Joe Shearer
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Went to the link above and saw that u couldn't resist from leaving a comment there too well i am no technical guy so couldn't make head or tail of it much. All i could understand was that all the right parties were involved and there was no cost overrun as such other than time. So this brings to my question?? why is it that the LCA a project so important was squandered in such a way?? Why is there always a difference between the IAF's and DRDO's version of the saga??
That's a big ask!! All of the aerospace-interested community has an opinion on this, and every single person has a different opinion.
Mine is a composite opinion: lots of factors were involved, and these factors combined to make up a mind-set each for the IAF and for the DRDO, and incidentally, for the Ministry, for the community, for concerned parliamentarians, for journalists and mango society.
First, when they thought about doing this right back in the 80s, they should have thought incrementally then itself. Creating a whole bloody industry is no joke and someone somewhere should have put things in perspective.
What does doing things incrementally mean? Let me give you an example. Somebody needed to build a body of programmers in a particular language totally unknown in the civilian environment in India (it was in fact in use in the civilian environment abroad, but that became known later). Nobody was training it, there was no facility anywhere, no instructors, courseware, systems, software. Obviously, starting it up was also a problem; if there was no demand, nobody would sign up for the course, and if nobody signed up for the course, nobody would commit to developing in that language for fear that sufficient programmers couldn't be found.
To get around this, first, a completely unconnected HR consultant was roped in (kicking and screaming) and made to volunteer to be the first trainers. Their candidate students were tested, trained, then tested again in the language this time, given three months' on-the-job training, then absorbed. For the first course, every single thing, place, instructor, courseware, systems and compiler, was provided. For the second course, the place was that of the consultants, for the third, the courseware was removed; next course, the systems, then the compilers, last of all the instructors. A total of nearly 200 youngsters were trained, where the previous largest concentration of this language was not bigger than 30 to 35.
This was a simple example; could it have worked for something as mind-bogglingly complex as designing, building and flying a fast jet from scratch? Well, as some commentators have pointed out, five technologies were involved, five aviation technologies, that is, not including the weaponisation, which was another kettle of fish: these five were the use of composite structures, glass cockpits, multi-mode radar, a high thrust-weight ratio engine and the flight control system. There were two failures and three successes.
Perhaps it could have been done differently. Perhaps we could have used composites in light, propeller aircraft for basic trainers, for instance, a need that always persists, and done some of the learning for these on intermediate steps. Glass cockpits were being designed for a huge civilian system integrator; that wasn't going to be a problem. The flight control system actually got built, and that was a major success. Was there something that could have been done for getting our grip on multi-mode radar and on the engine? Dunno. I don't know Jack Squat about either of these.
But somewhere in the huge public sector undertaking that loomed over my little shop, somebody was making plenty money making marine turbine engines; one wonders if engine-design skills at the lower ranges could have been acquired, and the very special skills involved in developed turbine blades that could take the frightful operating conditions for fast-jet operation could not have been left as the final climb, right at the end.
Similarly, was it possible to develop terrestrial radar systems, only miniaturised sufficiently, incrementally, so that a military airborne version could be hived off at any time? Why not, considering the huge appetite for radar in the country, with the need to upgrade the two basic networks always present in our minds at all times?
That way, we wouldn't have had the pathetic spectacle of the IAF preparing QSRs and then being asked decades later if it still held good. Nor would DRDO have had to swallow its pride and ask for a revised QSR, and listen to the IAF jeer them all the while.