Public opinion was pro-Taliban and anti-Nato. Ofcourse the fault is GHQ (Zia era) which fostered this mindset but ultimately Musharraf had to toe a balance
Ok. While Zia was involved in this, he wasn't the only one; honestly, he passed away tragically, and none carried out his plans. The main issue is after the conflict, we dropped the ball entirely with future leadership and left the Afghans hanging, for the U.S., even a child could've seen it coming that they'll go after their work was done. An intelligent man doesn't stick around after a robbery. After Zia, where were ISI and top brass to help reform and structure Afghan society? You have two generations that know nothing but to fight.
How India molded Bangladesh properly, we failed to do with Afghanistan, a neighbor right next door. However, you have India during WoT go to Afghan and influence their public to a great deal to be Anti-Pakistani, again a failure of the establishment.
Mushraff didn't re-balance anything, he chose a side, and this country is paying the price now. There was no structural change to Pakistan's bureaucracy or inner workings; instead, he brought the old back first.
Tell me, what long-term benefits did Mushraff bring besides his useless speeches? First, he did a job and did it very cheaply. The individuals I know work with some of the American policymakers I've talked with over the years were surprised at how easy it is to deal with Pakistan. One individual commented his mistress was more stressful to deal with.
The only thing we've gotten were F-16s, that's it. So you've lost more and gained very little.
Suppose you live in a subdivision (housing society), and someone from another housing society decides to come and wreck your area, and you offer your support. Do you think your subdivision neighbors will come out with barfi to celebrate?
We lack critical long-term thinking; we do not think 5, 10, 20, or even 50 years out.
What relationship? it was a transactional dealing where Pakistan was used to prevent Soviet hegemony in central and south Asia(Soviets would have taken afghanistan and then overthrown pakistan to connect to a USSR aligned India in a land corridor), after the collapse of the soviet union, there was no real benefit to the relationship for the US, if anything after the 90s, and into the 2000s with the emergence of China, the US needed India as a counterbalance, and with Pakistan's relationship with China, this sort of thing was inevitable.
The rest is wishful thinking. People don't seem to understand the hostility towards Pakistan by the Karzai administration, whether its the talibs or Karzai, the Afghans were hostile towards the Durand line, and whether the insurgency came via the talibs or whether it resembled something like the BLA/PTM, there is no guarantee that an insurgency wouldn't exist.
The mistake for Pakistan was not managing the Afghan issue better after the soviet collapse, where it became a hotbed for nonstate actors, and even after the US invasion, it could have been salvaged if Pakistan played a more active role in shaping the dynamics of the Afghan Govt, and leveraging access to the landlocked country to do so(its not like the US could access Afghanistan through Iran and the northern Russia route was never sustainable for geopolitical reasons). The Durand line issue should have been decisively settled then and there, as well as the fence issue, back when US money was flowing in with no restrictions.
This is where we fail to understand the transactional cost, and we repeat the mistakes repeatedly.
I do not know what Mooli the Americans offers, whereas the whole government keeps its mouth open and religious fall on it repeatedly.
.
www.mei.edu
www.theguardian.com
multimedia.europarl.europa.eu
www.newsweek.com
