Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
CardSharp said:Joe Shearer said:I am glad you looked up the figures and did not blindly depend on my citations, because then it is possible to discuss the matter with you on the basis of facts.
What you say is right, but Chengdu is not the only Military Region which faces India. In 62, the responsibility was given to Chengdu for operations in what was then the NEFA, North East Frontier Agency, today Arunachal Pradesh. But the devastating attack on Aksai Chin, which contained the vital road that actually was China's strategic asset and point of sensitivity, was by Lanzhou.
If you look at the figures relating to Lanzhou, where Chengdu has a rated headcount of 180,000, Lanzhou has a rated headcount of 220,000. Together, facing our meagre strength of 10 divisions, there are a potential 400,000 troops in the two military regions. It is agreed that this is a potential strength; but on the other hand, we have to consider two facts, maybe half more.
First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.
Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.
The half-a-fact is the logistics capability of both sides.
As I have already pointed out, against the mobility and access to logistics of the troops of the two Military Regions, the Indian troops, located far from the frontiers in several cases, also have to depend on an overcrowded logistics system which urgently needs revamping and additional capacity. When they get wto their point of deployment, they have to depend on lorries to get to the front line, over narrow, single-lane mountain highways. Note that all, ALL, the Indian formations are light infantry, not a tank in the whole lot. Even Bangladesh has more tanks - about seven armoured regiments, an armoured brigades - than India has (India has none east of Jhansi, btw).
Good post and a good read, but just a couple of points Joe,
Chengdu and Lanzhou MR border many many other countries and are responsible for a diverse set of security concerns. So considerations for their strength and size is not based solely on India. Of course you probably know this (not that I suspect it makes you less concerned).
As you may have suspected already, my reasons for writing what I did were that each of these two Military Regions do indeed border more than one nation, but it is unlikely - absurd, even - that the PLA has ever in its worst nightmares contemplated a two- or even worse, a three-front conflict. For instance, Chengdu borders Vietnam, Laos, Burma/Myanmar and eastern India, from right to left; Lanzhou borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and north-west India, in an anti-clockwise direction. It is bizarre and in the highest degree unlikely, even for a young fan-boy Generalissimo, to contemplate the PLA in arms simultaneously against India and Vietnam, for instance; or India and Kazakhstan, or even the wildest possible Vietnam + India + Kazakhstan. A person with such an outline for a table-top military exercise would be hooted down, and rightly so, by his seniors.
Just to add a cherry to the cake, we have the testimony of the PLA itself:A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war. The Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals.
CardSharp said:and as for this paragraph, I found it a bit distressing. The Chinese government does not discriminate between Han and minorities when it restricts political rights (it would be just as illegal for a Han Chinese to agitated for an independent Hebei or Hainan)
Beating on Uyghurs is definitely not the duty of our professional army.
Joe Shearer said:First, Chengdu doesn't really have much to do. I suspect that the people of Gansu and Qing Hai are not in the rebellion business any longer. Qing Hai has been very obedient since the days of the Muslim war-lords during the revolution; Gansu likewise. These troops really have nothing to do but breathe down our nervous necks.
Second, Lanzhou too is fairly free. Unless you are presently bashing Uighur, these 400,000 must be quite bored of parade-bashing. That is not a good situation for the general leading such a force, and even worse for a general opposed to such a force. The leading general has to keep his troops busy, the opposing general knows what keeping the troops busy means. The result: increased tension in the border areas. What has already been happening there has become more intense; Chinese parties have been going up to contractors engaged in local civil works and threatening them and saying that the work would be rooted up and the contractors and their men taught a lesson.
I would also note that the PLA is not responsible for internal security duty since the creation of the People's armed police. The PLA will never be used again to put down a demonstration. It suffered greatly in the aftermath of that national tragedy, and it is working hard to rebuild trust.
Using a battle training army to put down a demonstration was like driving in a screw with a hammer. A political failure.
As an example, during the 2008 Lhasa riots, no PLA personnel was deployed and the People's armed police trained in modern police riot tactics were deployed.
The history of this division of labour and many other interesting facts about the PLA can be found here in this talk by a rtd. Intel Officer.
The distress that was caused is deeply regretted.
It was partly due to a misunderstanding of an historical reference made by me, partly due to ignorance.
The historical reference seems to have been missed out. Please review the history of Gansu and Qing Hai provinces before the final defeat of the KMT forces, and the presence and influence of the Ma family in the order of battle of the PLA, or the Chinese Red Army as it was then known. It was in order to refer to this historical circumstance that I wrote what I did, which unfortunately came out looking so clumsy.
My ignorance was due to insufficient knowledge and experience in Tien An Men Square watching. I was unaware that policy had changed over the last decade, and that the People's Armed Police, which also reports to the Central Military Commission, is now charged with maintaining law and order. The video clip you sent will be studied carefully to avoid such errors.
Last edited by a moderator: