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1971 facts from fiction

Disposition of Forces

The Pakistan army had only one division stationed in Bangladesh in February 1971: The 14th Infantry division, commanded by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja. The division had 4 infantry brigades attached to it, instead of the normal 3 Brigades. The 57th infantry brigade was stationed in Dhaka, the 53rd was in Comilla, the 23rd in Rangpur and the 107th was in Jessore. Normally each brigade had 3 to 4 infantry battalions, and a field artillery regiment attached to it in addition to various support troops. After the Pakistanis decided on military action, 2 new formations, the 13th Frontier Force and the 22nd Baluch was flown to Dhaka from West Pakistan. To maintain secrecy, no major reinforcements were initially sent to the other garrisons before March 25th.

Must have been HUGE divisions:lol: .
 
Actually I understood where you were going with it but I think you missed my drift which was wrt the grossly exaggerated 90K number of POWs that is claimed against Pakistan in the 1971 conflicts. What most geniuses forget about is that the total Pakistani military presence in EP did not exceed 45K troops.

Dear sir, I understand that you people are not ready to accept the facts, if it is possible please try to lay your hands on "AUTHENTICATE" documents. Try to learn about some incidents like Nalabari incident, Hebua and some other things in 1971 war,in Bangladesh and Indian army Loungewala border fightback on 4th May 1971, I don't know wether you can get unbiased information. Twisting facts are more criminal act than the actual incident. Please refer to the documents below and later justify your statements.
Later Also I will post the list of strength of surrenderd forces including their ranks, made by Gen.Niazi. And here is the list of surrendered armed forces personnel.
List of members of Pakistani occupation army surrendered to Bangladesh-India alliance forces on 16 December 1971.

1.Regular Army
a.Officers: 1,606
b. JCO’s: 2,345
c. Soldiers: 64,448

2. Air force Personnel
a. Officers: 61
b. Warrant Officers: 31
c. Airmen: 1,049

3. Para military forces
a. Officers: 79
b. JCO’s: 448
c. Soldiers: 11,665
4. Others
Armed Police and civila dministration officers and personnel: 7,721.



5. Naval Forces
a. Officers: 91
b. Petty officers: 30
c. Seamen: 1,292 Total: 91,549*
* Does not include another 250 Personnel who were under Bangladeshi custody and was later given custody to the Indian forces.

The total strength was 91,549. Waiting for counter claims with "VALID ONLY" documents. Hoping that you will not prove the existing selective amnesia.
Bye.
 

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Indian military forces initially remained in newly independent Bangladesh to consolidate their victory and to assist in stabilizing the new government, but they completed their withdrawal on March 12, 1972. A flotilla of Soviet minesweepers arrived in Bangladesh shortly thereafter, ostensibly to clear Pakistani mines from Chittagong harbor. The prolonged Soviet presence, a source of suspicion among Awami League critics, ended in 1975 when Mujib's successors requested the Soviets to leave.

Regular Bangladeshi armed forces were quickly established but, because of budgetary constraints, on an extremely limited scale. The organization of these armed forces reflected not only that of the colonial British Indian Army, especially as it had continued under the Pakistan Army, but also the experience of the Mukti Bahini in the 1971 war of independence. Most of the guerrilla fighters reverted to civilian status, although some were absorbed into the regular armed forces. Countrywide, vast but undetermined numbers of small arms and automatic weapons remained at large in the population, presaging trouble in the years ahead.

A difficult residual issue was prisoner exchanges. India held about 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees, while Bangladesh retained 195 Pakistanis (mostly military) with the intent--later put aside--of bringing them to trial for war crimes. Pakistan also held some 28,000 Bengali military personnel stranded in West Pakistan. Under agreements reached by the governments of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan in August 1973 and April 1974, prisoner release and repatriation in all categories were completed by April 30, 1975.

The bitter rift between military personnel who returned to Bangladesh after liberation and freedom fighters who had fought in the war was to have profound consequences for the new nation.

The repatriates, who had languished in West Pakistani jails during the civil war, were absorbed into an army dominated by former guerrillas, some of whom were civilians inducted as a reward for their sacrifices. Repatriates, by and large, felt no personal loyalty to Mujib and viewed the freedom fighters as a undisciplined and politicized element. Repatriate officers bridled under Mujib's use of the army in disarming the civilian population and taming his political opponents. Moreover, repatriates were suspicious of the regime's pro-Indian sympathies, its rhetorical support for the Soviet Union, and its efforts to circumscribe the role of Islam in national affairs. The rift between repatriates and freedom fighters worsened considerably when Mujib formed the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defense Force), an elite parallel army intended to insulate the regime against military coups and other armed challenges to its authority. By 1975 the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini had swelled to an estimated 30,000 troops. Repatriates complained that Mujib destroyed the army's integrity by disbanding the East Bengal Regiment, which was composed primarily of repatriates; funneling all new recruits to the Jatiyo; Rakkhi Bahini; favoring freedom fighters in matters of pay and promotions; and slashing the army's budget in order to sustain the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini.

Other armed elements that supported Mujib roamed the countryside searching out and punishing Pakistani collaborators, opponents of the regime, and, as was often the case, anyone who offered resistance to their warlord-style rule. For instance, freedom fighter leader Kader "Tiger" Siddiqi and his estimated 3,000 armed supporters virtually ruled Mymensingh District while Mujib was in office.

Other, more radical factions within the army viewed the liberation movement as unfinished until the "petit bourgeois" Awami League government was swept aside and replaced by a "people's government" of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party modeled after the Chinese experiment. The central figure among these factions was Abu Taher, a former Pakistan Army colonel who had been trained in commando operations in the United States and was later cashiered by Mujib because of his radical views. Taher and an inner circle of radical freedom fighters belonged to the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party) and its armed wing, the Biplabi Sainik Sangstha (Revolutionary Soldiers Organization). The Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal developed deep roots in the military and among radical students connected with the Chhatro Union (Students Union) of the Bangladesh Communist Party. The Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal tailored its appeal to lower level officers and jawans. By 1975 Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal sympathizers within the military and police were estimated to number 20,000.

Tensions within the military exploded on August 15, 1975, when thirty middle-ranking army officers, many of whom were repatriates, staged a coup. With the support of troops from the First Bengal Lancers and the Second Field Artillery Regiment, the mutineers assassinated Mujib and members of his family and called on Ziaur Rahman (Zia) to become army chief of staff. Osmany, the former Mukti Bahini chief, lent respectability to the emerging military- political order by agreeing to serve as defense adviser to the new figurehead president, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed.

Freedom-fighter elements within the army countered this so- called "majors' plot" by staging a coup of their own on November 3, 1975. Following the murder of prominent Awami League officials detained in Dhaka Central Jail, troops commanded by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf dismissed the government, placed Zia under arrest, created a vaguely defined revolutionary council, and exiled the ringleaders of the original coup to Libya. A total breakdown in discipline within the military occurred shortly after this second coup, as junior army officers and jawans took to the streets to defend themselves against anticipated assaults from rival army factions. Simultaneously, the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal called on jawans to kill their commanding officers. On November 7, Zia secured his release from house arrest, reportedly with Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal backing, and staged a third coup. Musharraff was killed, Zia and other senior officers restored a semblance of army unity, and the jawans returned to barracks.

As Zia attempted to consolidate power under his new title of chief martial law administrator, additional challenges to his authority occurred. In April 1976, conservative officers led by Air Vice Marshal M.G. Tawab attempted to overthrow Zia after recalling four of the "killer majors" from exile. The conspirators called for the creation of an Islamic state and demanded a share of political power. After officers of the two armored regiments, the First Bengal Cavalry and the First Bengal Lancers, refused to turn over the rebels, troops loyal to Zia descended on Bogra cantonment to put down the mutiny. In the aftermath of the failed coup, Tawab was exiled, the Twenty-second East Bengal Regiment was disbanded, Taher was hanged, and over 200 servicemen were tried in military courts on disciplinary charges.

An even more serious breach of discipline occurred on September 29, 1977, when Japanese Red Army terrorists landed a hijacked aircraft at Dhaka International Airport (present-day Zia International Airport). While Zia and his senior staff officers were busy negotiating with the hijackers, an entire army battalion mutinied in Bogra. As the hostage drama continued, the revolt spread to Dhaka cantonment and to air force units at the airport itself.

The uprising was the handiwork of the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal, which again exhorted jawans to kill their commanding officers. Their slogan was "All soldiers are brothers; blood of officers wanted; no ranks above [low-ranking] subedar." The mutineers' goal was to create a "classless army" that would act as a revolutionary vanguard in remaking Bangladeshi society in a Maoist mold. Alarmed by the spreading disorder within the ranks, senior army officers rallied behind Zia's leadership. After several days of heavy fighting that killed an estimated 200 soldiers, loyal troops succeeded in suppressing the rebellion. Zia then moved swiftly to purge mutinous elements from the military. Within a span of 2 months, more than 1,100 had been executed for involvement in the uprising. According to a well-informed observer, "it was the most devastating punishment exercise in the history of Bangladesh, carried out with the utmost speed and with total disregard for justice and the legal process." As additional precautions, Zia reorganized the three service branches, disbanded mutinous units, shuffled his senior commanders, and banned the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal.

During his six-year tenure in office, Zia implemented a number of strategies to instill discipline in the armed forces and broaden the political base of his regime. Zia recognized that officers and jawans alike nursed serious grievances against their military and civilian superiors, such as low pay, lack of promotions, corruption and political machinations. He set out to professionalize the military by promoting repatriates, increasing military pay and benefits, and building up the defense budget. Zia also co-opted the officer corps by expanding the armed forces, appointing both active-duty and retired military cronies to lucrative positions in the civil bureaucracy, and exiling potential challengers to diplomatic posts abroad. Simultaneously, Zia militarized the national police system by firing thousands of police on charges of corruption and appointing army officers to oversee the system.

Despite his efforts to curb the army's appetite for power, Zia fell victim to assassination. On the night of May 30, 1981, Major General Muhammed Manzur Ahmed, commander of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division and a hero of the war of independence, led troops to the government rest house in Chittagong where Zia was staying. After murdering the president and his bodyguards, Manzoor seized the local radio station and called on troops elsewhere in the country to support his coup.

Manzur announced the formation of a "revolutionary council," dismissed senior officers from their posts in Dhaka, dissolved Parliament, and abrogated the 1972 Treaty of Cooperation, Friendship, and Peace with India. Manzur apparently was convinced that freedom fighters--estimated at 20 percent of the army--would rally behind him, despite the fact that the leader he murdered was a venerated freedom fighter himself. Fearing that a successful coup might trigger another intramilitary bloodletting, senior commanders in Dhaka lined up behind Zia's aging and infirm constitutional successor, Supreme Court justice Abdus Sattar. Loyal army units converged on Chittagong, and the coup attempt was crushed within forty-eight hours. According to a government white paper published after the episode, Manzur was apprehended after fleeing to the Indian border, and he was shot "while attempting to escape." Thirty-one officers were subsequently tried for mutiny, twelve of the thirty-one were hanged, and fifty-four senior officers were dismissed.

Zia's most impressive achievement--the creation of a viable institutional framework for promoting political stability and economic growth--did not survive long after his death. "One of Zia's strongest points," according to commentator Ashish Kumar Roy, "was the stability he symbolized in a state that seemed to have become a victim of chronic violence, both civilian and military. By assassinating him, the military itself destroyed all that Zia had sought to prove: that the army could be contained, and that genuine power could be handed back to civilians through a democratic process." Sattar lacked Zia's charisma, and the country was soon subjected to mounting political and monetary crises. Although Sattar and his inherited Bangladesh Nationalist Party won an electoral mandate in November 1981, most political observers believed another army coup was only a matter of time (see The Zia Regime and Its Aftermath, 1977-82 , ch. 1). To compound matters, Sattar was extremely vulnerable because of the political debt he owed the army for quashing the coup and guaranteeing constitutional order. The generals, nevertheless, were reluctant to seize power immediately because of the fear that public opinion might turn against the military.

Army Chief of Staff Hussain Muhammad Ershad pressured Sattar to grant the military a formal, constitutional role in governing the state. During a press interview in November 1981, Ershad offered "some straight talk about a very grave and deep-seated politico- military problem." According to him, the military was an "efficient, well-disciplined and most honest body of a truly dedicated and organized national force. The potentials of such an excellent force in a poor country like ours can effectively be utilized for productive and nation-building purposes in addition to its role of national defense." Ershad denied any personal political ambitions but lamented the shabby treatment civilian politicians accorded the military. "Our rank-and-file do not want military adventurism in politics, nor do they want political adventurism in the military," he declared to his political opponents, thus setting the stage for the coup he was to engineer later. To remedy the problems he saw, Ershad put forward a concept that "requires us to depart from conventional Western ideas of the role of the armed forces. It calls for combining the roles of nation building and national defense into one concept of total national defense." Ershad denied that "total national defense" amounted to military interference in the democratic process, but his contention was hotly disputed by civilian politicians.

Sattar responded to Ershad's challenge by trying to establish a National Security Council in January 1982, comprising the three service chiefs and seven civilians. Ershad rejected the plan. Sattar, hoping to forestall an army takeover, reorganized his crumbling cabinet the following month and reconstituted the National Security Council with the three service chiefs and only three civilians. Despite this concession, which was opposed by opposition politicians and by some members of Sattar's own party, Ershad staged a coup on March 24, 1982. Unlike previous coups, there was no bloodshed, senior military commanders acted in unison, and the population accepted the military takeover, albeit sullenly. Ershad cited the political and social evils that necessitated drastic action on the part of the "patriotic armed forces" and again denied any personal political ambitions (see The Ershad Period , ch. 4).

Data as of September 1988

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bd0141)
 
Key,

Pretty informative post. I'm glad the Indian Army had the wisdom to leave when the job was done. We should have done that in Iraq also!!
 
Key,

Pretty informative post. I'm glad the Indian Army had the wisdom to leave when the job was done. We should have done that in Iraq also!!

yeh they were over-confident to make Bangladesh another Bhutan but Bangladeshis proved too strong to bend over :D
 
yeh they were over-confident to make Bangladesh another Bhutan but Bangladeshis proved too strong to bend over :D

conspiracy conpiracy is there anything else.
Learn from your Enemy so says that chinese guy...lol:D
 
thn dont complaint whn we have hand in even sneazing of someone in India:D
That is unfair, the seeds of 1971 lay in the 1965 war. Pak should'nt have tried Op Gibraltar in J&K, now its a tit-for tat, never ending game.
 
That is unfair, the seeds of 1971 lay in the 1965 war. Pak should'nt have tried Op Gibraltar in J&K, now its a tit-for tat, never ending game.

and u are sayign India was justified to op for 71 like war.?
 
yeh they were over-confident to make Bangladesh another Bhutan but Bangladeshis proved too strong to bend over :D

Was that supposed to be a sarcastic, non-contributive post, or were you trying to convey some point?

"too strong to bend over ...." for what?
 
A question to senior Pakistani members, should i feel guilty, what happened in 71?...cuz am after 71 generation. But i feel the dust is settling down and i see so many strange faces. Who were never seen in that picture. Just blaming Pak army or accussing Pak is not enough....90000 POW. Of which hardly 50000 army killed 3 million bengalies? and fighting on front with Indian and Bengali insurgents too......thats total Bengali misinformation. I serach so many sites about mass grave, found nothing. Some reports say total civilian casualities were 3000, some say 30,000 or less.
But after reviewing the whole scenario. I would say we are better off without Bengladesh. Why? so many reason behind that.
 
No room to pay homage to Arora

An article in an Indian magazine 'Frontline' (Volume 22 - Issue 13, Jun 18
- Jul 01, 2005, http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2213/stori...01001405300.htm ) , contributed by a Bangladeshi journalist Haroon Habib,under the caption 'Homage to a hero' drew my attention. My fellow-journalist Harron Habib left no stone unturned to praise Gen. Arora for his heroic (?) deeds. Haroon expressed his anguish seeing the passive mood of many quarters, including the ruling elites, for their failure inpaying homage to Arora who died on May 3.

The write-up of Haroon Habib could be excellent one, if he could be impartial and could also try to explore and unearth the reason, why the Bangladeshis in general refrained from paying sincere tribute to Arora. The reason is this that the role of Arora and his associates was heroic for India, but not for Bangladesh, rather it was a curse for Bangladesh and its people. His death was condoled by those who are known in Bangladesh as pro-Indian elements.

Observers, who monitored those condolence meetings, found the speakers engaged in competitions in pleasing India more than paying homage to Arora. Indian High Commission in Dhaka is alleged to have sponsored almost all the meetings orgrainsed by various parties and groups. None of the condolence meetings was spontaneous. Most of the organisers and speakers were supposed to do so, as they are overtly and covertly aligned to and benefited by India.

Haroon Habib praised Arora for his unique command over his troops in keeping them disciplined. But his comment is beyond reality. There is no evidence as to what the General did to stop his soldiers from looting. He was either a failed commander who miserably failed to impose discipline and supervision in the conduct of his troops when they resorted to stealing the assets of the country they allegedly came to liberate.

The failure to prevent this full scale looting actually planted the first seed of anti-India feeling in the hearts of the Bangladeshis. One expatiate Bangladeshi, Tuhin Reza,alleged that he failed to impose discipline on his troops that paved the way for looting. But the ground reality that I saw in Dhaka just after December 16, 1971, shows that the looting was open and concerted, something, as if,by official instruction. It was not a failure.

It was his instruction. Not only the dwelling houses or shops of Dhaka and other major urban areas of Bangladesh, were looted, but also mills and factories, stores of jute, cotton and food grains, and all other things. The looted materials were sent to India loading hundreds of thousands of military lorries and trucks and ship. Individual soldier could steal one or two fancy or attractive items, but how thousands of trucks and vessels loaded with different types of articles and goods could ply to India, if Arora and his bosses in New Delhi had not instructed to do so.

Haoon Habib regretfully said that the role of Arora was distorted in Bangladesh. Haroon Habib opined, "Despite the distortions, one particular photograph of the country's history cannot be erased. The historic picture shows Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi signing the instrument of surrender in front of Lt. Gen. J.S.

Arora at Dhaka's Ramna Race Course." But Mr. Haroon failed to comprehend that this very picture of singing ceremony also itself is the evidence and document of Indian conspiracy in denying the role and sacrifice of freedom fighters of Bangladesh and its people. Where was the representation of Bangladesh in the signing ceremony?

Why Gen. M. A. G. Osmany, the commamander in chief of the Banglasesh forces was not allowed to remain present in the signing ceremony, who could be co-signatories? Denying the signature of Osmany or any other legalrepresentative of the then Revolutionary government of Bangladesh, India itself denied our liberation war. It is alleged that Gen. Osmany was not allowed to reach Dhaka even to attend the ceremony. India instructed

Arora to goalone to sign the surrendering instrument wanted to establish its claim
that it was a war between India and Pakistan.India denied our sacrifice in the very dawn of ourliberation. India wants to claim that our independence was a gift of India.

Those who pay homage to a looter named Arora, indirectly tune to Indian line and accept Indian claim. Mr. Hroon should have known that Indian Army celebrates the 16th December as Vijay Divas(victory day) of the Eastern command of India over Pakistan. By doing so India denies the victory day of Bangladesh. Arora was sent to invade and capture Bangladesh, to pave the way for unhindered looting and the Indian soldiers under the command of Arora did it for days.

For this reason no representation was allowed in he signing ceremony. To a real patriotic Bangladesh Arora and Indian soldiers in 1971 in Bangladesh were invaders and looters not savier or liberator as claimed by Haroon Habib. Arora and his Indian associates assisted the liberation war not to liberate us, but to crush the Muslim power in the subcontinent and enslave us under Indian cage.

Indian Army fought in 1971 to invade and capture Bangladesh and keep it under occupation. I would request Mr. Haroon to collect the last interview of Indian late President Zail Singh published in the 'Sunday' magazine (now defunct) of Calcutta, where he said, that withdrawl of the Indian soldiers from Bangladesh was a blunder.

During the war of liberation I was trained in India. I was twenty years in 1971 and the Vice president of a government college student's union. I wrote and staged a drama at Halflong Camp of Assam in India.I enjoyed close confidence of many leading Awami League and Chattra League some of whom were unfortunately infiltrated by RAW to float Mujib Bahini. I rushed to Dhaka five days after the surrender to visit my elder brother's house in Kachukhat area (adjucent to Dhaka Cantonment).

I personally saw the looting of the Indian soldiers. Elderly people of Dhaka of those days still alive and they can give vivid description how massive looting occurred after December 16. Those who praise India or Arora can talk to them to get the real picture of looting. They may like to study the descriptions of looting provided by many eyewitnesses, including a Sector commander Major Abdul Jalil, who bid to deter shipment of Bangladeshi goods to India.

Jalil was arrested and put to Indian jail for his offence of obstructing the undindered plundering of Bangladeshi assets. Curfews were imposed in the name of security to coverthe looting. Indian soldiers looted whatever they got even the taps of wash basins and spoons. Harrun Habib and others, who paid homage to Arora and treat India as a friend of 1971, are well aware of the looting, but they buried those memories and evidence to secure their self-interest. I humbly request this group of people to ask their conscience a question. Where did the arms,ammunition , military vehicles , equipment, warplanes etc of Pakistan Army go? By looting the costly military hardware India crippled the nacsent Bangladesh army. India did it to make us permanently dependent on India.

Indian conspiracy did not end there. Her subsequent behaviour with Bangladesh since 1972 was more heinous and open that proves that she cannot be our real and trusted friend. The envious and inimical, expansionist and big brotherly attitude of the India for the last 34 years manifest the covert plan and design why the Aroras showed their overt friendliness in 1971.

Other than plundering in 1971, India's post-'71 anti-Bangladesh steps prove that the Aroras did not help us, but made the way to exploit and squeeze us, to grab and annex us finally in their bid to make 'Akhand Bharat'. India illegally blockades the water of the international rivers during the dry season and floods Bangladesh in the rainy season to cause it economically, ecologically and environmentally devasted. India's hidden and open role in sheltering and nursing the Bangladeshi terrorists and secessionists, creating unrest and insatiability in political and educational arenas, constructing barbed wire fence and killing inocent people along the international border, smuggling etc are some of her friendy attitude towards Bangladesh. Indian ruined our basic industries to make Bangladesh her bonded market.

Besides, the atrocities of BSF (Border Security Forces) in the border,procrastination in resolving the bilateral disputes ,violating the bilateral treaties and agreements, undue influence in the internal affairs of Bangladesh, sabotage and subversive activities, anti-Bangladesh propaganda only branded India as an unfriendly country. How all these ugly anti-Bangladesh activities could inspire a patriot to pay homage to Arora or Indira Gandhi?

But the common people of Bangladesh do not find any logic to praise the Indians. Even the illiterate Bangladeshis understand the overt and covet designs of India against Bangladesh. It is strange why some literate persons who even claim themselves as the champions and vanguards of liberation war and its spirit failed to comprehend the heinous designs of India against Bangladesh. India nurses such people in Bangladesh to implement her nefarious blueprints. I feel pity for these people. *

http://bangladesh-web.com/view.php?hidDate...000000000096648
 

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