Winning in Afghanistan Requires Taking the Fight to Pakistan

[PradoTLC]

They don't. If they did it wouldn't have taken almost two decades to fantasise how to punish Pakistan.

you mean mental masterbation...

i guess it some times relieves the pain.

 

[Sine Nomine]

When these charlatan are writing something about Afghanistan they just drag Pakistan into it beat drums of war but they never look into own backyard.Peace in Afghanistan is something only a miracle can achieve.

Pakistan supported first Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an Islamist, ethnic Pashtun, and sociopath) long after the United States abandoned him and then Pakistan co-opted the Taliban (whom the United States never supported, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary).

After this line writer becomes a certified liar,same GH is now sitting in Kabuli coalition which is under patronage of US.

The 1971 secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) shook Pakistan to its core. After all, Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic state, but Bengali succession showed both how potent ethnic nationalism was, and how it posed an existential threat to the country. It was then that the Pakistani military broadly and the Inter-Services Intelligence specifically concluded that Pakistani security depended upon the spread of radical Islamism so that religion could trump ethnicity as the primary identity across the country.

Again either writer is plain retard regarding History of Pakistan or is fabricator.Religion and ethnicity are two distinctive entities.If State wanted, it would have easily suppressed ethnicity through USSR model.

Pakistan may be a nuclear power, but this is a move which India has used to great effect to demonstrate the consequences of Pakistani terror support.

India got a very bloody nose very next and was forced to cool down.

Not everything must be coercion, however. Afghanistan’s stability depends on its ability to grow its economy, but Pakistan’s refusal to enable Afghanistan to export its produce overland to India undercuts Afghanistan’s economy and pushes Afghanistan into greater cooperation with Iran.

Genius writer should know that West has only taught opium cultivation and extraction of Heroin to Afghans.Good luck with getting a stable Afghanistan using economy because it hasn't got much.

It may be unwise to target the entirety of Pakistan for what, in reality, are the actions of a handful of specific military officers and ISI veterans well known to the United States. These individuals—and terror-supporting politicians—might be individually designated, much as Iranian Qods Force head Qassem Soleimani is.

Illusive behaviour continues,writer is clueless,PA and ISI are both professional entities,command changes every few years and no one knows who would step in.

Whole of article seems like pile of garbage.Writer failed to see following points while putting up this.

1. Who was HK before being picked up by US(a religious leader or a tribal chief)?
2. Why they brought miniority over majority?
3. Why hardcore criminals like Dostum were brought?
4. Why opium production has been accelerated?
5. Why warlords are getting funds?
6. Why several militias when there is national Army?
7. Why no inside Afg ops for cutting Talib supply lines?
8. Why ANA has been allowed gross human right violation and child abuse?
9. Last but not least Why Taliban haven't been designated as Terrorists?

 

[Surya 1]

The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan.

by Michael Rubin

U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was in Washington, DC last week to brief Capitol Hill on his ongoing talks with the Taliban. The senators were unimpressed, and with reason. There any many flaws in Khalilzad’s plan: It revives the pre-9/11 formula of legitimizing Taliban rule in exchange for a Taliban pledge to close terror camps; it undercuts the legitimacy of the elected Afghan government; and it discounts the Taliban’s long history of insincere diplomacy and fleeting commitments. The biggest problem with Khalilzad’s approach, however, is it ignores a simple fact: There can be no peace in Afghanistan so long as Pakistan chooses to undercut Afghan stability and support extremism. The missing piece to the Khalilzad strategy, therefore, is how to bring Pakistan to heel.

Why Pakistan Supports Radicalism

Pakistan has been a problem for decades. While a Cold War ally, the distrust toward the United States among ordinary Pakistanis and the country’s elite is pronounced. Pakistani officials understand that the Truman administration only allied with Pakistan after India spurned the United States. Pakistani officials have also convinced themselves that Washington betrayed their country in both 1965 and 1971 when the United States did not come to Pakistan’s rescue during its wars with India. From Pakistan’s perspective, India was the aggressor and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) obliged the United States to enter the conflict. From the U.S. perspective, however, Pakistan initiated the fight, the United States was therefore not obliged and, regardless, U.S. forces were busy in Southeast Asia.

The 1971 secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) shook Pakistan to its core. After all, Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic state, but Bengali succession showed both how potent ethnic nationalism was, and how it posed an existential threat to the country. It was then that the Pakistani military broadly and the Inter-Services Intelligence specifically concluded that Pakistani security depended upon the spread of radical Islamism so that religion could trump ethnicity as the primary identity across the country.

This impacted Afghanistan for the simple reason that Pakistani authorities fear a strong, stable Afghanistan could become a magnet for Pakistan’s own Pashtun minority. After the Soviet invasion, Pakistan channeled aid exclusively to more religious rather than nationalist Afghan groups empowering the “Peshawar Seven” Mujahedin over a far broader array of anti-Soviet opposition. The United States had little choice but to go along since delivering aid to Afghanistan was even more dependent upon Pakistan than it is now (given that Iran was in the throes of revolution and Central Asian states were still under Soviet domination).

Pakistan supported first Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an Islamist, ethnic Pashtun, and sociopath) long after the United States abandoned him and then Pakistan co-opted the Taliban (whom the United States never supported, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary). While the George W. Bush administration pushed Hamid Karzai to power in the hope that he could tie Afghanistan’s myriad strands together, the Pakistani government from the start supported the Taliban as a hedge against Afghan stability and security. Regardless of what Pakistani diplomats and political officials might have said, the ISI continued to support the Taliban and more radical groups operating in Afghanistan and, more broadly, against the United States.

How to Solve the Pakistan Problem

So what to do? Neither President Donald Trump nor, for that matter, the American electorate wants to stay in Afghanistan into perpetuity, at a cost of more than $30 billion per year. That, however, does not make negotiating a bad deal or a thinly veiled surrender wise. The United States is in Afghanistan for a reason—to prevent its territory from being used by Al Qaeda or like-minded groups to strike at the United States. To abandon Afghanistan to a force that cooperates fist-in-glove with Al Qaeda simply negates the sacrifice already made. Nor are Britain’s Irish Republican Army negotiations and Good Friday accords a useful analogy for the Afghanistan peace process for the simple fact that Northern Ireland never bordered a country like Pakistan.

If the Afghan peace process is to succeed, then the United States must bring the full weight of leverage to bear on Pakistan in order to win a cessation of Pakistani support for the Taliban. Despite decades of tension, and occasional sanctions mostly applied over the nuclear issue, the United States has many options in its diplomatic arsenal as yet unused in its quest to compel Pakistan to reduce support to the Taliban or to raise the cost of defiance.

First, Pakistan might be put on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist given its extensive ties to terror groups. Simply put, there is no reason why Pakistan should receive a pass for diplomatic convenience, especially when it has shown a consistent unwillingness to act with good will.

Second, in 2004, the George W. Bush administration designated Pakistan “a Major Non-NATO Ally.” This move provided Islamabad with benefits in both defense purchasing and cooperation and was also a mark of confidence in Pakistan. Rescinding such designation would accordingly signal a lack of confidence.

Third, Pakistan continues, with U.S. support, to receive International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to help resolve its balance-of-payments problems, most recently negotiating a $6 billion IMF loan. Given the amount Pakistan spends on militancy support, the future U.S. position should be to oppose all such loans or at least make them contingent on an end to any assistance to the Taliban. Consider that to be the Pakistan equivalent of theTaylor Force Act.

It may be unwise to target the entirety of Pakistan for what, in reality, are the actions of a handful of specific military officers and ISI veterans well known to the United States. These individuals—and terror-supporting politicians—might be individually designated, much as Iranian Qods Force head Qassem Soleimani is.

The Trump administration might also privately threaten Pakistan with a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation which, by any objective measure it deserves. Public declaration of intent or even consideration would rock Pakistani markets.

Finally, in its counterterrorism fight in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have yet to strike at Afghan Taliban bases in Pakistan. While the U.S. military has violated Pakistani territory—for example, in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden whom Pakistani authorities were hiding—it has never taken the Afghanistan fight into Pakistan. It may be time to do so, if only to signal to Pakistan the costs of providing safe haven to the Taliban and also to signal to Islamabad that Pakistan will not be immune from terror camp targeting as U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan shifts from occupation to an over-the-horizon posture. Pakistan may be a nuclear power, but this is a move which India has used to great effect to demonstrate the consequences of Pakistani terror support.

Not everything must be coercion, however. Afghanistan’s stability depends on its ability to grow its economy, but Pakistan’s refusal to enable Afghanistan to export its produce overland to India undercuts Afghanistan’s economy and pushes Afghanistan into greater cooperation with Iran. Perhaps, then, the incentive for more positive Pakistani behavior would be an agreement to trade Afghan access to India in exchange to Pakistani access through Afghanistan to Central Asia. South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions on earth. For the sake of peace, it is important to rectify this.

Teetering on the Brink of Failure

President Donald Trump and National Security Advisor John Bolton have prided themselves on extricating themselves from treaties and agreements which constrain and do not benefit the United States. Both criticized President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry for accepting a bad deal over no deal with Iran. It is ironic, then, that Trump and Khalilzad seem to be pushing forward with a deal that would make the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) look loophole-proof.

At the same time, remaining in Afghanistan in perpetuity is unwise both militarily and economically. Diplomacy plays a role, but it cannot work if it blinds policymakers to reality: Pakistan is not an ally and should not be treated as one. Had it not been for Pakistani policy, Afghanistan would likely be far more stable today. The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan rather than asking nicely. Certainly, there are risks to this approach. The United States must be concerned about pushing Pakistan into China’s camp, for example, but the reality is Pakistan’s move toward China has occurred regardless of U.S. action, not because of it. Therefore, that should be a brake on coercion now. Absent any strategy to bring Pakistan in line, it is important that Trump and Bolton call the Khalilzad process what it is: window dressing on surrender and an invitation to further terrorism against the American homeland.

The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan.

by Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/winning-afghanistan-requires-taking-fight-pakistan-60332?page=0,1

Finally, a gora is talking some sense after so many stupid self destructive action in the region.

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

As if the US policy makers haven’t tried everything in the book in the last 18 years!!!! The Taliban folks are being supported both financially and militarily by all neighbors sans Pak as per the US media itself...

 

[shahbaz baig]

Hahahaha to place pakistan in a place of scapegoats has been began once again as expected.

THE ground reality is different, winning in afghanistan requires to completely defeat taliban. It's good for taliban that USA has decided to waste more time. LOLZ

 

[PradoTLC]

Finally, a gora is talking some sense after so many stupid self destructive action in the region.

actually he made ZERO sense...

 

[sparten]

Every genius in think tanks writes about laying down the law on Pakistan.
Every new person in power swears to do so.

They all learn.

 

[Dalit]

Every genius in think tanks writes about laying down the law on Pakistan.
Every new person in power swears to do so.

They all learn.

Trump was supposed to be the worst news for Pakistan according to Indians.

Today Trump is negotiating with the Taliban.

 

[KeyBORED Warrior]

The author is a complete asswipe. He thinks the scum on our eastern border 'successfully used the strategy of force to coerce Pakistan into dismantling terror networks' when in reality all these measures were pre-determined due to FATF since 2018 when Pak was first put on the grey list. He convieniently forgets that the indians were dealt a bloody nose (literally and figuratively) from which they're yet to recover. Their pilots keep crashing out of fear of facing the same fate as abhinondone.

Secondly and most importantly, he somehow know more about pusthun culture than us pushtuns do. For argument sake, I being a Yousafzai Pashtun can tell you with 100pc belief and instinct that if there ever comes a day when the border between Pak and Afg is made obsolete and the Pashtuns are re-united, it WILL be due to Afg Pashtuns joining (Pak Pashtuns) i.e, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa AND Pakistan, in sha ALLAH. People just DONT understand how our culture works. Why should a bigger community join a smaller community? Its simple logic ! There are more Pashtuns in KP than there are in the entire of Afghanistan and i havent even counted the ones in Karachi which by the way has the single biggest community of Pashtuns in perhaps the entire world ! This is a no-brainer actually but the us-indian-afg nexus has been trying to push this narrative for decades but it has recently received a little too much of an attention due to the advent of social media, post-27 feb, post-ttp and offcourse Cpec, which has given rise to a stronger Pakistan much to the dismay and frustration of this unholy nexus. For the record, i dispise the afghandus more than the indoos due to their namak-haramism trait. Call it schadenfraude if you will but i just love it when we kick some gangadeshi *** but the screams are heard all the way from Afganistan. This article is nothing more than a desperation attempt to subdue Pakistan. If the US is frustrated with us and cant do much about it, clearly we must be doing something right. Pakistan Zindabad !

 

[Dalit]

The author is a complete asswipe. He thinks the scum on our eastern border 'successfully used the strategy of force to coerce Pakistan into dismantling terror networks' when in reality all these measures were pre-determined due to FATF since 2018 when Pak was first put on the grey list. He convieniently forgets that the indians were dealt a bloody nose (literally and figuratively) from which they're yet to recover. Their pilots keep crashing out of fear of facing the same fate as abhinondone.

Secondly and most importantly, he somehow know more about pusthun culture than us pushtuns do. For argument sake, I being a Yousafzai Pashtun can tell you with 100pc belief and instinct that if there ever comes a day when the border between Pak and Afg is made obsolete and the Pashtuns are re-united, it WILL be due to Afg Pashtuns joining (Pak Pashtuns) i.e, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa AND Pakistan, in sha ALLAH. People just DONT understand how our culture works. Why should a bigger community join a smaller community? Its simple logic ! There are more Pashtuns in KP than there are in the entire of Afghanistan and i havent even counted the ones in Karachi which by the way has the single biggest community of Pashtuns in perhaps the entire world ! This is a no-brainer actually but the us-indian-afg nexus has been trying to push this narrative for decades but it has recently received a little too much of an attention due to the advent of social media, post-27 feb, post-ttp and offcourse Cpec, which has given rise to a stronger Pakistan much to the dismay and frustration of this unholy nexus. For the record, i dispise the afghandus more than the indoos due to their namak-haramism trait. Call it schadenfraude if you will but i just love it when we kick some gangadeshi *** but the screams are heard all the way from Afganistan. This article is nothing more than a desperation attempt to subdue Pakistan. If the US is frustrated with us and cant do much about it, clearly we must be doing something right. Pakistan Zindabad !

You haven't read the rest of the articles from the same author.

https://nationalinterest.org/profile/michael-rubin

I think the CIA affiliated author specialises in fabricating ethnic tension.

 

[Zarvan]

The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan.

by Michael Rubin

U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was in Washington, DC last week to brief Capitol Hill on his ongoing talks with the Taliban. The senators were unimpressed, and with reason. There any many flaws in Khalilzad’s plan: It revives the pre-9/11 formula of legitimizing Taliban rule in exchange for a Taliban pledge to close terror camps; it undercuts the legitimacy of the elected Afghan government; and it discounts the Taliban’s long history of insincere diplomacy and fleeting commitments. The biggest problem with Khalilzad’s approach, however, is it ignores a simple fact: There can be no peace in Afghanistan so long as Pakistan chooses to undercut Afghan stability and support extremism. The missing piece to the Khalilzad strategy, therefore, is how to bring Pakistan to heel.

Why Pakistan Supports Radicalism

Pakistan has been a problem for decades. While a Cold War ally, the distrust toward the United States among ordinary Pakistanis and the country’s elite is pronounced. Pakistani officials understand that the Truman administration only allied with Pakistan after India spurned the United States. Pakistani officials have also convinced themselves that Washington betrayed their country in both 1965 and 1971 when the United States did not come to Pakistan’s rescue during its wars with India. From Pakistan’s perspective, India was the aggressor and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) obliged the United States to enter the conflict. From the U.S. perspective, however, Pakistan initiated the fight, the United States was therefore not obliged and, regardless, U.S. forces were busy in Southeast Asia.

The 1971 secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) shook Pakistan to its core. After all, Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic state, but Bengali succession showed both how potent ethnic nationalism was, and how it posed an existential threat to the country. It was then that the Pakistani military broadly and the Inter-Services Intelligence specifically concluded that Pakistani security depended upon the spread of radical Islamism so that religion could trump ethnicity as the primary identity across the country.

This impacted Afghanistan for the simple reason that Pakistani authorities fear a strong, stable Afghanistan could become a magnet for Pakistan’s own Pashtun minority. After the Soviet invasion, Pakistan channeled aid exclusively to more religious rather than nationalist Afghan groups empowering the “Peshawar Seven” Mujahedin over a far broader array of anti-Soviet opposition. The United States had little choice but to go along since delivering aid to Afghanistan was even more dependent upon Pakistan than it is now (given that Iran was in the throes of revolution and Central Asian states were still under Soviet domination).

Pakistan supported first Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (an Islamist, ethnic Pashtun, and sociopath) long after the United States abandoned him and then Pakistan co-opted the Taliban (whom the United States never supported, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary). While the George W. Bush administration pushed Hamid Karzai to power in the hope that he could tie Afghanistan’s myriad strands together, the Pakistani government from the start supported the Taliban as a hedge against Afghan stability and security. Regardless of what Pakistani diplomats and political officials might have said, the ISI continued to support the Taliban and more radical groups operating in Afghanistan and, more broadly, against the United States.

How to Solve the Pakistan Problem

So what to do? Neither President Donald Trump nor, for that matter, the American electorate wants to stay in Afghanistan into perpetuity, at a cost of more than $30 billion per year. That, however, does not make negotiating a bad deal or a thinly veiled surrender wise. The United States is in Afghanistan for a reason—to prevent its territory from being used by Al Qaeda or like-minded groups to strike at the United States. To abandon Afghanistan to a force that cooperates fist-in-glove with Al Qaeda simply negates the sacrifice already made. Nor are Britain’s Irish Republican Army negotiations and Good Friday accords a useful analogy for the Afghanistan peace process for the simple fact that Northern Ireland never bordered a country like Pakistan.

If the Afghan peace process is to succeed, then the United States must bring the full weight of leverage to bear on Pakistan in order to win a cessation of Pakistani support for the Taliban. Despite decades of tension, and occasional sanctions mostly applied over the nuclear issue, the United States has many options in its diplomatic arsenal as yet unused in its quest to compel Pakistan to reduce support to the Taliban or to raise the cost of defiance.

First, Pakistan might be put on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist given its extensive ties to terror groups. Simply put, there is no reason why Pakistan should receive a pass for diplomatic convenience, especially when it has shown a consistent unwillingness to act with good will.

Second, in 2004, the George W. Bush administration designated Pakistan “a Major Non-NATO Ally.” This move provided Islamabad with benefits in both defense purchasing and cooperation and was also a mark of confidence in Pakistan. Rescinding such designation would accordingly signal a lack of confidence.

Third, Pakistan continues, with U.S. support, to receive International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to help resolve its balance-of-payments problems, most recently negotiating a $6 billion IMF loan. Given the amount Pakistan spends on militancy support, the future U.S. position should be to oppose all such loans or at least make them contingent on an end to any assistance to the Taliban. Consider that to be the Pakistan equivalent of theTaylor Force Act.

It may be unwise to target the entirety of Pakistan for what, in reality, are the actions of a handful of specific military officers and ISI veterans well known to the United States. These individuals—and terror-supporting politicians—might be individually designated, much as Iranian Qods Force head Qassem Soleimani is.

The Trump administration might also privately threaten Pakistan with a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation which, by any objective measure it deserves. Public declaration of intent or even consideration would rock Pakistani markets.

Finally, in its counterterrorism fight in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have yet to strike at Afghan Taliban bases in Pakistan. While the U.S. military has violated Pakistani territory—for example, in the mission to kill Osama bin Laden whom Pakistani authorities were hiding—it has never taken the Afghanistan fight into Pakistan. It may be time to do so, if only to signal to Pakistan the costs of providing safe haven to the Taliban and also to signal to Islamabad that Pakistan will not be immune from terror camp targeting as U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan shifts from occupation to an over-the-horizon posture. Pakistan may be a nuclear power, but this is a move which India has used to great effect to demonstrate the consequences of Pakistani terror support.

Not everything must be coercion, however. Afghanistan’s stability depends on its ability to grow its economy, but Pakistan’s refusal to enable Afghanistan to export its produce overland to India undercuts Afghanistan’s economy and pushes Afghanistan into greater cooperation with Iran. Perhaps, then, the incentive for more positive Pakistani behavior would be an agreement to trade Afghan access to India in exchange to Pakistani access through Afghanistan to Central Asia. South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions on earth. For the sake of peace, it is important to rectify this.

Teetering on the Brink of Failure

President Donald Trump and National Security Advisor John Bolton have prided themselves on extricating themselves from treaties and agreements which constrain and do not benefit the United States. Both criticized President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry for accepting a bad deal over no deal with Iran. It is ironic, then, that Trump and Khalilzad seem to be pushing forward with a deal that would make the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) look loophole-proof.

At the same time, remaining in Afghanistan in perpetuity is unwise both militarily and economically. Diplomacy plays a role, but it cannot work if it blinds policymakers to reality: Pakistan is not an ally and should not be treated as one. Had it not been for Pakistani policy, Afghanistan would likely be far more stable today. The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan rather than asking nicely. Certainly, there are risks to this approach. The United States must be concerned about pushing Pakistan into China’s camp, for example, but the reality is Pakistan’s move toward China has occurred regardless of U.S. action, not because of it. Therefore, that should be a brake on coercion now. Absent any strategy to bring Pakistan in line, it is important that Trump and Bolton call the Khalilzad process what it is: window dressing on surrender and an invitation to further terrorism against the American homeland.

The stability of Afghanistan—and the denial of its territory to terrorist groups—requires a good-faith Pakistani agreement to cease backing extremists, and after nearly two decades, this means, coercing Pakistan.

by Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/winning-afghanistan-requires-taking-fight-pakistan-60332?page=0,1

I like the column it's time that both USA and Pakistan come out of delusion in 21st century we are bound to be enemies not friends nor neutral but bitter enemies. India and USA on one side and Pakistan on China on the other side.

 

[Dalit]

I like the column it's time that both USA and Pakistan come out of delusion in 21st century we are bound to be enemies not friends nor neutral but bitter enemies. India and USA on one side and Pakistan on China on the other side.

The problem is that the US is in denial. The US still gives a false impression that Pakistan is an "ally" be it a non-compliant one.

Pakistan has made its intentions crystal clear by putting more focus to the region instead of being a US lackey.

 

[Rusty]

this was really fun to read. You can taste how frustrated he is.
Pakistan has to only say one sentence and the US will back down from this chicken hawk shit.
"No more passage to Afghanistan"

Watch how fast they back down after that.

 

[mudas777]

Clutching with straws more like it, because they used to threaten us with cutting the aid. That's now gone and we have stood stead fast and have not done anything different before or after the aid was stopped . Now they have only got one last arrow in their arsenal which is non NATO ally status and they think it can make any difference to us. No major equipment have been transferred to us from last few years and we have not made any purchase either due to lack of faith from both parties. If Bajwa doesn't go to give a lecture in Brussels to show them the mirror they will be the losers. Please take it away this status too and see what difference that's makes to us.

IMF loans and FATF can be used as tools to hurt our economy but US must not forget one thing we are only supporting Taliban politically. We can arm them too with better arms and the cost for US in dollars and lives can be increased significantly until they can't sustain it and run back to their homes like they left Vietnam clutching to the helicopters. Afghanistan is land locked country and they won't be able to run anywhere either other then surrender to our soldiers on our borders or get killed in Afghanistan or show up on Iranian soil. Also US never forget whole Afghanistan campaign is sustained by using our air and land routes.

ISI didn't supported any religious organisations by choice. Other then their never was or is any nationalism exists in Afghanistan society as they are happily willing to sell their souls to the highest bidder and religion was the only tool that could be used to unite and fight the infidel USSR. By the way that was the CIA strategy to use religion as tool to unite the afghan factions.

Lastly like it happened before in 60.s 80's 90's when we were under sanctions due to our nuclear program or misbehaviour according to some circles we still survived. Not only we survived we only came out more stronger. Cutting ties with us in 60's gave us the best friend like China. Banning F16 gave us JF 17, stopping old crappie destroyers transfer gave us Milligan and putting in storage cobras took us to Turkish helo's .

We no longer depend on US trade any more and we got friends too to bail us out if and when the situation arise while US can be kicked out of Afghanistan so easily.

Writing articles in air conditioned rooms is one thing reality bites under the soaring temperatures of Pakistan plains. As Pakistani's we are used to the high temperatures but it will not do any good to US health. We don't want to be at odds with any country let alone with the sole super power and cooperating with each other have only benefitted both. So don't say things because one gets paid for it and have to be against Pakistan. Plenty of things can be said which are good about us and friendship with Pakistan is not a lost cause and it have got benefits too.

 

[CrazyZ]

Rubbish article....more get tough on Pakistan BS. Hasn't worked for the last few years.