3 Year Extension for COAS Pakistan

[waraich66]

Good Show - such an indispensable person should have been made COAS for life.

This is good example of major problem in Pakistan , personalities are stronger than institutions

 

[Condor]

This is good example of major problem in Pakistan , personalities are stronger than institutions

Why this sham Democracy - fooling the people or allowing the people to fool themselves.

We should have Kingship and Monarchy in all three sub continental countries.

 

[Areesh]

3 years is long time. Army is very disciplined organization, otherwise it will create lot of rebellions inside juniors.

Remember it is Pakistan army dear. Don't worry about rebellion. Pak army isn't such weak organization.

 

[Socialist]

May be becuase he is Yes Man lol

Well every Military General should be yes man to democratic government otherwise they won't be called professional Generals.All professional generals in history were yes man to the democratic government but 1 year extension would have been better then 3 years so more Generals get the chance to get to the top.

 

[fatman17]

Would he be accepting that ??

3 years is a long time, it will hurt a lot of other junior generals who had a chance to go to the top positions.

I hope Kiyani doesn't accepts it, and even if he does, he does it for 1 years and in that time, he molds his successor, who can then lead the army as Kiyani did.

It may send a bad signal.

TK - its a done deal. the corps commanders have supported this move (if the media is to be believed) and former Gen. W/Kakar was instrumental in getting Gen.Kiyani to change his earlier stance of retirement.

now that the govt has 'covered' their flank they can go 'head-on' against the SC and the PML-N

 

[fatman17]

^^^surprisingly a very 'subdued' reaction from the forum!!!maybe we can run a poll on this extension!

 

[Socialist]

nm............/

 

[Old School]

^^^surprisingly a very 'subdued' reaction from the forum!!!maybe we can run a poll on this extension!

Some forum members were expecting 'a traditional General' to take over as COAS . They are disappointed and we are happy.

 

[mehru]

Good move. It's necessary for him to continue.

 

[bc040400065]

On extensions and expectations




Thursday, July 22, 2010
Ikram Sehgal

For some weeks now speculation is rife that Kayani, whose term as COAS expires in four months almost to the day, will get a two-year extension. Normally one talks about a one-year extension or the full term, the two-years period seems to be a trial balloon. The public is being conditioned (psy-war technique). Common belief is that this may likely become a fact.

People, particularly politicians, find it convenient to forget history about sacking of prime ministers. A political impasse ensued in 1993 when the Supreme Court restored Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif summarily sacked without cogent reason by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Earlier this former bureaucrat had sacked Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1990. The situation was an invitation on a silver platter for military rule but the army chief, Gen Waheed Kakar, sustained the democratic process by carefully guiding the country out of the political morass, gently nudging Ishaq out of office, and ensuring comparatively free and fair elections that saw Ms Bhutto triumphant. A grateful Ms Bhutto, echoing the sentiments of a broad mass of politicians and citizens alike, beseeched him to take an extension as COAS. To his undying credit, and setting a tremendous precedent, Gen Waheed Kakar listened to the only person who purposefully spoke up against the enormous pressure to accept the offer, Comd 5 Corps, Lt-Gen Lehrasab and refused the extension. One believes Kayani holds Gen Waheed Kakar as a role model.

Extension must never even be under consideration in normal circumstances. In my article "Reforming the JCSC" on May 13, 2010, I wrote: "Once promoted to lieutenant-general a three-star must complete his tenure of four years of service (age should not become a bar), but if he has completed his four years of service an extension can be given for truly extraordinary reasons. Extension of service for a COAS is an entirely different matter. Prime among the many reasons for my saying 'no' is that it sets off a chain reaction of permutations, if not combinations, and blocks promotions in the army. However, loyal and sincere the senior military hierarchy, potential aspirants will feel deprived of their turn at attaining the top slot for which rightfully they have had ambitions throughout their career. Really good prospects down the line will find their careers and ambitions thereof sidelined. All those presently in contention for the COAS have good professional careers, and for the most part are not tainted by real-estate scandals. 'Extension' will mean these officers will retire from service in the next 12-18 months. An extension to the COAS will put an artificial monkey wrench into a natural process."

Kayani's has great pluses. He has (1) restored the morale and confidence of the Pakistan Army, the one entity that holds Pakistan together, (2) sustained the present democratic process, being run presently by civilians as a dictatorship in contrast to Musharraf's military dictatorship, which to give him his just due, was being run by him more or less as a democracy and (3) last but most important won the confidence of the US and other western powers by his professionalism while not allowing the Pakistan Army to be used as a mercenary force.
The dilemma provides us with a unique opportunity to make the JCSC into an effective military instrument. In my article titled "Chairman JCSC", I wrote: "Today's warfare cannot be fought service by service, it has to be an all-service combined affair. Not a single military analyst believes otherwise, so why is practice different from theory? The JCSC should be the central HQ for all three services, formulating overall war plans incorporating their combined fighting potential, and the mechanism for implementing the war plans. Things basic to the three services must be unified. Some of it is already being done, e.g. medical and engineering services, why not entities that are common, basic training institutions, workshops, etc.? Constructive reforms should include (1) the JCSC to become the GHQ for all three services and the army's HQ the "Army HQ" (2) The JCSC chairman (re-name him "chief of defence services" or something similar) to preside over the senior promotions, from one star to two stars and from two stars to three stars in all three services (3) all postings of three stars to be done with the concurrence of GHQ (4) creating a joint operations chief (JOC), or any such nomenclature, in the GHQ (5) all military procurement under GHQ aegis and (6) the ISI and the ISPR reporting to GHQ etc.".

What is logical will very rarely fly in the face of reality. A tremendous idea notwithstanding, JCSC's continued effectiveness as a viable institution is questionable. Many multiple times in manpower to the PAF and the Pakistan Navy, the army is loath to have an all-powerful chairman JCSC other than a soldier. The army leadership has a point: in the war environment on the borders and within Pakistan, the army is the measure of last resort in all things. The world powers have large navies and air forces in support of their strategic mission over vast areas of the world map, our wars will be confined to the swath of territory within our land borders. We have very little depth for large-scale manoeuvres. Influenced by the air and the sea, the war will be finally won or lost on the ground, not in the air or in the sea. This is not a theoretical exercise or a game of musical chairs, but a life-and-death struggle with an implacable foe. The PAF and the Pakistan Navy know well how much one respects their capability and potential. But in Pakistan's context the chairman JCSC, commander defence services, the commander-in-chief, etc., whatever one may call the all-powerful principal appointment exercising control over the defence services, has to be from the land forces, and has to be located in the GHQ, perception being nine-tenths of the law. There should be a four-star deputy to the chief in rotation from the PAF or the Pakistan Navy, giving the two services not only an additional four-star slot every three years but someone who can free the chief from routine protocol duties.
The ongoing war, the geo-political circumstances and his track record dealing with foreign powers make Kayani much needed. The respect he commands among all ranks of the armed forces as well as the nation's citizens must take the continuity factor onto a higher and different plane. As per Murphy's Law, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it". More importantly he has acquired the prestige to make combined services a fighting reality. Instead of having a titular head of the armed forces as chairman JCSC, make Kayani the executive head sitting in GHQ as "commander-in-chief" (C-in-C) of all the three services.
A new COAS must be promoted. It would be severely disappointing if Kayani should accept the offer of extension being dangled in front of him. He has an image that would suffer for posterity. If he cannot be C-in-C, Kayani should refuse an extension in the Waheed Kakar tradition.



The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com


On extensions and expectations

 

[Meengla]

From a political perspective, the PPP government will be very happy with a COAS who has remained largely apolitical and avoided getting tangled in domestic politics.
.

That should ideally silence some anti-Zardari/anti-PPP conspiracy theorists--but perhaps it won't because these people have failed to see that fine working relationship between Zardari and Kayani despite the hiccup around the Nawaz Sharif led Long March (when Kayani had to broker a deal).

Actually, it is not just Zardari-Kayani co-existence, it also Zardari-Gilani and Zardari-Nawaz Sharif.

Pakistan's political class may not have 'matured' in democracy enough but they are not fully stupid and unpatriotic either. There is definitely a wait-n-see by all concerns.

 

[Durran3]

Definitely an excellent decsion. Almost everyone in Pakistan as well as the United States respect General Kayani for the way he has handeld and executed counter terrorism operations in Pakistan. I am glad we have a responsible person in charge of this whole mess and i am equally glad that Patreus is now overlooking Afghanistan as well.

 

[mikkix]

Good decision. We need stability at this position, and nothing is perfect than extending COAS Kiyani who has developed vast experience to deal with critical situations in Pakistan.

stability in what current crises of terrorism and economy??.

 

[mikkix]

i don't know why he has got 3 years of extension, does it seems that no other Pakistani general is competent to fight the crises..
Perhaps it is beneficial for Americans to continue what they are doing so that is why they acts as a lobbist for Kiyani to convinced people in Pakistan..
It would be good to have a extension of 1 year but this is much more which can create internal frustration in Army..

 

[sparklingway]

Kayani, a man for many seasons​

By Shuja Nawaz, July 23, 2010 Friday, July 23, 2010 - 3:37 PM Share

In a timely though perhaps overly dramatic move, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan announced last night on national television the extension of army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for another three years beyond November this year, when his first term was to end. Timely, since any further delay in announcing it would have led to further speculation and confusion about what was to happen. Dramatic, since the normal manner would have been a press release from the Inter Services Relations Directorate.

But then this is Pakistan and anything to do with the army chief makes headlines. And this announcement further strengthens the view that the army continues to be a key player even as democracy struggles to establish itself in a country that has been ruled for more than half its life by the military.

This is the first time a civilian government has extended an army chief for a full term. In the past, extensions have been either short, given by military rulers to themselves or, in the case of the first military ruler, Ayub Khan, to an ineffectual army chief with no independent power base. Benazir Bhutto sought to break with tradition when she offered an extension to General Abdul Waheed in 1996 but he refused it. Kayani took pains to convey the impression that he would not seek an extension nor negotiate for one. It appears that the government made him an offer he could not refuse.

Kayani is widely regarded as a quiet, professional soldier, who has helped transform the army in his tenure from a largely conventional force to one that is effectively fighting an irregular war inside its own borders. His new tenure gives him a rare opportunity to continue the transformation of the Pakistan into army into a professional body ready to fight insurgencies and conventional enemies equally well. He maintains a low public profile and is seen as a thinking general. Compared with his predecessor, General Pervez Musharraf, who was tempestuous and rarely had time to read, Kayani is deliberate. From the outset, he stated a policy of keeping the army out of politics, a policy that he tried to maintain even while selectively intervening in political squabbles as a referee. In recent months he has played a key role in moving the United States-Pakistan strategic dialogue onto a higher plane in terms of content and action.

While many inside and outside the country have welcomed the move as providing continuity and stability at a time of a raging insurgency and the rise of militancy inside Pakistan, others view it as a retrogressive move away from institutionalizing the selection and promotion system by linking it to personalities. Above all, it is a political move since the final decision was made by a politician. The United States has studiously avoided taking a public position but conversations with U.S. diplomats and military officials over the past few months indicated their deep interest in the future of General Kayani and a noticeable desire to see him remain at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. Yet Kayani on his part has showed no signs that he is or even is willing to be painted as "America's choice."

What are the implications of this extension? In the near term, it opens up the possibility of a routine promotion for the next senior most army general to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee when that position falls vacant in October 2010. There may well be an opportunity also to elevate one of the other service chiefs, from the air force or navy, to bolster inter-service cohesion. Within the army there has been some talk of a Vice Chief. This may make sense for such a large army but runs against the grain, since the Pakistan army has a steep pyramid structure. Authority rests in one man: the chief. When I suggested to my own brother, General Asif Nawaz, when he took over as Army chief in 1991 that he appoint a deputy chief to help manage the administrative details of his work, his reply was crisp: "Command is indivisible!" While not supported by historical evidence, this mantra has taken hold in Pakistan and was echoed by General Pervez Musharraf for different and perhaps political reasons, even though he appointed a Vice Chief of the Army Staff. But Musharraf made all the important decisions himself.

In the longer run, the career paths of many senior generals will be affected by this decision. Nearly a dozen operational three-stars (Lieutenant Generals) will retire before Kayani's new term expires in November 2013. These include a number of very bright and highly trained officers whom he has promoted to three star rank in April this year. As a result, the age and service gap between Kayani and his corps commanders in another two years will be quite large, as he digs down into the ranks order to promote new commanders. The nature and quality of the exchanges between him and his commanders will necessarily be affected, as was the case for General Zia ul-Haq and General Musharraf before him. Few junior officers will be willing to challenge the views of such a senior chief. Yet, he has exhibited a certain collegiality in his exchanges with fellow officers. If he can maintain that approach it will serve him in good stead. Politically, the country will of necessity see another election during Kayani's extended term, unless things deteriorate so dramatically internally or in relations with Pakistan's fractious neighbors that the army, under public pressure, mounts another coup. Here, Kayani will fight against historical precedent: in the past, an extension or the dismissal of a chief and replacement by a new chief invariably led to a coup, as mutual suspicions between the civilians and the military was compounded.

A positive spin-off from the extension in the eyes of some may be that a slew of Musharraf promotees will also retire between now and 2013 reducing the tension between them and others vying for the next rung. Some of these are strong professional officers but the taint of having been favored by Musharraf may remain. After all, Kayani too was a Musharraf choice. A major advantage that might accrue is that the certainty provided by the new term for the army chief will allow the civilian government to become confident in asserting itself in policy matters, knowing that the army chief will not overtly intervene in its affairs. This may help strengthen political institutions. At the same time, civilians must resist the temptation to turn to the army to lead the battle against militancy (a national endeavor not purely a military one) or to arbitrate differences on the political field.

These three years should also give Kayani time to assess the present Higher Defense Organization of Pakistan and perhaps come up with a more devolved structure for the army and a better system of command and control at the center. One possible scenario may include regional and centralized commands at four-star rank, appointed by the same authority who selects the service chiefs, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs with real powers to regulate all the services while acting as the main military advisor of the government. This approach has been taken by the United States and many other modern militaries, so it would hardly be unprecedented. Without having a stake in the chairman's position in 2013, Kayani may be able to provide a dispassionate plan for the government to decide, well in advance of the next round of promotions in 2013. Any proposal that he presents as a disinterested party will have credibility and will also help override the parochial concerns of the army relative to the other services in Pakistan.

All this will be against the backdrop of Pakistan's traditional rivalry with emerging superpower India to the east. Kayani would be key to any effort to reduce hostility and to open the eastern border to trade and traffic. He has already played a role in opening up to Afghanistan and perhaps positioning Pakistan to play a role in the reconciliation efforts of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

The United States, as a key ally, must also understand that the army chief in Pakistan will think foremost about Pakistan's interests. To the extent that they have an interlocutor who knows them well, from his extensive U.S. training and contacts, the U.S. will benefit from a clear dialogue. Removing years of mistrust will take a major and longer-term effort. Officer exchanges will help. But most important will be steady provision of the best possible equipment to the Pakistani forces in their battle against insurgents and militants, with no underlying threats or overhanging waivers accompanying those transfers. That is what trust means.

Key to this entire enterprise is the man who will continue to head the Pakistan army beyond President Barack Obama's first term and into the term of the next elected government in Pakistan: General Kayani, truly now a man for many seasons.

Shuja Nawaz is Director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council.

Implications Of Gen. Kayani's Extension - By Shuja Nawaz | The AfPak Channel