Not possible. The Indians hold the high ground. While Gen Zia was dreaming of taking on the Soviet armies in Afganistan and laying the ground for a caliphate in Pakistan he failed to detect the sly Indians slip into the Siachen, grab the high ground. By the time Pak reacted the game was over. Stalemate 2020. India did a Kargil on Pakistan in 1983, sixteen years before Pakistan dreamed the Kargil. Only Pakistan messed up.
Just to remind you, big man, the 'sly Indians' went shopping for Arctic protective clothing, and found that the Pakistan Army had been around some weeks earlier placing orders. That tipped them off and they - we - launched a pre-emptive attack. Otherwise you would have been writing that the insight and forethought of Pakistani forces gained them the high ground, and kept out the baffled not-so-sly Indians.
The mess-up was due to the atypical quick Indian reaction, so akin to the quick Pakistani reaction that we have seen so often.
Hi,
Our planners did not count for the cowardice of Nawaz Sharif---.
Hi,
Zia was informed that the Indians were on a buying spree for extreme cold weather equipment---.
And the real porblem with pakistani Generals is---that they are in majority " YESSIR "---cannot speak their mind or do not have a mind to speak of---.
If Zia did not catch onto it---then what happened to the other generals---were they sleeping---.
It was the other way around, according to Indian accounts.
Strobe Talbot's account makes it clear that Nawaz Sharif was given a brief.
Ffs can you tell us how Nawaz cost victory.
The substance of this is the change of status quo. Whatever existed before [defined or not] was disturbed or changed after 1983 Indian military action. 1999 was also intended to change the status quo by military action.
I would like to know why Pakistan should have been planning a change of status quo in 1983, through military action, and when beaten to the draw, went on planning to change the status quo through military action in 1999. Is it perhaps included in the role-definition that Pakistan should plan to change the status quo through military action, and India should, in all cases, simply react?
Leaving aside the instance with which this thread began, Pakistan seeking to change the status quo through military action in 1947-48, we have Pakistan seeking to change the status quo in 1965, in the Rann of Kutch, tanks against border policemen, in Kashmir, special forces trained by General Meetha against the inattentive Indian military, and in the Chhamb sector, NOT in the ceasefire line that became the LOC, but a sector defined as akin to the International Boundary, in Operation Grand Slam.
In the east, please check Z. A. Khan's account of the ISI sponsorship of the Mizo rebels, and of his meeting those rebels in their well-organised base outside Chittagong; more seeking to change the status quo, after 1965, and long before the events of Operation Searchlight.
All this well before the seeking to change the status quo through military action at Kargil.
Is there a pattern?
@Nilgiri
It isn't a matter of degree; it is clearly a Standard Operating Procedure.