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A Vision of a New Combined Arms Philosophy & Doctrine

At zero hour, from over 10 vectors, Pakistani forces will infiltrate into India. Each vector will have two battalions of Randers leading the way, followed by a single battalion of Pakistani regulars. Each battalion in single file and separated by 100 yards. This will be the initial force. Relatively lightly armed with some tanks, some mobile gun mortars, some APCs, and CAS on standby.

On the vectors which are least successful, and showing the... to be continued have to sleep.

You again went lightening fast......anyways, you can sleep, we'll continue from here, but you arent going in to the other side easily.

@Armchair
Some topics on which you can work upon while you sleep, will help you prepare better.
- Once move ends, where is the Strike Corps detraining or move stops where? Which are the areas where they are assembling? Threat envisaged and your responses.
-Routes taken for the approach march from assembly areas to the border. Threat envisaged and your responses.
- Indian Fence at the border, how will you negotiate it?
- Help required from Engineers, AD, S&T, Signals, artillery, AHs etc in the above mentioned phases.
 
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A few snaps of the southern sector area I took just now (remember its just basing):

Larger scope of area:

snaplarge.jpg


Close up of immediate border area:

snapzoom.jpg


One can see 11th INF that @kongn and Joe were mentioning stationed in Ahmedabad at the bottom in both.

Some browsers need Right click + Open images in new tab etc to get full size.

Feel free to request things to be moved/changed/made clearer.... or add some arrows etc yourself as you want

Will fix broken link of the main master ORBAT map soon...and update here.
 
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Open terrain with no obstacle , is a recipe for high casualties. With added sandy dune makes it a nightmare for the general staffs . Then you add the uncertainty of CAS and logistics.
There is no easy conventional solution to PAK-Indo war planning unless either side's decision makers are recklessly dumb.
@PanzerKiel

As tensions heighten and India conducts surgical strikes, V Corps based out of Karachi, using the railway network, moves to Chor, just East of Umerkot. XII Corps moves down to Pano Aqil again via rail. Conscript independent brigades and divisions are shown which are based in Badin, Nawabshah, Khairpur and Khanpur. Marked in red are our new conscript brigades / divisions, which are infantry brigades / divisions.

Additionally rangers are deployed all along the border. View attachment 624770



Actually he is pointing to Ahmedabad which isn't Bhuj.

LOL.

And I wrote Bhuj, not Ahmedabad.
 
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There are solutions,if you have huge coffers.
In theory, those huge coffers
LOL.

And I wrote Bhuj, not Ahmedabad.

It is a big mistake to underestimate the horrifying side effects of high casualties. It is not the political leadership but the commanders have the primary task to protect their soldiers at any costs. A good commander will be prepared to put his career on the line in order to protect his troops. There are of course ruthless people out there who don't give a damn about the welfare of the troops under pseudo pretext such as fake patriotism while staying themselves in comfort.
 
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Who wouldnt like that? But then economy limits us as well. Kharian Cantonment is one of such purpose built cantonments, very well planned. But made by US in 50s. We havent been able to come up with such a thing till now.
please shed some light on kharian
was it built for mangla dam engneers?
or military use or was it built for american use.
and is there anything else which is built in 50s by americans
thanks
 
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In that case, rubber may not be able to sustain the weight, rubber gets damaged as well since it burns easily, and of course, imagine rubber tracks in hot desert sand!

Some totally random remarks.

  1. The difficulty is in adaptation of equipment to different operating environments. One of the worst features of any Russian design is their complete neglect of dust filtration. It is bad enough coping with this in the upper India plains, it is absolute hell in Rajasthan (or in the Thar region, to keep the comment neutral). It is understood that Pakistan, in its later adaptations of armoured equipment (I believe this is the later of the two tank types re-designed from Chinese and Russian originals), has carefully ensured that air filtration is of a high enough quality to permit sustained operation in the desert; the Thar is much more lethal for equipment management than Libya. Obviously, similar steps have been taken elsewhere. It is inappropriate to go into further detail but there is sufficient open information on this.
  2. Further, there is another dilemma; ideally, armour would be delivered to the battlefield with minimal wear and tear. Tanks are not Ferraris, and do not deal happily with roads. One is reminded of Tipu Sultan, who once said that he would have liked to have had British gora soldiers fighting for him; he would have transported them, like hunting cheetahs, in palanquins to the battle field. So, too, with tanks; eliminating road movement as much as possible is desirable. No matter what work-arounds we use, moving them by road just shortens their life and shortens their maintenance cycle. The result is likely to be multiple mechanical breakdowns in the middle of battle. At the same time, rail-heads are what they sound like, the terminal points for rail transportation. They don't run conveniently right to the edge of the forming up zone.
  3. This is one reason why the Indian Army managed to resist the Arjuna for so long, pleading - a devious, motivated plea - that there would be huge complications in rail transportation due to their outsize dimensions. This was, in some circles, pushed harder than the problem of bridge capacity, and the problem of weight on the ground, both so shallow that they were shot out of the water in very quick time.
@PanzerKiel, collating your hints and guidelines is like being presented with a tutorial in written form from one of the institutions of higher learning in specialised, professional studies. Both your patience and your attention to detail are remarkable. Have you been an instructor already, Sir?

@Nilgiri, you might feel ill done by, in not having been given details below the division level. First, there was the question of appropriate disclosure; second, there was the sheer volume of the task. Now that the orbat is put to the test by zestful young enthusiasts like @Armchair, these lacunae are becoming prominent. So, tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner, mon ami. Or, to bow to @PanzerKiel, Verstaendnis ist Vergebung.

@Blacklight If you had not been so rude and uncivil, I would gladly have complimented @Armchair with a positive rating as you wished. As it is, you have to apply to somebody who also appreciates remarks about 'gangus' and the baggage of adjectives that go with it. Good luck.
 
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@Nilgiri, you might feel ill done by, in not having been given details below the division level. First, there was the question of appropriate disclosure; second, there was the sheer volume of the task. Now that the orbat is put to the test by zestful young enthusiasts like @Armchair, these lacunae are becoming prominent. So, tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner, mon ami. Or, to bow to @PanzerKiel, Verstaendnis ist Vergebung.

Yup I totally understand. This is just to give broad positioning, I put the caveat that its not all 100% equivalent (between both sides) and @Signalian mentioned that a few times himself in the earlier thread.

Yes you are right it will face some distortion by use at various times, but I think we are in safe hands here with @PanzerKiel questioning everything every step of the way....and keeping the environs well reasoned, grounded and tempered. He is a good Beethoven to Armchair's Debussy.
 
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In theory, those huge coffers


It is a big mistake to underestimate the horrifying side effects of high casualties. It is not the political leadership but the commanders have the primary task to protect their soldiers at any costs. A good commander will be prepared to put his career on the line in order to protect his troops. There are of course ruthless people out there who don't give a damn about the welfare of the troops under pseudo pretext such as fake patriotism while staying themselves in comfort.

I am sorry, but what did I write to offend?
 
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No offend. You are not the primary audience. My post was addressed to larger audiences who never witnessed deaths from close proximity.

That is a relief.

I can assure you that the death of even a single human, serving or civilian, is very painful to me, and has been to those of my immediate family who have served.

Your point is well taken, Sir.

You again went lightening fast......anyways, you can sleep, we'll continue from here, but you arent going in to the other side easily.

@Armchair
Some topics on which you can work upon while you sleep, will help you prepare better.
- Once move ends, where is the Strike Corps detraining or move stops where? Which are the areas where theyre assembling? Threat envisaged and your responses.
-Routes taken for the approach march from assembly areas to the border. Threat envisaged and your responses.
- Indian Fence at the border, how will you negotiate it?
- Help required from Engineers, AD, S&T, Signals, artillery, AHs etc in the above mentioned phases.

No doubt left in my mind any longer. You are or were an instructor.
 
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In what material way does this differ from the late lamented Cold Start Doctrine? It can happen, it will, in fact, probably happen; both the Haji Pir Pass and a section of land in the Shakargarh bulge bear testimony to the loyalty of the two armies to this concept.
So simply put -Indian Military copied the plan that Pakistan had since EX. Zarb e Momin late 1980s. Sunder Ji out - CSD in.
 
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So simply put -Indian Military copied the plan that Pakistan had since EX. Zarb e Momin late 1980s. Sunder Ji out - CSD in.

LOL.

I'm not going anywhere into this 'You did - I did' stuff (the word I had in mind was not stuff). It doesn't matter what labels you put on it.
  1. It has been clear for some time that South Asian conflicts will not last beyond 2 weeks at the longest, and that within these time boundaries, nothing of substantial or strategic importance can be achieved.
  2. Some part of this is due to the inability of GoI to comprehend that ALL upgrade facilities must come together; what Sunderji wanted was only partially given. Without the entire package coming together, none of his plans could be implemented.
  3. Cold Start, a doctrine that never was, covers a contingency plan to take care of a vacuum. Holding Corps were supposed to hold; Strike Corps were supposed to strike. If the capability to do these in conjunction was not there, for whatever reason, there had to be an alternative. The alternative was an ad-hoc contrivance to meet the situations forecast with resources available.
  4. Nobody was looking over Pakistani shoulders to find what wonders of war management were being planned. Somehow, that brilliant idea never occurred to Indian planners, except insofar as gauging the probable movements in the first seven days was concerned. We seem to have some difficulties with screwdrivers; you may have to cast your net wider to get experts on that.
  5. As it stands today, it is considered that two things should be worked for, actively, without loss of time.
    1. All formations should be integrated formations; as much as possible, all arms should report to a common head, and they should train to work in harness together.
    2. All formations should have a general mission, defence of a certain frontage, for instance, and a special mission, the alternative plan.
    3. Special missions are to be launched by formation commanders on release being granted by HQ due to relative lack of activity by adversary forces.
    4. Both general missions and special missions have very tightly defined objectives.
I hope that helps.
 
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LOL.

I'm not going anywhere into this 'You did - I did' stuff (the word I had in mind was not stuff). It doesn't matter what labels you put on it.
  1. It has been clear for some time that South Asian conflicts will not last beyond 2 weeks at the longest, and that within these time boundaries, nothing of substantial or strategic importance can be achieved.
  2. Some part of this is due to the inability of GoI to comprehend that ALL upgrade facilities must come together; what Sunderji wanted was only partially given. Without the entire package coming together, none of his plans could be implemented.
  3. Cold Start, a doctrine that never was, covers a contingency plan to take care of a vacuum. Holding Corps were supposed to hold; Strike Corps were supposed to strike. If the capability to do these in conjunction was not there, for whatever reason, there had to be an alternative. The alternative was an ad-hoc contrivance to meet the situations forecast with resources available.
  4. Nobody was looking over Pakistani shoulders to find what wonders of war management were being planned. Somehow, that brilliant idea never occurred to Indian planners, except insofar as gauging the probable movements in the first seven days was concerned. We seem to have some difficulties with screwdrivers; you may have to cast your net wider to get experts on that.
  5. As it stands today, it is considered that two things should be worked for, actively, without loss of time.
    1. All formations should be integrated formations; as much as possible, all arms should report to a common head, and they should train to work in harness together.
    2. All formations should have a general mission, defence of a certain frontage, for instance, and a special mission, the alternative plan.
    3. Special missions are to be launched by formation commanders on release being granted by HQ due to relative lack of activity by adversary forces.
    4. Both general missions and special missions have very tightly defined objectives.
I hope that helps.

Yes, I was pulling your leg and i knew you will come after me 8-) But the realization of IA IBGs did come a bit late :D

Whats interesting in all this is that Pakistan can use two types of forces for launching similar strikes - the Independent Brigade Groups and an Ad-Hoc force similar to Indian IBG (between brigade and Division strength). I find the area of Rahim Yar Khan of utmost importance and vulnerable - cut off region.

You again went lightening fast......anyways, you can sleep, we'll continue from here, but you arent going in to the other side easily.
I heard that officers study all night in group study (if possible) before/during exams and attend classes during regular days on a specific course which makes their career. What are you doing here so early in morning :angel:
 
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please shed some light on kharian
was it built for mangla dam engneers?
or military use or was it built for american use.
and is there anything else which is built in 50s by americans
thanks

It was part of the package of 50s, in which we received tanks, aircraft, arms and ammunition. They made it for us, part of overall re-organization and improvement of our armed forces. Cherat Cantonment was another such project built by them.

@PanzerKiel, collating your hints and guidelines is like being presented with a tutorial in written form from one of the institutions of higher learning in specialised, professional studies. Both your patience and your attention to detail are remarkable. Have you been an instructor already, Sir?

Yes. And it was further improved once we wargamed everything from sub-tactical to strategic level under the supervision some of the ablest instructors of ours at the operational and strategic level. I can, myself, see a big improvement once i compare my replies on PDF of today compared with those of 15 years ago. Learning process should continue till death.
 
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Yes, I was pulling your leg and i knew you will come after me 8-) But the realization of IA IBGs did come a bit late :D

Whats interesting in all this is that Pakistan can use two types of forces for launching similar strikes - the Independent Brigade Groups and an Ad-Hoc force similar to Indian IBG (between brigade and Division strength). I find the area of Rahim Yar Khan of utmost importance and vulnerable - cut off region.


I heard that officers study all night in group study (if possible) before/during exams and attend classes during regular days on a specific course which makes their career. What are you doing here so early in morning :angel:

We should worry about IBGs???

We don't even have a unified Air Defence Command, chief.

Your point about the specific area you mentioned is taken. I have nothing to do with these matters, but it will be interesting to find out what Western Command thinks about it.
 
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