known in Pakistani circles as being rabidly anti-Pakistan - readers can review his pieces in the early years of the Afghan intervention - while the authors attitude about Pakistan have not changed and more than likely will not, his attitude about the causes of failure certainly have changed


August 17, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
Afghanistan’s Tyranny of the Minority
By SELIG S. HARRISON
Washington

AS the debate intensifies within the Obama administration over how to stabilize Afghanistan, one major problem is conspicuously missing from the discussion: the growing alienation of the country’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtun tribes, who make up an estimated 42 percent of the population of 33 million. One of the basic reasons many Pashtuns support the Taliban insurgency is that their historic rivals, ethnic Tajiks, hold most of the key levers of power in the government.

Tajiks constitute only about 24 percent of the population, yet they largely control the armed forces and the intelligence and secret police agencies that loom over the daily lives of the Pashtuns. Little wonder that in the run-up to Thursday’s presidential election, much of the Taliban propaganda has focused on the fact that President Hamid Karzai’s top running mate is a hated symbol of Tajik power: the former defense minister Muhammad Fahim.

Mr. Fahim and his allies have been entrenched in Kabul since American forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001 with the help of his Tajik militia, the Northern Alliance, which was based in the Panjshir valley north of the capital. A clique of these Tajik officers, known as the Panjshiris, took control of the key security posts with American backing, and they have been there ever since. Washington pushed Mr. Karzai for the presidency to give a Pashtun face to the regime, but he has been derided from the start by his fellow Pashtuns with a play on his name, “Panjshir-zai.”

“They get the dollars, and we get the bullets,” is the common refrain among Pashtuns critical of the government. “Dollars” refers to the economic enrichment of Tajiks and allied minority ethnic groups through an inside track on aid contracts. The “bullets” are the anti-Taliban airstrikes and ground operations in Pashtun areas in the south and east of the country.

While Mr. Karzai has tried to soften the image of Tajik domination by appointing Pashtuns to nominally important positions, much of the real power continues to rest with Tajiks. For example, he appointed a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, to replace Mr. Fahim as defense minister — but a trusted Panjshiri, Bismillah Khan, remained an army chief of staff and kept fellow Tajiks as his top corps commanders and in other vital spots, including director of military intelligence, army inspector general and director of counternarcotics forces.

The National Security Directorate, which oversees the civilian and military secret police and intelligence agencies, is headed by a Northern Alliance veteran, Amrullah Saleh. Michael Semple, a former adviser to the European Union representative in Kabul, told me that Mr. Saleh had appointed “some credible Pashtun provincial directors” but that “the intelligence services are still basically seen as anti-Pashtun and pro-Northern Alliance because the power structure in the directorate is still clearly dominated by the original Northern Alliance group,” and above all because “they also have control of the prosecution, judicial and detention branches of the security services.”

The Obama administration is pinning its hopes for an eventual exit from Afghanistan on building an Afghan National Army capable of defeating the insurgency. But a recent study by the RAND Corporation for the Pentagon, noting a “surplus of Tajiks in the A.N.A. officer and NCO corps,” warned of the “challenge of achieving ethnic balance, given the difficulty of recruiting in the Pashtun area.” The main reasons it is difficult to recruit Pashtuns, one United Nations official recently said, are that “70 percent of the army’s battalion commanders are Tajiks” and that the Taliban intimidates the families of recruits. It doesn’t help that many of the army units sent to the Pashtun areas consist primarily of Tajiks who do not speak Pashto.

Pashtun kings ruled Afghanistan from its inception in 1747 until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973. Initially limited to the Pashtun heartland in the south and east, the Afghan state gradually incorporated the neighboring Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek areas to the north and west.

It was understandable, then, that Pashtun leaders tried to make the last king, Zahir Shah, the president of the interim government that ruled from 2002 until the first presidential election in 2004. The king, revered by the Pashtuns, was to have limited powers, with Mr. Karzai, as prime minister, in day-to-day control. The Tajiks, however, objected, and on the eve of the national assembly that set up the interim government, the Bush administration’s special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, sided with the Tajiks and had a bitter 40-minute showdown with the king, who then withdrew his candidacy.

Pashtun nationalism alone does not explain the Taliban’s strength, which is fueled by drug money, Islamist fervor, corrupt warlords, hatred of the American occupation and the hidden hand of Pakistani intelligence agencies. But the psychological cement that holds the disparate Taliban factions together is opposition to Tajik dominance in Kabul. Until the power of the Panjshiris is curbed, no amount of American money or manpower will bring the insurgency to an end.

Selig S. Harrison is the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

 

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Seven steps to peace in Afghanistan
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KABUL - Election officials in Afghanistan on Friday began counting the votes cast in Thursday's presidential and provincial polls. In capitals from Kabul to Islamabad to Washington, officials are counting the days until they can engage the Taliban and bring them into the mainstream political process.

Approximately 40%-50% of the 17 million registered voters made it to the 6,202 polling centers scattered across the country, according to a senior election official, Zekria Barakzai. This was in defiance of calls from the Taliban to boycott the vote, although at least 26 people were killed in election-related violence in 73 attacks in 15 provinces.

Preliminary results are expected within the next few days. Ahead of the vote, President Hamid Karzai led his main challengers - former foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah, former planning minister Ramzan Bashardost and former finance minister Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai - by some way. It is not clear whether Karzai will win the 51% of the votes cast needed to avoid a second-round runoff.

Abdullah's team has already complained of "very large-scale" fraud in at least three of 34 provinces, according to the Associated Press.

Others have cast doubt on the credibility of the elections. But this is not so much the point. Whoever wins or loses, the shadow of the Taliban hangs across the country. After eight years since they were thrown from power, it is now accepted by American and European leaders that some form of reconciliation with the Taliban is the only way in which the insurgency can be defeated.

The head of the United States Central Command, General David Petraeus, told the BBC this week that "there would have to be talks with insurgents at a local level, though probably not at this stage with senior Taliban leaders". British Foreign Secretary David Miliband also indicated in a recent speech that the government should be prepared to talk to moderate tribal leaders associated with the Taliban.

Senior officials in Kabul have told Asia Times Online that the process of talking with elements of the Taliban is already underway. More substantial talks would most likely take place outside the country, with Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia possible venues.

The momentum for talks gathered pace in the few months before Thursday's elections with the realization that counter-insurgency operations alone are not the solution. This is despite the fact that tens of thousands of additional troops have been pumped into the country this year, bringing the total number to more than 100,000.

Multiple channels are being used to get the process moving. Some have involved senior American officials and military commanders and the Afghan government, which has roped in former Taliban leaders such as Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Abdul Wakeel Muttawakil and Senator Moulvi Arsala Rehami (above).

A former British and European Union senior diplomat, Irishman Michael Semple, expelled from Afghanistan in 2007 for talking to the Taliban without approval from Afghan (read US) officials, has also been involved. He now lives in the Pakistani capital Islamabad and has been using his contacts with the Taliban on behalf of London. Semple is married to a Pakistani woman, spent 30 years in Afghanistan, speaks fluent Dari and is a self-declared Muslim.

Taliban sources recently told Asia Times Online that all backroom negotiations had ended a few months ago when Taliban leader Mullah Omar told Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz, through the Taliban's supreme commander Mullah Bradar, that such talks were not possible.

"It would be wrong to interpret that message [from Mullah Omar] as stopping the talks," Rehami told Asia Times Online during an interview at his Kabul residence, while confirming that a message had been relayed.

Rehami should know.

He is from the Paktika tribe which originates along the border with Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal area. He was minister of religious affairs during the Taliban's regime in the late 1990s, but after the invasion of 2001 he severed his ties with the Taliban and moved to Islamabad. Rehami later returned to Afghanistan to throw his support behind the Karzai government. He is now a senator.

Although two other former Taliban officials are involved in the initiative to talk to the Taliban, Rehami enjoys some advantages. Mullah Zaeef is not trusted by the Americans as they see him as still sympathetic to the Taliban, while former foreign minister Muttawakil is not trusted by some of the Taliban.

Rehami uses his extensive tribal connections to create channels of communication with the Taliban. He is also in almost daily contact with the British Embassy in Kabul, as well as mixing comfortably with Western diplomats.

"I can confirm that seven stages have been agreed on by the Afghan government to deal with the Taliban, and at present the negotiations are in the first and primary phase," Rehami said, without mentioning the obvious inevitable involvement of certain Western governments.

"It would be incorrect to say that the talks have been terminated. You have to appreciate that this is a very complex situation on both sides. From the Afghan government side, several countries are behind [it] and everybody has their own agenda. The same on the Taliban side. There are several groups, like al-Qaeda, the Uzbeks and other nationals who often intervene and influence the process. Therefore, we need to deal with multiple factors from both sides," Rehami said.

"All previous manipulations of the past apart, I assure you that within a week of the election process being over, a major change in behavior is forthcoming from both sides. This is the result of our working with the Taliban.

"The Americans also don't have much choice but to show flexibility. It is because of their rigid behavior that the Taliban have not been suppressed, in fact, they increased [their activities]. Previously, they were only in Afghanistan, where they are a serious threat. But they are gearing their activities for the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Americans realize that they have to move quickly," Rehami said.

"After last year [talks involving the Taliban in the Saudi city of Mecca] a regular dialogue process started and we opened up channels of communication with the Taliban. But suddenly, the new [Barack] Obama administration announced its review on Afghanistan and there were suggestions of new tactics to be implemented in the conflict against the Taliban. Mullah Omar's response to that was one of tit-for-tat. So he also announced a war strategy and informed Prince Muqrin that no more talks were possible. But that was more a political posture than anything real," Rehami said.

All the same, Rehami conceded that since that announcement, nobody had been able to hold direct talks with the Taliban at a senior level.

"Michael Semple tried to use his contacts, but these were at a low level. At the maximum, he could negotiate at the level of Gramser ulaswali [the Gramser district in Helmand province in Afghanistan] with very low-level Taliban commanders.

"I did not get the chance to directly hold talks with any senior-level Taliban commanders, but being a tribal leader, I have been communicating with the Taliban leaders through relatives and common friends. In that process, we have made progress. We have exchanged written messages in which we have put our demands. We have also succeeded in getting approval from the Americans and British for some concessions for the Taliban if they agree to reconciliation," Rehami said.

"We now have the mandate to bargain with the Taliban, as a first step, for them to stop attacks on Afghanistan's infrastructure, such as bridges, buildings and dams. They would also stop suicide attacks in public places. But this is a conflict, and it is not easy to implement demands.

"If the Taliban comply with this primary demand, then the next steps [out of seven] would begin and the Taliban would be more facilitated. For instance, the Taliban would be allowed to open offices in countries like Turkey, the UAE and Saudi Arabia from where regular rounds of talks could be held between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

"These talks would include issues like the withdrawal of troops and the setting up of a new political government with the participation of the Taliban and other insurgent groups," Rehami said.

Apart from talks with the Taliban, a channel of negotiations is still going on with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (see Holbrooke reaches out to Hekmatyar Asia Times Online, April10, 2009). Hekmatyar is the leader of the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA). The 61-year-old engineer from Kunduz province and his anti-government fighters are responsible for large numbers of attacks against Afghan and international forces, mainly in the northeast of the country.

Former members of the HIA who are now involved in the political process are in contact with Hekmatyar. Also playing a part is former interim prime minister and one of the pioneers of the Islamic movement from mid-1960s, Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai.

Ahmadzai confirmed to Asia Times Online that he had recently exchanged messages with Hekmatyar and that he was trying to pave the way for his peaceful return to Kabul.

Hekmatyar was a mujahideen commander in the fight against the Soviets in the 1980s and a key player in the bloody civil war that followed the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. He twice served as premier before the Taliban came to power in 1996.

"The case of reconciliation with Hekmatyar is far easier than that of the Taliban. His party is registered and present in parliament in big numbers. All important ministries are held by his men. Several governors of Afghanistan are his former loyalists. If he reconciles, there will be no difficulty in including him in the political mainstream. And also, we have now agreed to his viewpoint, that foreign troops should announce a schedule for withdrawal," Rehami said.

"The thing is, they are all Pashtuns who are part of the insurgency and we are trying to convince the Western forces that Afghanistan can only be ruled by Pashtuns. There is no solution possible without them. Hamid Karzai cannot be reckoned as a Pashtun leader as he does not have any following among the Pashtun. He is only an individual without influence. Statecraft simply does not work like that," Rehami said.

Rehami believes that all Taliban commanders are now in favor of reconciliation, the only problem being a very stubborn Mullah Omar.

"We are slowly spreading our communication, we are talking to all Taliban commanders, not just with Mullah Omar. Our emphasis, however, is to talk to members of the shura-e-Rahbari [leadership council of the Taliban]. If we convince them all, Mullah Omar will have to follow their advice because he cannot fight alone."

All the same, Mullah Omar has a habit of getting his way. In 2001, the Taliban shura, looking down the barrel of a gun following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, wanted to expel al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was a guest in Afghanistan and the main reason the US wanted to "bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age".

To a man, the shura - which included Rehami - wanted bin Laden out, but Mullah Omar prevailed. Bin Laden stayed, and the Taliban were driven from power.

Ultimately, this will be the man who has to be persuaded, and the first steps towards realizing this are well under way, regardless of which way Thursday's votes add up.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

 

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The US has a plan for Afghanistan
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KABUL - Afghan President Hamid Karzai's chances of being re-elected on Thursday for a second four-year term received a major boost on Monday with the return from exile of ethnic Uzbek warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who has added his considerable weight to Karzai's campaign.

In the bigger picture, though, whether or not Karzai is re-elected, Afghanistan's troubled neighbor Pakistan, and its United States ally, are preparing the ground for a broad-based post-election consensus government that it is envisaged would play a pivotal role in defeating the Taliban-led insurgency.

The plan is based on one implemented in Pakistan last year which saw a pro-US civilian government elected into power. That government in Islamabad has had a high level of success in cracking down on militancy in the tribal areas.

The latest polls show Karzai some way ahead of his main rival, former foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah, but it remains doubtful that Karzai has enough support to win 51% of the votes cast, which he needs to avoid a runoff with the second-placed candidate. Other challengers include former planning minister Ramzan Bashardost and former finance minister Ashraf Ghani.

Dostum went into exile in Turkey eight months ago over allegations of beating up a political rival. His unexpected return will solidify the support of the million-strong Uzbek community behind Karzai. Last week, the Pashtun president received a pledge of support from another powerful figure - Tajik Ismail Khan, a mujahideen hero from the western city of Herat.

Regional positioning
The Pakistani ambassador to Kabul recently visited the Panjshir Valley in north-central Afghanistan, where he paid his respects to the shrine of slain Tajik Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was known as the "Lion of Panjshir". The envoy met with top leaders of the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan, an Islamic political party, as well as with Abdullah.

The meeting was significant in that Abdullah is traditionally portrayed in Pakistan as close to India and Iran. Islamabad is clearly resurrecting the ties the Pakistani military establishment once had with northern leaders. These links were broken when Pakistan threw its support behind the Taliban when they came to power in the mid-1990s. The wheel has turned full circle, as Pakistan is also pulling back from its support of the the Pashtun Taliban.

"This is more or less the same plan the Americans designed in Pakistan in 2007 when they finalized a plan of a broad-based, pro-West secular and liberal coalition alliance to be elected in the 2008 elections to form a consensus government which would provide the support to the Pakistan army for its coordination in the US-led 'war on terror'. It was planned that the whole setup would be overseen by a civilian Pakistani president," a senior Western diplomat told Asia Times Online in Kabul.

"An identical plan has been drawn for Afghanistan and all regional and international powers are on board for that purpose. The plan involves a role for all major [Afghan] players and there is a chance that after the elections, parliament will be more and more empowered and that the position of chief executive will be created - he would work in coordination with parliament and the president," the diplomat continued.

"It is also planned to escalate a training program for at least 100,000 Afghan soldiers who would be able to work independently within the next two years. At the same time, intense efforts are going on in Pakistan and Afghanistan to strike as many deals as possible with the lower and middle cadre of the Taliban. The aim is to get them to lay down their arms and be a part of the next parliamentary elections. There is a high hope that through this plan an Afghan turnaround will be possible in the coming years," the diplomat said.

The US has tried various approaches in the eight years since it led the invasion of Afghanistan that threw the Taliban out of power. Yet the insurgency rages stronger than ever. Similarly, many policies were adopted in Pakistan to crack militancy in the tribal areas, which feeds directly into Afghanistan. Finally, it appears the civilian government led by President Asif Ali Zardari is doing the business.

This is the rationale behind the concept of a broad-based government in Kabul that would incorporate the main players, especially through the establishment of a "chief executive" position. Karzai, win or lose, would be involved, as would Abdullah, and most likely heavyweights such as Bashardost and Ghani.

Afghanistan is not Pakistan, though, and bringing assorted warlords and traditional tribal leaders into one cohesive administration will be no easy task.

Britain's General Sir Richard Dannatt, chief of the general staff, has qualified his remarks that Afghanistan will require development assistance for "twenty, thirty, forty years - who knows how long it will take"?

But it will take time, and during that time the Taliban will not be sitting idly by, even if, as Western diplomatic circles in Kabul would have it, their promises to disrupt Thursday's polls turn out to be the climax of their insurgency.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

 

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Powers line up to stir Afghanistan's pot
By M K Bhadrakumar

In his distinguished diplomatic career spanning four decades, there is not a trace of record to show that Richard Holbrooke, United States special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, dabbled in energy security issues. His current visit to Pakistan - en route to Afghanistan - has been officially projected as aimed at helping his host country find a way to overcome its electricity shortage.

Holbrooke admitted to Pakistani journalists on Monday in Islamabad that the energy crisis in their country had been building up over a quarter century and he could not be expected to solve it in a few weeks. But nonetheless he came as the US wanted to send a message that it was concerned about the Pakistani people's genuine problems and would do all it could to be of help.

Meanwhile, he delayed his departure for Kabul. And he took more meetings - with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman and the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) leader Qazi Hussein Ahmad. But that's intriguing, as neither the Maulana nor the Qazi can be an interlocutor on energy security. Their forte lies elsewhere - militant Islam, cross-border terrorism and jihad in Afghanistan.


As Holbrooke kept himself busy in Islamabad, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, also arrived in nearby Rawalpindi - the twin city of Islamabad - for a meeting with Pakistani army chief General Pervez Ashraf Kiani.

Holbrooke's "cover" has been blown and his real brief is exposed - evolving a joint approach with Pakistan apropos the next moves to be made on the Afghan political chessboard. Indeed, regional capitals are watching the next US-Pakistani move.

Neighboring India refused to receive Holbooke. Delhi has its reasons. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned the country in a major speech on Monday that "there is credible information of ongoing plans of terrorist groups in Pakistan to carry out fresh attacks" on India similar to the fedayeen-style terrorist strike on Mumbai last November that claimed the lives of nearly 200 people. He also spoke of a "surge" in Pakistan-aided militant activities in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Evidently, Delhi disagrees with Holbrooke's mission - courting Islamabad in the search for regional security and stability.

Tehran, too, harbors misgivings. Holbrooke inter alia remarked just before his trip to Pakistan that Tehran had a "legitimate role to play in the resolution of the Afghan issue". He said, "They [Iranians] are a factor, and to pretend that they aren't, as was often done in the past, doesn't make sense." But, he quickly added, "We don't have any direct contacts with them on this."

Holbrooke seemed to indulge in some kite-flying. It serves both the US and Pakistani interests to project that their axis enjoys "regional consensus". But Tehran ignored Holbrooke's charm offensive. Tehran has taken note of the robust campaign by the US and Pakistan with a view to somehow getting the Afghan presidential election postponed on the plea that the security situation didn't allow a free and fair poll. The polls are scheduled for Thursday.

Tehran saw through the US ploy. A postponed election may not get held for a very long time. Credit goes to Tehran in discouraging any postponement. Tehran is now keeping its fingers crossed about the possibility that the US might now engineer an "Iran-like situation" to muddy waters and install a surrogate power structure in Kabul. The Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan, Fadd Hossein Maleki, publicly warned on Monday about post-election manipulation by outside powers.

He said: "We are concerned about the events after the elections. We have seen signals that there might be problems. In this regard, we have begun serious consultations with the UN officials and a number of European ambassadors in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan authorities."

Maleki would have spoken publicly on such a sensitive issue only with clearance from Tehran. Obviously, Tehran estimates it is best to warn the US and Pakistan, two countries with the capacity to enact an "Iran-like" situation, that any such attempt would complicate the Afghan situation.

Again, Kayhan newspaper, which is identified with the religious establishment, commented: "[Afghan President] Hamid Karzai is truly in a bit of a corner ... Challenges are mounting from every side ... Presidential hopeful Abdullah Abdullah's camp has been acting most peculiarly." The commentary then came out with strong endorsement of Karzai's alliance with the so-called warlords as embodying an approach "to keep the country from falling apart", which recognizes that "Afghanistan is and has been a federation of provinces ruled over by strongmen".

It concluded: "Afghanistan can only be governed via federal rule and Mr Karzai understands the latter fact very well but he can't come out and say it to his Western patrons. His balancing act sometimes falls short of Western expectations and at other times gets right up Afghan warlords' nose. And criticisms immediately follow from either party. The West has sought to 'clear, hold and build' a functioning Afghan state on the Western model in which citizens' assent to a social contract that imposes social and political discipline in exchange for allowing a relatively wide berth in the personal realm. This places the Americans, right from the start, in total opposition to the last thousand or so years of Afghan history, just as it did the Soviets."

Tehran has every reason to be pleased with Karzai's close alliance with erstwhile mujahideen leaders such as Ismail Khan, Mohammed Fahim, Karim Khalili, Mohammed Mohaqiq and Rashid Dostum. Tehran obviously had a hand in persuading Dostum to return from Turkey - defying US warnings - and galvanizing the Jumbish party just in time to boost Karzai's electoral prospects in the Amu Darya region. The Uzbekis and Hazara Shi'ites account for well over a quarter of the Afghan population.

Besides, Ismail Khan, who is close to Tehran, is allied to Burhanuddin Rabbani. Khan's support for Karzai at this juncture undercuts the entire US-Pakistani strategy behind fielding Abdullah, which was based on the premise that he would garner Tajik votes. Thus, if Karzai's prospects have distinctly improved on the eve of the elections, Tehran has a hand in it.

Washington is aghast that its entire stratagem to prevent a first-round victory by Karzai is in serious jeopardy. (Karzai, the front-runner, would need to win 51% of the total votes cast to avoid a run-off with the second-placed candidate.)

In an extraordinary public vent of choler, the US State Department said in Washington: "We have made clear to the government of Afghanistan our serious concern regarding the return of Mr Dostum and any prospective role in today's Afghanistan." President Barack Obama has already asked his national security team to give further information on Dostum's "background", including concerns that he might have been involved in the deaths of a significant number of Taliban prisoners of war in 2001 during the US invasion.

Holbrooke faces a huge challenge. If Karzai secures a clear-cut victory in the first round on Thursday, it will bring into power a coalition that the US will find extremely hard to control as there will be multiple power centers.

This is where need may arise to create an "Iran-like situation". Significantly, noted Pakistani author Ahmed Rashid, who is wired to the Pentagon and Holbrooke's entourage, underscored on Monday that a "serious credibility gap haunts" the Afghan election.

Rashid anticipated the election would be marred by controversy over low turnout and allegations of rigging. "If there is a low turnout - under 30% - there is every chance that a lot of the candidates will say that we do not accept these elections and we want a new election."

However, Iranians will ask: "Since when is it that Afghans became such serious practitioners of Western-style democracy?" As Kayhan newspaper pointed out, "Fornication, bare flesh and a descent into Western decadence - these Afghan definitions of democracy expose how little the foreign concept has permeated the Afghan psyche ... As long as they [Afghans] are allowed to fornicate freely, Westerners will also believe that that they have embraced freedom and won't so much mind being slaves ... In Afghan society - where clan, tribe, hierarchy and tradition trump all - the equation of democratic values with those of an irresponsible hedonism and even nihilism have tangled up."

But Rashid, who knows Afghanistan like the palm of his hand, is definitive: "Now, I think after this election, no matter which way it goes, there are going to be huge charges and counter-charges of rigging." He estimates that if a runoff becomes necessary, "it will be a very dangerous moment for Afghanistan ... Now, that will create a gap of two months, there will be chaos and political confusion."

This is where the "operational role" of the Pakistani intelligence (ISI - Inter-Services Intelligence) will assume critical importance. The Pakistani intelligence disfavors Karzai's victory. It has scores to settle with almost all the "warlords" who rally behind Karzai - Fahim, Khalili, Mohaqiq, Dostum, Ismail Khan - and they happen to be in the rogues' gallery in the Western world, too. Besides, these "warlords" will upset the US-British-Saudi-Pakistani game plan to co-opt the Taliban into the Afghan power structure, as they know Taliban leader Mullah Omar and his followers will go after them one day or another.

Equally, the Pakistani security establishment and the Obama administration will consider it hard to stomach that a democratically elected government dominated by the Northern Alliance "warlords", who used to enjoy the support of Russia, Iran and India, may come to power in Kabul. The agenda of introducing Islamism for the remaking of Central Asia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion, the long-term military presence in Afghanistan - all these get disrupted.

Surely, no one needs to tell Holbrooke and his interlocutors in the Pakistani security establishment that when the destiny of the Afghan war and Obama's AfPak strategy hangs by a thread, they have a congruence of interests. Indeed, if ever there was a "do-or-die" situation, this is it.

The big question is: how do Holbrooke and the ISI tackle this common challenge? Rashid may have provided the clue.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey

 

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A curious and fluid game -- US and Pakistan were planning for a post Karzai Afghanistan - Iran wins again



Pakistan hoping for post-poll stability in Afghanistan

* CFR says Pakistan will like to project its influence into Afghanistan
* Islamabad sees Karzai as best option

Daily Times Monitor

LAHORE: Pakistan is looking for political and military stability in Afghanistan following the country’s second elections, said Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

When asked what was at stake for Islamabad in the Afghan presidential election, Markey said Pakistan was basically concerned with a stable Afghanistan.

“For Pakistan, the concern has to do with basic political and military stability in Afghanistan. The election is one piece in that process. From a Pakistan perspective, an Afghanistan that returns to deep instability as it has in the past, specifically in the 1990s, would be a cause for concern for Pakistan because it would probably bring greater instability inside Pakistan. An election that works and yields a legitimate government of some kind is the basic interest from a Pakistan perspective,” he said.

Influence: “The other side, of course, is that Pakistan would like to project its influence into Afghanistan. To the extent that various candidates offer different potential for Pakistan to do so and Islamabad is more or less a supporter for them. Pakistanis tend to see Karzai as maybe the best of the two serious options—the other being Abdullah Abdullah—simply because he’s a known n personality and a Pashtun who has a reasonably good working relationship with the current government in Islamabad”.

The Afghan presidential elections are seen as a crucial step forward in what US President Barack Obama has dubbed a “war of necessity.”

But Markey said many in Pakistan saw the polls “a bit of a sideshow and much less relevant or exciting than the last time around”. He said Islamabad would like a friendly government in Kabul that allowed Islamabad to project its influence in Afghanistan.

When asked about Pakistan’s concerns over Karzai’s close links with India and its ramifications for Islamabad, Markey said despite him getting along with President Asif Ali Zardari, Karzai was not seen “to be a friend, per se, of Pakistanis. He is perceived to have links to India. He studied in India. He’s been very critical of Pakistan in the past, particularly when President Pervez Musharraf was in charge. He’s not an easy ally from a Pakistani point of view, and he’s not prone to a lot of Pakistani influence”.

“But neither would Abdullah Abdullah be a great outcome from a Pakistani point of view. Although he’s half Pashtun, he’s also half Tajik. He’s most closely associated with the Northern Alliance and the former leader of that anti-Taliban mujahideen, Ahmad Shah Massood. He’s also a Panjshiri from the north of Afghanistan. None of these things make Abdullah Abdullah a particularly positive choice for Pakistan either,” the CFR expert said.

He said Pakistan was preoccupied with its own politics and security situation and many of its people did not think the Afghan elections were important enough. “From a Pakistani point of view, this Afghan election is getting attention, but not nearly what it once got and also not as much as it’s getting in Washington.”

Asked what effects a possible runoff or protests in Afghanistan over electoral outcome would have on Pakistan’s stability, Markey said “anything that contributes to instability in Afghanistan will have some spillover effect into Pakistan. The potential of a runoff means that we’ll have another month to six weeks of political uncertainty in Afghanistan, which contributes to opportunities for militants to continue causing trouble.

Under Afghan rules, if no candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote, a runoff between the top two candidates must be held within two weeks after the announcement of the election results.

“That all plays to the disadvantage of Pakistan. Aside from that, the real issue is simply whether this election provides a firm foundation for politics in Afghanistan going forward. If you see a lot of contentious activity during this period in between the first election and the second, it will raise more questions about legitimacy and make whatever government that comes out of this probably weaker than it would be if it won through a popular majority right from the outset,” he added. Markey said the election was unlikely to make significant improvements in Afghan governance that could help US counterinsurgency efforts in the region. “Because Karzai is likely to win, it is likely to yield something that looks more like continuity than change.”

 

[muse]

Exit strategy?? or Clash of Interests?

August 24, 2009
Mullen Issues Caution on Afghanistan
By BRIAN KNOWLTON

WASHINGTON — The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Sunday that conditions in Afghanistan were “deteriorating,” even as Afghans awaited results of their presidential election last week and as the new American commander in the region worked to complete a major progress assessment and perhaps to propose a further troop increase.

“I think it is serious and it is deteriorating,” Adm. Mike Mullen said on CNN’s “State of the Union,” “and I’ve said that over the past couple of years, that the Taliban insurgency has gotten better, more sophisticated, in their tactics.” Top American commanders have been making similar grim pronouncements for months, but Admiral Mullen’s remark came amid the election, the strategy review by General Stanley McChrystal and a steady decline in American public support for the war. Recent polls show those opposing the war now slightly outnumber those favoring it.

Admiral Mullen, who as chairman is the nation’s highest-ranking military officer, said that General McChrystal was still completing his review and had not yet requested additional troops on top of the 17,000 decided on earlier by President Obama. “His guidance from me and from the secretary of defense was to assess where you are and tell us what you need, and we’ll get to that point,” the admiral said.

A leading Republican voice on security matters, Senator John McCain of Arizona, said Sunday that he thought the general faced heavy pressure not to seek large numbers of additional troops, but he also said he did not think the pressure was coming from President Obama.

“I think there are great pressures on General McChrystal to reduce those estimates,” the senator said on ABC’s “This Week.”

“I don’t think it’s necessarily from the president, I think it’s from the people around him and others,” Mr. McCain said. “But I have confidence that he will make his most honest and best recommendations.”

Both the senator and Admiral Mullen said that they thought it important that serious signs of progress begin emerging in the next 12 to 18 months if the administration is to withstand public and congressional pressures to leave Afghanistan.

“I think you need to see a reversal of these very alarming and disturbing trends,” said Mr. McCain, who recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan.

The admiral counseled patience, noting on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that “we’re just getting the pieces in place of the president’s new strategy.”

“I don’t see this as a mission of endless drift,” he said. “We learned a lot of lessons from Iraq.”

 

[muse]

Gentle readers are invited to review the story below in light of the articles presented above, in particular, the US annoyance with MR. Karzai, and it's plans for a government of national unity which can unify all elements against the Talib:


Holbrooke ‘expects’ disputes over Afghan election

KABUL: Allegations of rigging and fraud are expected in the Afghan presidential election, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke said on Sunday. Holbrooke told AP Television News in the western city of Herat that observers should wait for the official complaints process to run its course before judging the vote’s legitimacy. “We have disputed elections in the United States. There may be some questions here,” he said. The top Afghan monitoring body said there were widespread problems with supposedly independent election officials at polling stations trying to influence the way people voted. The group also catalogued violations such as people using multiple voter cards so they could vote more than once, and underage voting. Holbrooke said the US government would wait for rulings from Afghanistan’s monitoring bodies – the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaint Commission – before trying to judge the legitimacy of the vote. ap

 

[muse]

Abdullah accuses Karzai of 'rigging' Afghan vote
Agencies
Published: August 23, 2009, 07:59

Kabul: Afghanstan President Hamid Karzai's challenger is accusing him of using the Afghan state to "rig" this week's election.

"He uses the state apparatus in order to rig an election," said Abdullah Abdullah, once Karzai’s foreign minister. "That is something which is not expected."

Both Abdullah and Karzai claim they are in the lead based on reports from campaign pollwatchers monitoring the count.

Officials of Abdullah's campaign have alleged fraud in several southern provinces where the insurgency is strongest and Karzai had been expected to run strong.

Abdullah said it "doesn't make the slightest difference" whether Karzai or his supporters ordered the alleged fraud.

Abdullah said that officials in Kandahar and Ghazni provinces stuffed ballot boxes in Karzai's favour in six districts. He also said his monitors were prevented from entering several voting sites.

"This is under his leadership that all these things are happening, and all those people which are responsible for this fraud in parts of the country are appointed by him,” he said.

Karzai's campaign spokesman Waheed Omar dismissed Abdullah's allegations and claimed the president's camp had submitted reports of fraud allegedly committed by Abdullah's followers to the election complaint commission.

"These are not new allegations. These were made even before the election took place," Omar said. "We have documented violations that were made by Abdullah's campaign team. But we believe our job is to report to the elections complaint commission ... We do not want to make a media propaganda campaign out of the violations we have documented."

 

[Gin ka Pakistan]

Afghan election is actually selection and the winners name will come from Washington soon. Election was a drama, no foreign observers, no International media coverage on large scale and Afghanistan has no correct database for its civilians. any one can vote hundred times at once with hundred different names, no check.

 

[muse]

After losing to Iran in Iraq, US prepares for another Iranian victory - that's why the 2nd round is so close to US policy makers, but Karzai seems to have preempted that, and so US will have in Karzai, a asset that, should he survive, may bring the Talib to the table, if only to facilitate a US evacuation.




Why the Afghan elections matter
Bruce Riedel



Afghanistan’s Presidential election is still a work in progress but its implications will be enormous. President Barack Obama’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan needs a legitimate and credible outcome from this election in order to build support for what is now America’s longest war both at home and abroad. The NATO mission in Afghanistan needs an Afghan partner who has the support of the Afghan people and can provide the decent governance that is essential to fighting an insurgency. War weariness is gaining ground in America and Europe, a flawed election would only add to discontent. So the stakes are unusually high in only the third election ever in the country’s history.

The preliminary results released on the Afghan elections so far are too small (only 17 percent of the polling places) to mean much. The claims of victory by the contenders, including incumbent President Hamid Karzai (a Pashtun) and his main challenger former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah (a Tajik), should also be given little attention; they are just spin. Charges of fraud and vote tampering need to be investigated thoroughly. Final results are not expected until next month and they will provide much more insight into the status of the war. In many ways they will be the best metrics on how the war is going.

The actual voting day events — violent and non-violent — demonstrated that both sides of the war achieved some, but not all, of their goals. For NATO and the Afghan government, the major accomplishment was just holding the election in the face of the Taliban’s announced determination to disrupt the process. This is a pretty low bar for a military alliance with almost 100,000 foreign troops and 150,000 Afghan security personnel on the ground but it was passed. The more difficult challenge of convincing Afghans and others that the outcome is legitimate and credible still lies ahead.

For the Taliban and its Al Qaeda partners, while they failed in their promised goal to disrupt the voting so as to prevent any semblance of an election, they succeeded in intimidating voters in many parts of the country, especially females, to effect a low turnout. According to NATO there were over 400 Taliban attacks on Election Day, a record number, and turnout in the Pashtun dominated provinces of the south was apparently very low.

While we await the final results, it is useful to look back at Afghanistan’s previous elections to set a base for interpreting the 2009 vote. In 2004 Hamid Karzai won Afghanistan’s first election by getting 56% of the vote with an official turnout of about 70%. It was more of a coronation than an election. Everyone knew that Karzai was America’s choice and the Taliban was unable to muster a serious challenge to the process.

The 2005 provincial and legislative elections are a more relevant and interesting base for reviewing 2009. Official turnout was less than 50% nationally and probably closer to 40% and it varied enormously by province. The Shia province of Bamian had 71% turnout but the Pashtun provinces in the south — the stronghold of the Taliban — had much lower. Zabol had less than 20%, Kandahar less than 25% and Orzugan, the home of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, only 23%.

Even more varied was the vote by gender. In one Tajik province, women outvoted men 58% to 41% of the turnout. But in most provinces female turnout was 10-20% lower than the male vote. And in the Pashtun belt it was even more unbalanced. In Zabol the vote was 96% male and in Orzugan and Helmand 86% male. In 2005, the Taliban were not yet strong enough to mount a real challenge to the vote, while the Pashtuns simply did not feel the process was legitimate.

Indeed one of the clear lessons of both 2005 and 2009 is the widespread disaffection of the Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group (about 40% of the population). The south, heartland of the old Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, has never accepted the legitimacy of its overthrow in 2001. It will be very difficult under the best of circumstances to change that mood.

Next door, Pakistanis will be watching to see whether NATO or the Taliban look like winners and calculate their own policies as a result. Islamabad’s calculation of the outcome is as important as anyone’s. It will impact the Pakistani Army’s assessment of NATO’s staying power which is currently very low.

Pakistanis have seen America abandon Afghanistan twice before and expect it to happen again. First was in the 1990s when, after the defeat of the Soviets, the United States basically turned its back on the Afghan people and left Pakistan to clean up the mess. Second was after the rapid fall of the Taliban regime when President Bush took his eye off the Afghan ball and ran to the Iraqi quagmire, starving the Afghan conflict of the troops and money needed to prevent the Taliban’s resurgence.

Those who run Pakistan’s Afghan policies are convinced the US and NATO will run away again. Therefore they keep their Taliban connections alive as a hedge for the future. A credible election won’t change Pakistani attitudes overnight; but it will provide the basis for a sustainable NATO presence in Afghanistan while the alliance builds up the strength of the Afghan army and police force — probably doubling its size — so they can contain the Taliban threat themselves, allowing foreign forces to begin their draw down.

So what next?

If Karzai wins narrowly in the first round, he will owe victory to the politicians and warlords who endorsed him in the last months of the campaign, especially Abdul Rashid Dostam. Dostam is well known as an exceptionally brutal warlord who controls much of the Uzbek vote. He started his career in the Afghan communist army and was the Soviet’s only real effective Afghan commander. Then he got religion, jumped ship and joined the mujahedin, precipitating the collapse of the communist regime in 1992.

Since then, he has switched sides endlessly, but in August he endorsed Karzai. If Karzai wins because of Dostam, then prospects for anti-corruption measures and good governance will be slim. NATO and America will need to be clear with Karzai that the warlords will not make a comeback.

If no one gets fifty percent plus one, we will have a runoff second round in October. Karzai and his likely opponent Abdullah Abdullah will have a real horse race. Each will seek endorsements from the other contenders and the warlords. Dostam could flip again. The Taliban will try again to assassinate the candidates and upturn the process. Much can and will go wrong.

But a second round would also build legitimacy and credibility into the Afghan political process. More democracy — not less — is a good thing in this war. A new government in Kabul, even if it still has Karzai as President but with a credible popular mandate earned in a credible election fight, can be the basis for changing the momentum in this conflict. After almost eight years of neglect, the Taliban are winning. A new strategy, new commanders and more troops can reverse that trend but only if they have a credible Afghan partner.

Bruce Riedel is a Senior Fellow in the Saban Centre for Middle East policy at the Brookings Institution. At President Obama’s request he chaired a strategic review of American policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan last winter. He is the author of “The Search for al Qaeda

 

[Elmo]

Hi,

Went through the articles posted here but couldn't establish the link between the thread title and the posts. Much of it is already known... for instance, the biased representation of the Pashtuns in the Afghan National Army, why Karzai should or should not win, the geo-strategic importance of the Afghan presidential elections... Much of these arguments have been augmented in the last couple of years.

What specific arguments did you have in mind?

 

[muse]

Elmo

The specific argument of interest was that the US had decided to back Abdullah, and that Pakistan followed suit -- the position was that i the same way that Musharraf was unable to put a coalition together against the Talib, neither can Karzai and that Abdullah may be in a position to bring the Afghan politicans (warlords) together against the Talib -- and then there's this:

Why Obama may fail in Afghanistan
Shahzad Chaudhry



For one, he doesn’t belong there. He is seen as a foreign occupant of someone else’s land. His war is after all not a ‘just’ war, because it does not kindle the passion of those fighting on his side. His aims may have been noble but he mustn’t forget that he cannot impose such morality on a people who find themselves occupied by his forces and those of the West.

No, it is not an Islam vs the West thing, something the neo-cons have lived by with biblical belief and conservative obscurantism. It is simply an historic truth that people tend to fight on to liberate their lands from people who have come from afar to usurp territory and dictate a new morality alien to their sensibilities.

Hell, it isn’t even Obama’s war. But in his keenness to show that he was not really an Islamophile, that he had marbles strong enough to dislodge the squeamish image of Democrats, that he will never fail America, he adopted Bush’s war.

But has he dug his grave instead; will he be a one-term wonder?

Answers lie in his sagacity to comprehend the intractability, and perhaps the futility, of the path that he has chosen in fighting someone else’s war. How do Messrs McChrystal and Mullen (where’s Petraeus — anyone noticed?) advise him on the do-ability or otherwise will also be key to his understanding of the prolonged agony that Afghanistan will cause him.

Successful, intelligent leaders in history were always those who judged early and called correctly; and if the going did not seem right, abandoned a bad thought or extricated from a difficult situation. The good ones actually never got into a bad war — at all. The more successful never fight a lost war; they ditch it till they find another opportunity, or fight it through other means. The valiant must by historical precedence be discreet.

What will get him there? Most ironically, history stands in his way; but this in an attempt to make history, not read it. That is where the rub shall lie for him. It seems quite clear that his instincts and his pronouncements are quite the opposite. His pronouncements call it a ‘necessary’ war, while the pendulum has swung among his own people the other way. Europe, the committed pacifist, has never had two opinions on this war; for them it has always been the ‘unnecessary’ war. It is just that the groundswell has just about touched the shores of America. Trust the swell to upscale into a tsunami sooner rather than later. It will be Obama’s test to change direction before his hand is forced.

And again, he may not, given that he is a pioneer in the classic sense, one who broke the ultimate barrier for his people. Would he be seen as the man who conquered foreign frontiers, or one who played his real self, an intelligent, sensitive, visionary leader? This is where most have failed the test of history — the defining moment.

Mr President: a few other considerations.

One key aspect that separates the NATO/ISAF effort in Afghanistan against the Taliban, and the one that the Pakistani military is engaged in, is the element of local support. The Pakistani military is seen to be fighting for real; saving its own land from hordes that are intent to occupy it for their own personal motives, and hence the great unanimity of purpose and intent that emboldens the military’s hand.

Consider the lack of any popular support to the US/NATO mission; and is that a surprise? They may have had some support initially in their own lands — even that has evaporated. The poor souls cannot be expected to have support from within an alien land! A serious reboot is required of the American system of perception about their importance and role in the world. The Americans need to review their global and arrogated responsibility.

Every few years, the Americans will induct a Democratic government; this, one assumes, is because the Democrats are required to correct the collective psychological anomalies and reset the system — reboot — to go back to the real problems that lie within the shores of what periodically is a great nation.

It is essential to understand the importance of local support. American idealism usually shields the truth; also their self-belief as a nation is too strong to judge or expect other than what they set out to achieve. The ‘just war’ or a ‘noble cause’ is what perhaps the entire United States may have believed in; certainly their gung-ho GIs. It reminds them of their’ word’, and that of their forefathers was spread in the lands that they discovered and dominated. It may have never seemed to the Average Joe that there could exist people, barbarous and unkempt in looks, poorly initiated to modern life, uneducated in their form of literacy, and in whose lands, after an eight-year war, and on the wrong side of many billions of dollars, their leadership smells nothing but defeat. What is more, other than Obama, everyone else has begun to call it an ‘unnecessary’ war.

Mr President, the United States has never won a war in Asia; unless you call nuking Japan victory! Much less Iraq, where you let your instincts guide you well, and you made the important about-turn. Somewhere in a concurrent consideration at the time of making those early decisions, you were led by other than your instincts on Afghanistan. As a result you stare into a blind alley. Some of us thought AfPak was a smart re-definition and a possible way out — essentially your calculated move to cause as much damage to Al Qaeda while you recovered from Iraq; and with that done, enough cause to beat a graceful retreat out of Afghanistan. One hopes that still is your aim.

When Bruce Riedel & Co claim there is no alternative to victory in Afghanistan, they don’t really mean that defeat isn’t a possibility. In fact that is exactly how Mullen and McChrystal counter-state the reality. The task at hand is becoming momentous and inching towards unachievable. They may suggest a greater number of troops for a prolonged period till the task gets done. But, pray, what is the task?

Karzai’s house of cards will collapse the day America leaves. Permit him to begin talking to his real brethren so that he can find a stable order. Afghanistan must find its own solution; it simply is not programmed to accept one. That has been re-inscribed in history over and over again.

No, this piece is not a demoralising statement about the world’s greatest military; it simply is a statement of the fact as it gets seen up close. The world at large has great expectations of Obama ‘resetting’ America to a more rational role; one that leaves enough space for others to pursue what seems noble to them, particularly in Afghanistan. One hopes he will answer the call of history for his own good and that of America.

The writer is a retired air vice marshal and a former envoy. Contact shahzad.a.chaudhry***********

 

[Elmo]

Muse,

There is nothing new in this article you posted either.

We all know of American adventurism and idealism, which takes the better of it, and Afghanistan and Iraq are two prime examples of where things have gone awry, more so in the latter.

What we can draw a parallel with is the massive opposition the US government faced during Vietnam and was forced to call back its troops. It was playing the Communist card then as compared to the Islamist card now --- but it was meeting with little success even then. It remains to be seen if the Americans come out en masse to press for its withdrawal. In either case --- whether it withdraws now or after a couple of years --- it will be leaving the Afghans in a quagmire.

If one has to look at a successful example of countering insurgents, then Britain in Malaya would be the one. It's one of the rare examples available for the twentieth century. While air power had played a crucial role, it was used more so for propaganda. You had airborne radios blaring out offers of safe passages to enticements to pregnant female terrorists to surrender so their babies could be born in a government hospital. The British were able to quell it in less than the time the US is taking and lost less soldiers as well.

What's been old for long is that military adventurism and political idealism have to be tightly monitored. The US can continue to tinker with the elections etc, but it will still not be able have control over the people or the land in real terms.

 

[ejaz007]

Hamid Karzai threw his cap down in spat with Richard Holbrooke

* Gesture ‘big’ for an Afghan man, signifies a post-Taliban low in Afghan-US ties
* Both leaders were discussing different scenarios after polls ‘when there was a misunderstanding’
Daily Times Monitor

LAHORE: In a recent meeting between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US special envoy Richard Holbrooke, Karzai reportedly whipped off his distinctive karakul sheepskin cap and slammed it onto the table where the two men were having dinner.

A report in The Sunday Times gave an account of the “explosive details that have emerged of the encounter”.

“For an Afghan man to do that, it’s a big gesture,” a local businessman was quoted. “It’s like throwing down the gauntlet.”

The “fiery meeting” has apparently plunged Afghan-US relations to a post-Taliban low. The report said the Obama administration has not hidden its “disdain” for Karzai who it has blamed for running a corrupt government.

“When the two men clashed, Karzai’s campaign team had already claimed victory, fuelling accusations that the election was rigged. At that point there had been no official results,” the paper said.

When Holbrooke raised the possibility of a run-off, Karzai angrily accused the US of pushing for a run-off in the Afghan presidential election.

“They were discussing different scenarios and one of them was the possibility of a run-off,” the paper quoted a Karzai insider as saying. “That’s when there was a misunderstanding. There were strong words from both men.”

US officials had downplayed the row and said they believed “Karzai’s agents leaked a selective version of the meeting to make it look as if he was resisting US pressure to force him to hold a second round when he was already the winner”, the report said.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

No exit strategy from Afghanistan

Swedish FM

KABUL — The international community, with more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, does not have an exit strategy and will stay committed for the long term, Sweden's foreign minister said Tuesday.

"There is no time line, it is clear that no one has an exit strategy, because we have a transition strategy," Carl Bildt, whose country is currently president of the European Union, told AFP.

"It is vital that Afghans have the confidence that we will stay," he said.

The emphasis of the foreign presence was shifting, he said, from military action against Taliban-liked insurgents, to training Afghan security forces and helping build a civilian governance infrastructure.

"There has to be a move from a military-heavy presence to a civilian-heavy presence," he said.

"One of the big problems in Afghanistan in the last 30 to 40 years is that there have been too many exit strategies and not enough transition strategies," Bildt said before leaving Kabul after a two-day visit to Afghanistan.

The US and NATO commander in Afghanistan on Monday submitted a long-awaited review into the eight-year war, calling for a revised strategy to defeat the Taliban and reverse the "serious" situation in the country.

The United States and NATO have called for new thinking in Afghanistan to counter record numbers of Taliban attacks since the 2001 US-led invasion.

Bildt said the emphasis of the new strategy was on "civilian, political, economic resources" to build "rule of law, governance and anti-corruption mechanisms".

"These are critical to winning this war," he said, because "this is not a conflict that can be won by military means alone".

Bildt said he met the deputy commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Jim Dutton, and discussed the review submitted by General Stanley McChrystal on Monday.

The Afghan government has welcomed the civilian focus in McChrystal's review, as civilian deaths and collateral damage have caused widespread anger.

Afghanistan is bogged down in controversy over presidential elections. President Hamid Karzai is leading a painstaking vote count but the polls have been clouded in allegations of massive fraud.

AFP: No exit strategy from Afghanistan: Swedish FM