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What's Behind Russia's Rapprochement With Pakistan?

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What's Behind Russia's Rapprochement With Pakistan?
What does the Kremlin’s emphasis on Pakistan say about the state of Russia-India ties?

By Dmitriy Frolovskiy
May 14, 2016

A Russian-Pakistani renaissance started in 2014 when the Kremlin removed its arms embargo against Islamabad. In 2015, Moscow agreed to sell four Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan and welcomed Islamabad to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This year already, Russian Army Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov has announced the first-ever “mutual special drills in mountainous terrain,” and Khawaja Asif, defense minister of Pakistan, visited Moscow to further discuss enhancing cooperation.

Both nations additionally agreed on a construction project to transfer liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Karachi to Lahore. The pipeline could potentially supply 30 percent of the Pakistani population and assist in resolving the country’s ravaging energy crisis, as well as extol Russia’s influence.

The current rapprochement has taken many by surprise, as it might impinge upon Moscow and New Delhi’s cooperation in the long-term. However, Russia is still willing to proceed. What stands behind the Kremlin’s motives?

Russia still reveres its strategic and lengthy partnership with India and remains its largest arm supplier over the past three years. Both nations also are experiencing blossoming economic relations, with Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin looking for a bright future together.

Russian-Indian relations might seem flourishing on the outside; inside, however, they have experienced a downward trend.

The Kremlin has grown cautious lately about India’s augmenting defense cooperation with the United States and other Western nations. Selling weapon remains a tenet of Russia’s foreign policy strategy and its soft power outreach; however, the country’s market share in India has been on a gradual decline for the past several years. In contrast, the U.S.-India arms deals have topped a record amount of $9 billion.

New Delhi is also planning to spend an additional $250 billion in the forthcoming decade for strengthening its defense. Therefore, it is becoming evident to the Kremlin that the total share of the Western nations and the United States, in particular, will increase amid the continuous erosion of Russia’s current monopoly.

Russia remains one of the major contenders for a tendering procedure for building India’s fourth aircraft carrier; however, Indian defense officials have already grown concerned about Russia’s ethics after INSVikramaditya’s three-fold cost increase and a five-year delay. Moreover, Moscow agreed to participate in India’s “Make in India” national program, but this has only further revealed its inability to live up to many of New Delhi’s expectations. In particular, difficulties are coming to light during the Indo-Russian fifth generation fighter jet multibillion-dollar program, with Russia currently failing to fulfill most of India’s indigenous production goals.

New Delhi’s growing dissatisfaction with the mutual partnership and the country’s quest for diversification are perpetuating the shift. India needs improvements and is keen on trying other suppliers; however, Moscow sees these moves as impinging on its current stance.

The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending downward trend, as well as leverage its influence over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing the “Pakistan card.” By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves New Delhi with a hard choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or to observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode India’s military advantage.

This maneuver comes in line with the Kremlin’s realpolitik strategy, which has become traditional over the recent years. In 2010, Vladimir Putin famously said that “Russia is not maintaining military cooperation with Pakistan as it takes into account the concerns of Indian partners.” Moscow was sensitive to the India-Pakistan rivalry before; however, altering geopolitical realities goaded Russian foreign policy into exploring new horizons.

Russian-Pakistani relations were far from harmonious during the previous decades. The Kremlin supplied Pakistan with weapons in 1960s but both countries eventually faced a major split, as Moscow selected New Delhi to be its strategic regional partner. Furthermore, Moscow and Islamabad had a proxy conflict during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with Pakistan openly supporting the mujahideen. The geopolitical vector did not change after the USSR’s collapse. It is only now, after a quarter of a century, that Moscow is looking to rekindle bilateral relations.

The Kremlin has chosen its moment wisely. Islamabad has grown cautious lately about its alliance with the United States, as it perceives a lack of reliability from the White House. In particular, the recent U.S. refusal to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets may have pushed both countries farther away from each other, with Russia potentially emerging as an alternative supplier.

Interestingly, though, Moscow is not ready to move full-speed ahead and is keen on maintaining its distance while portraying other reasons for its recent engagements with Islamabad.

It is not a secret that Russia is extremely alarmed by the growth of ISIS and a possible collapse of Afghanistan, to the extent that it is even ready to engage with the Taliban. By actively coordinating with Pakistan, Moscow should be able to halt the radical jihadists’ future spillover to Central Asia. Therefore, Russia is trying to portray its own security concerns as the raison d’être behind the rapprochement.

Russia will not become a major Pakistani partner any time soon, and will remain closely connected to India. Still, the Kremlin’s move delivers a strong message to the Modi administration. In effect, New Delhi acknowledges Moscow’s security concerns but also understands that the Russia-Pakistani partnership would continue to evolve proportionally to India’s cooperation with the West.

Dmitriy Frolovskiy is a Moscow-based political analyst and writer. His writings have been featured in the Huffington Post, Foreign Policy Association, Russian International Affairs Council and others. Follow him onTwitter and Facebook.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/whats-behind-russias-rapprochement-with-pakistan/
 
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What's Behind Russia's Rapprochement With Pakistan?
What does the Kremlin’s emphasis on Pakistan say about the state of Russia-India ties?

By Dmitriy Frolovskiy
May 14, 2016

A Russian-Pakistani renaissance started in 2014 when the Kremlin removed its arms embargo against Islamabad. In 2015, Moscow agreed to sell four Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan and welcomed Islamabad to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This year already, Russian Army Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov has announced the first-ever “mutual special drills in mountainous terrain,” and Khawaja Asif, defense minister of Pakistan, visited Moscow to further discuss enhancing cooperation.

Both nations additionally agreed on a construction project to transfer liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Karachi to Lahore. The pipeline could potentially supply 30 percent of the Pakistani population and assist in resolving the country’s ravaging energy crisis, as well as extol Russia’s influence.

The current rapprochement has taken many by surprise, as it might impinge upon Moscow and New Delhi’s cooperation in the long-term. However, Russia is still willing to proceed. What stands behind the Kremlin’s motives?

Russia still reveres its strategic and lengthy partnership with India and remains its largest arm supplier over the past three years. Both nations also are experiencing blossoming economic relations, with Narendra Modi and Vladimir Putin looking for a bright future together.

Russian-Indian relations might seem flourishing on the outside; inside, however, they have experienced a downward trend.

The Kremlin has grown cautious lately about India’s augmenting defense cooperation with the United States and other Western nations. Selling weapon remains a tenet of Russia’s foreign policy strategy and its soft power outreach; however, the country’s market share in India has been on a gradual decline for the past several years. In contrast, the U.S.-India arms deals have topped a record amount of $9 billion.

New Delhi is also planning to spend an additional $250 billion in the forthcoming decade for strengthening its defense. Therefore, it is becoming evident to the Kremlin that the total share of the Western nations and the United States, in particular, will increase amid the continuous erosion of Russia’s current monopoly.

Russia remains one of the major contenders for a tendering procedure for building India’s fourth aircraft carrier; however, Indian defense officials have already grown concerned about Russia’s ethics after INSVikramaditya’s three-fold cost increase and a five-year delay. Moreover, Moscow agreed to participate in India’s “Make in India” national program, but this has only further revealed its inability to live up to many of New Delhi’s expectations. In particular, difficulties are coming to light during the Indo-Russian fifth generation fighter jet multibillion-dollar program, with Russia currently failing to fulfill most of India’s indigenous production goals.

New Delhi’s growing dissatisfaction with the mutual partnership and the country’s quest for diversification are perpetuating the shift. India needs improvements and is keen on trying other suppliers; however, Moscow sees these moves as impinging on its current stance.

The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending downward trend, as well as leverage its influence over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing the “Pakistan card.” By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves New Delhi with a hard choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or to observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode India’s military advantage.

This maneuver comes in line with the Kremlin’s realpolitik strategy, which has become traditional over the recent years. In 2010, Vladimir Putin famously said that “Russia is not maintaining military cooperation with Pakistan as it takes into account the concerns of Indian partners.” Moscow was sensitive to the India-Pakistan rivalry before; however, altering geopolitical realities goaded Russian foreign policy into exploring new horizons.

Russian-Pakistani relations were far from harmonious during the previous decades. The Kremlin supplied Pakistan with weapons in 1960s but both countries eventually faced a major split, as Moscow selected New Delhi to be its strategic regional partner. Furthermore, Moscow and Islamabad had a proxy conflict during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with Pakistan openly supporting the mujahideen. The geopolitical vector did not change after the USSR’s collapse. It is only now, after a quarter of a century, that Moscow is looking to rekindle bilateral relations.

The Kremlin has chosen its moment wisely. Islamabad has grown cautious lately about its alliance with the United States, as it perceives a lack of reliability from the White House. In particular, the recent U.S. refusal to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets may have pushed both countries farther away from each other, with Russia potentially emerging as an alternative supplier.

Interestingly, though, Moscow is not ready to move full-speed ahead and is keen on maintaining its distance while portraying other reasons for its recent engagements with Islamabad.

It is not a secret that Russia is extremely alarmed by the growth of ISIS and a possible collapse of Afghanistan, to the extent that it is even ready to engage with the Taliban. By actively coordinating with Pakistan, Moscow should be able to halt the radical jihadists’ future spillover to Central Asia. Therefore, Russia is trying to portray its own security concerns as the raison d’être behind the rapprochement.

Russia will not become a major Pakistani partner any time soon, and will remain closely connected to India. Still, the Kremlin’s move delivers a strong message to the Modi administration. In effect, New Delhi acknowledges Moscow’s security concerns but also understands that the Russia-Pakistani partnership would continue to evolve proportionally to India’s cooperation with the West.

Dmitriy Frolovskiy is a Moscow-based political analyst and writer. His writings have been featured in the Huffington Post, Foreign Policy Association, Russian International Affairs Council and others. Follow him onTwitter and Facebook.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/whats-behind-russias-rapprochement-with-pakistan/
[URL='http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/whats-behind-russias-rapprochement-with-pakistan/[/QUOTE'][/QUOTE][/URL]
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/whats-behind-russias-rapprochement-with-pakistan/



The article missed or omitted the root cause of this shift.

The primary reason is the west leaning BJP government taking power in India in 2014. As congress gets weaker the wider would be the gap in Indo-Russian relations.
 
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Premise of gradual decrease itself is wrong. If anything Russia's book order stands today larger than ever, despite all the hype of MMRCA, it took less than a fortnight to make the decision to procure 40 additional MKI bringing it from 272 to 312.
In addition we recently finished 45 Mig29K's, and negotiating three talwar class frigates, S400 strategic SAM, K77Aesa, additional BMP's, 300 KA 226, 80 Mil Mi17V5,
Besides these confirmed book orders and proposals, projects like Pakfa/FGFA,MTA, Amur and two more Nuclear Subs are in pipeline.

If anything Russia's book order in India is enormous. Russia developing ties with Pakistan is positive development in the bilateral ties with Russia-Pakistan. India if anything has reservations about defense ties between the two at the detriment of India-Russia relations and it has the right to say so, because India values it's relations with Russia . It's up-to Russia to craft it's foreign policy, As far as Russia is concerned, it remains a strategic ally for India.
 
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I disagree with the assessment, US-Indo nuclear deal was signed during Manmohan Singh's tenure. I believe it is to contain China, just the way US supported India militarily after 1962 Indo-Chinese war.

Incorrect.

Indo-US rapprochement was initiated under BJP government of Vajpayee (ABV).

Congress was forced to continue that dialogue and tried its best to scuttle and delay the rapprochement.

1) Eliminated US fighters from the MMRCA

2) Did not procure any strategic or offensive weapons for US

3) Implemented the Nuclear liability clause

4) Opposed Climate change agreement

5) Opposed Drug Patent agreement

The situation was so bad that US showed India its place with the khobragade incident.

Once BJP government under Modi came to power in 2014 they have not only reversed all of the above acts of Congress but also started pulling out of the rapprochement with China while giving a cold shoulder to Russia.
 
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I would be caution of Russian approach. The aren't US, and are pretty much isolated. Even tho they act like they are some hot $hit super power. Ask them SU-35s, if they play bluff like that did with Iran on S300 for years, Kick them back to corner.
 
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you have an interesting Idea of BJP, From what I can see, India's foreign policy doesn't change with change in center. Policy decisions are a different ball game. Anyways I am quite intrigued by your line of thinking.



Incorrect.

Indo-US rapprochement was initiated under BJP government of Vajpayee (ABV).

Congress was forced to continue that dialogue and tried its best to scuttle and delay the rapprochement.

1) Eliminated US fighters from the MMRCA

2) Did not procure any strategic or offensive weapons for US

3) Implemented the Nuclear liability clause

4) Opposed Climate change agreement

5) Opposed Drug Patent agreement

The situation was so bad that US showed India its place with the khobragade incident.

Once BJP government under Modi came to power in 2014 they have not only reversed all of the above acts of Congress but also started pulling out of the rapprochement with China while giving a cold shoulder to Russia.
 
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As per article some reasons are..


The Kremlin has grown cautious lately about India’s augmenting defense cooperation with the United States and other Western nations. Selling weapon remains a tenet of Russia’s foreign policy strategy and its soft power outreach; however, the country’s market share in India has been on a gradual decline for the past several years. In contrast, the U.S.-India arms deals have topped a record amount of $9 billion.

New Delhi is also planning to spend an additional $250 billion in the forthcoming decade for strengthening its defense. Therefore, it is becoming evident to the Kremlin that the total share of the Western nations and the United States, in particular, will increase amid the continuous erosion of Russia’s current monopoly.

Russia remains one of the major contenders for a tendering procedure for building India’s fourth aircraft carrier; however, Indian defense officials have already grown concerned about Russia’s ethics after INSVikramaditya’s three-fold cost increase and a five-year delay. Moreover, Moscow agreed to participate in India’s “Make in India” national program, but this has only further revealed its inability to live up to many of New Delhi’s expectations. In particular, difficulties are coming to light during the Indo-Russian fifth generation fighter jet multibillion-dollar program, with Russia currently failing to fulfill most of India’s indigenous production goals.

New Delhi’s growing dissatisfaction with the mutual partnership and the country’s quest for diversification are perpetuating the shift. India needs improvements and is keen on trying other suppliers; however, Moscow sees these moves as impinging on its current stance.

The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending downward trend, as well as leverage its influence over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing the “Pakistan card.” By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves New Delhi with a hard choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or to observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode India’s military advantage.

And yes U right that the main reason was the leaning of BJP led Govt towards west.
 
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I would be caution of Russian approach. The aren't US, and are pretty much isolated. Even tho they act like they are some hot $hit super power. Ask them SU-35s, if they play bluff like that did with Iran on S300 for years, Kick them back to corner.

In this world Muslim states like Pakistan must tread very carefully, they must utilize each and every opportunity instead of doing what their adversaries want them to do. They must be diplomatic and must not offend a power when it wants rapprochement. Burying the hatchet is sometimes the best option.
 
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In this world Muslim states like Pakistan must tread very carefully, they must utilize each and every opportunity instead of doing what their adversaries want them to do. They must be diplomatic and must not offend a power when it wants rapprochement. Burying the hatchet is sometimes the best option.
Sure, obviously I meant do everything diplomatically, but don't let Russian take advantage of us. Pakistan need to make it clear to them, that we mean business. Reason Pakistan is avoiding getting into Syrian mess is due to Russia. If it wasn't for JF-17s engine and some other possible hardware, Pakistan would have join the much lucrative GCC coalition to train Syrian rebels.
 
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I'd like to think its me but probably China has a lot to do with it as well as Indias growing relations with the US.
 
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you have an interesting Idea of BJP, From what I can see, India's foreign policy doesn't change with change in center. Policy decisions are a different ball game. Anyways I am quite intrigued by your line of thinking.

It is a myth that policies do not change with the change in government. Indians are used to that line as people had socialist/communist policies being followed by government after government. At the end of the end Bureaucrats are at the pleasure of the ministries and non-obliging bureaucrats would be fired and/or transferred.

The bureaucrats who are on the fence would adopt the new line as things get clear which way the wind is going to blow.
 
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It is a myth that policies do not change with the change in government. Indians are used to that line as people had socialist/communist policies being followed by government after government. At the end of the end Bureaucrats are at the pleasure of the ministries and non-obliging bureaucrats would be fired and/or transferred.

The bureaucrats who are on the fence would adopt the new line as things get clear which way the wind is going to blow.

Dear Dadeechi from Grippen and F-16 for India, now there is a shift of your view toward this topic. Cool

LAGE RAHO !!!
 
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Pakistan has no any threat with Russia,India will try to cut this tie of both countries.
 
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