Was Rajiv Gandhi India's worst Prime Minister?

[third eye]

How simple it is to castigate a leader in hindsight.

A PM is as good as his advisors.

VP Singh has done the max damage by unleashing Mandal , its effects will remain for posterity

 

[dray]

VP Singh has done the max damage by unleashing Mandal , its effects will remain for posterity

Very true.

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

[


So you think that he overrode the recommendations of the bureaucracy in these cases?

25 Years of India-Sri Lanka Agreement

2012-08-01 01:59:12

Extracts of my answers to questions raised by media on the India-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 in the last two days are given below.

1The Rajiv Gandhi-Jayewardane Accord completes 25 years on July 29, 2012. Many now feel it represents a total diplomatic failure of India. As one who was present in Sri Lanka when Indian forces were operating from 1987 to 90, what are your comments?
Not all, but some of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora consider it as India’s diplomatic failure. The Agreement represented a strategic rather than a mere diplomatic initiative. The Agreement was signed after India arm-twisted Sri Lanka's President JR Jayewardane to sign it. He had little option but to do so as no external help was forthcoming particularly after India carried out Operation Poomalai when Indian air force planes dropped much needed food supplies to a beleaguered Jaffna. This showed India would not hesitate to use force if Sri Lanka ignored Indian concerns. This action probably kindled Sri Lanka Tamil expectations that India would re-enact another Bangladesh in Sri Lanka and create an independent Tamil Eelam. The Agreement not only underwrote India’s support for a united Sri Lanka but also defused the fight for an independent Eelam by creating space for a

Sri Lankan initiative to provide a measure of autonomy for Tamils; so sections of Sri Lanka Tamils were miffed with India.
India – Sri Lanka Relations

The Agreement had two parts – one relating to the Cold War environment of that time when the U.S. was trying to make a foray in Sri Lanka at a time when the Soviet Union was fighting an insurgency war in Afghanistan, an ally of India. The other part related to ensuring Tamil minorities in Sri Lanka to get their rights on par with Sinhala majority.

The Agreement did prevent Sri Lanka from providing any foothold for the U.S. However, it failed in finding a permanent solution to the Tamil issue, though it paved the way for the creation of Northeastern Province when the 13th amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution was introduced. There was an element of ambiguity in the Agreement as it required a referendum to be held to ratify the merger of North and East on a permanent basis. And verbal promises were said to have been made by both sides which were not implemented. When a political leadership with no faith in the Agreement came to power in both the countries, the Agreement was downgraded to a MoU (memorandum of understanding).

The Agreement was signed between two countries to decide the political future of the Tamil minority, whose representatives were not a party to the Agreement. So it lacked the ownership of Tamils. Tamil militant groups and Tamil political parties of Sri Lanka depended upon India’s goodwill to carry forward their struggle. So they had little choice but to accept the Agreement regardless of their own views. Even TULF which had close political connections in India agreed to the Agreement though it had some reservations. Similarly though the three major militant groups –TELO, EPRLF and PLOTE – went along with the Indian government, Prabhakaran had to be persuaded to accept it. He was suspicious of India’s intentions. MGR’s influence with him came in handy in getting him to join others. In the case of Sinhala majority, President Jayewardane simply steam-rolled the objections without allowing time for the people to dispassionately study and understand it.

Looking back at it now, I feel Jayewardane probably expected objections to the Agreement snowballing in Sri Lanka; the Sri Lanka army was also said to be unhappy. That is why probably he wanted Indian forces in Sri Lanka to discourage any threat to him. In the bargain he also used them to fight the LTTE relieving his responsibility. It gave him freedom to handle JVP opposition. So Sri Lanka also contributed to the partial failure of the Agreement.

Overall, the Agreement was hastily conceived by leaders of both sides by using it as a means to meet their own ends rather than a common cause.

2If the Indian army had assessed the situation on the ground why did it not take any initiative to make a success of the Agreement?

The Indian army is an instrument of the Indian government. It had only a limited mandate to “guarantee and enforce cessation of hostilities” between the Sri Lanka army and Tamil militants so that Sri Lanka can take action to give a degree of autonomy to Tamils as visualised in the Agreement. Prabhakaran’s Suthumalai speech on his return to Sri Lanka gave indications that he was not going to tow the Indian line. When the LTTE made only a token surrender of arms – handing over unserviceable and obsolete weapons – it started sending strong signals of its reluctance to fall in line with other Tamil militant groups giving up their arms. Though initially we did not expect the LTTE to take up arms, later when it started killing other Tamil militant group cadres and dragged its feet on the interim administration, it was clear that the Agreement could be jeopardised.

However, Indian intelligence agencies – not military intelligence – providing interface with militants were probably confident that they could persuade Prabhakaran to accept the Agreement. And they could have advised the government to give some concession to LTTE and save Prabhakaran’s face to make it easy for him to come to terms with reality.They had clearly underestimated Prabhakaran’s obduracy. This is only my conjecture.

But one thing is clear – no one had factored LTTE turning out to be a major obstruction for the success of the Agreement. This is where everyone including the Indian government, intelligence agencies and the army failed to understand Prabhakaran’s singular fixation on leading the militant pack to create Tamil Eelam and make no compromises. Of course, later he had no qualms about colluding with Sri Lanka President Premadasa to send the Indian army out, Eelam or no Eelam.

3Is there a possibility of reviving the Agreement? Is there any life left in the Agreement?

The Agreement is very much in vogue but not very active. Thanks to the Agreement, the 13th amendment to the Constitution came about and that led to the creation of provincial councils providing some level of autonomy for the people. Though not fully implemented, the 13th amendment is probably the only instrument available to Tamils to continue their five-decade long political struggle particularly after the LTTE armed struggle was put to an end in May 2009.

4However, it is for India to decide on activating the Agreement and if necessary amend it in scope and content so that both India and Sri Lanka achieve a win-win situation and end the Tamil question once and for all by providing a solution acceptable to all parties. But can India do it?

Despite three years of peace, Tamils in Sri Lanka have unattended problems and Sri Lanka needs our help to speed up the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war ravaged Northern Province. That can come through only if there is greater political understanding between India and Sri Lanka to provide a fair deal to Tamils. Mrs Indira Gandhi was there for the Bangladesh initiative in 1971 and Rajiv took the plunge in Sri Lanka in 1987. But now, I see no national leader in India with enough dynamism to take up this challenge. That is a pity as the Agreement way well be making its way to the archives.

25 Years of India-Sri Lanka Agreement ::: Dailymirror.lk ::: Breaking News-


Sri Lanka tilts to Beijing
26 November 2014
Author: David Brewster, ANU
A sea change is occurring in Sri Lanka’s strategic orientation. Recent developments suggest that Sri Lanka is becoming China’s new best friend and security partner in the eastern Indian Ocean. This would represent a major change in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and could have significant consequences for regional security.
The immediate cause célèbre is the visit of a Chinese submarine and announcement of a new Chinese-built port in Colombo in September, followed by another visit in early November. A third is rumoured for later this month. These are no ordinary naval visits: their nature, frequency and timing are extraordinary. The first occurred during state visits by Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Claims by Beijing that its nuclear-powered attack submarine is on deployment against Somali pirates are risible. Despite Colombo’s initial attempts at secrecy, the visits seem to be a deliberate signal by China that it intends to maintain a submarine presence in the Indian Ocean and that Sri Lanka will play an important role that strategy.

Sri Lanka has a longstanding policy of showing accommodation and reassurance towards India. In particular, Sri Lanka will not allow itself to be used by other powers to threaten India’s security interests. This policy has been followed more or less since independence. It was reflected in a 1987 agreement under which Sri Lanka committed not to allow any of its ports to be used by any country for military purposes in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests. Overall the strategy has served Sri Lanka well in dealing with its huge and sometimes difficult neighbour.
This stance has only really been called into question once, with disastrous results for Sri Lanka. During the 1980s, in the early days of the Tamil civil war, Colombo toyed with offers of foreign military assistance that some feared would lead to the establishment of a US naval base at the northern port of Trincomalee. These concerns were a significant factor in India’s decision to provide support for the Tamil insurgency and India’s subsequent military intervention in Sri Lanka.
What has caused a change in Sri Lanka’s stance? In recent years there has been significant Chinese investment in high profile infrastructure in the country. The Chinese presence in Colombo is palpable. Some of these projects, such as a new port at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka, have led to claims that China seeks to build a string of naval bases across the northern Indian Ocean. It seems unlikely that Hambantota will become a formal Chinese naval base, but there is little doubt that the Chinese navy will be seeking dependable access to replenishment facilities in the region.
There have been increasing indications over the last six months of Sri Lanka’s willingness to host Chinese military-related facilities. It was recently revealed that China will take over management of a new and enlarged Phase II Hambantota port with berths dedicated for Chinese use. In July the government also revealed it intended to establish a Chinese-run aircraft maintenance facility near Trincomalee, ostensibly to support Sri Lanka’s air force. After strong protests from Delhi, the government may establish this facility in another location, perhaps next to Hambantota port. If nothing else, this is a reminder that the both the Chinese navy and air force will be new players in the Indian Ocean.
The timing of these developments is odd. Beijing is currently promoting what it calls the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ that would involve the construction of ports and other infrastructure across the Indian Ocean. This would include a string of dedicated component manufacturing facilities that would feed back to assembly in China — perhaps something akin to Japan’s ‘flying geese’ strategy in the 1970s. Sri Lanka has volunteered itself as China’s prime partner in this initiative. Yet both vociferously claim that the strategy has no military implications. The recent security developments seriously undermine these claims.
China may be simply seizing an opportunity. Despite some of the hype, China actually has few ‘friends’ in the Indian Ocean that could be depended upon to host military-related facilities. Pakistan is of course a long-standing ally, but its stability and dependability is looking increasingly questionable. Indeed, Xi recently cancelled a planned trip to Islamabad over security concerns. Many have also tagged Myanmar as a de facto ally of China. But Myanmar has never allowed China to use its military facilities, and its political dependability to China is also increasingly uncertain. Sri Lanka, with a stable and cooperative authoritarian regime strategically located in the central Indian Ocean, ticks many of China’s strategic boxes.
How will India respond to these developments? Delhi has expressed anger at these visits in the strongest terms and has told the Rajapaska government that they are ‘unacceptable to India’. But despite strong trade and defence links, including considerable training for Sri Lanka’s military, India’s options are relatively limited. Attempts to isolate the Rajapaksa government are unlikely to be considered an option: Delhi believes attempts to isolate Myanmar’s military regime after 1988 were a major strategic mistake that drove the regime closer to Beijing for decades. Delhi may try to reverse Colombo’s current path through a combination of engagement and coercion, although it is not clear what leverage it has. But decision-makers in Colombo will (or should) be acutely aware of Delhi’s actions in the 1980s when it perceived Sri Lanka may be used by other powers as a threat to India.
David Brewster is Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University.

Breaucracy will make 1000 recommendations. As a political leader he should take the best decisions possible.

A question in return. Till date have the 1987 agreement of 13th amendment implemented?

 

[Saradiel]

Indian Peace Keeping Force: Indian Army has a very honorable record. It had barely lost in any operation it planned and it was never misused fighting random wars elsewhere. However, in a Bush-like action, Rajiv sent 100,000 armed men to Sri Lanka

To be fair to rajiv, the decision to send army to SL under any context had been in indian agenda from early days. Even before india gandhi.

we would have a new country Tamil Eelam by now

LOL India never supported eelam.

But one thing is clear – no one had factored LTTE turning out to be a major obstruction for the success of the Agreement. This is where everyone including the Indian government, intelligence agencies and the army failed to understand Prabhakaran’s singular fixation on leading the militant pack to create Tamil Eelam and make no compromises

SL government always pointed out that LTTE had no committment towards any agreement. And they were correct all these years

Till date have the 1987 agreement of 13th amendment implemented?

Are you high? 13 A is very much active in SL since 1987 and that is why there is a northern provincial council with a Tamil CM in north

 

[Sky lord]

How simple it is to castigate a leader in hindsight.

A PM is as good as his advisors.

VP Singh has done the max damage by unleashing Mandal , its effects will remain for posterity

We are still living with the after effects of the shah bano case. Bofors was the first big money scam in India. Sri Lanka was handled so poorly, that the after effects still resonate and etc etc. a PM is supposed to be smart enough to pick good advisors and to have sufficient instinct to know good advice from bad, otherwise why have a PM at all, why not just run the country by committee?

On looking back, it seems incredible that India is still standing despite the long list of awful leaders. Here's a take

Fairly good
Nehru - had a larger vision for the country and the world
Narasimha Rao - pushed through economic reforms
Vajpayee - continued with modernization and for the first time a 5 year non congress government leading the way to possible stable two party democracy.

50/50
Indra gandhi - pros : 1971, green revolution. Cons: ruined the country's economy, Sikh uprising, started dynastic elected politics with her sons as designated heirs
Manmohan singh - pros: emphasis in economy, nuclear deal. Cons: was not really running the country, completely subservient to unelected Sonia Gandhi, could not stand up to anything or anyone including foreign countries, corruption became totally out of control.

Awful
The rest with special emphasis on
Rajiv Gandhi - IPKF, Bofors, Shah bano etc etc as above.
Morarji Desai - who disclosed spooks who were then picked up tortured and killed.
Ik Gujural - Gujral doctrine basically says do anything you want to us and we will continue to wipe you @ss with flowers

Who would the better choices have been?

The first PM should have been Ambedkar not Nehru, he was remarkably prescient in his views

Chnadrababu Naidu instead of Manmohan.

 

[Rajaraja Chola]

To be fair to rajiv, the decision to send army to SL under any context had been in indian agenda from early days. Even before india gandhi.


LOL India never supported eelam.



SL government always pointed out that LTTE had no committment towards any agreement. And they were correct all these years

Are you high? 13 A is very much active in SL since 1987 and that is why there is a northern provincial council with a Tamil CM in north

Am talking from a Indian perspective. India's support to Tamil Separatist groups was its own way of paying back for supporting Pakistan indirectly in 1971. Had the support been sustained by Rajiv Gandhi, give or take few years, a BD situation might have arised in the north.
We are also talking of the land and police powers. And very much sure not all the aspects of 1987 agreement implemented. TNA regularly raises the issue of 87 agreement.

 

[Saradiel]

Am talking from a Indian perspective. India's support to Tamil Separatist groups was its own way of paying back for supporting Pakistan indirectly in 1971. Had the support been sustained by Rajiv Gandhi, give or take few years, a BD situation might have arised in the north.
We are also talking of the land and police powers. And very much sure not all the aspects of 1987 agreement implemented. TNA regularly raises the issue of 87 agreement.

I didnt answer in a SLn perspective.
The 13 is implemented and it is a lot different from not having it implemented. Land and police powers , that depends a lot on how SLG feels