Laughing Buddha
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India was a superpower already, “emerging” no doubt, but a superpower nevertheless. “Emerging” as in emerging market economy, which is a market economy though poor. And that India had to get used to being a superpower, and start behaving like one. Non-powers use their power within their own borders; superpowers project it outside. It was in this sense that Britain was a superpower till World War I, and the US a superpower since then. The Soviet Union was a superpower, but failed. The European Union is a superpower, though it lacks an effective central decision-making mechanism to project its power. China is a superpower, though it is being extremely cautious about projecting power beyond its borders. Obama wanted India to join the US in doing things outside their borders. He avoided being too specific in public; but his basic message was that India should realize that it had grown up, and begin to project its power outside its borders.
This message was implicit in Obama’s list of the tasks in which he wanted India to join the US outside their borders — for instance, in ensuring that Iran does not join the oligarchy of nuclear powers, and in helping Burma’s return to democracy. These were on his wish list, which articulate Indians, otherwise known as chatterati, took a look at and rejected. But I think we should not throw out the baby with the bath water or continue to be a superpower with a small mind.
In his speech, Obama showed familiarity with many things Indian like Chandni Chowk and Vivekananda. He cannot have known of these things; although he is well educated, such minutiae would not have been part of his education. He was briefed. And I would not be surprised if Stephen Cohen was one of the people who briefed him. Cohen and I were neighbours and friends when he first came to India in the 1960s to study Indian military affairs. Soon afterwards, Indira Gandhi and Richard Nixon quarrelled over the drubbing she gave Pakistan, and India refused Cohen a visa. So he went to Pakistan and became an expert on its army, and then on to China. After Manmohan Singh showered Indians’ love on George W. Bush, Cohen could visit India again. After 40 years, he has written another book on India’s military affairs (this time with Sunil Dasgupta), which was launched in Washington in September. It raises precisely the issue I have mentioned — that India does not project military power.
What is this power India does not project? According to globalfirepower.com, India was the fourth military power in the world in 2004, with 1.3 million men in arms, another 1.2 million in reserve, a further 1.3 million in paramilitary forces, 3,898 tanks, 1,007 aircraft, 143 ships, 9 deepwater ports and 346 serviceable airports. The United States was the leading military power; China and Russia came next, roughly neck-and-neck. China had 2.3 million men in arms, 800,000 in reserve, 4 million in paramilitary forces, 8,200 tanks, 1,900 aircraft, 760 ships, 8 ports and 467 airports. Russia had both more men under arms and more hardware than India; Britain, France and Germany had more hardware, but much smaller armies than India. Altogether, India’s equipment was not very modern or advanced, but it had very large forces by world standards.
Cohen says that the Indian armed forces have concentrated on three things — defence in the Himalayas, COIN (coordination, organization, institutions and norms in multi-agent systems), and a cold-start strategy against Pakistan (a military doctrine developed by the Indian army after Pakistan’s incursion in Kargil; it involves dispersal of a large number of small formations with offensive capability along the border, which would rapidly make incursions into the enemy’s territory and force him to disperse his forces). Although cold-start strategy is innovative, the army has implemented few of the organizational and logistic changes that it requires. The Indian government’s energies have been absorbed by internal threats to security in Kashmir, the Northeast and now, Jharkhand. The Indian navy is much better prepared for blue-water operations. But the air force is unwilling to let the army take leadership, which it would have to in a land war, and does not have the planes it would need to exercise air power on its own. The civil government has too many bodies involved, including the Prime Minister’s office, national security council, and the ministries of defence, finance and external affairs, to provide decisive, agile leadership in war; its relationship with the armed forces is marked by suspicion and lack of strategic understanding. All military production is concentrated in inefficient public enterprises; despite declarations of intention, the government has not significantly involved private enterprises. The result is that India is dependent on a small number of countries — Russia, the US and Israel — for its hardware requirements. The priority given to “developmental requirements” — expenditure with social and political dividends — keeps the army starved. The states have been getting stronger vis-à-vis the Centre; they give no priority to defence. In sum, India is organizationally unequipped to be a strong, decisive military power. I have not read Cohen and Dasgupta’s book, so my summary above may not have got all the nuances right. But if the US government adopted their view, what would its approach to India be? It would conclude that India is a rubber sword, and that it would be a mistake to make it a strategic partner or support it against Pakistan.
Cohen and Dasgupta’s picture of India’s military preparedness is not flattering. People in the government will want to contest it vehemently, and our political and military “experts” outside will equally want to pick holes in it. But one does not have to agree with all of it. One only has to draw two conclusions from the experience of our past wars: first, that the Indian armed forces do not have the unified command required for quick, coordinated response in war, and that our civilian government has no knowledge of the combination of leadership and delegation that is required to enable the armed forces to fight a war effectively according to the rules of modern warfare. These two propositions are enough to conclude that India cannot win a war. The proof lies in the one war that India won by breaking both rules — the 1971 war. Indira Gandhi was the sole civilian decision-maker in that war. She spent a whole year warning the world that the influx of refugees from East Pakistan was intolerable. She exhausted diplomatic means, and overcame the resistance of the entire world except that of the US. She went and signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, and replenished the arsenal. And when she asked the army to attack, she left the strategy entirely to the generals. In contrast, her father stopped his troops in Kashmir as soon as they had defeated the invaders, and refused to use the military advantage they had won for him. What prevents India from becoming a superpower is not resources, but quality of leadership, both political and military.
Shoot the Babus first and Then half WAR is WON
This message was implicit in Obama’s list of the tasks in which he wanted India to join the US outside their borders — for instance, in ensuring that Iran does not join the oligarchy of nuclear powers, and in helping Burma’s return to democracy. These were on his wish list, which articulate Indians, otherwise known as chatterati, took a look at and rejected. But I think we should not throw out the baby with the bath water or continue to be a superpower with a small mind.
In his speech, Obama showed familiarity with many things Indian like Chandni Chowk and Vivekananda. He cannot have known of these things; although he is well educated, such minutiae would not have been part of his education. He was briefed. And I would not be surprised if Stephen Cohen was one of the people who briefed him. Cohen and I were neighbours and friends when he first came to India in the 1960s to study Indian military affairs. Soon afterwards, Indira Gandhi and Richard Nixon quarrelled over the drubbing she gave Pakistan, and India refused Cohen a visa. So he went to Pakistan and became an expert on its army, and then on to China. After Manmohan Singh showered Indians’ love on George W. Bush, Cohen could visit India again. After 40 years, he has written another book on India’s military affairs (this time with Sunil Dasgupta), which was launched in Washington in September. It raises precisely the issue I have mentioned — that India does not project military power.
What is this power India does not project? According to globalfirepower.com, India was the fourth military power in the world in 2004, with 1.3 million men in arms, another 1.2 million in reserve, a further 1.3 million in paramilitary forces, 3,898 tanks, 1,007 aircraft, 143 ships, 9 deepwater ports and 346 serviceable airports. The United States was the leading military power; China and Russia came next, roughly neck-and-neck. China had 2.3 million men in arms, 800,000 in reserve, 4 million in paramilitary forces, 8,200 tanks, 1,900 aircraft, 760 ships, 8 ports and 467 airports. Russia had both more men under arms and more hardware than India; Britain, France and Germany had more hardware, but much smaller armies than India. Altogether, India’s equipment was not very modern or advanced, but it had very large forces by world standards.
Cohen says that the Indian armed forces have concentrated on three things — defence in the Himalayas, COIN (coordination, organization, institutions and norms in multi-agent systems), and a cold-start strategy against Pakistan (a military doctrine developed by the Indian army after Pakistan’s incursion in Kargil; it involves dispersal of a large number of small formations with offensive capability along the border, which would rapidly make incursions into the enemy’s territory and force him to disperse his forces). Although cold-start strategy is innovative, the army has implemented few of the organizational and logistic changes that it requires. The Indian government’s energies have been absorbed by internal threats to security in Kashmir, the Northeast and now, Jharkhand. The Indian navy is much better prepared for blue-water operations. But the air force is unwilling to let the army take leadership, which it would have to in a land war, and does not have the planes it would need to exercise air power on its own. The civil government has too many bodies involved, including the Prime Minister’s office, national security council, and the ministries of defence, finance and external affairs, to provide decisive, agile leadership in war; its relationship with the armed forces is marked by suspicion and lack of strategic understanding. All military production is concentrated in inefficient public enterprises; despite declarations of intention, the government has not significantly involved private enterprises. The result is that India is dependent on a small number of countries — Russia, the US and Israel — for its hardware requirements. The priority given to “developmental requirements” — expenditure with social and political dividends — keeps the army starved. The states have been getting stronger vis-à-vis the Centre; they give no priority to defence. In sum, India is organizationally unequipped to be a strong, decisive military power. I have not read Cohen and Dasgupta’s book, so my summary above may not have got all the nuances right. But if the US government adopted their view, what would its approach to India be? It would conclude that India is a rubber sword, and that it would be a mistake to make it a strategic partner or support it against Pakistan.
Cohen and Dasgupta’s picture of India’s military preparedness is not flattering. People in the government will want to contest it vehemently, and our political and military “experts” outside will equally want to pick holes in it. But one does not have to agree with all of it. One only has to draw two conclusions from the experience of our past wars: first, that the Indian armed forces do not have the unified command required for quick, coordinated response in war, and that our civilian government has no knowledge of the combination of leadership and delegation that is required to enable the armed forces to fight a war effectively according to the rules of modern warfare. These two propositions are enough to conclude that India cannot win a war. The proof lies in the one war that India won by breaking both rules — the 1971 war. Indira Gandhi was the sole civilian decision-maker in that war. She spent a whole year warning the world that the influx of refugees from East Pakistan was intolerable. She exhausted diplomatic means, and overcame the resistance of the entire world except that of the US. She went and signed a treaty with the Soviet Union, and replenished the arsenal. And when she asked the army to attack, she left the strategy entirely to the generals. In contrast, her father stopped his troops in Kashmir as soon as they had defeated the invaders, and refused to use the military advantage they had won for him. What prevents India from becoming a superpower is not resources, but quality of leadership, both political and military.
Shoot the Babus first and Then half WAR is WON
