"We have different methods to the US..."
You misunderstand and I knew you would. Let me say this first. We aren't burning fields. We've stopped that some time ago and are adhering to the mandated program's goals. I agree with you that it's needlessly alienating in the absence of a better cash crop. Secondly, the reversals experienced in many areas can easily be reversed again. Some reduction in planted hectares arose to drought-related difficulties. That's good but it also affected wheat and food costs are killing farmers who've given up opium and trying to survive on food crops that aren't yielding out.
So for whatever success we're achieving, nothing (as usual) is guaranteed without firmly monitoring and maintaining momentum. Meanwhile, there's the south...
There are differences in the south that have made the situation what it is and has nothing to do with methods and everything to do with size of your A.O. and the resources with which you have at your disposal.
I refer you to the ICOS map
here. Why it highlights the 2007 map, I don't know, but please double-click the 2008 map to the right.
It highlights incidents throughout the nation and grades their severity. Regardless of how some would posture "
taliban control" the facts remain as Major General Mart de Kruif, commander RC-SOUTH recently observed-wherever he travels throughout the south, the over-riding perception he leaves with is the vast emptiness of most of the land, and he is correct.
It's empty, as you know, except where it's not. Where's that? The green zones in Kandahar, Helmand, and Oruzgan. Find flowing water and you'll find the people. How many people? As many as you might find in the Kabul-Jalalabad axis. So what do we notice from our map?
That we've two real loci of trouble and it's those two large though discrete areas. One of these two areas is considerably better resourced and really covers less terrain. We face a lot of serious TICs on the eastern border but a portion of it's intensity is determined by the concentration of resources along a relatively smaller area.
You have less troops and more ground to cover. It's that simple. Helmand, alone, is ferkin' huge. You haven't been south of Garmsir, but one look at a map shows names like Musa Qala, Lashkar Gar, Sangin, and Garmsir village-all hot as hell at one time or another and plenty to have kept you gainfully occupied since 2006.
Here's the UNODC 2008 Executive Survey For Afghanistan Opium-
Afghan Opium Survey-2008
You and I both know we're heading south this spring and summer. Chaobaum Armour posted this elsewhere the other day. Your guys are already at it, with the Royal Marines and the ANA running a significant reconnaissance-in-force south the other day-
Royal Marines Take On Taliban In The Fish Hook-MoD
That's a long way south and key is "reconnaissance-in-force". Plenty was turned up and they'll be back. We'll likely be there to help soon. I sure hope so.
Dude, you know where those 103,000 hectares are-they're south of Garmsir. It makes all the sense in the world, is no fault of yours, and I'm not blaming you.
I'm just saying we're doing the best we can and having some results. Whether it stays that way or not remains to be seen and whether we can help make a difference in Helmand or not also remains to be seen.
Finally, I agee with you. I've long advocated we buy it at above-market price and do so through certified UNODC or ISAF military officers. You've got to register your fields and submit to a crop analysis when planting. We come by to collect and the dope better be there or we now know it's gone to somebody else. BAD farmer.
Good farmer gets above-market price at the doorstep for not selling his dope to the bad guys. Bust bad farmer. Alternatively, ARM these farmers and establisha cooperative to protect their crops.
Any fields not registered for survey during planting season-eradicate it.