What's new

1965 War - The complete story

@ RENEGADE....you want respect show some respect you have somethin interesting to say say it to me in a PM..... and as for an EDGE or not in 65 not going into it again.... because it seems like you are a typical youtube warrior boy who keeps ranting on about how india has junk in 65...and was tired fighting the chinese.... good for you i appologize we didn't give you time to rest or buy equipment you wanted!!!
 
The Indian invasion was a forgone conclusion by that point, given the events in East Pakistan and Indian support for them.

In that case why lament of the No of directions EP or WP was attacked. If Pk was attacked on so many fronts , India too fought on as many fronts.
 
The point is that the commission was set up before the 65 war. Which is something you've already admitted and I'm tired of repeating it. It was claimed that Pakistan should've waited for Kashmir to be resolved the same way the Kutch process was going, this was BS. And the Kutch process was encouraged by a military clash which might’ve encouraged Pakistan along that course in Kashmir where India was increasingly in denial. Our superiority in Kutch gave us confidence in our ability to make the Indians malleable elsewhere.
I don't agree that the commission was set up prior to your invading the area of kutchh...or that an indian patrol party was ambushed.
I need links Kasrkin..so far you've provided none.
The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of ... - Google Books
read page 54.
If you aren't satisfied with the accuracy of the author again...then here is the official UN tribunal set up for the purpose.
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XVII/1-576.pdf
I quote from pp7 of the report....
"NOW, THEREFORE, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be
taken in regard to the said area:
Article 1:
There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0300 hours GMT, on 1 July
1965.
Article 2:
On the cease-fire:
(i) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw;
(ii) This process will be completed within seven days;
(iii) Indian police may then reoccupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater
than that employed at the post on 31 December 1964;

(iv) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling
prior to 1 January 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in
intensity that which they were doing prior to 1 January 1965 and during the
monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon
period of 1964;
(v) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not
interfere with each other, and in particular will act in accordance with West
Pakistan-India border ground-rules agreed to in January 1960;
(vi) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and
from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider
whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs
(iii) to (v) above and to agree on the settlement of any such problems."

And encourage or facilitate a mediated settlement after said victory was achieved, or the very least encourage India and the world along that path through military maneuvering.
the failure of the aforesaid in '65 proved that your goals were not met in Kashmir and that is why I see the result of '65 war from being a Pakistani victory.I hope we've reached a consensus in this regard.
 
Indian 1st Armoured Division's failure at Chawinda

The major Indian attack of 1965 War was launched by the Indian 1st Armoured Division opposite Chawinda on 8th September 1965. The Indian formation had four tank regiments as opposed to 1 tank regiment of Pakistan Army! There was no infantry on both flanks of the Pakistani unit and only one battalion in its rear yet the Indians miserably failed to outflank this unit and reach Sialkot-Pasrur Road opposite Badiana or to the South of Pasrur! While two Indian tank regiments advancing on a narrow front unimaginatively battered frontally with a single Pakistani tank regiment, two Indian tank regiments in the rear were not employed by an Indian GOC and his brigade commander paralysed by intertia vacillation and procrastination ! This was not a case of a more martial morally superior Muslim soldier blunting a less martial Hindu soldier at Panipat but a failure on part of two Indian commanders sitting many miles in the rear! Thus the truth in Clausewitz's pronouncement on higher leadership ?marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily combined ?but let a general try to do these things like Frederick the Great ?it required the King's boldness, determination and strength of will to see the things in this light and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of which 30 years after people still wrote and spoke?.

The most interesting aspect of the first engagement opposite Gadgor being discussed is that Pakistan's 25 Cavalry which faced the Indian Armoured Division was not aware that it was facing an Indian Armoured Division while the Indian Armoured Division commander was also not aware that there was only one tank regiment opposing his tank division! If both knew what was the actual case then 25 Cavalry's commanding officer may have been paralysed by irresolution and inertia and history may have been different and the Indian commander may have gathered greater resolution and bypassed the unit! However, this is the realm of speculation! More important is what actually happened! The Indian commander decided not to outflank the Pakistani's in front because of three reasons i.e (1) that his four tank regiments were opposed by two tank regiments (2) no news of his left flank protection force (3) that his rear was under attack. At the end of the day the Indian divisional commander withdrew his division back and stayed inactive till 10th September 1965, during which Pakistan reinforced the area with its 6th Armoured Division! The battles that followed from 11th September till ceasefire could not be decisive since initial Indian superiority at the decisive point had been compromised! The reason why the Indian commander thought that he was faced with two tank regiments was Pakistan's 25 Cavalry's unusually extended line of defence, his flank protection force had lost his way because of poor map reading and strayed out of wireless contact and the attack on his rear which unnerved him was an exchange of fire between his left flank protection force and his own artillery guns! These three reasons were considered enough by the Indian GOC to withdraw eight miles to the rear and do nothing for the next two days! After 11th September when the Indians resumed advance the Pakistanis had brought reinforcements and there was no room for a battle of manoeuvre!
 
@ RENEGADE....you want respect show some respect you have somethin interesting to say say it to me in a PM..... and as for an EDGE or not in 65 not going into it again.... because it seems like you are a typical youtube warrior boy who keeps ranting on about how india has junk in 65...and was tired fighting the chinese.... good for you i appologize we didn't give you time to rest or buy equipment you wanted!!!

Nah got nothing more to say than i have said already, i intend to make constructive use of my time. It would be a sheer waste spoiling it like that.
 
:lol renegade you really have your panties up in a bunch boy!!!!
 
Leave his frillies alone Ok. :tsk: :-)lol:)

With respect to 65, Kishangarh Fort, these might be interesting. Also leave more questions re 71, Battle of Longewala, as well. I realise there are other blatant bungles for the 71 venture but experience from 65 should have taught some one in the pecking order something at least.

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/ng-42-03.jpg
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/ng-42-04.jpg

main ref:
India and Pakistan AMS Topographic Maps - Perry-Castaeda Map Collection - UT Library Online
 
"At this time the first MiG-21 squadron was just becoming operational...".

Hope you understand what 'just becoming operational' means?
just can't resist aginst toasted egos, have to say, only reason ragading MIGs being un-operational during whole event i able to found out was that they were smoked on the ground by PAF :flame:.
 

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom