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VIEW: Recognising our common interest Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Terrorism and militancy threaten everyone, as the perpetrators of violence operate outside normal, acceptable politics. There can be questions about the strategies appropriate for dealing with the situation, but none about ending militancy effectively, as it is a common interest that Pakistan shares with other countries
There appears to be some strain on the international coalition engaged in the war on terror in the region, more specifically in Afghanistan and the border regions between this embattled country and Pakistan. Pakistan has played a key role in this war by offering whatever assistance it could to the United States, NATO and other partners in stabilising Afghanistan.
This role, primarily scripted and played by President Pervez Musharraf, has been controversial among Pakistanis.
A great number of people in the country are opposed to the assistance Musharraf has extended to the international coalition for the removal of the Taliban and the continuing counter-insurgency campaign against the Pashtun-dominated militia. There is even greater opposition to the military operations in the tribal areas where Pakistan was forced to deploy close to eighty thousand troops, in some areas for the first time.
The presence of Pakistani forces and operations against the militants has provoked major political controversy in the country: whose war is this?
Many people believe that Pakistan is fighting its own citizens and it would have been better to avoid this war. Since this issue is debated in polemical terms by many Pakistani individuals and groups, it escapes a realistic assessment of the nature of threat posed by the militants and Pakistans responsibility to the international community in fighting terrorism.
In wars where the state is fighting against internal insurgents or external foes, how a threat is determined and the appropriateness of the response matter a great deal in the final outcome. Many doubt if the Musharraf regime, over the past eight years, has convinced most of its citizens about the threat militants pose to all of us and the correctness of using military means against them. The central problem of the regime its legitimacy deficit has resulted in the mixing up of many issues of internal security, politics and foreign relations, and nothing seems credible to Musharrafs opponents.
While some of the more informed Pakistanis understood both the wider ramifications of militancy in the border regions and its spill-over effects, as well as strategic compulsions to be on the American side in this war, for many ordinary Pakistanis, it was just an American war against the Muslims of Afghanistan and our tribal areas. From the outset, many religious and political groups forcefully argued for a neutral policy. These voices were ignored, and the regime decided to be an active partner in the war on terror which shaped a new partnership with the United States a third such strategic relationship but, like in the past, mainly centred on a third party.
Previous strategic relationships with Washington fell apart, and Pakistan has been dealing with their domestic and international fallout for decades. As a result, many Pakistanis were quite sceptical about the benefits of another such partnership, and were more concerned with the political costs. They now point to the destabilisation of the border regions and Musharrafs extended reign at the centre of the political system, which has added to the decay of state institutions. Musharraf has consequently taken a lot of flak from numerous different constituencies for involving Pakistan in the war on terror. This is understandable as there is hardly any agreement among us and Im afraid there cannot be any on the nature of the militant threat and suitable responses.
The Pakistani government has fought a necessary but mostly unpopular war against the militants in the tribal areas. In meeting the demands of its internal security and foreign obligations, it has suffered mounting human and political costs.
At a time when Musharraf has suffered significant political loss, although more due to his own domestic follies than the war on terror, the latter has added greatly to his difficulties.
Embattled at home, he has found the United States and some other partners increasingly more demanding on the issue of cooperation in the war on terror. Over the years, American attitude toward Pakistan has not been open-handed. While bolstering a faltering regime, it has exercised too much pressure on it to bend further in an effort to get more. In doing so, the US has often ignored domestic political and security consequences of the tactics and strategic roadmap it has been forcing upon Pakistan.
Pakistan and the international coalition against terrorism started on a good note: this war concerns every country and the problem is so complex that it needs multi-level strategies for many years. As the problem of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has persisted, coalition partners have become agitated, more anxious, and less sure about the each others capacity and sincerity. Surely, this cannot be a winning attitude or a strategy against terrorism.
Threats of varying intensity from the United States that it may cut off assistance to Pakistan if it does not deliver in the war on terror according to its expectations have often irked Islamabad, and rightly so. More than that, Washington has been communicating that it would directly launch attacks against suspected terrorist targets deep inside Pakistani territory. This speaks volumes about the distrust that appears to be emerging about Pakistans capacity and political intentions in the war on terror.
The knee-jerk reaction of the United States to the security climate in the border region does not leave Pakistan in a happy situation. If the Americans try to launch attacks from the Afghan side, intervene in hot pursuit or bomb suspected targets with the consent of Pakistan, they may provoke a much larger conflict than the Musharraf regime and the anti-terror coalition face today. This is not the kind of response Pakistan can expect for what its security forces have done in containing terrorism. It does not need to be repeated that Pakistani forces in the border regions have suffered far greater casualties than all the NATO forces put together. And they continue to remain committed to securing stability and peace, even alienating their own compatriots in the process.
Terrorism and militancy threaten everyone, as the perpetrators of violence operate outside normal, acceptable politics. There can be questions about the strategies appropriate for dealing with the situation, but none about ending militancy effectively, as it is a common interest that Pakistan shares with other countries. It is irrelevant to ask who is threatened more. What is relevant is figuring out how best we can cooperate, not just in dropping bombs, which is easy, but in addressing the more difficult and stubborn social, economic and political issues that sprout militancy.
The author is a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
Terrorism and militancy threaten everyone, as the perpetrators of violence operate outside normal, acceptable politics. There can be questions about the strategies appropriate for dealing with the situation, but none about ending militancy effectively, as it is a common interest that Pakistan shares with other countries
There appears to be some strain on the international coalition engaged in the war on terror in the region, more specifically in Afghanistan and the border regions between this embattled country and Pakistan. Pakistan has played a key role in this war by offering whatever assistance it could to the United States, NATO and other partners in stabilising Afghanistan.
This role, primarily scripted and played by President Pervez Musharraf, has been controversial among Pakistanis.
A great number of people in the country are opposed to the assistance Musharraf has extended to the international coalition for the removal of the Taliban and the continuing counter-insurgency campaign against the Pashtun-dominated militia. There is even greater opposition to the military operations in the tribal areas where Pakistan was forced to deploy close to eighty thousand troops, in some areas for the first time.
The presence of Pakistani forces and operations against the militants has provoked major political controversy in the country: whose war is this?
Many people believe that Pakistan is fighting its own citizens and it would have been better to avoid this war. Since this issue is debated in polemical terms by many Pakistani individuals and groups, it escapes a realistic assessment of the nature of threat posed by the militants and Pakistans responsibility to the international community in fighting terrorism.
In wars where the state is fighting against internal insurgents or external foes, how a threat is determined and the appropriateness of the response matter a great deal in the final outcome. Many doubt if the Musharraf regime, over the past eight years, has convinced most of its citizens about the threat militants pose to all of us and the correctness of using military means against them. The central problem of the regime its legitimacy deficit has resulted in the mixing up of many issues of internal security, politics and foreign relations, and nothing seems credible to Musharrafs opponents.
While some of the more informed Pakistanis understood both the wider ramifications of militancy in the border regions and its spill-over effects, as well as strategic compulsions to be on the American side in this war, for many ordinary Pakistanis, it was just an American war against the Muslims of Afghanistan and our tribal areas. From the outset, many religious and political groups forcefully argued for a neutral policy. These voices were ignored, and the regime decided to be an active partner in the war on terror which shaped a new partnership with the United States a third such strategic relationship but, like in the past, mainly centred on a third party.
Previous strategic relationships with Washington fell apart, and Pakistan has been dealing with their domestic and international fallout for decades. As a result, many Pakistanis were quite sceptical about the benefits of another such partnership, and were more concerned with the political costs. They now point to the destabilisation of the border regions and Musharrafs extended reign at the centre of the political system, which has added to the decay of state institutions. Musharraf has consequently taken a lot of flak from numerous different constituencies for involving Pakistan in the war on terror. This is understandable as there is hardly any agreement among us and Im afraid there cannot be any on the nature of the militant threat and suitable responses.
The Pakistani government has fought a necessary but mostly unpopular war against the militants in the tribal areas. In meeting the demands of its internal security and foreign obligations, it has suffered mounting human and political costs.
At a time when Musharraf has suffered significant political loss, although more due to his own domestic follies than the war on terror, the latter has added greatly to his difficulties.
Embattled at home, he has found the United States and some other partners increasingly more demanding on the issue of cooperation in the war on terror. Over the years, American attitude toward Pakistan has not been open-handed. While bolstering a faltering regime, it has exercised too much pressure on it to bend further in an effort to get more. In doing so, the US has often ignored domestic political and security consequences of the tactics and strategic roadmap it has been forcing upon Pakistan.
Pakistan and the international coalition against terrorism started on a good note: this war concerns every country and the problem is so complex that it needs multi-level strategies for many years. As the problem of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has persisted, coalition partners have become agitated, more anxious, and less sure about the each others capacity and sincerity. Surely, this cannot be a winning attitude or a strategy against terrorism.
Threats of varying intensity from the United States that it may cut off assistance to Pakistan if it does not deliver in the war on terror according to its expectations have often irked Islamabad, and rightly so. More than that, Washington has been communicating that it would directly launch attacks against suspected terrorist targets deep inside Pakistani territory. This speaks volumes about the distrust that appears to be emerging about Pakistans capacity and political intentions in the war on terror.
The knee-jerk reaction of the United States to the security climate in the border region does not leave Pakistan in a happy situation. If the Americans try to launch attacks from the Afghan side, intervene in hot pursuit or bomb suspected targets with the consent of Pakistan, they may provoke a much larger conflict than the Musharraf regime and the anti-terror coalition face today. This is not the kind of response Pakistan can expect for what its security forces have done in containing terrorism. It does not need to be repeated that Pakistani forces in the border regions have suffered far greater casualties than all the NATO forces put together. And they continue to remain committed to securing stability and peace, even alienating their own compatriots in the process.
Terrorism and militancy threaten everyone, as the perpetrators of violence operate outside normal, acceptable politics. There can be questions about the strategies appropriate for dealing with the situation, but none about ending militancy effectively, as it is a common interest that Pakistan shares with other countries. It is irrelevant to ask who is threatened more. What is relevant is figuring out how best we can cooperate, not just in dropping bombs, which is easy, but in addressing the more difficult and stubborn social, economic and political issues that sprout militancy.
The author is a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
