Solomon2
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A dangerous trajectory
MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA
PUBLISHED A DAY AGO
The writer is a security analyst.
A POSITIVE gesture or statement changes little if not supported with affirmatory, concerted action. The prime minister’s participation in the Hindu festival of Holi reflects his approach towards non-Muslim communities in Pakistan. His statement that the country came into being to stop religious confrontation was widely appreciated.
A week before his Holi speech in Karachi, the prime minister addressed a ceremony at the Jamia Naeemia, Lahore, where he stressed upon religious scholars’ need to develop counter-narratives against the terrorists’ ideology. Apparently, these statements are not contradictory, except that one was delivered in Karachi and the other in Lahore.
Nevertheless, contradictions certainly exist in the people’s thinking patterns and attitudes as well as in state actions. During the premier’s speech in Lahore, slogans were raised in favour of Mumtaz Qadri — the executed murderer of former Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer. Nor could his Karachi speech ensure the smooth registration of non-Muslims during the census process; the media has reported some complaints regarding that.
Though more evidence is needed for a definitive conclusion, most analysts agree that a dangerous level of extremism has become the new normal in society, which the country’s power elites have also accepted as a baseline of societal tolerance.
Most analysts agree that a heightened level of extremism has become the new normal in society.
The power elites are unable to comprehend the idea that they can take any action without the help of the religious actors. They see religious actors as the part of the problem as well as the solution. Why would the religious elites help the state against narratives that they have nurtured, in collaboration with the state, and that have now become a source of their strength, and to some extent, survival? After the prime minister’s speech in Lahore, many religious scholars came up with the counterargument that it was the state that created militant actors to protect certain interests. But they will never mention that the state facilitated the religious clergy and encouraged religious institutionalisation in the country that bred all religious actors, including the violent ones.
Religious institutionalisation was neither moderate nor intellectual in its discourse, nor was it compatible with societal changes. It has produced political capital for religious parties, maximised their economic advantages and developed a strand of religiosity that has nothing to do with morality and social norms. The religious elites will not respond to the challenges state and society are facing. As a result, radical narratives are strengthened, and constitutional, legal, and educational issues are becoming more and more complex.
The sociopolitical elites have a very simplistic view of the problem, but the context cannot be understood without a better understanding of the relationship between the religious actors, and the state and its institutions. A nexus between religious actors and state institutions monopolises the public discourse on morality, apostasy, and citizenship. If a few in the government — including the prime minister — have a different view, they cannot break this relationship merely through issuing rosy statements.
Growing religiosity — which came into being as a direct consequence of this nexus between religious actors and the state — has become quite dynamic and nurtures only those narratives that are supportive of the interests of the religio-political elites. For example, many rational religious scholars, including one former head of the Council of Islamic Ideology, are convinced that 95 per cent of the laws in Pakistan are compatible with Islam. A judgement of the Federal Shariat Court had endorsed many legal statutes in Pakistan as being along the lines of Islam. But those at the helm of religious politics demand more Islamisation or interpretation of Islam, and implementation according to their points of view. The hardliners among them develop separate and anti-constitutional discourse and believe the current system is the major hurdle to the complete enforcement of an Islamic system. The violent actors, not being satisfied, took up arms against the state. The whole religious discourse in Pakistan is sectarian in its essence and shapes a hate discourse in society.
The sort of religiosity that has little trust in legal and constitutional accords as well as non-religious morals also has lower interest in the intellectual advancement of society; it always tends to assert itself through its own expressions. It triggers a race over resources and power between different religious actors and communities that exploits the sentiments of the masses. Society is witnessing the transformation of another religious community, which was previously considered the antidote to extremism. The neo-religious awakening may come with more mob-oriented aggressive expressions.
Voices of reasons can be found among the religious community in Pakistan, but the power elites do not have connectivity with moderate religious scholars in society. Ultimately, the state engages the same religious elite that has stakes in the hate business. A law expert and member of the prime minister’s legal team, Zafarullah Khan, has written at length about a new narrative in his book, Islam in the Contemporary World. He calls for a fresh look at the religious construct in Pakistan. However, his intellect is not reflected in government policies. Few other such experts present a case that a legal framework can help nurture new narratives. A prominent international legal expert believes that the Muslim world still romanticises the pre-1945 world order, when force was exercised to annex territories in the name of common bonds, and when transnational ideals were upheld. Those radicals who do not accept the Constitution fall into the category of “ideological alien enemies”.
The discourse that started with the narrative of good and bad militants has reached a level of good and bad Muslims. The Muslims deemed modern in their outlook and thinking may not consider themselves part of the majority in the country. An intellectual minority has emerged in the society, which is as insecure as the marginalised religious and social communities in Pakistan.
The prime minister thinks his occasional speeches will change the situation and develop new narratives. The fact that his own party includes a range of far-right politicians contradicts his statements. In the absence of any action and policy direction, his speeches do not have any worth more than electoral statements. After all, only a few months are left in the political campaign for the next general elections.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 26th, 2017
MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA
PUBLISHED A DAY AGO
The writer is a security analyst.
A POSITIVE gesture or statement changes little if not supported with affirmatory, concerted action. The prime minister’s participation in the Hindu festival of Holi reflects his approach towards non-Muslim communities in Pakistan. His statement that the country came into being to stop religious confrontation was widely appreciated.
A week before his Holi speech in Karachi, the prime minister addressed a ceremony at the Jamia Naeemia, Lahore, where he stressed upon religious scholars’ need to develop counter-narratives against the terrorists’ ideology. Apparently, these statements are not contradictory, except that one was delivered in Karachi and the other in Lahore.
Nevertheless, contradictions certainly exist in the people’s thinking patterns and attitudes as well as in state actions. During the premier’s speech in Lahore, slogans were raised in favour of Mumtaz Qadri — the executed murderer of former Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer. Nor could his Karachi speech ensure the smooth registration of non-Muslims during the census process; the media has reported some complaints regarding that.
Though more evidence is needed for a definitive conclusion, most analysts agree that a dangerous level of extremism has become the new normal in society, which the country’s power elites have also accepted as a baseline of societal tolerance.
Most analysts agree that a heightened level of extremism has become the new normal in society.
The power elites are unable to comprehend the idea that they can take any action without the help of the religious actors. They see religious actors as the part of the problem as well as the solution. Why would the religious elites help the state against narratives that they have nurtured, in collaboration with the state, and that have now become a source of their strength, and to some extent, survival? After the prime minister’s speech in Lahore, many religious scholars came up with the counterargument that it was the state that created militant actors to protect certain interests. But they will never mention that the state facilitated the religious clergy and encouraged religious institutionalisation in the country that bred all religious actors, including the violent ones.
Religious institutionalisation was neither moderate nor intellectual in its discourse, nor was it compatible with societal changes. It has produced political capital for religious parties, maximised their economic advantages and developed a strand of religiosity that has nothing to do with morality and social norms. The religious elites will not respond to the challenges state and society are facing. As a result, radical narratives are strengthened, and constitutional, legal, and educational issues are becoming more and more complex.
The sociopolitical elites have a very simplistic view of the problem, but the context cannot be understood without a better understanding of the relationship between the religious actors, and the state and its institutions. A nexus between religious actors and state institutions monopolises the public discourse on morality, apostasy, and citizenship. If a few in the government — including the prime minister — have a different view, they cannot break this relationship merely through issuing rosy statements.
Growing religiosity — which came into being as a direct consequence of this nexus between religious actors and the state — has become quite dynamic and nurtures only those narratives that are supportive of the interests of the religio-political elites. For example, many rational religious scholars, including one former head of the Council of Islamic Ideology, are convinced that 95 per cent of the laws in Pakistan are compatible with Islam. A judgement of the Federal Shariat Court had endorsed many legal statutes in Pakistan as being along the lines of Islam. But those at the helm of religious politics demand more Islamisation or interpretation of Islam, and implementation according to their points of view. The hardliners among them develop separate and anti-constitutional discourse and believe the current system is the major hurdle to the complete enforcement of an Islamic system. The violent actors, not being satisfied, took up arms against the state. The whole religious discourse in Pakistan is sectarian in its essence and shapes a hate discourse in society.
The sort of religiosity that has little trust in legal and constitutional accords as well as non-religious morals also has lower interest in the intellectual advancement of society; it always tends to assert itself through its own expressions. It triggers a race over resources and power between different religious actors and communities that exploits the sentiments of the masses. Society is witnessing the transformation of another religious community, which was previously considered the antidote to extremism. The neo-religious awakening may come with more mob-oriented aggressive expressions.
Voices of reasons can be found among the religious community in Pakistan, but the power elites do not have connectivity with moderate religious scholars in society. Ultimately, the state engages the same religious elite that has stakes in the hate business. A law expert and member of the prime minister’s legal team, Zafarullah Khan, has written at length about a new narrative in his book, Islam in the Contemporary World. He calls for a fresh look at the religious construct in Pakistan. However, his intellect is not reflected in government policies. Few other such experts present a case that a legal framework can help nurture new narratives. A prominent international legal expert believes that the Muslim world still romanticises the pre-1945 world order, when force was exercised to annex territories in the name of common bonds, and when transnational ideals were upheld. Those radicals who do not accept the Constitution fall into the category of “ideological alien enemies”.
The discourse that started with the narrative of good and bad militants has reached a level of good and bad Muslims. The Muslims deemed modern in their outlook and thinking may not consider themselves part of the majority in the country. An intellectual minority has emerged in the society, which is as insecure as the marginalised religious and social communities in Pakistan.
The prime minister thinks his occasional speeches will change the situation and develop new narratives. The fact that his own party includes a range of far-right politicians contradicts his statements. In the absence of any action and policy direction, his speeches do not have any worth more than electoral statements. After all, only a few months are left in the political campaign for the next general elections.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 26th, 2017
