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What We, the Taliban, Want

Get your facts right first of all. Mullah Omar lived and died barely a few miles away from one of the largest US bases in Afghanistan.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47519157
Yes he did, but he also spent time in Pakistan before then.

Mullah mansoor died while traveling from Iran.
Mansoor died while transiting to/via Iran....his main and permanent base was Pakistan all that while. Siraj Haqqani is not in Pakistan now isnt he? His dad is in Pakistan too no? stop playing with me!
 
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WHen i told you all that Taliban couldn't have signed crap with US without prior Ok from Pakistan govt many of you threw ignorant rants. Now here u go:

US-Taliban deal puts Pakistan in driver’s seat
India stays quiet as South Asian geopolitics transforms with far-reaching consequences
by MK Bhadrakumar February 26, 2020
Zalmay-Khalilzad-e1572254941877.jpg

US special representative for Afghan peace and reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad was part of the talks. Photo: AFP/Wakil Kohsar
The manner in which US President Donald Trump’s administration is ramming a peace settlement down Afghanistan’s throat is disconcerting. New Delhi’s silence is more so.

One shudders to think that comprador elements in the Indian establishment could be silently collaborating with the US project, in the shadow of Trump’s recent trip to visit India (an event called “Namaste Trump”).

Neither the Indian political leadership nor the “deep state” seems to grasp that the geopolitics of the South Asian region is transforming with far-reaching consequences.

Events are moving in a torrential flow, navigated by the US-Pakistani compass. With Pakistani help, the Trump administration has secured a near-optimal deal with the Taliban.

The deal calls for negotiations among Afghans to start in March, an eventual countrywide ceasefire and a commitment from the Taliban not to harbor terrorist groups, while setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops.

A senior US official said that “the agreement for a seven-day ‘reduction in violence’ is ‘very specific’ and covers the entire country, including Afghan government forces.” Importantly, the Taliban have committed to a halt in roadside and suicide bombings as well as rocket attacks.

The scheduled “reduction in violence” began on February 22. On February 21, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo disclosed that the pact will be inked on February 29, which suggests Washington’s growing trust in the Taliban.

Pompeo’s announcement came immediately after a stunning op-ed by the deputy head of the Taliban (dreaded leader of the Haqqani network), Sirajuddin Haqqani, in The New York Times, the flag carrier of the Washington establishment, vowing that his fighters are “fully committed” to the reduction-in-violence deal.

The Haqqani network takes the cue from Islamabad, and Sirajuddin’s opinion piece (which was highlighted by the Voice of America later) signals that Islamabad wants the reduction in violence pact to be displayed on the ground. Indeed, Sirajuddin’s piece also signifies his metamorphosis from a branded terrorist to a political figure, which is how most insurgencies end.

Washington is well aware that the Haqqani group was responsible for terrorist attacks on the Indian diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan. But today US self-interest dictates that Sirajuddin’s mainstreaming in Afghan political life and a potential elevation eventually to a leadership role at the national level are useful and necessary, since he can deliver peace.

As for Pakistan, it can rest assured that a regime in Kabul with Sirajuddin in a commanding role will be amenable and never play footsie with Indians.

Ironically, on a parallel track, Washington also finessed the rejectionist stance of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani at a joint meeting on February 15 with Pompeo, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper and the chief negotiator with the Taliban, US peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.

What offer the Americans made to Ghani that he couldn’t refuse we do not know yet, but he has overnight turned into a believer and enthusiastic supporter of the reduction-in-violence pact between the Trump administration and the Taliban.

It is entirely conceivable that Ghani’s next move after the Munich appeasement on his return to Kabul – after the announcement of the results of last year’s presidential election on February 18 by the Independent Election Commission, declaring Ghani president for the second time – would have tacit US approval.

Unsurprisingly, the Afghan opposition has roundly condemned Ghani’s move. Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah is threatening to form a parallel government.

Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai also lashed out at the so-called international community for prompting Ghani to rig the election result. In a statement on February 19, Karzai said, “The process that was imposed on our people under the name of ‘elections’ was not a national process and was in contrast to the values of democracy.”

He rejected the election results and stated that “the election process fundamentally serves foreign agendas in Afghanistan, which are aimed at weakening Afghanistan’s national sovereignty and creating division among the Afghan people so that foreigners can implement their plans.”

Nonetheless, interestingly, the United Nations and the European Union lost no time to congratulate Ghani on his election victory. This would suggest, again, Washington’s confidence that the anti-Ghani opposition leaders – some of whom are on the CIA payroll, in fact – will ultimately accept the fait accompli.

But Karzai further responded by tweeting: “As was feared, unfortunately, the wrong decision to hold elections and misconduct in the process caused divisions threatening further instability. Now it is upon us, the Afghan people, to protect our homeland from the negative consequences, steadfastly work for peace and foil foreign designs against our unity, integrity and sovereignty.”

Later, when Khalilzad, who is camping in Kabul, called on Karzai on a mission to pacify him, the latter tweeted:

“Former President Hamid Karzai met Mr Zalmay Khalilzad @US4AfghanPeace, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan’s Reconciliation, & Amb. Ross Wilson on Wednesday [February 19]. The former President emphasized the following: a) Contradictory remarks by the international institutions involved in the elections are a clear sign of external efforts to divide the Afghan people and weaken the country. b) Strong US-Afghan relations are possible only when the US proves its good intentions through active support for a peaceful, united and sovereign #Afghanistan.”

Evidently, feelings are running high. (See an excellent commentary, here, by the think-tank Afghanistan Analysts Network on the rigged Afghan presidential election.) But Pompeo’s announcement on February 21 setting the date for the signing of the reduction-in-violence pact underscores that Washington is confident of steamrolling the anti-Ghani political forces drawn from the non-Pashtun ethnic communities.

In essence, the US is playing the “Pashtun card” – opting for the restoration of Pashtun dominance to stabilize Afghanistan, which has of course been a historical reality.

But there is a significant section of enlightened Pashtuns and the Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek nationalities who feel marginalized and let down. They had expectations for a future for their country as a modern, moderate, plural and truly independent state.

They would be apprehensive that the US-sponsored settlement would put Pakistan in the driver’s seat in Kabul eventually. They would have no reservations about integrating the Taliban as such but through a transparent process of inter-Afghan dialogue. An interim government would have met the purpose ideally.

Quite obviously, the recent four-day visit by the UN Secretary General António Guterres to Pakistan took place in the above backdrop where Washington is grooming the UN to navigate Afghanistan’s transition.

Washington encourages Guterres to prioritize Pakistan’s goodwill and cooperation for the sake of the success of the fateful UN mission in Afghanistan. His highly controversial remarks on Kashmir and the Narendra Modi government’s anti-Muslim policies (while on his visit to Pakistan last week) fall into perspective.

He didn’t speak flippantly. His chastising remarks were intended to put New Delhi on the defensive. Guterres hinted probably that India cannot afford to be a “spoiler” in Afghanistan. You don’t throw stones from glass houses, after all.

MK Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat. This article was produced in partnership by Indian Punchline and Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute, which provided it to Asia Times.
https://asiatimes.com/2020/02/us-taliban-deal-puts-pakistan-in-drivers-seat/
 
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Trump came to power declaring he wants to get out of foreign wars and that's what he is trying to do. Why is this a surprise to anyone? US has proven they can pretty much come in anytime they want. They can go out anytime they want as well - Trump has said it before and he repeated it again in the presser yesterday: it is easy to kill thousands of people (he said millions) but he doesn't want to do that.

Pakistan's assistance will obviously be appreciated as well.
 
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The Indian relative silence on the American exodus from Afghanistan... I don't know what, if anything, has been promised to India by Americans. I certainly don't see that the Talibans are going to entertain a significant Indian presence in Afghanistan. Mr. Bhadrakumar's article quoted above doesn't give a clear answer.

PS. Get over this NY Times giving space to Sirajuddin Haqqani. Yes, NYT is often a mouthpiece of the Washington establishment but it is still a very powerful platform and does have enough independence to oppose the Iraq war and a strong opponent of any war against Iran. Things are not as cut and dry as you might think. And it doesn't hurt Pakistan's interests that Haqqani was given a voice--quite the contrary.
 
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The American decision to handover Afghanistan on a platter to Pakistan has been apparent from get go as India was, is and always will be reluctant to put boots on Afghan soil. The only part of the story that remains to be seen is how much of Pakistani 'co-operation' will America need to maintain its interest in Afghanistan. Depending on how much of American strategic goals rely on Afghanistan, this could be Pakistan's future guarantee of American support.

The best that India can hope for from the Taliban is to allow legitimate commercial interests of Indian private sector in Afghan resources and economy.
 
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Here is one of the best videos I have seen lately about the upcoming (29 Feb. 2020) accord about Afghanistan. This is a very informed and objective panel; even Orya Maqbool seems reasonable. Some take aways:
1) This is indeed a big win for Pakistan.
2) Talibans are going to maintain good relations with both India and USA
3) Pakistan losing trade $$ to India (Chahbahar) because of the fencing has done on the border with Afghanistan.
4) Afghans are truly tired of war and will not tolerate groups to redo the carnage which happened after the Soviets left in 1989.
5) Afghans do resent that Pakistan restricts their relations with India but also Afghan have allowed India to hurt Pakistan through harboring terrorists in Afghanistan.
6) The negativity inside Afghanistan against Pakistan, once Talibans become the dominant group again, is likely to lessen.
7) The current Afghan govt is un-natural and disunited. It does not represent the voice of the people. Is a puppet regime.

My take is... overall a very good news for Pakistan. But perhaps not some complete victory as was accomplished when Talibans took over Kabul in mid 1990s. Afghanistan has changed a lot.

 
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