Whatever the purpose of the attack on Lahore was , its capture , as usually claimed by pretty much everywhere which was imminent according to Indians , if you had the capability , would have been carried out to have the biggest bargaining chip in the negotiations which ensued like always . But since it wasn't carried out , it points to something else , that Indian Army wasn't in a position to do it . Nothing to do with making Lahore - a part of India .
One can argue all day on that , who was on better footing . Neutral sources however point out that the war was a stalemate , with PAF gaining supremacy over its counterpart and the state of Pakistan walking out with capture of 10% of Rann of Kutch , which was authorized internationally in 1968 .
I ll repeat what I have said before capturing Lahore was a secondary objective and not the primary one and if you think what i am saying is wrong then prove it.
Do tell one of your pre war objectives you completed in the war?
Neutral sources also point out that you far exaggerate your air kills and far undermine your losses. Pakistan lost 43 aircraft's yet admits to only 19 losses, they also claim that Indian lost 73 aircraft, yet Pakistani claim 119.
IAF sortie rate was much higher than and its attrition rate was lower than PAF
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Name one sector which you had air supremacy/superiority.
Your air chief claimed air supremacy on first day of the war itself but where was this air supremacy??
"Nur Khan claimed air superiority for PAF by the end of 6th Sept, the first proper day of air war itself. He went on to claim air supremacy by the end of 8th Sept. No other Air Chief has made such hollow claim either before or after. What actually transpired was a half-hearted counter air battle by fighters of both sides on 7 Sept. In the face of heavy attrition both sides stopped using fighters by daylight, for counter air battle.6 Both the air forces preferred the option of night bombing utilising Canberra bomber. Canberra bombing though causing occasional damage and serving to harass the personnel was ineffective in winning the battle of air superiority. But it was persisted with since night interception capability was rather limited. In 1965, night interception proved most frustrating for the PAF when often the F-104s failed to locate low flying IAF Canberras. Streaming tactics used by IAF with multi-pronged attacks and constant changes in altitude and heading strained PAF.7
After few sorties by the IAF against East Pakistan on 7 Sept a political embargo was imposed on further attacks in the East. This remained in force despite continued PAF strikes in East on 7 Sept, 10 Sept and 14 Sept.
On the Indian side MiG-21s (T74) had recently been inducted and were not yet night capable for interception. Night flying of Gnat aircraft was limited due to poor cockpit lighting. The night fighter Vampires were already obsolete. Therefore, for all practical purposes, both the air forces having gone at each other on 6th and 7th Sept, gave up any further fighter effort as they had suffered unsustainable attrition.8 The exception being a four Mystere fighters strike over Pasroor on 12 Sept by the IAF.9 During the limited air superiority battle IAF suffered an attrition rate of 20 percent whereas PAF suffered 12.5 percent attrition.10
The Pak Air Chief continued to express strange notions of air superiority.
The PAF, barring the night attacks by the Canberras, totally gave up its forays into Indian territory. It concentrated on air defence of PAF airbases and certain amount of support to its army coming under attack at Lahore and Sialkot. Whereas at Khem Karan where Pak armour had launched its major offensive, Indian troops of 3 Cavalry and 4 Div did not come under any air attack. If PAF had achieved air supremacy as claimed, it could have decimated Indian Armys opposition to its major armour thrust which some claimed was to isolate Amritsar by capturing Beas Bridges. Pak lost 108 tanks here, quite a few in working condition. Nevertheless, Nur Khan claimed air supremacy over Pak air space, even though it was the IAF which attacked Pak armour and its supplies. IAF fighters continued to operate over Pak territory and air space.
In 1965 the only two offensives of the Pak Army were at Chhamb and Khem Karan. In both these sectors PAF did not win the air battle. At Chhamb both air forces continued to operate, with IAF halting Pak advance well short of Akhnoor. Therefore, the PAF could not claim air superiority here. At Khem Karan it was the IAF, which was more active. At Lahore, on the critical day of 6th Sept where Indian Army had launched an offensive PAF had an upper hand. During the rest of the war majority of the PAF air support sorties for Pak Army were over its own territory whereas majority of IAFs air support sorties were over Pak territory. So actually IAF had the favourable air situation over the battle area of concern during most of the war. In their respective territories both air forces were by and large free to operate. On the balance it was the IAF, which had greater control of air than the PAF. Of course IAF lost more number of aircrafts, a result of its larger number of offensive sorties over enemy territory, but its attrition rate was lesser than that of the PAFs. A causative analysis of IAF & PAF losses provides a better perspective rather than relying just on numbers."
. And we still have courageous sons. We bleed green. 
