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Indonesian Su 27/30 has tested Australian Super hornet, the radar is more superior than us for BVR dog fight, but rumors said we beat them in WVR. You have already had Su 27/30 so F 16 Block 52 is better to complement it. Our F 16 has also tested their F 18 in Kupang recently


The upgraded F-16s that Indonesia is getting, for how many flying hours are those guaranteed for?
 
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The upgraded F-16s that Indonesia is getting, for how many flying hours are those guaranteed for?

Well, I am not a military man, just a fanboy, I dont know for sure, but some parts are actually new so it makes the flying hours become quite long as the planes will be called a refurbished F 16. Better you ask @madokafc or @Jakartans@PkDef for any technical thing like this.

As we also know that Singapore has decided to upgrade all of their F 16 which will be finished until around 2022-3 conducted by Lockheed Martin. It means even though their platform are an old ones ( only their F-15 that is actually relatively new for them, being acquired since 2000 and adding them gradually), the Singaporean still considers it as worth it considering the upgrading project is huge in term of money.

I am not around anymore for sometimes, need focus for my new project.

:cheers:


I hope you guys well. :)
 
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Well, I am not a military man, just a fanboy, I dont know for sure, but some parts are actually new so it makes the flying hours become quite long as the planes will be called a refurbished F 16. Better you ask @madokafc or @Jakartans@PkDef for any technical thing like this.

As we also know that Singapore has decided to upgrade all of their F 16 which will be finished until around 2022-3 conducted by Lockheed Martin. It means even though their platform are an old ones ( only their F-15 that is actually relatively new for them, being acquired since 2000 and adding them gradually), the Singaporean still considers it as worth it considering the upgrading project is huge in term of money.

I am not around anymore for sometimes, need focus for my new project.

:cheers:


I hope you guys well. :)

Thank you. Good luck in your project.
 
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Military Capabilities
Japan and Vietnam outline patrol boat programme
Jon Grevatt, Bangkok - IHS Jane's Defence Industry
31 May 2016

Japan and Vietnam have agreed to strengthen defence collaboration, with a focus on Tokyo's provision of aid to support Hanoi's purchase of additional patrol vessels.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on 28 May, following talks between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his visiting counterpart, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, that the two sides had agreed to "accelerate" the patrol vessel programme.

The ministry added that the vessels would be new platforms and support the Vietnamese patrol boats previously supplied by Japan to enhance the Southeast Asian country's maritime security efforts.

The ministry indicated the project would be funded by Japan's official development assistance (ODA) programme.
 
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I just remember reading something in the Indian forum recently where an Indian member wrote that India needed the Rafale because the Pakistani F-16s block 52 have air superiority over their SU-30MKIs because of better ECM. They expect to lose 2 SU-30MKIs for each Pakistani F-16 lost.

If that's correct, then those F-16s block 52 still pack a nice punch. Just imagine if they are block 60.

I doubt anyone in the IAF expect that. They need a deep strike, better serviceable plane, with also the industrial benefits the French can offer to India. Also keep in mind the F16 Block 60 IN was also offered and rejected. Lockheed Martin is still trying to push the bird through.
 
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I doubt anyone in the IAF expect that. They need a deep strike, better serviceable plane, with also the industrial benefits the French can offer to India. Also keep in mind the F16 Block 60 IN was also offered and rejected. Lockheed Martin is still trying to push the bird through.

That makes sense; frankly, I was a bit surprised too, particularly since the SU-30MKI is an air superiority fighter, but that's what the guy wrote and nobody challenged that.
 
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Please, don't buy Apache...

Our brothers poles shot them down left and right both unrestricted and restricted scenarios in 2003...
how realistic were these "scenarios"?

well, I´m not as a military expert as you but I assume any weapon if operating alone is vulnerable to enemy firepower from ground, sea, air...

if you send tanks into battlefields without infantry and air support, those tanks would quickly turn to expensive scrap metal. so helicopters, fighter jets or even aircraft carriers. I don´t see any wrong in there if we acquire Apache or other attack helicopters. we haven´t have any attack submarines until recently.

you should keep in mind, our army has high percentage of russian made weapons (93%) imported from Russia, or produced domestically by russian licence. so the chinese army. they have russian made weapon systems, and derivates of. ok, they have developed a sophisticated military complex. Their dependency on Russia is much less.

Plus the chinese can field more men than the entire vietnamese population, having more weapons than their soldiers can carry, possessing more money they can spend.

so what is our response?

within our very limited resources, we must have something in stocks that give us a military edge over the PLA, should it come to a physical confrontation. Our navy is weaker. So it is wise to escalate the battles to land, where our real strength lies. It is a safe bet the Chinese would send more than several hundreds tanks they fielded in the 1979 land war. Haven't they more than 10,000 tanks today?

A thing the Chinese should take it into their strategic calculus, as history shows it: a war between Vietnam and China would always drag in our immediate neighbors Laos and Cambodia. and with a bit delay Thailand. Other Great powers as Russia, America, Japan and India would not sit idle if China starts aggression in attacking Vietnam. Our counter strategy must be a quick escalation, internationalizing the war.

I am ware of the fact, if Vietnam possessing US weapon systems or formal or informal military alliance with Washington will be another step on the escalation ladder. but the Chinese have no reason to blame us. it is them that seek confrontation.
 
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CONTENT PREVIEW
Country Risk

India aims to supply BrahMos cruise missiles to Vietnam
Rahul Bedi, New Delhi - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

01 June 2016

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India plans to provide Vietnam with varied defence equipment, including BrahMos cruise missiles, in a bid to counter Chinese armament companies equipping several militaries in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, according to Indian defence industry officials.

To further this offer and strengthen bilateral strategic ties, Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is travelling to Hanoi in early June accompanied by a 15-20 member team comprising private and public sector defence manufacturers.

"The Indian defence delegation to Vietnam will further the joint development and production of a range of military equipment such as small arms, missile and naval systems as well as assorted ammunition," an industry official told IHS Jane's .

Foremost among the proposed materiel is the joint India-Russia-developed BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile featuring a 292 km strike range that New Delhi had offered Hanoi two years ago. India had been unable to supply the missile at the time due to unresolved issues with Russia regarding export and intellectual property rights, which were only recently resolved, officials said.

Configured on Russia's 3M55 Oniks/Yakhont system (NATO designation SS-NZX-26) and named after the Brahmaputra and Moskva rivers in India and Russia, the BrahMos is a two-stage vehicle with a solid propellant booster and a liquid propellant ram-jet system.

The radar-guided missile is 8.4 m long, weighs 3.9 tonnes and is capable of being fired from ships. Its variants can be launched from mobile land-based platforms. India is also readying the BrahMos to be fired from a submarine and a Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighter.

Since 2008 India has supplied Vietnam with some 5,000 spare parts for its Soviet Petya-class frigates and provided assistance in overhauling the Southeast Asian nation's MiG-21 fighters and T-55 tanks.

In October 2014 India pledged to supply Vietnam with four locally built offshore patrol vessels under a USD100 million credit line.
 
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Moving the U.S-Vietnam Relationship into the Future
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/moving-the-us-vietnam-relationship-the-future-16361?page=2

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Truong-Minh VuNgo Di Lan
May 26, 2016


With China looming large in the background, it is easy to characterize the recent warming in relations between the U.S and Vietnam, which culminated in President Obama's latest visit to Vietnam, as a marriage of convenience. While this is undoubtedly true to a certain extent, such characterization fails to capture the full essence of U.S-Vietnam relations and where this relationship is heading in the near future. The U.S and Vietnam have been moving closer together for strategic reasons but this is possible because both sides have been building strategic trust, thereby laying the foundation for a more sustainable partnership in the longer term.

Although Obama visited Vietnam just several months before leaving office and at a time when he is considered by many as a "lame duck" president, this trip has both symbolic and substantive significance. First and foremost, the U.S finally agreed to fully lift its four-decade-old lethal arms embargo on Vietnam, thereby removing one of the last vestiges of the Cold War and paving the way for closer defense cooperation between two countries. Second, both countries also deepened their economic relations as VietJet reached a groundbreaking $11.3 billion deal with Boeing, purchasing 100 Boeing's B737 MAX 200 aircrafts and another $3 billion worth of Pratt & Whitney engines.

At the same time, U.S General Electric and the Vietnamese government have agreed to cooperate in the field of wind energy. To deepen people-to-people ties, Vietnam allowed the Peace Corps to enter the country to teach English in Vietnamese schools and both sides mutually agreed to grant one-year multiple-entry visas for short-term business and tourism travelers from both countries. There is no doubt that these arrangements will make it easier for both Vietnamese and Americans to connect, to share ideas and build long term partnerships.

While it is decidedly true that China's increasingly assertive behavior in the South China Sea has sped up the process of full rapprochement between the U.S and Vietnam, this process had been initiated long ago and at a time when Sino-U.S relations were still fairly cordial. After a lengthy period of negotiations, in 1994, President Clinton finally lifted the economic embargo on Vietnam, paving the way for the full normalization of the U.S-Vietnam relations a year later. In 2000, Clinton became the first U.S president ever to visit Vietnam and in that same year, the U.S and Vietnam also successfully concluded the Bilateral Trade Agreement, which has been fundamental in boosting trade relations between the two countries.

In 2013, during President Truong Tan Sang's visit to Washington, the two countries agreed to upgrade their relations to "comprehensive partnership", signaling that their bilateral relations have entered a new era of deepening cooperation in all aspects. In late 2014, after much consideration, the U.S decided to partially lift its lethal weapons embargo on Vietnam. In 2015, General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong made an unprecedented visit to the U.S, which led to the U.S-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement - a very important document that laid out a crucial roadmap for future U.S-Vietnam cooperation. In this context, what Obama achieved in this trip is remarkable but also expected as it is a natural result of a process that has been carefully nurtured by both sides for many years.

Nevertheless, it is impossible not to view Obama's trip to Vietnam as part of the "U.S pivot to Asia". While the U.S denies that the trip has anything to do with China, Obama's remarks in Hanoi makes it clear that Washington wants to counterbalance Beijing's attempts to dominate the South China Sea. The decision to fully lift the lethal arms embargo on Vietnam is the highlight among various agreements reached by both sides. Symbolically, this move is important because it sends a robust and unambiguous signal to China that their "gunboat diplomacy" in the South China Sea has backfired. At the same time, it shows Chinese leaders that Vietnam is now important enough strategically for the U.S to set human rights concerns aside and move forward in the field of defense cooperation. This will not immediately change the strategic calculus in Beijing but in the longer term, there are grounds to believe that closer defense relations between the U.S and Vietnam can moderate China's behavior in the region.

Substantively, this decision will allow Vietnam to purchase military hardware that it is in dire needs to enhance its maritime defense capability vis-à-vis China. According to SIPRI, between 2011-2015, Vietnam imports 93% of its arms from Russia. This suggests that Vietnam needs to quickly diversify its arms supplier because too much reliance on a single supplier puts Hanoi in a vulnerable position by giving others too much leverage and leaving itself exposed in the event of a supply shock. It is also worth noting that Russia has been selling similar weapon systems like the Su-35 fighter or S-400 missile defense system to both China and Vietnam. This is understandable from an arms' seller viewpoint but it is clearly disadvantageous for Vietnam because it does not allow having a military edge over China in any area.


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While Russian weapons may be cheaper than others, they are not always the most advanced or effective, particularly in terms of C4ISR. This is not to say that the lifting of the arms embargo will immediately result in massive Vietnamese purchase of U.S weapons. In fact, such a scenario is highly unlikely but the fact that Vietnam could now purchase some of the most advanced weapon systems available is significant in and of itself. The struggle over the South China Sea will be a long game of wei qi, not a game of chess that is going to end any time soon so Vietnam's ability to arm itself and deter China in the long run is still immensely important. Furthermore, the fact that the U.S allows Vietnam to buy its weapons despite remaining differences regarding human rights issues is bound to have some spill-over effects in the long term. This decision will allow both sides to build mutual trust, which would permit more far-reaching cooperation in the future.

Last but not least, in a situation where China-Philippines relations, potentially drawing in the United States, become precarious, China will likely watch carefully how Vietnam responds. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected to issue a ruling very soon. Substantially, given the reality of State practice in the South China Sea, it doubtful whether China can prove that it has met the conditions to establish historic rights in the South China Sea. In any case, the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides very limited support for historic rights as the basis for a State to claim a vast body of water beyond UNCLOS legal framework. It will be difficult for China, therefore, to uphold its claims to historic rights over the entire South China Sea.

Beijing might be motivated to take further actions to solidify its claims before the court decision, or once the court decision is out, to take some “dramatic” actions to demonstrate that it does not have any intention to respect the decision, even if only implicitly. If the siege mentality, a product of the “Century of Humiliation,” kicks in, Beijing might start to see (if not already) smaller neighbors, including Vietnam, as puppets of the United States. From Beijing's perspective, Washington is bent orchestrating a coalition to encroach upon Chinese sovereignty and preventing it from “legitimately” exercising its rights in the South China Sea. Given recent China’s behavior to protect her influence sphere, it is no longer possible to ignore the possible challenge to Southeast Asian countries that border China.

Vietnam’s continuing trade and investment dependence on China is a particular vulnerability. Due it geographic position, Vietnam is also vulnerable to both direct attack and the more complicated “hybrid” warfare. It will take time to reduce that independence. However, serious efforts should be launched and promoted strongly from both sides. What this means is that while Hanoi has scored points with Obama’s visit and the lifting of the lethal weapons embargo, it needs to use this capital wisely and avoid situations that unnecessarily irritate Beijing. Leaders need to carefully consider how to respond to the upcoming court ruling and potential conflicts between China and the Philippines. To maintain stability, considering that nobody is legally obliged to back Vietnam, it might be wiser for Hanoi to pursue a mix of deterrence and enhanced capability, as well as reassurance at the same time.

A strong Vietnam in a united ASEAN is a key American interest. President Obama’s historic visit continuously has laid a robust foundation that could secure U.S-Vietnam cooperation in the longer term to combat China's hegemonic ambitions and other future challenges. Sharing strategic interests between Vietnam and U.S will ensure that this partnership will survive and thrive even when an immediate external threat no longer exists, so that both sides could eventually move beyond a "marriage of convenience" toward a truly comprehensive and strategic partnership.

Ngo Di Lan is a PhD student at Brandeis University, where he focuses on U.S foreign policy and U.S-China relations. He is also a research associate at the Center for International Studies (SCIS) at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Ho Chi Minh City.
 
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Shared concerns about China bring Vietnam and Japan closer
2 June 2016
Author: Nguyen Manh Hung, George Mason University

Three weeks after assuming office, on 22 April 2016, Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang was quoted as saying that Japan is ‘one of Vietnam’s most important cooperative partners’. The importance given to the Vietnam–Japan relationship, on both sides, has increased with the changing power configuration in Asia.





The basis for the extensive and growing security cooperation between Vietnam and Japan is a shared concern over Chinese territorial ambitions. China’s assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Sea has prompted Vietnam to adopt a strategy of soft balancing against China. This strategy is based on two components: a three-nos policy — no foreign base, no military alliance, no siding with one country against another — to assuage China’s fear of encirclement, and what Hanoi calls the ‘diversification and multilateralisation of its foreign relations’ to balance against Chinese pressure.

Even before the emergence of the current South China Sea disputes, Vietnam considered Japan to be one of its best and most powerful friends in Asia. As a close ally of the United States, Japan has been Vietnam’s most important link to the West. Japanese policy has been much more supportive of Vietnam than that of the United States. Japan immediately normalised relations with Vietnam after the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, (while it took the United States another 22 years to do so). Japan was also the first country in the Western camp to resume aid to Vietnam in 1992, a major step in ending Vietnam’s diplomatic and economic isolation as a result of its invasion of Cambodia.

Japan signed a trade agreement and exchanged most favoured nation status with Vietnam in 1991, seven years before the US Congress did the same. In 2011 Japan officially designated Vietnam a market-based economy, a status Vietnam has not yet received from the United States. As a result, Japan is Vietnam’s largest donor in terms of official development assistance, the second largest investor in Vietnam after South Korea, and the third largest export market for Vietnam after China and the United States.

In the sensitive area of defence cooperation, Japan agreed to form a strategic partnership with Vietnam as early as 2006, making it the second country to do so after Russia, a traditional ally of Vietnam. This partnership was elevated to ‘intensive strategic partnership’ in March 2014.

Of the major powers that could serve as a counterweight to China, Russia has sided with China in opposing the internationalisation of the South China Sea dispute. Human rights issues and latent Vietnamese suspicion of American intentions and commitments have prevented relations with the United States from developing to their full potential.

That leaves Japan as an attractive alternative that can, along with the United States, act as a counterweight to China. Japan is an Asian country, so Vietnam does not have to worry about it withdrawing from the region. Because of Japan’s own maritime disputes with China in the East China Sea, and the importance of the South China Sea to Japanese commerce and security, Japan has an important stake in preventing China from controlling the South China Sea. Japan has taken steps to increase its role in safeguarding freedom of navigation, sustaining US involvement in Asia and providing defence assistance to the Philippines and Vietnam.

China’s placing of an oil rig in Vietnam’s claimed exclusive economic zone in May 2014 as well as its subsequent efforts to build and militarise artificial islands in disputed waters created a slight pivot in Vietnam policy toward the West. Seeking counterweights took precedence over the fear of antagonising China. It was in this context that defence cooperation between Vietnam and Japan accelerated.

One month after the oil rig incident, in June 2014, the Japanese landing ship Kunisaki docked at Tien Sa port as part of a US Navy-supported Pacific Partnership. Two months later, in August, Japan announced it would provide Vietnam with six vessels to boost its capacity for maritime security. In May 2016 Japan pledged to provide two more. The two sides have also agreed to hold joint naval exercises.

The most concrete sign of the new defence partnership has been Japan’s increased use of Vietnam’s strategic Cam Ranh Bay naval base. The two countries agreed to allow Japanese warships to dock at Cam Ranh for refuel and supplies. Two Japanese P-3C Orion surveillance planes and two Japanese guided-missile destroyers have transited there so far this year.

The presence of the Japan Self-Defense Forces at Cam Ranh Bay signals Japan’s clear commitment to Vietnam in the South China Sea dispute and heralds a new chapter in bilateral defence cooperation. More broadly, the deepening defence cooperation between Vietnam and Japan is illustrative of how China’s actions in the South China Sea are prompting Southeast Asian states to seek out friendships with new regional partners.

Nguyen Manh Hung is Professor Emeritus of Government and International Relations at George Mason University and non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C.
 
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Please, don't buy Apache...

Our brothers poles shot them down left and right both unrestricted and restricted scenarios in 2003...

blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah

Solution : ZERO
Logic : Prepschooh kid level + near impossible to understand
Assuming + calculated response : As always
Shotdown Apache left and right..............SURE, VERY GOOD. :omghaha:

Gali rifle. The current model is somewhat better than the first. Higher muzzel velocity may be the reason

13315231_944122389044055_7752882874601340130_n.jpg
 
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blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah

Solution : ZERO
Logic : Prepschooh kid level + near impossible to understand
Assuming + calculated response : As always
Shotdown Apache left and right..............SURE, VERY GOOD. :omghaha:

Gali rifle. The current model is somewhat better than the first. Higher muzzel velocity may be the reason

13315231_944122389044055_7752882874601340130_n.jpg

AQ is that you? you shouldn't play with those guns, it's too dangerous on you. You should give them to me. :partay:
 
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a news that surprises some: in a recent report of IISS - Survival - Global Politics and Strategy, North Korea recently shipped spare parts to Vietnam for the 2 Yugo-class midget submarines, purchased in 1997. The 1997 deal included 16 torpedoes (Soviet type, probably Type 53-56), 282 batteries and 8 mines. the mini-sub has twin 533mm (21”) torpedo tubes in the nose.

it is a strong indication that the Navy continues operating the mini-subs for covered operations.

Yugo1.jpg




Vietnam operated mini-submarine is similar to the P-4 YUGO boat captured by South Korea during an North Korean infiltration mission in 1998. Interestingly the sensors of the captured boat, including the sonar, were of Japanese origin.

Yugo3.jpg
 
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They still roaming the sea till today :)
 

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