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VIEW: US war strategy and the Taliban

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VIEW: US war strategy and the Taliban —Musa Khan Jalalzai

There is no legitimate government and a legal functioning state in Afghanistan. People in all provinces do not trust either the US-led forces or the President Karzai regime. The non-Pashtuns are deeply suspicious that any deal between Karzai and the Taliban would strengthen the Pashtun hegemony

Many intellectuals in the UK are of the opinion that the US should have adopted a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional war strategy to counter the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The Obama strategy announced last year badly failed. President Obama faced opposition both from Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and US South Asia representative, late Richard Holbrooke. They were critical of the way the Taliban insurgency is tackled. General McChrystal was fired, Holbrooke died, and the Pakistan Army no more wants the killings of its own people. This is ultimately a nonsensical and immaterial war and may lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan.

To revive Pakistan’s zeal, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of General Staff Admiral Mike Mullen visited Islamabad to press General Kayani to do more. Newspapers reported Admiral Mullen’s visit to Pakistan with a strong sense of strategic impatience. He complained about the inability of the government in clearing insurgents from border safe havens where they prepare lethal attacks against American and allied forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen told General Kayani: “We all have a sense of urgency about this. We are losing people.”

Many Pakistani journalists and men of letters believe that if the US wants to counter the Taliban insurgency in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, it will have to appreciate the cooperation of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), not criticise the agency for its military or political role across the border. In one instance, the ISI is requested to bring the Haqqani network and other Afghan Taliban to the table for talks, in the other it is criticised and humiliated. Intellectual circles understand that this policy of the US government is based on hypocrisy and deception.

US President Barack Obama is looking for another flock of horses for this difficult race to defeat the professional horses of the ISI. For this purpose, Britain’s well-trained horses are being moved to Kandahar to support and reinforce the tired and frustrated American horses effectively. Mr Holbrooke was tired of the performance of the Afghan riders. He was critical of the Obama strategy and told a Pakistani surgeon: “You have got to stop this war in Afghanistan

Keeping in view all these internal criticisms and political troubles, on December 16, 2010, the US president declared the revision of his previous failed strategy. Obama said for disrupting al Qaeda and combating the Taliban, Pakistan needs to do more. He complained about Pakistan’s intelligence performance but he knows that Pakistan lost thousands of its troops in this war. Obama noted that Pakistan not only deployed 140,000 troops in that region, but was also coordinating its military operations with the US and Afghan forces.

The revision of US military strategy time and again means that the US government has failed. The Taliban have already informed world media that the US offensives in Helmand have failed. Fresh warnings by the al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have come at a time when the US and NATO forces are facing a tough time in Afghanistan. In 2010, 700 foreign soldiers, including American servicemen, were killed in Taliban attacks. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office facts and figures show that more than 20,000 officers from the Afghan National Police have left over the past year.

Similarly, the cost of the Afghan war is unpalatable. At present, the US spends about $ 120 billion a year while the internal deficit is one trillion dollars. The government in Afghanistan is widely seen as corrupt. There is no legitimate government and a legal functioning state in Afghanistan. People in all provinces do not trust either the US-led forces or the President Karzai regime. The non-Pashtuns are deeply suspicious that any deal between Karzai and the Taliban would strengthen the Pashtun hegemony. Warlords in the north have become so rich that they are running the black market economy and criminal trade across the country. They have established their own private armies. They provide security to the coalition forces.

The debate on the failure of the Afghan state and its institutions had intensified in the NATO summit. All member states emphasised that a well functioning state in Afghanistan is a must. The present hardly existent Afghan state has never been able to effectively control its territory and deliver good governance. International forces (US, UK, NATO, ISAF) neither gave any importance to the Afghan National Army in maintaining stability, nor used it in tackling insurgency across the country. Local warlords have long been used to fight insurgency. Warlords and their irregular armies neither understand insurgency nor conventional war. The Afghan National Army has no specific counterinsurgency training. The Afghan state has been bypassed and ignored in the war against terrorism. Nation building has barely materialised.

There is a constant need for nation building in the country. More regrettably, Afghanistan has neither a strong educated class nor basic infrastructure that can help in strengthening national unity. The country has been poor and weak throughout the course of its history. Ethnic, sectarian and geographical differences have long been the basis for suspicion and resentment. The state is not able even to collect revenue and manage public resources.

Peace among warlords, criminal trade, black market economy, organised crime, corruption and insurgency are impossible to reconcile. The people of this poor country have been alienated by corruption, mismanagement, brutalities of war and unemployment. They join the insurgency in retaliation. Moreover, poor eradication management of narcotic drugs is another factor that supports the insurgency and national alienation. The whole process is financed by al Qaeda within Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bad governance is going to cost both NATO and the Afghans. The lives of Americans, Europeans, Pakistanis, Indians and Afghans are in constant danger. Nobody can travel by road alone and people are even being kidnapped from the middle of major cities, including Kabul. To tackle this issue, the Bush and Obama regimes never established a clear military strategy for Afghanistan.

Afghan intellectuals say the problem of the dysfunctional western-backed democracy in Afghanistan is much deeper as it is neither a democracy nor a well functioning government. Not only the Afghan state, the corruption of international forces and firms is too significant to be ignored. All this is because the institutions of a hardly functioning Afghan state have been on the decline. Insurgency is slowly developing within the Afghan National Army and hundreds of soldiers are joining the Taliban movement every day. Military experts complain that a major portion of the Afghan Army and the police are still controlled by former jihadist leaders.

General McChrystal cried again and again for help in improving the security situation in Afghanistan. The main reason behind the general’s cry was the need for a unified strategy because there are two war strategies — US strategy and ISAF strategy. These strategies conduct the war on terror in different directions. They have lost confidence and know nothing about what they want to do, how they want peace and who they want to involve in the stabilisation process.

The writer is author of Britain’s National Security Challenges and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com
 
Unfortunately this is what I would call a shallow article. Shallow in that it simplifies many of the arguments made.

Starting with this:
"the problem of the dysfunctional western-backed democracy in Afghanistan is much deeper as it is neither a democracy nor a well functioning government."

The west and specifically the US with respect to nation building is always pushing the so called democratic approach. There are in many situations where the concept of pure democratic governance as understood by the west is totally inappropriate to implement. Afghanistan is one such place. Ethnically and geographically it is too diverse to propose such governance. Democracy in such places develops into the base level Demoscrazy and hence falls part.
Governence needs to built from the village/tribal level up not down.

This is a significant issue in the whole design of delivering stability:
"General McChrystal cried again and again for help in improving the security situation in Afghanistan. The main reason behind the general’s cry was the need for a unified strategy because there are two war strategies — US strategy and ISAF strategy."

The matter of these two different strategies was picked out and criticised well before McCrystal took over control. It had been raised at NATO summits. But seems nothing has and will ever be done. Which is the better strategy is no doubt a point of contention and can lead to the usual long non resolving discussion.

The use by the US and no doubt other forces of the northern warlords is little more than legitimising their claim to their role in Afghanistan. For any form of governance this warlords role can not exist but its there due to this fictitious legitimacy.

The most entertaining is:
"poor eradication management of narcotic drugs is another factor that supports the insurgency and national alienation"

The US and the ISAF have different approaches to this matter. Unfortunately heavy handed approaches do not always work and such has been documented, (also discussed about threads in this forum). If you take one cash crop away make sure you have one to replace it and if necessary equipment to implement the new cash crop. It also has to return a profit to the farmer/village as well.

Just a brief passing thought or two.
 
Unfortunately this is what I would call a shallow article. Shallow in that it simplifies many of the arguments made.

Starting with this:
"the problem of the dysfunctional western-backed democracy in Afghanistan is much deeper as it is neither a democracy nor a well functioning government."

The west and specifically the US with respect to nation building is always pushing the so called democratic approach. There are in many situations where the concept of pure democratic governance as understood by the west is totally inappropriate to implement. Afghanistan is one such place. Ethnically and geographically it is too diverse to propose such governance. Democracy in such places develops into the base level Demoscrazy and hence falls part.
Governence needs to built from the village/tribal level up not down.

This is a significant issue in the whole design of delivering stability:
"General McChrystal cried again and again for help in improving the security situation in Afghanistan. The main reason behind the general’s cry was the need for a unified strategy because there are two war strategies — US strategy and ISAF strategy."

The matter of these two different strategies was picked out and criticised well before McCrystal took over control. It had been raised at NATO summits. But seems nothing has and will ever be done. Which is the better strategy is no doubt a point of contention and can lead to the usual long non resolving discussion.

The use by the US and no doubt other forces of the northern warlords is little more than legitimising their claim to their role in Afghanistan. For any form of governance this warlords role can not exist but its there due to this fictitious legitimacy.

The most entertaining is:
"poor eradication management of narcotic drugs is another factor that supports the insurgency and national alienation"

The US and the ISAF have different approaches to this matter. Unfortunately heavy handed approaches do not always work and such has been documented, (also discussed about threads in this forum). If you take one cash crop away make sure you have one to replace it and if necessary equipment to implement the new cash crop. It also has to return a profit to the farmer/village as well.

Just a brief passing thought or two.

RR - you dont seem to be disagreeing with the 'context' of this op-ed. just stating it 'differently' - in the end things are getting worse not better IMHO.
 
The Afghan reality

Friday, December 31, 2010

Mir Adnan Aziz

It was on July 6, 1808, that King Joseph of Spain presented a constitution. It allowed the peasants to retain their harvests, an independent judiciary, press freedom and abolition of Church privileges. Till then, abbeys and bishops owned every single building and piece of land in towns and villages. These were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants.

The Spanish peasantry still chose to ignore it. Instead, they obeyed the priests who motivated them to fight against the foreign invader’s ungodly innovations. This, because Joseph was Napoleon’s brother, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was what mattered to the Spaniards – not the ideal constitution to better their lives, but the perception about the man behind it. In today’s made-to-order corrupt democracies (including ours), these perceptions are realities.

The hypocrisy is galling when individuals who could never be allowed to function at the junior most level of any sensitive government organisation in Western countries are trussed up to rule the destinies of other nations. It becomes all the more abhorrent when the governments of these unaccountable individuals morph into kleptocracies.

US ambassador in Kabul Karl Eikenberry characterised Hamid Karzai as “a weak individual unfamiliar with the basics of nation-building,” whereas President Zardari (the “greatest obstacle to Pakistan progress”) was branded “clearly a numbskull” by Jock Stirrup, then Britain’s chief of defence staff. These perceptions are not gospel because they come from afar, but because the miserable lives of a crushed multitude bears a stark testament to this harsh reality.

Back to President Karzai. During Milan’s fashion Week in 2002, Gucci’s Tom Ford called him “the chicest man on the planet.” Silvia Fendi termed his attire as worn with “nonchalance and elegance.” Unfortunately for him, Karazai was propped up to govern Afghanistan, not exemplar for models or the catwalk.

Today, with billions invested, and thousands dead, he heads the most turbulent country of the world. His predicament (and that of our chosen King Josephs) is that he is viewed as a US asset. If ever he moves around Kabul, which he rarely does, he does so with American bodyguards; not trusting Afghans with his life. Referred to by many as the “Mayor of Kabul,” there are no imminent signs of increase in his municipal limits.

Dogged by corruption charges and dwindling support, he relentlessly blames Pakistan for all that plagues his land. He also blames the ISI of helping the Taliban, an affront, given the thousands of lives lost here and an economy in ruins<edit>and so does the west!

He has also often repeatedly demanded of the NATO/ISAF forces to enter Pakistan. The cables released by Wikileaks have him alleging that Al-Qaeda training activity on our side of the border has increased. He also wails that the West is unwilling to move against Pakistan.

He demands: &#8220;The question now is, why they are not taking action?&#8221; He has previously even threatened to send his own forces across the border to a country whose largess he enjoyed for two decades and without whose complete support he could never have been &#8220;elected.&#8221;

His brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, tainted by massive corruption and drug trade allegations, charged that a peace initiative was undermined because &#8220;Pakistan detained Mulla Baradar and Taliban leaders prepared to discuss reintegration with the Karzai government.&#8221;

In its edition of Jan 29, 2008, The Telegraph had this advice for the Afghan president: &#8220;Mr Karzai must live with the knowledge that every one of his predecessors for the past 107 years, whether kings or presidents, was overthrown violently. Of the ten men who have served as Afghanistan&#8217;s president in the past three decades, four were murdered and one strung up from a lamppost and disembowelled.&#8221; Was the ISI up and about since the last one century?

Today&#8217;s Afghanistan is a battleground between unfounded Western optimism and realism. Optimists think that Afghanistan can be transformed into a made-to-order democracy, a Western satellite; realism cautions otherwise. In public, defeat in Afghanistan is anathema for Western governments; in private it is deemed inevitable. Australian foreign minister Kevin Rudd, the country&#8217;s former prime minister, epitomised the West&#8217;s mindset when he confided thus to visiting US Congressmen: &#8220;Afghanistan scares the hell out of me.&#8221;

Similarly, public statements of faith in Afghan democracy are coupled with private expressions of despair when it comes to hopes of even remotely legitimising President Karzai and his administration. Western officials agonisingly admit in private that any real hopes of bringing about this miracle are now dead.

Hostilities, coupled with remote-controlled democracies, breed resentment and resistance over a period of time. In this &#8220;mission accomplished&#8221; war, we have seen America&#8217;s firepower thwarted and blunted. Devoid of military victories, it has only fuelled hatred and global insecurity. Rationally, the US-led West should engage the Taliban positively, although the latter have little incentive to negotiate, given their growing strength and sway in Afghanistan.

If engaged, the Taliban can prevent Afghanistan from being an ungovernable state sliding into warring anarchy and inhibit its present stature as the globally largest, freely enduring, drug producer courtesy Operation &#8220;Enduring Freedom.&#8221;

Churchill wrote in his History of the Second World War: &#8220;When two armies approach each other, it makes all the difference in the world which one owns only the ground it stands on and which owns all the rest.&#8221; This is the Afghan reality of today: it has the war theatre, time and history firmly on its side. To face and accept this Afghan reality, though it could be extremely difficult for some, will augur well for Afghanistan, this region, and the West in particular.



The writer is a freelance contributor.

Email: miradnanaziz@gmail.com
 
RR - you dont seem to be disagreeing with the 'context' of this op-ed. just stating it 'differently' - in the end things are getting worse not better IMHO.

Let's just say; start with bad assumptions and you end up with stinky stuff on your face.

Things can be changed but it requires someone to say they got it wrong from the start. This is something I doubt will ever happen.

My suspicion is that Pakistan needs to look at a real security to its northern border and possibly resolve its internal matters and hope its all done before US/NATO/ISAF pull out. Again I doubt this is going to happen as well.

Yes very pessimistic at present.
 
As per the natural rule of rise and fall of nations, it seems the American Capitalist, Expansionist and Killer Empire has started its march towards the great fall, Insha Allah.
It looks Almighty Allah will show US that there is a Supreme power above it and if they are in a nasty planning again others, Allah also planning against its injustices and it will crush it as Abraha's army was crushed by Ababeels when they march towards Mecca with the intentions of destroying Kaaba.

Qura: Chapter 105 (Al-Fil - The Elephant):
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.


Hast thou seen how thy Lord dealt with the possessors of the elephant?
Did He not cause their war to end in confusion?
And send against them birds in flocks?
Casting at them decreed stones &#8212;
So He rendered them like straw eaten up?
 
Just be pleased I have recovered from dealing the sudden death of one of my horses.
Otherwise my posts might be a bit stronger in negativity.
 
As per the natural rule of rise and fall of nations, it seems the American Capitalist, Expansionist and Killer Empire has started its march towards the great fall, Insha Allah.
It looks Almighty Allah will show US that there is a Supreme power above it and if they are in a nasty planning again others, Allah also planning against its injustices and it will crush it as Abraha's army was crushed by Ababeels when they march towards Mecca with the intentions of destroying Kaaba.

Qura: Chapter 105 (Al-Fil - The Elephant):
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful.


Hast thou seen how thy Lord dealt with the possessors of the elephant?
Did He not cause their war to end in confusion?
And send against them birds in flocks?
Casting at them decreed stones —
So He rendered them like straw eaten up?

Bluntly Give me a break! Rise and fall of nations!
Both articles are a bit deeper than this.
May your words be better guided and more instructive.
 
America is suffering from a clear strategic disconnect between "ends", "ways" and "means".

That disconnect lies in our inability to separate vital nat'l interests from nat'l interests. There is a clear doctrinal difference between the two. Our central mission behind OEF was the decapitation of Al Qaeda as an entity existing within the Afghan/Pakistan border region possessing the intent to conduct global terror operations aimed primarily at the west. To that end, we were largely successful by the late fall of 2001. That was, and remains, within our vital nat'l interests.

What was required after that and how did that emphasis shift? Certainly not nation-building (whatever THAT may be) with the attendant wholesale transformation of the Afghan countryside into a kinder, gentler stone-age. In short, I can't want little afghan children to receive a madrassah-free secular education more than their parents. If their parents, in turn, won't fight and shed their blood for this goal why should I?

There is value in the below essay. I encourage thoughtful readers here to consider its perspective.

Is The War In Afghanistan In the Interests Of The United States And Its Allies?-SWJ Foundation Maj. Jeremy Kotkin 2009

Since 2007 I've advocated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. I firmly believe that Al Qaeda can be effectively attacked as required without the encumbrances we currently suffer WRT either Afghanistan or Pakistan. I willingly cede "victory" (such as that may be) to the Pakistani government and would offer unfettered access to the destruction of the GIRoA if possible. I wouldn't help but I wouldn't hinder either. Others, as their vital nat'l interests are defined, may.

Finally, were Pakistan to champion the conquest of Afghanistan by the Afghan taliban, they may find (as they did between 1995-2001) unruly and ungrateful beneficiaries. Afterall they are, in the end, AFGHAN and TALIBAN. Pakistan has travelled that road already.

Thanks.:usflag:
 
America is suffering from a clear strategic disconnect between "ends", "ways" and "means".

That disconnect lies in our inability to separate vital nat'l interests from nat'l interests. There is a clear doctrinal difference between the two. Our central mission behind OEF was the decapitation of Al Qaeda as an entity existing within the Afghan/Pakistan border region possessing the intent to conduct global terror operations aimed primarily at the west. To that end, we were largely successful by the late fall of 2001. That was, and remains, within our vital nat'l interests.

What was required after that and how did that emphasis shift? Certainly not nation-building (whatever THAT may be) with the attendant wholesale transformation of the Afghan countryside into a kinder, gentler stone-age. In short, I can't want little afghan children to receive a madrassah-free secular education more than their parents. If their parents, in turn, won't fight and shed their blood for this goal why should I?

There is value in the below essay. I encourage thoughtful readers here to consider its perspective.

Is The War In Afghanistan In the Interests Of The United States And Its Allies?-SWJ Foundation Maj. Jeremy Kotkin 2009

Since 2007 I've advocated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. I firmly believe that Al Qaeda can be effectively attacked as required without the encumbrances we currently suffer WRT either Afghanistan or Pakistan. I willingly cede "victory" (such as that may be) to the Pakistani government and would offer unfettered access to the destruction of the GIRoA if possible. I wouldn't help but I wouldn't hinder either. Others, as their vital nat'l interests are defined, may.

Finally, were Pakistan to champion the conquest of Afghanistan by the Afghan taliban, they may find (as they did between 1995-2001) unruly and ungrateful beneficiaries. Afterall they are, in the end, AFGHAN and TALIBAN. Pakistan has travelled that road already.

Thanks.:usflag:

Pakistan should not repeat the same mistake and have direct administrative role rather than a Pak Friendly regime which is hated by the Afghan people...
 
Hamid Karzai needs to go. This guy is not popular even in Afghanistan. His mandate seems to be restricted to Kabul, which is not good.

He won in the elections via heavy rigging.

I think that some other person needs to take the charge of affairs in Afghanistan. That man, Abdullah Abdullah, should be given a chance.
 

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