1965 War: The Wrong Lessons

[Interceptor]

Interesting source,

"This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the

Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River."

"At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be.

On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor."

http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/1965.htm

This puts some light on Pakistan in 1965 some key facts, and allot more else in the source.

 

[niaz]

Interesting source,

"This has been the subject of many controversies and myths! In 1965 India was recovering from the effects of the China War. Indian Army was engaged in a process of massive expansion with units and divisions half trained half novice! Something like the Austrian Army of 1809! Outwardly expanding and larger but lacking the military virtue and military spirit identified by Carl Von Clausewitz as the key elements in an military machines effectiveness! There was no overwhelming Indian numerical superiority unlike 1971 and many parts of the

Indo-Pak border like the vast bulk of Shakargarh bulge were unmanned on the Indian side! Qualitatively Pakistan had a tangible superiority by virtue of possession of relatively superior tanks and artillery! The Centurion tank which was the backbone of Indian army was concentrated in the Indian Armoured division while the vast bulk of Indian infantry divisions were equipped with the obsolete Shermans! Even in quality of command there were serious drawbacks! The Indian 1 Corps had been just raised and the GOC of the Indian 1st Armoured Division was about to retire! Indian Mountain Divisions brought into the plains lacked sufficient antitank resources and were not in the ideal fighting condition. Some 38 plus Indian Infantry Battalions were absorbed by the blotting paper of Indian Army i.e a tract known as Kashmir! All these battalions were deployed north of Chenab River."

"At the strategic level the Pakistani plan was superior. Its initial thrust launched with an infantry division-tank brigade size force against Akhnur was enough to cause a crisis of strategic level in the Indian Army. The situation with Akhnur in Pakistani hands would have been disastrous for India. All the Indian plans to launch the 1 Corps against the MRL would have been thrown to winds and Indians would have spent the entire war redressing the imbalance caused due to loss of Akhnur! On the other hand the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan would have bottled up three Indian Infantry divisions in the Beas-Ravi corridor and three Indian divisions would have been forced to surrender. 1965 could have then been a Pakistani strategic success rather than a tactical draw as it turned out to be.

On the other hand the Pakistani 6 Armoured Division was well poised to deal with any Indian armoured thrust launched in the Ravi-Chenab corridor."

http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/1965.htm

This puts some light on Pakistan in 1965 some key facts, and allot more else in the source.

This is based upon "Would have, could have, should have" scenario. Ground reality was different.

As I mentioned in an earlier post; capture of Akhnur was delayed even though River Tawi had been crossed. Main reason was delay due change of command of the 12th Div from Akhtar Malik to Yahya Khan. This delay of about two days allowed India to reinforce this sector. Indian attack on Lahore front was to relieve pressure on Akhnur and they succeeded as PA rushed re-inforcement to Lahore and never managed to capture Aknur. To this day no one has satisfactorily explained why Wahga- Jallo sector didnot have sufficient forces to withstand possible Indian diversionary attack.

According to some, Z A Bhutto is to blame because he assured that Indians will not attack the international border. Even if Foreign Office was under this delusion; this is proves that PA High Command was naive to utmost level. IA also opened up a new front in the Rajasthan sector a few days later for good measure.

Khem Karan attack was a disaster by all accounts and the attack, meant to outflank the Indians, ground to a halt within a few kilometers and lost/ditched ( for whatever reason) at least a battalian of tanks in the bargain.

Shakargarh Salient that you are talking about was a close run thing. Propagnda is so faulty that everyone knows about Tikka Khan who was commanding the Infantry Div, whereas real fighting was done by the 6th Armoured Div equiped with " WW2 Shermans" and very few people know the name of GOC of 6th Armoured Div. According to " The way It was". Lt Col who refused to withdrew his tank regiment from Marala and bore the brunt of the IA Armoured Div " Kala Hathi" retired as Brigadier where as cowards such as Tiger Niazi made upto Lt General. This illustrates the consideration of merit in Pakistan Army !!. Another illustration of whimsical promotions is that Gen Zia ul Haq fought two wars ( 1965 and 1971). Can you show me any where his name is mentioned in gallantry. I heard Maj Gen Babar ( Governor of NWFP during ZA Bhutto's time) saying about Lt Gen Hamid Gul on TV program " Views on News"; Ask Hamid Gul what great feats he performed during 1965 or 1971 wars and you will know how incompetent he really is. At least Lt Musharraf was mentioned in despatches during 1965.

Whether you like it or not. 1965 was not a victory, it was at best a stalemate. Please understand, war is serious business. You never fight a war to show who has a bigger****. You always fight a war to achieve a clearly defined objective. Aim of Operation Gibralter was to liberate Kashmir and we failed in this.

Prudence demands that one should learn from one's mistakes. I may be wrong but what I understand from your post is that you are trying to prove the PA was superior to IA in 65 and "Could" have won. May be you are right but we didnot liberate Kashmir and that is what really counts. What difference does it make if PA captured more Indian territory or took more Indian prisoners. Operation Gibralter was not launched for this purpose.

 

[TexasJohn]

So where were we, before the crap started????

 

[Adux]

1965 Kashmir War
The 1965 war came at a time when the United States was not only absorbed in the Vietnam conflict and other Cold War concerns, but also weary and frustrated after nearly two decades of supporting or leading international efforts to promote India-Pakistan reconciliation, most recently in 1963, and after ten years of major economic and military assistance to both countries. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented subsequently: "[W]e in effect shrugged our shoulders and said, 'Well, if you're going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we're not going to pay for it'."[6] The United States supported British attempts to calm tensions during the difficult summer of 1965 after Indian and Pakistani forces had skirmished in the desolate Rann of Kutch during April,[7] and participated in the UN Security Council's vain attempts during August to bring about a cease-fire and restoration of the status quo ante when Pakistani infiltration into Indian Kashmir sparked serious fighting. In the Johnson Administration's eyes, however, U.S. influence was at an ebb with both sides, so Washington preferred to play its supporting role through the UN even after the Pakistanis launched large conventional forces (equipped with American weapons) across the Kashmir cease-fire line on 1 September. "Highest level decision here not to engage in direct pressure on either Pak[istani]s or Indians for time being, but to place primary reliance on UN," Secretary Rusk informed Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi on 2 September.[8]

The U.S.-backed UN initiatives hardly had time to mature before India sent its own troops over the international border toward Lahore on the 6th. With both antagonists fully committed to combat along the entirety of their mutual border, there was no longer a question of preventing or limiting conflict, and international pressure thereafter was aimed at bringing the two sides to the negotiating table, a process that did not bear fruit until the 23rd of the month.[9]

The United States thus made little effort to dissuade India and Pakistan in the period leading to the 1965 war and its support of the UN failed to preclude the expansion of fighting beyond Kashmir. However, two aspects of American policy relating to dissuasion require further comment. First, Washington imposed an arms embargo on both belligerents on 8 September. As much of Pakistan's military hardware was of American origin, the embargo had a much heavier impact on Pakistan and probably contributed to the Pakistani calculation that its forces could not sustain the fighting much beyond mid-September absent U.S. spares and ammunition. The U.S. decision thus had the dissuasive effect of helping to curtail the conflict by promoting Pakistani acceptance of the UN-sponsored cease-fire. On the other hand, the United States probably missed an opportunity to dissuade Pakistani adventurism in the years leading up to the war and even in months following the April clash in the Rann of Kutch. Having acquired most of its weaponry from the United States and having received vague assurances of American support vis-à-vis India, many Pakistani leaders mistakenly concluded that Washington would come to their assistance even when they provoked a conflict by pushing thousands of infiltrators into Indian Kashmir and attempted to rescue this failed operation by opening the full-scale conventional assault on 1 September.[10] U.S. Ambassador Walter McConaughy's stern attempts to warn Pakistan against using U.S. arms in a conflict with India could not penetrate this Pakistani preconception.[11]

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/gillOct04.asp

Very good read.

 

[Adux]

The Battle of Assal Uttar: Pakistan and India 1965

v.1.3 February 24, 2002

Agha Humanyun Amin (orbats)

Roland Davis (supplemental orbat information)

Ravi Rikhye (commentary)

Pakistan Orbat

Please note that President (General) Pervez Musharraf was a lieutenant of artillery in the 16 (SP) Field Regiment, 1st Armored Division Artillery.

Also please note that the Pakistan Army during this period normally assigned only seven infantry battalions to an infantry division (with the exception of the 12th Azad Kashmir Division). It was thought that Pakistan did not need a full complement of infantry. Great reliance was put on the excellance of Pakistan Artillery (justified, in the event), and in the numerical and quantitative superiority of the Pakistan Cavalry (only partially justified, in the event). After the 1965 War Pakistan recognized its error and increased infantry in its divisions to a more standard nine battalions.

11th Division was a new raising only some months old. For this reason, all its artillery came from other divisions and was either not replaced or replaced with new raisings. In the Pakistan Army new raisings relied heavily on recalled reservists who were not necessarily pleased to return to active duty, sometimes just weeks before the outbreak of war. The issue is not that some of the battalions failed to perform well, but that so many actually did a commendable job. In 1971, when India mobilized its reservists Territorial Army battalions, it remained unsatisfied with their performance even though the reservists had at least six months to retrain.

Pakistan raised four cavalry regiments as Tank Delivery Units (30, 31, 32, 33 TDU), intending to decieve the Indians as to their real strength. This gave Pakistan 17 regiments vs India's 15. Four of India's regiments were, however, equipped with the AMX-13 or PT-76, tanks which while excellent for reconnaissance, were near useless against Pakistan's M47/48 and M4 Shermans, and quite inferior to Pakistan's two M24 Chaffee regiments. This widend the disparity in Pakistan's favor even further.

1st Armored Division [Maj. Gen. Naseer Ahmad Khan]

12th Cavalry (Division reconnaissance regiment, Chaffees)


Division Artillery [Brig. A.R. Shammi] (killed in an ambush)

3 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ghulam Hussain]

15 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ehsan Ul-Haq] (later Major General)

16 (SP) Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Akram Chaudhry]

21 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Maqbool]


19 (SP) Light Anti Aircraft Regiment [Lt. Col. Mohammad. Sarwar]

1 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Altaf Hussain]


3rd Armored Brigade [Brig. Moeen] (in reserve, did not enter battle)

19th Lancers (Pattons) [Lt. Col. Bashir Ahmad] (Later replaced at Chawinda) - See Correspondence

7th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Abdul Rahman]


4th Armored Brigade [Brig. "Tony" Lumb]

4th Cavalry [Lt. Col. M. Nazir] Pattons

5th Horse [Lt. Col. M. Khan] Pattons (sole pre 1947 unit not to fight in any Indo-Pakistan action)

10th Frontier Force (Armored Infantry)[Lt. Col. Fazal Kareem]


5th Armored Brigade [Brig. Bashir]

6th Lancers [Lt. Col. Shahibzad Gul] Pattons

24th Cavalry [Lt. Col. Ali Imam] Pattons

1st Frontier Force (Armored Infantry) [Lt. Col. Syed Shabbir Ali]



11th Infantry Division [Maj. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan]

15th Lancers [Lt. Col. Iskandar Al Karim] I Corps Reconnaissance Regiment

32nd Tank Delivery Unit [Lt. Col. Aftab Ahmad] Shermans after war 32 Cavalry


Division Artillery [Col. Shirin Dil Khan Niazi] (Major General in 1971)

26 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Ata Malik] (ex 7th Division)

38 Field Regiment [Lt. Col. Hamid Tamton] (ex 8th Division)

12 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Bashir] (ex 8th Division)

9 Medium Regiment [Lt. Col. Gulzar] (ex 10th Division)

35 Heavy Regiment [Lt, Col. M. H. Ansari] (later Major General) (35 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)

Troop/88 Mortar Battery (ex 8th Division)

37 Corps Locating Regiment [Lt. Col. Khalil Ahmed Khan] (37 Regt ex I Corps Artillery)


3 Engineer Battalion [Lt. Col. Saleem Malik]

25 Signals Battalion [Lt. Col. Anwar Ahmad Qureshi]


21st Infantry Brigade [Brig. Sahib Dad] initially detached, returned Sept. 6 Div striking force/reserve

5th Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Mumtaz]

13th Baluch (now spelled Baloch) [Col. M. Hussain]


52nd Brigade [Brig. S.R.H. Rizvi] (deployed from Kasur-Khem Karan Road to Kasur-Ferozepur Road)

2nd Frontier Force [Lt. Col. Fateh Khan]

7th Punjab [Lt. Col. Shirazi]

12th Baluch [Lt. Col. Akhtar]


106th Infantry Brigade [Brig. Nawazish Ali] (deployed Bedian Sector, North of Kasur)

1st East Bengal [Lt. Col. A.T.K. Haque]

7th Baluch [Lt. Col. Rasul Bux]


Indian Orbat

Werstern Army (Kashmir theatre, Punjab theatre down to Bikaner in Rajasthan)

[Lt. Gen. Harbax Singh] Commanding XV, I, XI Corps, total 11 divisions

XI Corps [Lt. Gen. J.S. Dhillon] Commanding 4, 7, 15 Divisions

2nd Independent Armored Brigade [Brig. T.K. Theograj]

3rd Cavalry [Lt. Col. Salim Caleb] Centurions

8th Lancers [Lt. Cpl. P.C. Mehta] AMX-13

(Third regiment was away in another sector)

1st (SP) Field Regiment (Sextons)

4th Mountain Division [Maj. Gen. Gurbaksh Singh]

9th (Deccan) Horse [Lt. Col. A.S. Vaidya, later Army Chief] Sherman IV/V

A Squadron [Maj. J.M. Vohra, later Lt. Gen.]

B Squadron [Maj. G.S. Bal]

C Squadron [Maj. D.K. Mehta]

7th Mountain Brigade [Brig. Sidhu]

4th Grenadiers

7th Grenadiers

9th Jammu and Kashmir Regiment

62nd Mountain Brigade

1/9th Gorkha Rifles

13th Dogra

18th Rajputana Rifles

(33rd Mountain Brigade was away in another sector)


http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/india/assaluttar.html

 

[niaz]

Major General Abrar Husain was GOC of 6th Armoured Div and thus man most involved in the batte of Chawinda. Thanks to the wrong information, no one eve knows his name and Maj Gen Tikka Khan is credited as hero of Chowinda by the man on the street. even though Tikka was commanding an infantry Div at that time. As you said such is life.

 

[Interceptor]

Adux,

Why dont you summerise what you posted rather than flood it onto the thread what is the main points of the Post?

 

[Adux]

Adux,

Why dont you summerise what you posted rather than flood it onto the thread what is the main points of the Post?

I am just reading it myself for the first time as we speak, i will edit the rest. you can read it..I will summerize after i finnish

 

[Interceptor]

^^
Thats better its bitesize now.

 

[ahussains]

It need some accurices too

 

[TexasJohn]

It need some accurices too

I am assuming you meant accuracy. Please point out any inaccuracies you see. As always substantiate them if you would with appropriate links.

 

[Skull-Buster]

whenever 1965 war is talked about, why do Indians have only one thing to say, Khemkaran? we did lose quite a few tanks there, but we also captured quite a few land in that sector.

but the main battle in 1965 was not Khemkaran, it was Chawinda, the biggest tank battle after WWII. where badly outnumbered Pakistani Army was able to withstand the indian assault and forced them to retreat.

 

[Adux]

why do you talk about Chwainda is exactly same reason why indians talk about khemkaran.
1965 war is a stupid war in my opinion, it is war of errors from both sides. Pakistan failed in its objectives for starting the war, and Indians failed miserably in assessing that and taking advantage.

 

[Skull-Buster]

you are right. but in a Khemkaran Vs Chawinda case, Chawinda is certainly a bigger and fierce battle than khemkaran.

 

[Adux]

That is a matter of prespective, as well as that I never judge the bravery of soldiers.
If you want Indians operated inferior tanks to Pakistan......as i said the less spoken about that war on both sides the better..... I have got an excellent write up of it, by two writers. I will search and post it here.