Wikileaks Diplomatic Cables

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

COAS Kayani mused takeover: leaked cables

Wednesday, December 01, 2010



WASHINGTON: Pakistan's army chief COAS Kayani mused about forcing out civilian President Asif Ali Zardari who has made preparations for a coup or assassination, leaked US diplomatic cables said Tuesday.

The latest tranche of memos, obtained by whistleblower site WikiLeaks and reported by American and British newspapers, also showed that the United States was more concerned than it let on publicly about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

General Ashfaq Kayani, chief of Pakistan's powerful military, told the US ambassador during a March 2009 meeting that he "might, however reluctantly," pressure Zardari to resign, according to cable cited by the papers.

Kayani was quoted as saying that he might support Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National League Party, as the new president -- not Zardari's arch-nemesis Nawaz Sharif.

In another cable quoted by both newspapers, US Vice President Joe Biden recounted to Britain's then prime minister Gordon Brown a conversation with Zardari last year.

Zardari told him that Kayani and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency "will take me out," according to the cable. The paper said the cables also showed that Zardari has made extensive preparations in case he is killed.

Tensions between Zardari and the army are no secret, and Pakistan often witnesses coup rumors.

After Kayani met in September with Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, the now-exiled Musharraf quipped: "I can assure you they were not discussing the weather."

COAS Kayani mused takeover: leaked cables

 

[sherdil76]

Wednesday, 07 October 2009, 13:31
<BR>S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 002427
<BR>SIPDIS
<BR>EO 12958 DECL: 10/06/2019
<BR>TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
<BR>SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH KAYANI AND PASHA ABOUT
<BR>KERRY-LUGAR
<BR>Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) Summary: Ambassador heard a number of complaints about the Kerry-Lugar bill from COAS General Kayani and DGISI Pasha in a two-hour meeting October 6. These focused on the history of Pressler sanctions, particularly a fear that the waiver in Kerry-Lugar would not be used and aid would be suspended. There were several clauses in the bill, such as an American assessment of civilian control over military promotions and the chain of command, that rankled COAS Kayani. DGISI Pasha said Kayani was receiving criticism on the bill from the Corps Commanders. Ambassador emphasized the bill's long-term commitment to Pakistan and made three points: provisions of the bill could be waived; the bill only requires certifications and "assessments;" and the bill does not apply to the large amounts in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund or Coalition Support Fund but only, so far, to non-appropriated Foreign Military Financing. Pasha and Kayani repeated that the Army had taken huge steps this year in its bilateral cooperation with the US and in its campaign in Swat and Bajaur and was getting little public (or private) credit from the US for these historic steps. Kayani said he was considering a statement on the bill, but he was struggling with what to say. He realized that Senator Kerry and Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, were among Pakistan,s best friends. He predicted the parliamentary debate would be tough, but in the final analysis the government controlled the agenda. Kayani said the language in the bill could undermine political support for the Army's anti-terrorist effort.

2. (S) Kayani said the Pakmil was going into Waziristan in force in two-four weeks. (It is not entirely clear what this meant.) He said Zardari had advised against it for political reasons and wanted to wait until spring. (Ambassador will follow up with Zardari.) Kayani said he had met with PMLN Punjab Chief Minister Shabaz Sharif and PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar in a much publicized "clandestine8 meeting solely to bring them on board for the Waziristan operation, not to discuss politics.

3. (S) Kayani said we should talk to President Zardari about moving forward the back-channel with India, starting with the provisions agreed to in 2006. Kayani did not have a problem but thought Zardari was unwilling to take it on at this time.

4. (S) Kayani said the most important element for the US in Afghanistan, and for Pakistan, was a &perception of winning.8 There was no incentive for either reintegration or reconciliation without it.

5. (S) DGISI Pasha said that he wanted to convey to Washington agencies that he had been to Oman and Iran to follow up on reports which he received in Washington about a terrorist attack on India. He also had been in touch with the Israelis about information about attacks against Israeli targets in India. His intelligence counterparts in Oman and Iran did not know anything so far but were on alert. Pasha indicated he was willing to meet with his Indian counterpart at any time. End Summary.

6. (S) Ambassador called on General Kayani late evening October 6 to discuss the Kerry-Lugar bill. (Kayani had spoken to Chairman Mullen and General McChrystal earlier in the day.) DGISI Pasha joined most of the two-hour meeting. General Kayani said there were elements in the bill that would set back the bilateral relationship, and critical provisions were almost entirely directed against the Army. Both he and Pasha claimed the bill refused to recognize the enormous progress which had been made bilaterally with the US military and against terrorism within Pakistan: he was particularly irritated at the assessment required on civilian control of the military since he had no intention of taking over the government. "If I had wanted to do this, I would have done it during the long march.8

7. (S) Pasha, who is usually more emotional than Kayani, said the bill had caused a negative reaction among the Corps Commanders and younger officers. Pasha said they could not figure out why these "conditions" on assistance had been raised now when the anti-terrorist efforts had improved so
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much. The &conditions8 were much tougher now than in previous legislation, despite the different situation on the ground.

8. (S) Ambassador said there were no conditions on the assistance, only a requirement for certifications and assessments. We saw the bill as a major victory since it represented a long-term commitment to Pakistan's development. The bill had a provision for waivers, which in her judgment would be exercised if necessary. Kayani replied that the Pressler amendment had a waiver, too, but President Bush had refused to sign it.

9. (S) But most importantly, the Ambassador said, the provisions in the bill did not affect &real8 money going to the security forces: it did not apply to the FY 09 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund, nor to the FY 10 Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund. (There is a waivable condition in the Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund FY 10 that the funds cannot be used for F16s). The provisions do not apply to Coalition Support Funds; and Kerry-Lugar would only apply to Foreign Military Financing funds not yet appropriated. Kayani said he understood that, just as he understood that the amount of funding available to the Pakistani military had increased very substantially under the new Pakistan Counter-insurgency Fund.

10. (S) Kayani said the Corps Commanders would press him to make a statement about the bill during their October 7 meeting: he had been struggling with how to handle this. He said he recognized and appreciated that Vice President Biden, the original sponsor of the bill, and Senator Kerry were great friends of Pakistan. Ambassador said any negative statements would affect Pakistan,s improving relations with our Congress. Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister had told her that the parliamentary debate on Kerry-Lugar would run for a few days, but it would not result in a vote. The government had defended the Kerry-Lugar bill very aggressively in recent days. Kayani thought the government would have a harder time in the assembly than the Prime Minister had predicted, but he agreed that the government could prevent a vote. Kayani had recommended the government bring the issue before the national assembly, it would enable the government to say it had been "informed" by the debate.

11. (S) DGISI Pasha asked Ambassador to convey to Washington that he had followed up on threat information that an attack would be launched against India between September-November. He had been in direct touch with the Israelis on possible threats against Israeli targets in India. He had also gone to Muscat and Tehran to engage those intelligence services on threats, and they were alerted and working with Pakistan. He reminded Ambassador that information about an attack on India had come his way and he had asked CIA to convey it to the Indians through CIA channels. (Further details about these cases available in other channels.) He said he would meet his Indian counterpart any time, noting that it was critically important that any threat information be shared with him. He emphasized that ISI was doing everything possible to reduce the possibility of an attack on India.

12. (S) Ambassador asked about the likelihood for restarting the back-channel with India, noting that we had received a good readout from former Foreign Minister Kasuri, who was enthusiastic about the appointment of former Foreign Secretary Riaz Khan as the back-channel negotiator. Kayani said that Ambassador should talk to Zardari about restarting the back-channel where it "left off:" he was not sure that Zardari was quite willing to wade into these political waters yet. Kayani and Pasha both said that they wanted this channel to succeed, and Kayani expressed his confidence in Riaz Khan's integrity and intelligence.

13. (S) Kayani said the military was going to move into Waziristan in two-four weeks, although President Zardari had wanted him to delay. (We will discuss this with Zardari.) He had met with PMLN Chief Minister of the Punjab Shabaz Sharif and with PMLN opposition leader Chaudrey Nisar to obtain their support for the Waziristan operation, not for political reasons. (Note: This outreach appears to have been successful. In a recent meeting with PolCouns, Shahbaz
ISLAMABAD 00002427 003 OF 003
stated that the Waziristan operation was critical and needed to move forward immediately. End Note.)

14. (S) Kayani went over some of the discussion he had had with General McChrystal about counter-insurgency but said that the most important issue in Afghanistan was the "perception that the US was winning." There was no chance for reintegration or reconciliation unless this took place. PATTERSON

 

[Abhishek_]

Cameron’s India initiative was scripted by U.S.: WikiLeaks

David Cameron’s highly-publicised visit to India within weeks of becoming Prime Minister and his remarks in Mumbai that Pakistan was “exporting” terror flowed from the Tories’ commitment to America to improve relations with New Delhi and be “tougher” on Islamabad, WikiLeaks documents show.

According to a leaked cable from the U.S. ambassador in Britain, Louise Susman, published by the Guardian on Wednesday, the Tories who were then in the Opposition claimed that they were less dependent than Labour on votes of British-Pakistani community and were thus better placed to be tough with Pakistan while warming up to India.

The cable dated December 10, 2009 -- five months before the British general elections in May that brought the Tories to power – quoted Liam Fox, a senior Tory figure and now the Defence Secretary, as saying that under Labour, British foreign policy towards the subcontinent had become “skewed to Pakistan”.

“Fox criticised the Labour Government for policies which reinforce the Indian Government’s long-held view that HMG’s (Her Majesty’s Government) foreign relations on the subcontinent are ‘skewed to Pakistan’,” the cable said.

It quoted Mr. Fox as saying that the Tories were “less dependent” than the Labour on voters of Pakistani origin.

“Cameron’s approach can now be seen to have been prefigured in Washington’s previously secret dispatches,” the Guardian said pointing out that barely a month after becoming Prime Minister he led a high-power trade delegation to India seeking an “enhanced” relationship with New Delhi, and sparked a diplomatic furore when he accused Pakistan of “looking both ways” in its approach to tackling terrorism.

According to another leaked U.S. embassy cable, Mr. Cameron and “an eager group from his frontbench” raised their concerns about Pakistan during a meeting with a congressional delegation led by the Republican senator John McCain in 2008.

“Cameron...raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the U.K. each year and that this has implications for the U.K.’s own significant domestic ‘terror threat’,” the cable said.

The issue of Pakistan and terrorism was also discussed at a meeting with Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, on April 9, 2009. A U.S. embassy cable recorded that the “Conservative Party leader agreed that HMG ‘must get UK-Pakistan relations right’ and stressed the Conservatives’ commitment to this goal should they assume power.”

The Hindu : News / International : Cameron&rsquo;s India initiative was scripted by U.S.: WikiLeaks

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

no major surprise.......on an aggregate level, the wikileaks (if corroborated) represent merely a confirmation of suspicions and beliefs dogmatically held by many Pakistanis in civilian and even military garb ---though it is incorrect even to generalize.

mere hysteria, mere words.....it's interesting to get a glimpse of the mindset of these 'diplomats' and foreign officials


I'm looking forward to seeing some leaks on Mr. David Coleman Headly, since thus far the wikileaked only seem to pertain mostly to Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

Again, I am basing my views on the assumption that the wikileaked have been or can be corroborated.


looks like Interpol has issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Assange, and Sarah Palin and other conservatives are even trying to get him and his organization labelled as a terrorist organization --which would be an unprecedented and very serious move with very serious ramifications

 

[Marxist]

Monday, 22 February 2010, 14:22
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000416
SIPDIS
NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER,S PARTY
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2030
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S FEBRUARY 24
VISIT
Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein, Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d)

1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your February 24 visit to Pakistan. You will participate in a trilateral cooperation meeting with Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Afghan Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, followed by bilateral meetings with senior Pakistani officials, including Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Director General Zafarullah Khan, Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director General Javed Noor, and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Director General Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

2. (C) You should express to your Pakistani interlocutors appreciation for ongoing law enforcement cooperation and express our readiness to enhance such efforts. You may want to register U.S. concerns about terrorist threats to U.S. citizens and U.S. interests that emanate from Pakistan, and encourage continued Pakistani action to counter these threats. You should press the Pakistanis to follow through on their prosecution of the seven Mumbai defendants. End Summary.

Domestic Overview

------------------

3. (C) Pakistan continues to face extraordinary challenges on the security and law enforcement front. The country has suffered greater military, law enforcement, and civilian casualties in fighting extremism and terrorism than almost any other country. Pakistan's military is currently engaged in combat operations against militant groups in the Malakand Division of North West Frontier Province (NFWP) and six of the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border. At the same time, Pakistan has experienced an alarming increase in terrorist attacks against government and civilian targets in Pakistan's major cities, resulting in several hundred deaths in recent months. In your meetings, you should acknowledge the sacrifices made by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies and the pressure the terrorist attacks have placed on their resources.

4. (C) In the midst of this difficult security situation, Pakistan's civilian government remains weak, ineffectual, and corrupt. Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about the fate of President Zardari. He enjoys approval ratings in the 20 percent range and has repeatedly clashed with key power centers, including the military, politically ambitious Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif. In December, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the November 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance, promulgated by then-President Musharraf, which provided legal amnesty for Benazir Bhutto, Zardari, and key figures in their party, enabling them to participate in 2008 elections. The Court's ruling has paved the way for a revival of corruption cases against a number of officials, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Whether corruption cases can be revived against Zardari himself is less certain, as Pakistan's constitution includes a clause providing sitting presidents with criminal immunity.

5. (C) While we have had major successes in our military and law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan, cooperation has frequently been hampered by suspicion in Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment about U.S. intentions and objectives. Among other things, the Pakistanis believe that we have favored India over Pakistan -- most notably, by approving civil-nuclear cooperation with India -- and that we aim to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which, in light of their conventional military disadvantage vis-a-vis India, they consider critical to their national security. The military and intelligence establishment is also concerned that we are working with Pakistan's civilian leadership to limit the military's prerogative in determining Pakistan's national security policies. As a result of these concerns, the military and intelligence establishment has taken steps since Spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the

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Embassy. These steps include holding up the issuance and renewal of Pakistani visas for permanent Embassy staff and TDYers; denying import permits for armored vehicles for Embassy use; sabotaging our contract with DynCorp International to provide enhanced protective support for Consulate General Peshawar personnel; slowing down importation of U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government, including equipment for Pakistani law enforcement agencies; shutting down our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training program at Pakistan's Sihala Police Academy; putting up roadblocks for our acquiring additional land for the Embassy's expansion; and harassing Embassy personnel by stopping and detaining Embassy vehicles. Some of these problems have recently abated in response to our repeatedly raising them with the highest levels of the Pakistani government. However, we expect we will have to continue to push back against such impediments for the foreseeable future.

Federal Investigation Agency

----------------------------

6. (C) The FBI's primary Pakistani counterpart is the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). On December 7, the government replaced FIA Director General Tariq Khosa with Zafarullah Khan. While Khosa was ostensibly given a promotion by being named Secretary of the Ministry of Narcotics Control, a number of press reports maintained that Khosa was removed from his FIA position for his aggressive pursuit of corruption cases against government officials and businessmen. Khosa had developed close cooperation with the U.S. on a host of law enforcement issues, including on the Mumbai case. While Khan has a strong law enforcement background, he has not shown an inclination to be as forward-leaning on cooperation as Khosa was.

Counter-Terrorism Finance

-------------------------

7. (S) In the past year, Pakistan has made steady progress in combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Earlier this year, the FIA partnered with the State Bank of Pakistan to crack down on large licensed and unlicensed money service businesses that were violating foreign exchange laws and contributing to money laundering. In January, the National Assembly passed new Anti-Money Laundering (AML) legislation; the bill is currently awaiting Senate action. In the interim, the legislation is in force through its promulgation as an ordnance signed by President Zardari. Separately, during a February 12 meeting in Islamabad, Assistant Treasury Secretary David Cohen provided the Pakistanis with a compilation of tearline information on the financial activities of terrorist organizations in Pakistan -- including their use of the formal financial sector -- and affiliated charities, businesses, and individuals. Cohen encouraged the Pakistanis to exploit these leads in the pursuit of additional inform ation to identify key terrorism donors, fundraisers, and financial facilitators. Cohen also passed declassified terrorism finance information to four Pakistani banks.

Law Enforcement Assistance

--------------------------

8. (SBU) Pakistan's terrorism threats necessitate substantial strengthening of the country's law enforcement capabilities. The State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Bureau is providing significant training, equipment, and infrastructure assistance to the police in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), i.e., the province most affected by terrorist attacks. This assistance -- $40.5 million in FY2009 and $34.6 million in FY2010 -- focuses on the NWFP police's Elite Force, a "heavy" police force with SWAT-like capabilities established in 2008. Equipment we are providing the Elite Force includes vehicles, armored personnel carriers, protective vests, night vision goggles, and communications gear. We are hardening police checkpoints with Hesco-like barriers and are rebuilding three police

ISLAMABAD 00000416 003 OF 004

stations in NWFP's Malakand Division that were destroyed by militants. INL is also funding a variety of police training courses implemented by the Department of Justice's ICITAP program that are open to nationwide participation.

9. (C) The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program has separate activities aimed at enhancing the counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies. A key component of the ATA program is focused on "hard skills" tactical training, including explosives detection and disposal, quick reaction, and VIP protection. Unfortunately, the ATA program is now under threat of termination. Following false press reports that our ATA trainers are using the training center provided by the Pakistani government, i.e., the Sihala Police Academy, for nefarious purposes -- including to gather information on a nearby Pakistan nuclear installation -- the government has decided to end our use of that facility and has not yet provided an acceptable alternative site.

Mumbai Case

-----------

10. (C) Pakistan's prosecution of the seven suspects it arrested in the Mumbai case -- i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX and terrorism financiers XXXXXXXXXXXX-- is proceeding, though at a slow pace. The defense lawyers have aggressively filed motions challenging varying aspects of the case. On November 25, an Anti-Terrorism Court finally framed the charges against the seven defendants, allowing the court proceedings, which are being held in camera, to move to the trial phase. Four FBI expert witnesses are expected to be called to testify for the prosecution. The government has continually reassured us that the prosecutors will win convictions against all the defendants after a trial lasting several months, though it has a stronger case against the five LeT operatives than against the two terrorism financers. There are concerns that some of the convictions could be overturned at the appellate level, where the courts set an extremely high evidentiary bar. On October 12, a Pakistani court quashed all remaining cases against Hafiz Saeed, the head of LeT alias Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD). Those cases were not related to the Mumbai attack. The government has repeatedly told us that it would need much more evidence of Saeed's direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks to move forward with Mumbai-related charges against him.

David Coleman Headley

---------------------

11. (S) In December, an FBI-DOJ team briefed Pakistani officials from the ISI, Ministry of Interior, FIA, IB, and MFA on the David Coleman Headley investigation, providing them with tear-line information on Headley's statements to U.S. authorities. ISI officials said they had very little information to identify the Pakistanis mentioned in the statements. They discussed their investigation into First World Immigration Service, a business front used by Headley and his co-conspirators. The ISI said while they would not grant direct FBI access to co-conspirator Major (retd.) Abdurrehman Syed, who was in ISI custody, the FBI could submit questions for Syed through the ISI. The FIA and Ministry of Interior informed the FBI that it would be difficult to introduce Headley-related evidence in the government's prosecution of the Mumbai defendants, including because Headley's statements to U.S. authorities would be treated as hearsay with little evidentiary value in court.

Sargodha Five

-------------

12. (C) The Pakistanis continue to pursue their own case against the five American citizens from Northern Virginia who were arrested in Sargodha, Punjab province, on December 8, following suspicions they had travelled to Pakistan to engage

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in jihadist activities. They have not acted on our request that the five be returned to the United States. The Pakistani prosecutor has repeatedly asked for continuations in the case because he is not yet prepared to move forward with charges. The five suspects, who claim to have been abused while in custody, were denied bail at a February 16 court hearing. The next hearing will take place sometime in March.

Aafia Siddiqui

--------------

13. (C) There has been widespread condemnation here of the February 3 guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani citizen who was tried in Federal Court in New York on charges of attempting to murder U.S. soldiers and law enforcement authorities in Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis were taken by surprise by the verdict because one-sided Pakistani media coverage of the case reported only on her defense and not the prosecution's case, leading local observers to conclude her acquittal was a near certainty. We have stressed to the Pakistanis that Siddiqui received a fair trial and has a right to an appeal. A number of our Pakistani interlocutors have suggested that President Obama consider pardoning Siddiqui, and Prime Minister Gilani told Senator Kerry on February 16 that Siddiqui should be transferred to Pakistan to serve out her sentence here. PATTERSON

US embassy cables: Pakistan punishes US diplomats for 'siding with India' | World news | guardian.co.uk

 

[Solomon2]

The fact that a former prime minister believes the US could control the appointment of Pakistan's chief of army staff speaks volumes about the myth of American influence here," the ambassador noted tartly afterwards.

Amazing. Apparently there is no direct civilian control of the Pakistani military. It isn't just that the Inspector General is a military rather than executive or legislative appointment; Pakistan's civilian leaders have no expectation that Pakistan's military leadership will take orders from them. Men like Sharif assume the U.S. pulls all the strings. It seems nothing the U.S. can say or do will free Pakistanis of this delusion. W E I R D ! - but a convenient way for the Zardaris and Sharifs of this world to excuse their responsibility to the nation and thus concentrate on building personal or family wealth.

 

[pakdefender]

no major surprise.......on an aggregate level, the wikileaks (if corroborated) represent merely a confirmation of suspicions and beliefs dogmatically held by many Pakistanis in civilian and even military garb ---though it is incorrect even to generalize.

mere hysteria, mere words.....it's interesting to get a glimpse of the mindset of these 'diplomats' and foreign officials


I'm looking forward to seeing some leaks on Mr. David Coleman Headly, since thus far the wikileaked only seem to pertain mostly to Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

Again, I am basing my views on the assumption that the wikileaked have been or can be corroborated.


looks like Interpol has issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Assange, and Sarah Palin and other conservatives are even trying to get him and his organization labelled as a terrorist organization --which would be an unprecedented and very serious move with very serious ramifications

very correct that there are no major suprises there , its quite amazing that wikileaks more or less comfirms most of the widely held views among the wider Pakistani public , before wiki leaks often these views were written off as conspiracy theories.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Mumbai Case

-----------

10. (C) Pakistan's prosecution of the seven suspects it arrested in the Mumbai case -- i.e., XXXXXXXXXXXX and terrorism financiers XXXXXXXXXXXX-- is proceeding, though at a slow pace. The defense lawyers have aggressively filed motions challenging varying aspects of the case. On November 25, an Anti-Terrorism Court finally framed the charges against the seven defendants, allowing the court proceedings, which are being held in camera, to move to the trial phase. Four FBI expert witnesses are expected to be called to testify for the prosecution. The government has continually reassured us that the prosecutors will win convictions against all the defendants after a trial lasting several months, though it has a stronger case against the five LeT operatives than against the two terrorism financers. There are concerns that some of the convictions could be overturned at the appellate level, where the courts set an extremely high evidentiary bar. On October 12, a Pakistani court quashed all remaining cases against Hafiz Saeed, the head of LeT alias Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD). Those cases were not related to the Mumbai attack. The government has repeatedly told us that it would need much more evidence of Saeed's direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks to move forward with Mumbai-related charges against him.

David Coleman Headley

---------------------

11. (S) In December, an FBI-DOJ team briefed Pakistani officials from the ISI, Ministry of Interior, FIA, IB, and MFA on the David Coleman Headley investigation, providing them with tear-line information on Headley's statements to U.S. authorities. ISI officials said they had very little information to identify the Pakistanis mentioned in the statements. They discussed their investigation into First World Immigration Service, a business front used by Headley and his co-conspirators. The ISI said while they would not grant direct FBI access to co-conspirator Major (retd.) Abdurrehman Syed, who was in ISI custody, the FBI could submit questions for Syed through the ISI. The FIA and Ministry of Interior informed the FBI that it would be difficult to introduce Headley-related evidence in the government's prosecution of the Mumbai defendants, including because Headley's statements to U.S. authorities would be treated as hearsay with little evidentiary value in court.

Interesting notes on the prosecution of the seven Mumbai suspects.

It does not appear that the GoP is deliberately slowing down the case. The US appears to understand the constraints faced by the prosecution, as well as concerns about the higher 'evidentiary requirements' placed by appellate courts which might overturn any convictions in the lower courts.

The latter is something we have seen happen repeatedly with domestic Pakistani terrorism suspects as well.

 

[Solomon2]

Saudis urged USA to attack Iran! Lousy hypocrite b****rds! Just to keep their own path clear.

The Impotence of the Pan-Semitic Front

Nov 30 2010, 1:25 PM ET

Here's a fact that might astonish Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, whose book, "The Israel Lobby," posits the existence of a nefarious, all-powerful Jewish lobby that works in direct opposition to American interests: The "Lobby" (they love to capitalize the word, to accentuate its alleged uniqueness) has failed to convince two successive American administrations, one Republican and one Democratic, to attack Iran's nuclear sites. So much for Jewish power.

Here's another fact that might astonish Walt and Mearsheimer: It turns out that the Jewish lobby wasn't even the main lobby working to bring about an attack on Iran. It was, according to the treasure trove of State Department cables released by Wikileaks, the Arab lobby -- whose lead lobbyist is, by the way, the King of Saudi Arabia (which is a big job, since he's also in charge of the world's oil supply) -- that was at the forefront of an intensive, even ferocious, anti-Iran lobbying effort. For Walt and Mearsheimer to acknowledge that the Arab lobby, and not the Jewish lobby, was the prime mover of this issue would mean that they would have to recall their book, and somehow stuff back into a bottle all of the anti-Semitic invective they unleashed in the book's wake. So don't expect an apology anytime soon.

In sum, what we have here is a situation in which all of the Semites in combination have been proven impotent in their attempt to move American foreign policy. Which suggests that American foreign policy might actually be made by Americans. This is definitely a tough week for the neo-Lindberghians.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

What can overall be deduced from these wikileaks...?

 

[mehboobkz]

In public, officials oppose the drone strikes - which have killed hundreds, including an unknown number of innocent civilians. In private, it is a different story, according to a cable from Ms Patterson. It says Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani had no objections to a planned drone attack.

"I don't care if they do it, as long as they get the right people," he said. "We'll protest in the National Assembly [parliament] and then ignore it."

Tacit approval from GOP!

In other words, keep on killing our citizens....

 

[pakdefender]

Cameron’s India initiative was scripted by U.S.: WikiLeaks

David Cameron’s highly-publicised visit to India within weeks of becoming Prime Minister and his remarks in Mumbai that Pakistan was “exporting” terror flowed from the Tories’ commitment to America to improve relations with New Delhi and be “tougher” on Islamabad, WikiLeaks documents show.

According to a leaked cable from the U.S. ambassador in Britain, Louise Susman, published by the Guardian on Wednesday, the Tories who were then in the Opposition claimed that they were less dependent than Labour on votes of British-Pakistani community and were thus better placed to be tough with Pakistan while warming up to India.

The cable dated December 10, 2009 -- five months before the British general elections in May that brought the Tories to power – quoted Liam Fox, a senior Tory figure and now the Defence Secretary, as saying that under Labour, British foreign policy towards the subcontinent had become “skewed to Pakistan”.

“Fox criticised the Labour Government for policies which reinforce the Indian Government’s long-held view that HMG’s (Her Majesty’s Government) foreign relations on the subcontinent are ‘skewed to Pakistan’,” the cable said.

It quoted Mr. Fox as saying that the Tories were “less dependent” than the Labour on voters of Pakistani origin.

“Cameron’s approach can now be seen to have been prefigured in Washington’s previously secret dispatches,” the Guardian said pointing out that barely a month after becoming Prime Minister he led a high-power trade delegation to India seeking an “enhanced” relationship with New Delhi, and sparked a diplomatic furore when he accused Pakistan of “looking both ways” in its approach to tackling terrorism.

According to another leaked U.S. embassy cable, Mr. Cameron and “an eager group from his frontbench” raised their concerns about Pakistan during a meeting with a congressional delegation led by the Republican senator John McCain in 2008.

“Cameron...raised Pakistan, noting that 60,000 individuals travel to Pakistan from the U.K. each year and that this has implications for the U.K.’s own significant domestic ‘terror threat’,” the cable said.

The issue of Pakistan and terrorism was also discussed at a meeting with Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, on April 9, 2009. A U.S. embassy cable recorded that the “Conservative Party leader agreed that HMG ‘must get UK-Pakistan relations right’ and stressed the Conservatives’ commitment to this goal should they assume power.”

The Hindu : News / International : Cameron&rsquo;s India initiative was scripted by U.S.: WikiLeaks

lol poodle being a good poodle

on a side note it shows that the powers tha be know that to get favours out of india all they have to do is give statments against Pakistan.

This is contrary to the image that india tries to portray ( and believes the world buys into it ) that Pakistan doesnt matter much to it.

 

[Luftwaffe]

Thursday, 16 October 2008, 10:16
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 001541
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, SA, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS &#8220;STRAINED&#8221;
REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 3249 B. (B) RIYADH 1510 C. (C) RIYADH 1175 D. (D) ISLAMABAD 2405
Classified By: CDA David Rundell, reasons 1.4 b & d.

&#182;1. (C) SAUDIS UNHAPPY WITH ZARDARI: Echoing Pakistani interlocutors in Washington and Islamabad, in an introductory call with PolCouns, Pakistani DCM Sarfraz Khanzada (protect) characterized Saudi-Pakistani relations as &#8220;under strain.&#8221; This was due, he said, to a lack of Saudi confidence in the Zardari government. He cited a sharp reduction in Saudi financial assistance to Pakistan, and said that the Saudis had not provided &#8220;a single drop&#8221; of oil at the concessionary terms promised last year (refs c & d). Instead, during 2008, the Saudis had provided assistance in the form of a single $300 million check, considerably less than in previous years, but &#8220;beggars can&#8217;t be choosers,&#8221; he lamented. Khanzada opined that the Saudi government appeared to be &#8220;waiting for the Zardari government to fall.&#8221;

&#182;2. (C) NAWAS FAVORED: Khanzada said the Pakistanis are convinced that Saudi King Abdallah would prefer to see Pakistan run by former PM Nawas Sharif, and were cutting back assistance to Pakistan to hasten this eventuality. Nawas &#8220;practically lives&#8221; in Saudi Arabia, Khanzada declared, claiming that Nawas had even been favored with reserved prayer space in the Prophet&#8217;s Mosque in Medina. Because Nawas&#8217; daughter is married to a grandson of King Fahd, he has &#8220;become a member of the Saudi royal family.&#8221; (Comment: Embassy is not able to confirm whether this is true. End comment.)

&#182;3. (C) AFGHAN MEDIATION: Khanzada claimed that the Pakistani government was not directly informed about the Saudi Afghan mediation effort, though they suspected that Nawas had been present, since he was in Mecca at the same time. While the Pakistani government did not oppose such talks in principle, they believe they have little chance of succeeding without U.S. and Pakistani participation.

&#182;4. (C) COMMENT: Khanzada&#8217;s remarks track with reporting from Islamabad and Washington regarding Pakistani concerns about deteriorating relations with the Saudis. While our Saudi interlocutors tend to be less forthcoming, they&#8217;ve made no secret of their reservations regarding Asif Zardari. Nevertheless, officials continue to insist that Saudi Arabia supports efforts to stabilize Pakistan, and we expect that Saudi officials will participate in the next round of meetings of the Friends of Pakistan. End comment. RUNDELL

 

[storm seeker]

(C) NAWAS FAVORED: Khanzada said the Pakistanis are convinced that Saudi King Abdallah would prefer to see Pakistan run by former PM Nawas Sharif, and were cutting back assistance to Pakistan to hasten this eventuality. Nawas &#8220;practically lives&#8221; in Saudi Arabia, Khanzada declared, claiming that Nawas had even been favored with reserved prayer space in the Prophet&#8217;s Mosque in Medina. Because Nawas&#8217; daughter is married to a grandson of King Fahd, he has &#8220;become a member of the Saudi royal family.&#8221; (Comment: Embassy is not able to confirm whether this is true. End comment.)

wow!!! i never knew that .thats why he has such a good term with royals .

 

[storm seeker]

What can overall be deduced from these wikileaks...?

THE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT ....


this site has created a difference , the thing that cant be said they are publishing it on a forum . they are really telling the common man abt their govts , the poor ppl who always believe on them .