Threat to Indian interests
The killing of Indians in an attack in Kabul on February 26 highlights the mounting dangers for India in Afghanistan. As the West prepares to exit from there and strike a deal with the Taliban, the very forces responsible for the latest killing, India’s vulnerabilities will increase. Kabul cannot be sealed and if large parts of the country are not under firm government control and local intelligence is unavailable, the ability of terrorist groups to strike unexpectedly cannot be eliminated.
The US has deployed an additional 30,000 troops, with the allies adding 10,000 more. This will supposedly give the means to put military pressure on Taliban strongholds, eliminate the insurgents from key areas, hold them with the help of trained and expanded Afghan forces, provide proper civilian administration, undertake development activities, winning over in the process local populations to the government side and reducing the Taliban base within the country. The operation in Marjah in the Helmand province is supposed to demonstrate the viability of this strategy, and its success, it is believed, will have a demonstration effect all over the country. But in the absence of a credible, popular, galvanising national political authority in Kabul, can this strategy work by July 2011?
The policy of reintegration and reconciliation with the Taliban is fraught with uncertainty. The December 2009 NATO statement describes reintegration as efforts at the tactical and operational levels to persuade low-level fighters, commanders and shadow governors to lay down their arms and to assimilate peacefully. Reconciliation is referred to as high-level strategic dialogue with senior leaders of the insurgent groups (no distinction here between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban) designed to terminate their armed campaign against the Afghan people and their government. Both processes are to be Afghan-led. The January 28, 2010 London Conference, to which India was invited but its views disregarded, endorsed this policy.
The process of reintegration, according to Afghan representatives, will be advanced through strengthening Afghan institutions and their delivery capability, enforcing the rule of law, combating corruption, carrying out geographically balanced development, investing in education, creating legitimate economic opportunities, extending the reach of the government to remote areas, etc. At its core it means providing good governance. Can something that takes years to effect be done in less than 18 months? Reintegration includes the responsibility of providing physical security to those who break links with the Taliban against any reprisals in the future against them and their families from the extremists. Such protection will have to be provided by capable Afghan National Security Forces, set to increase to 1,71,600 by July 2011. Can such a well-trained and adequately armed, motivated and loyal force be created in a few months?
India needs to worry about this outreach to the Taliban. In his November 19, 2009 speech on taking over the presidency, President Karzai singled out reconciliation as one of the key priorities of his government. Karzai is rightly considered India’s good friend. His government has given us space to spread our political influence in Afghanistan. We have common interest in exposing Pakistan’s use of terror as an instrument of state policy against both India and Afghanistan. But it is Karzai who is pushing for reconciliation with the Taliban leadership in Pakistan — a policy that can gravely undermine India’s position in Afghanistan, give Pakistan the role it seeks, and open the doors to the political expansion of extremist religious ideology. It is not clear what his calculations are. His political position has been seriously eroded by the controversy over last year’s fraud-smeared presidential election. Why with little Pashtun support and an ambivalent western one he believes he can make peace with the Taliban on favourable terms as president is unclear. If this constitutes survival strategy post-US drawdown, it is unlikely to succeed. Pakistan, with no particular reason to trust Karzai, would want to see him out of the way to facilitate their own dominance over a future Afghan government. A gap is opening between what Karzai sees are Afghan interests and his own and those of India.
India has to be wary of Karzai’s search for a Saudi role in promoting the reconciliation process. Given the close nexus between the two, Saudi intervention suits Pakistan. One need not take seriously Saudi claims, made by its foreign minister to the Indian press during prime minister’s visit to the kingdom that they are not in touch with the Taliban. Reality is otherwise though the Saudis will press the Taliban to break its ties with al-Qaeda.
Western overtures to the Taliban constitute a significant diplomatic success for Pakistan, as these forces constitute its strategic assets for restoring its influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan has showed great resilience in withstanding US pressure to act against these groups. General Petraeus’ aversion to Pakistan stirring up any more ‘hornet’s nests’ in the border areas has encouraged General Kiyani to offer to mediate between US/NATO and the Taliban on the condition that Pakistan’s need for a soft strategic depth in Afghanistan is recognised as an insurance against the Indian threat and limits are put on India’s presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan will automatically get a role in the parleys with the Taliban as these groups are located on its territory and have close links with the ISI. Kiyani’s stature in Pakistan has risen, Pakistan’s attitude towards India has hardened and its political classes are singing the military’s tune.
India would need to rethink its strategy towards Afghanistan. Karzai can no longer be a reliable partner. Our local popularity is a fragile base for retaining our long-term influence unless it is supported by an ability to affect power equations within the country. The anti-Taliban forces within Afghanistan need stronger backing by Russia, Central Asian countries, Iran and India. The Taliban, sustained by Pakistan, will always be close to that country even if there are disagreements between the two. US is failing to take into account India’s long-term strategic interests. Its self-interest is prompting it to advance Pakistan’s interests at India’s expense. Its arming of an unreformed Pakistan constitutes a threat to us. The answer does not lie in India buying more arms from the US. Worse, through the West’s willingness to reconcile with the odious and vandalist Taliban forces conditions are being created for the spread of an extremist version of Islam with long term consequences for India’s security. The US is failing a critical test of its so-called strategic partnership with India.
