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25 police checkpoints set up in Islamabad as part of ‘special’ security plan

Hey guys no offence but looks like you’ve sold your country to the Americans hook line and sinker . I think this is all a ploy I also think ttp is masterminded by your army to divert from political issues and to get aid from US .

Your army chief has destroyed your country for money .

Looks from afar .

Not meaning to cause offence but just the way I see it hearing the news from Pakistan over last few months .
 
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A very good step, this was much much needed rather than learning the different numbers.

So if I call 1122, how will it be different to 911? Or both will route to the same agency which will then dispatch the appropriate agency?

Also, please publicize this more. I read the news alot and still didn't know this was fully op.
1122 and 911 route though same safe city contact centre. The call handler will then determine end user needs using a standardised question set. However in some remote locations the call may be routed to your local DHQ for 1122.
 
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Word of advice for anyone in Pindi and Islamabad for the next few months, make sure you carry your NIC with you.

If you see a suspicious item, vehicle or person - think HOT!
Hidden
- i.e. placed where they will not be readily seen or noticed as unusual
Obviously suspicious (e.g. by physical appearance, by placement, or because of the circumstances in which they have been discovered)
Not Typical of what you would normally expect to find in that environment

Items that have any of the following should be treated with extreme caution:
a. external wiring;
b. visible batteries;
c. switches;
d. timers;
e. circuit boards;
f. wire passing from one package to another;
g. items secured by plastic adhesive tape;
h. annotations (e.g., ‘ON’ or anything in reference to the time delay);
i. specially modified wooden or plastic boxes;
j. unidentified powders or other putty-like substances; or
k. carefully wrapped in plastic bags.

What you should DO:
  • DO NOT TOUCH IT OR HANDLE IT
  • Vacate the area and inform security/police
  • Do Not use cell phones or CB radios in close proximity to the device
  • Evacuate the area minimum 200 meters, try to get behind a solid building away from any glass or falling hazards and do not return until the police have made the area safe. Terrorists are known to use primary explosions to stage an assault or gather a crowd before detonating a secondary IED, try not to return to the area until the all-clear has been given.
Just 1500g of ANFO (terrorist preferred HME) is enough to kill 10 people in a 15-meter radius:

An average suicide vest detonates and produces a number of effects chiefly being the blast overpressure "Shockwave" it is estimated that the average vest (depending on varying factors) can produce blast overpressure of anywhere between 50-150 PSI within the immediate area around the T.

According to the "Forensic Neuropathology, Third Edition" blast overpressure of 100-250 PSI is not survivable. Your best job as a civilian is to observe, report and evacuate or if it is a car or package, move as far as possible away from the object min distance between 300-400 meters.

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Look out for "Hostile Surveillance"

How to identify "Hostile Surveillance":
The first thing to remember is that attacks and other crimes don’t just appear out of a vacuum. They are the result of the attack cycle [fig 2], and those planning crimes are vulnerable to detection as they progress through these processes.
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Figure 2: The Attack cycle

The activity that most exposes hostile actors to detection is surveillance, and every criminal act involves some degree of surveillance. Obviously, the amount of surveillance needed for a simple purse snatching is much less than that required for a complex kidnapping, but both nevertheless require surveillance.

Most criminals have poor surveillance tradecraft. Yet, the reason they are able to succeed in their crimes despite their ineptitude at this critical skill is that the majority of people simply aren’t looking for surveillance and therefore miss even awkward surveillance efforts.

Tradecraft is an espionage term that refers to operational techniques used in the field. The term implies that tradecraft is as much an art as a skill and that they require a degree of finesse to conduct them properly.

In many ways, tradecraft skills are like learning a musical instrument. One can listen to music, read books on music theory, and take lessons, but becoming a skilled musician requires a great deal of time and practice.

The same is true for the art of surveillance, as it takes time and practice on the street for one to become a skilled surveillance operative.

While there are some terrorist operatives and high-end criminals who have mastered the surveillance art, most hostile actors simply do not devote the time necessary to become adept. They display terrible technique, use sloppy procedures, and lack finesse during their surveillance. This makes them easy to pick out—but only if someone is looking for them.

Remember: TEDD​


TEDD stands for Time, Environment, Distance and Demeanour, and is also applicable to ordinary citizens trying to identify hostile criminal or terrorist surveillance.

If a person sees someone repeatedly over time—in different environments and at a distance from where they last saw them—or if they notice someone who displays poor surveillance demeanour, then that person can assume he or she is under surveillance.

For example, if you see someone on your morning commute to work, and then see the same person while shopping that evening at the mall in a different part of town, there is a good chance that person is following you.

For an individual, however, TEDD is only relevant in cases where you are being specifically being stalked or targeted for a complex attack such as a kidnapping or being stalked. In such cases, the individual will have the elements of time, environment, and distance to see the hostile actor planning a crime.

However, in mass casualty incidents such as a terrorist or workplace violence attack, it is often the location that is being targeted rather than a specific individual. An individual who just happens to be at the attack site will not have the ability to make time, environment, or distance correlations.

In such cases, a victim will only have a demeanour to key on. It is often a demeanour mistake that allows one to initially notice a person and then key in on them over the other TEDD factors of time, environment, and distance.

Changing Appearance​

Skilled hostile actors conducting surveillance over an extended period may cloak their actions by changing their clothing, wearing wigs, or other light disguises. They may also use different vehicles or license plates, and thus watching for mistakes in demeanour is critical for detecting hostile surveillance.

It is thus important to focus on the things that cannot be changed as easily as clothing or hair, such as a person’s facial features, build, mannerisms and gait. Additionally, while someone can change the license plate on a car, it is not as easy to alter other aspects of the vehicle such as scratches and dents in the body.

Critical Places​

One technique that can be helpful in detecting hostile surveillance is to identify critical places that provide optimal visibility of a critical place someone doing surveillance would want to watch.

Such a critical place would include the front door of the surveillance target’s residence or office, or a choke point on a route frequently used by the target, and the places that provide an optimal view of them are referred to as perches in surveillance jargon.

Once identified, perches can then be monitored for tell-tale signs of hostile surveillance such as people who do not belong, people who are unnaturally lurking, or people making more subtle demeanour mistakes.

Keying in on Demeanour​

Demeanour is the outward behaviour a person displays to those watching him or her. The key to good surveillance tradecraft is mastering the ability to display appropriate demeanour for the environment one is in.

Practicing good demeanour is not intuitive. In fact, I believe many of the things one must do to maintain good demeanour while conducting surveillance are counter to human nature.

At its heart, surveillance is watching someone while attempting not to be caught doing so. As such, it is an unnatural activity, and a person doing it must deal with strong feelings of self-consciousness and of being out of place.

Burn Syndrome​

People conducting surveillance frequently suffer from what is called “burn syndrome,” the belief that the people they are watching have spotted them. Feeling “burned” will cause untrained surveillance operatives to do unnatural things, such as hiding their faces or suddenly ducking into a doorway or turning around abruptly when they unexpectedly come face to face with the target.

People inexperienced in the art of surveillance find it difficult to control this natural reaction.

Because of this, intelligence, law enforcement, and security professionals receive extensive surveillance training that includes many hours of heavily critiqued practical exercises, often followed by field training with a team of experienced surveillance professionals.

This training emphasizes and reinforces maintaining proper demeanour. Even experienced surveillance operatives must deal with the feeling of being burned.

The difference is that since they have received extensive professional training, they are better able to control their reaction and behave normally. They possess the ability to maintain a demeanour that appears normal even though their insides are screaming that the person they are watching has seen them.

Proper Cover​

In addition to doing something unnatural or stupid when feeling burned, another common mistake made by amateurs when conducting surveillance is the failure to use proper cover for action and cover for status.

Cover for status is a person’s purported identity—his costume. A person can pretend to be a student, a businessman, a repairman, etc. Cover for action explains why the person is doing what he or she is doing—i.e., sitting on that bench waiting for a bus.

Proper cover for status and cover for action makes the presence of the person conducting the surveillance look routine and normal in that specific environment at that particular time. When done right, the surveillance operative fits in with the mental snapshot subconsciously taken by the target as the target goes about his or her business.

An example of a bad cover for status would be someone dressed as a “businessman” walking in the woods or at the beach. An example of a bad cover for action is someone pretending to be sitting at a bus stop who remains at that bus stop even after several buses have passed.

For the most part, however, inexperienced operatives conducting surveillance practice little or no cover for status and cover for action. They just lurk and look totally out of place. There is no apparent reason for them to be where they are or doing what they are doing.

In addition to plain old lurking, other demeanour giveaways include a person moving when the target moves, communicating when the target moves, making sudden turns or stops, or even using hand signals to communicate with other members of a surveillance team or criminal gang.

Surveillants also can tip off the person they are watching by entering or leaving a building immediately after the person they are watching does so, or simply by running in street clothes.

Just Doesn’t Look Right​

Sometimes, people who are experiencing the burn syndrome exhibit almost imperceptible behaviours that the target can sense more than observe. It may not be something that can be articulated, but the target just has a gut reaction gets the gut feeling that there is something wrong or creepy about the way a certain person is behaving.

The term we use for that gut feeling is “JDLR” or Just Doesn’t Look Right. Innocent bystanders do not exhibit behaviour that triggers such feelings. I encourage people to trust their gut when they encounter such a situation.

There is often little to lose by doing so, other than perhaps a little time and effort, and avoiding a potential problem is always the right thing to do.

Another important demeanour indicator is a person’s eyes. How a person looks at you—or doesn’t—can provide a good indicator of their intent.

Are they looking at you with a hostile, drop-dead look? Do they have a thousand-yard stare? Are they avoiding your gaze? It has been said that the eyes are the window to the soul, and I have found this to very often be true.

It takes intelligence officers months or years of training and practice to become highly proficient at detecting surveillance conducted by professional surveillance operatives, and there are many tricks of the trade.

However, almost anyone can learn to spot surveillance by poorly trained criminals or terrorists—it is not rocket science.

The keys to doing so are to first understand a bit about surveillance and demeanour as we have done in this article; and secondly, to make the effort to practice situational awareness to look for surveillance when appropriate.

Suspect Identification:
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Emergency Numbers:
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First aid Advice:
Here is a link to another post I wrote on providing first-aid during IED and terrorist incidents:


@Jango @HRK @LeGenD
Great post but if this starts again, all this would be like a bandaid on a missing body part.
 
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1122 and 911 route though same safe city contact centre. The call handler will then determine end user needs using a standardised question set. However in some remote locations the call may be routed to your local DHQ for 1122.

Oh so I call 911, they ask me a set of questions, and then route me to another operator?

This isn't like the 911 of the US where only one agent is responsible for the police, ambulance, and fire?

I guess perhaps because all departments here aren't in sync with each other and there isn't an automated system?
 
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@RescueRanger , is 911 operational now? As in fully functioning?

As for Islamabad Police, my sympathies with the security apparatus, but due to a few personal experiences in the recent past, my respect for them has gone down the drain.

Akhir kaar inhain hosh aa hi gayi to stop picking social media activists and journalists, and stop harrassing young 25 year olds and asking for chai pani, and actually working on stopping crime and terrorism.

Let's hope they have now learned to mend their ways and actually focus on actual crime rather than looking to make a quick buck.



Where are they? Went out today and came back from Pindi but couldn't see any.
They'd tell you: "sir uper se orders he"
and can you really blame them?

Oh so I call 911, they ask me a set of questions, and then route me to another operator?

This isn't like the 911 of the US where only one agent is responsible for the police, ambulance, and fire?

I guess perhaps because all departments here aren't in sync with each other and there isn't an automated system?
Still better than nothing.

1122 and 911 route though same safe city contact centre. The call handler will then determine end user needs using a standardised question set. However in some remote locations the call may be routed to your local DHQ for 1122.
so in short,
1) Is 911 operational country wide (talking about rural areas esp) or just major cities?
2) Should one only call 911 now and they'll redirect to 1122 if needed or fire dept if needed? Or is there a case where should directly call another service like 1122 or 15?
 
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Pakistani officials are very fond of "Ooper say Order" and "Ooper ki Kamaayi". Only difference between them and prostitutes is that the later rely upon "Neechay ki Kamaayi". :lol: :lol:
Low blow.
 
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Maybe the point @SIPRA sb was making is the lack of dignity one has to have to take a bribe and to sell one's body is common in the aforementioned groups.

Certainly, my point is precisely, what you have stated. This "Ooper say Order" and "Ooper ki Kamaayi" has destructed Pakistan, beyond recognition.
 
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Great post but if this starts again, all this would be like a bandaid on a missing body part.
Rather have people informed and prepared than people not knowing what to do. I’ve picked up my share of dead bodies from terrorist attacks, you think I want to relive that?

Oh so I call 911, they ask me a set of questions, and then route me to another operator?

This isn't like the 911 of the US where only one agent is responsible for the police, ambulance, and fire?

I guess perhaps because all departments here aren't in sync with each other and there isn't an automated system?
Sir this is how 911 works in the US too. You have one tandem or switch - which routes calls to the state PSP (Emergency Operations Centre) where you get 911 calls, these are then routed through to the county control rooms / dispatch.

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In Pakistan the switch technology is only just being upgraded, things take time. 🙂
 
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They'd tell you: "sir uper se orders he"
and can you really blame them?


Still better than nothing.


so in short,
1) Is 911 operational country wide (talking about rural areas esp) or just major cities?
2) Should one only call 911 now and they'll redirect to 1122 if needed or fire dept if needed? Or is there a case where should directly call another service like 1122 or 15?
You should call 911 it’s now an integrated emergency number. You can always call 15 and 1122 but eventually these numbers will be switched off when the switch upgrade has been completed.

Only place you should always dial 15 is Balochistan which doesn’t have the infrastructure upgraded as yet.

Sadly Baluchistan still doesn’t have full coverage from 1122, only partial coverage along the highway and in the provincial capital.

@Jango please can you do something about this member trolling serious topics:

E70FB86E-3896-4333-8717-C52C889A617C.jpeg
 
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Rather have people informed and prepared than people not knowing what to do. I’ve picked up my share of dead bodies from terrorist attacks, you think I want to relive that?

My post was not questioning your intent. Rather lack of leadership and foresight from people in command.
 
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Can KPK set up the same amount of checkpoints in its major cities in terms of available resources (Police/LEAs/equipment)?
No sir, KPK lacks the personnel and also the terrain is advantageous to infiltrators. The best KPK can do is routes along major transport arterial routes and provincial capital / vital installation security.

TTP and other actors know this, they exploit it well.
 
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No sir, KPK lacks the personnel and also the terrain is advantageous to infiltrators. The best KPK can do is routes along major transport arterial routes and provincial capital / vital installation security.

TTP and other actors know this, they exploit it well.
Yes, I thought so as soon as I saw the news of 25 new check posts setting up, I at once thought of Peshawar, Nowshera, Bannu, Kohat, Swat, etc. The trouble starts brewing from KPK and thats the region where provincial Government should be demanding resources (men+guns) to be spread across the province. On the contrary, the Government is looking to start a new military offensive. This military operation can be avoided if policing LEAs and deployed properly in all Ops whether IBO or interrogation.
 
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