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Why Pakistan won't give up Hafiz Saeed

I think you are beginning to understand that we live in a very different world from the one at 9/11 and even Mumbai - and I think it's just not the way to go, so to speak, for people to put so much on the line as it seems they do when they begin speaking of push and shove, and soft and hard options -- these are positions nuclear powers will not find themselves in if sobriety is in force, but of course Indian friends can believe whatever they find persuasive - The world is much bigger than just the US.

May I point out that India has no illusions that it is on the same plane as the U.S., we don't believe anything will happen on the Hafeez Saeed issue with Pakistan's help. That doesn't stop us from using the Hafeez Saeed stick to beat you chaps with. Pakistan pays a price whether it is noticed as a price being paid or not. Our aim is to continue to make Pakistan pay the price till it decided that the price to usefulness of Hafeez Saeed ratio becomes untenable. We don't imagine that you are about to surrender him to us, all we are seeking is that he be rendered ineffective. Until that happens, we won't move much on any thing that Pakistan may want which is not also to India's advantage.
 
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I think you are beginning to understand that we live in a very different world from the one at 9/11 and even Mumbai - and I think it's just not the way to go, so to speak, for people to put so much on the line as it seems they do when they begin speaking of push and shove, and soft and hard options -- these are positions nuclear powers will not find themselves in if sobriety is in force, but of course Indian friends can believe whatever they find persuasive - The world is much bigger than just the US.

Of course the world is bigger than the US. USA is only one country in the comity of nations, though it may be the most powerful. That is what I believe and so does the Country of my birth. It is not an easy view to hold but that is what India has done from the Nehruvian era to now with a few dips, rises and swings.

@muse; the world has changed (and is still changing) from both 9/11 and 26/11.
But the question still confronts us: Is the change(s) substantial enough or decisive enough?
Nobody; which includes Pakistan can give a clear answer to that. Which is why the concepts of "push and shove", "hard and soft options" are still existent. Muse, we live in a real world and as humans; nothing is more daunting than 'uncertain future(s)'. That applies to us both as individuals as well as nations.

Take the example of this Hafizzz fellow. He is an 'uncertain quantity' both for India and the world. If you are honest enough, Muse; you will understand that the same thing applies to him wrt Pakistan itself. Never mind the comforting thought that some of you have that he is a faithful dog.
There is enough evidence to indicate (maybe indirect or maybe circumstantial) of his connection to 26/11. If he is left free to indulge in his shenanigans, he is still a threat. And if the people who can reign him in choose not to do so or are covertly in cahoots with him; they will be considered to be a threat also. Does that seem illogical or unjustified to you?

In India; since 26/11, changes have been taking place. To buttress ourselves from a re-occurrence. While India is still carrying ou a dialog with Pakistan. As well as trade. Has India declared Pakistan to be an enemy power?
Therefore some optimism still exists while the necessary "insurance" is being created.

Now from your side: Pakistan had undertaken to investigate the creation of the 26/11 plot on Pakistan soil. What is the progress of that investigation? What are the findings so far? What is the fate of prosecution action in Pakistani Courts?

@muse; tell me the answers to those questions.
 
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What I think you are not following is that I think the likes of HAfiz Saeed and LeT are a danger to both Pakistan and India and I would want to see him made irrelevant -- understand??

Can this be done by propaganda which even Indians admit is being used for the purpose of push/shove and hard and soft options? I think Indian efforts to exercise such options with regard to Pakistan are not and have not been ones we can point to as successes - therefore, another approach, one that makes clear to Indians and Pakistanis and the world, that the claims made by the Indian state are not just factual but strong enough to proceed with a legal case against Hafiz Saeed - in the absence of this, the effort is reduced to a sham propaganda exercise - understand?? Who wins from this??? Sections of Indian opinion takes emotional satisfaction, while the supporters of the Hafiz can make the point that if the Indian does not like him, he can't really be bad. Who wins??
 
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What I think you are not following is that I think the likes of HAfiz Saeed and LeT are a danger to both Pakistan and India and I would want to see him made irrelevant -- understand??

Can this be done by propaganda which even Indians admit is being used for the purpose of push/shove and hard and soft options? I think Indian efforts to exercise such options with regard to Pakistan are not and have not been ones we can point to as successes - therefore, another approach, one that makes clear to Indians and Pakistanis and the world, that the claims made by the Indian state are not just factual but strong enough to proceed with a legal case against Hafiz Saeed - in the absence of this, the effort is reduced to a sham propaganda exercise - understand?? Who wins from this??? Sections of Indian opinion takes emotional satisfaction, while the supporters of the Hafiz can make the point that if the Indian does not like him, he can't really be bad. Who wins??

@muse; have you really answered my questions yet? :)
 
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Of course the world is bigger than the US. USA is only one country in the comity of nations, though it may be the most powerful. That is what I believe and so does the Country of my birth. It is not an easy view to hold but that is what India has done from the Nehruvian era to now with a few dips, rises and swings.

@muse; the world has changed (and is still changing) from both 9/11 and 26/11.
But the question still confronts us: Is the change(s) substantial enough or decisive enough?
Nobody; which includes Pakistan can give a clear answer to that. Which is why the concepts of "push and shove", "hard and soft options" are still existent. Muse, we live in a real world and as humans; nothing is more daunting than 'uncertain future(s)'. That applies to us both as individuals as well as nations.

Take the example of this Hafizzz fellow. He is an 'uncertain quantity' both for India and the world. If you are honest enough, Muse; you will understand that the same thing applies to him wrt Pakistan itself. Never mind the comforting thought that some of you have that he is a faithful dog.
There is enough evidence to indicate (maybe indirect or maybe circumstantial) of his connection to 26/11. If he is left free to indulge in his shenanigans, he is still a threat. And if the people who can reign him in choose not to do so or are covertly in cahoots with him; they will be considered to be a threat also. Does that seem illogical or unjustified to you?

In India; since 26/11, changes have been taking place. To buttress ourselves from a re-occurrence. While India is still carrying ou a dialog with Pakistan. As well as trade. Has India declared Pakistan to be an enemy power?
Therefore some optimism still exists while the necessary "insurance" is being created.

Now from your side: Pakistan had undertaken to investigate the creation of the 26/11 plot on Pakistan soil. What is the progress of that investigation? What are the findings so far? What is the fate of prosecution action in Pakistani Courts?

@muse; tell me the answers to those questions.



In times of uncertainty
M. Zaidi

THE term “national security” is heard often but there is little comprehension of its integral component, the concept of national security uncertainty.

This refers to the presence of ill-defined or ill-understood threats that can arise to challenge states, usually after paradigm shifts (such as the events of 9/11) or major turbulences in history.

One of the main problems is that if a state is unsure about the intent of its opponent, it will not be adequately prepared to meet the challenges presented by the opponent’s goals, interests and capabilities. A state facing such a dilemma will not be able to make a decision as to when and how to prepare for a war, counterinsurgency, engagement or any other challenge.

The dilemma escalates when there are other challenges facing the state as well, such as economic problems. This will exacerbate the uncertainty horizon, since what may be a perfectly viable option for a financially secure state may not be feasible for one facing an economic crunch.

Socio-cultural factors also result in limited choice, such as the influence of religion in a state facing national security uncertainty, ethnic or nationalist violence etc.

National security uncertainty is not usually the result of a single factor but is often multifaceted, with an overlay of socio-cultural and socio-economic factors that can increase or decrease uncertainty in conformity with the changing context.

A state that has made no enemies within and without may still have to make choices about its national security. A classic example is the traditionally neutral state of Norway, which has joined the Nato alliance in the most dramatic shift possible and away from its neutral posture.

Together with a burgeoning immigrant population, acceptance of the fact that porous borders allow insecurity in Europe to permeate the state’s physical and ideological borders has promoted this shift. This has arisen from increasing national security uncertainty more than anything else, since Norway does not have a clearly defined enemy. Asymmetric attacks such as the one perpetrated almost two years ago by a local man exacerbate the environment of uncertainty.

As regards national security uncertainty, when the threat is ill-defined or ambiguous, it is harder for states to explain clearly to the public who the enemy is. This lack of clear explanation makes it more difficult to mobilise support for any national security strategy meant to counter the uncertainty.

In this dimension, the sort of societal support scholar Michael Howard terms the “forgotten dimension of strategy” is absent or lacking in depth.

A theory that explains why it is so hard to get support from the public when there is ambivalence about the enemy is the prospect theory. The prospect theory states that people will react differently to prospects of gains or losses.

In case of losses which seem imminent or probable, or when a choice needs to be made to accept losses, people will be more amenable to taking chances.

When gains are within grasp, or when a choice is to be made to accept gains, people will not be ready to accept the risk of losses. In other words, people will be more amenable to accepting the prospect of losses if they go for a risky venture than if they go for one where the chances of gains are higher
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The human condition is programmed to be “risk acceptant” for losses and “risk averse” for gains. Incorporating the prospect theory into national security paradigms would mean that citizens are more accepting of losses when they can see a clearly demarcated opponent of the state especially in the face of imminent terrorism.

Thus, public opinion can be mobilised even when a state tells its citizens that acts of terrorism are inevitable. There just needs to be a clearly demarcated enemy, with the state admitting that there will be human or infrastructural losses along the way but that it will fight back with all its might to eventually eradicate this menace.

Goals such as minimising losses in the face of threats can be more acceptable to the public if they are communicated to the latter, rather than the state going on and on about positive goals such as becoming a terrorism-free progressive nation
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The latter will not gain traction with the public in countries facing turbulence. Noble as these positive goals are, and certainly worth aspiring for, they may not help a state gain credibility when besieged by terrorism, an economic crunch and a general deterioration in law and order and governance.

Especially in a state beset by troubles, the people are pragmatic in their outlook — no matter what their level of education — and would be able to conceive in better terms what will be lost than what might be gained.

Of course, when the threat is more or less eliminated, then people will be more amenable to accepting themes that focus on the ideals to which states aspire.

However, once an environment of low threat has lasted for some time, people will not be that willing to take losses along the way for the realisation of positive goals.

In times of insecurity, issues that do not present a clear picture, such as that of an identifiable opponent, it is certainly easier to have a national counterterrorism strategy as compared to a counter-extremism strategy, even though evolving a clear counterterrorism strategy can prove problematic.

This is partly due to the fact that few people will study vague and diffuse threats until they actually materialise. However, there are definite ways in which different theories can coalesce so that national security doctrines remain fluid in the face of diffuse threats. It is time, perhaps, to start studying them
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The writer is a security analyst
 
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I thought the Zaidi piece might have helped you understand - but since it has not:

Now from your side: Pakistan had undertaken to investigate the creation of the 26/11 plot on Pakistan soil. What is the progress of that investigation? What are the findings so far? What is the fate of prosecution action in Pakistani Courts?

TO the best of my knowledge, investigations have not developed information leading to the arrest, trial or conviction of Hafiz Saeed by Pakistan, though since the charge was one the Indian state raised, it ought to be the Indian state, not some other, to develop evidence that will lead to the convctionf Hafiz Saeed in court of law in which he is afforded the best defense possible.
 
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Loool :omghaha::omghaha:
Pakistan is the only country with nukes:D

with first nuke policy we will not leave to reply us back. We will destroy it in the first go.

Okay then. Have a Marde Monim sleep. It was my mistake taking up the discussion with you.

sure we r mard e momin but what u r??
sons of bharat matta?
 
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India needs to provide solid evidence against saeed hafiz, until then the man is innocent until proven guilty, India has levelled the accusations against him and therefore should provide concrete evidence.

If evidence against saeed is substantial then, we will punish him according to our law, there will be no extradition.

Let the Indians scream and scream but until they can provide evidence, the barking dog is wasting its breath.
 
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The Question here should be .

Why Should Pakistan Give Hafiz Saeed up ?

1. India or US for that matter have no evidence again him , Non whatsoever
2. Even the US bounty didn't produce any evidence .

So Why Exactly does Pakistan have an Obligation to Give Haifiz Saeed Up ? just because a Nation who when unable to solve a Problem, blames it on Pakistan says so .
 
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TO the best of my knowledge, investigations have not developed information leading to the arrest, trial or conviction of Hafiz Saeed by Pakistan, though since the charge was one the Indian state raised, it ought to be the Indian state, not some other, to develop evidence that will lead to the convctionf Hafiz Saeed in court of law in which he is afforded the best defense possible.


Standard Pakistani obfuscation argument. The conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan, the training of the terrorists took place in Pakistan, the terrorists were sent off from Pakistan, India was just a 24-72 hour end game for them. Where would you expect evidence of the conspiracy to be found? A place where the expendables executed the act for which they had trained and died doing so (actually dying was a very important part of the plan-Kasab's arrest spoiled the plan somewhat), how much evidence would you expect from there as opposed to the place, Pakistan where the conspiracy was hatched, where the months of training took place & where the conspirators & the trainers resided?

Abu Jundal blew pretty much all the defences of Pakistan quite clear from the water. It was why Pakistan was so desperate to prevent his extradition to India. Maybe you can explain why the Pakistani government fought tooth & nail to prevent his extradition, yet the moment he was extradited, Rehman Malik went on record saying that Abu Jundal proved the Indian hand. He obviously didn't think him Indian when he was busy telling the Saudis that he was a Pakistani citizen. You seriously expect that after that, anyone would believe that no Pakistani state agency had a part in 26/11? No one in India buys that story anymore.
 
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Q: Why Pakistan won't give up Hafiz Saeed ?

A: Because pakistan openly supports terrorism activities into India. And their state sponsored terrorism/terrorist activities are crystal clear.
 
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Indian government has threatened many times with raids, after obl operation they ramped up the bull crap.

Why not conduct an operation to take saeed away or is talk that cheap these days?.
 
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As long as Hafiz Saeed plays the important role of showcasing the terrorist side of pakistani state, he's pretty useful.

That is something that is so under appreciated. To many Pakistanis, having Hafeez Saeed on the loose is a bit like poking India in the eye, what they don't realise is how much they end up hurting themselves with what is seen everywhere as open support to a mass murdering terrorist.

We need to just sit back & watch Pakistan continue digging that hole deeper.
 
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