He didn't work for American interests in the region he worked for Pakistan's interests it just so happened that in the case of the USSR our interests were the same.
The USSR always planned on eventually invading Pakistan and their actions, particularly since the 60s, were antagonistic/hostile which is a major reason we got involved in repelling it's invasion of Afghanistan.
To understand why you need to go back to Tsar Peter I who specifically writes in his own will advising Russia:
"To approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India [he is actually referencing Pakistan during the Mughal Empire] whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently, excite continual wars, not only in Turkey, but in Persia And, in the decadence of Persia, Penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf advance as far as India." (Clause IX)
The USSR's needed control of warm sea ports and important straits to ensure unhindered trade and projection of it's navy/military. Russia's northern ports were locked frozen during the winter, the Turks controlled their access to the Aegean/Mediterranean Sea via the Bosphorus and Dardenelles (which lead to the
Turkish straits crisis between the USSR and Turkey), Iran denied them access to the Persian gulf (which lead to the USSR's direct support of Iraq in it's war with Iran during the 80s) while Pakistan denied them unfettered access to the Arabian Sea (leading to the eventual need to invade Afghanistan and their continued support for India).
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan to repulse the soviet invasion was unavoidable:
- In 1971 the "Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was signed and Article IX specifically states that if either nation is attacked the other would come to it's aid to "remove such threat" which was exemplified by a large scale USSR naval intervention in the 1971 war on behalf of India to assist in blockading the bay of Bengal confirmed by former Russian naval commander Vladimir Kruglyakov. This posed a grave threat to Pakistan in case of a future war with India which would have resulted in us being flanked on both sides by large hostile enemy forces. Soviet imperialism had occupied the Caucuses, Central Asia and along with their openly antagonistic attitudes and actions towards Islam and Muslims including their invasion of Afghanistan it was obvious they had their eyes set on Pakistan and were not averse to going to war with us and considering the fact they already did it was imperative to get rid of them.
- The USSR was a major source of economic and military AID for India as well as overall military hardware purchases including the licensed manufacture of the Mig-21 not to mention a source of trade which bolstered their economy and by 1972 became it's largest trading partner. Eliminating that source of revenue, military hardware/technology and scientific cooperation was advantageous to us and our own security.
- The "Pushtoonistan" movement was a creation of the USSR (Khrushchev himself openly supported it in his March 4 1960 visit to Kabul which occurred two months before the U-2 incident) and it's allied government in Kabul in an attempt to divide Pakistani's along fictional differences to eventually to rob my homeland of our culture, place control of our lands in the hands of warlords allied to the soviets, and have us deviate from Islam which lead to the 1960 Afghan invasion of Bajaur on top of which they are responsible for the formation of groups like the BLA by tapping into Ulfat Nazim's Marxist-Leninist "World Baloch Organization" as confirmed by Stephen and Carol McC. Pastner ("Adaptations to state level politics by Southern Baloch" in "Pakistan the Long View" 1977, pg. 136) and by and Lt. General Abdul Qayyum ("Balochistans Commotion: What is the truth?" in Nawa-e-Waqt, May 1, 2009). The USSR was literally following the playbook of Tsar Peter I.
Well considering Zia doubled the GDP per capita within two terms he's done considerably better than liberal minded scum like Zardari under the same circumstances. Zia was never able to deal with the Afghan refugee issue because he died before the USSR-Afghan war ended.
Pakistan's current problems have nothing to do with Zia but the countries "leaders" poor policy choices and successive governments blatantly refusing to listen to the people that has lead to poverty, resentment and ultimately anger.
What did you think was going to happen when NATO was allowed transit to engage in a war and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan? This is reminiscent of Israel's plan to attack Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facility in the 80s via India's but the latter refused because they understood Pakistan would bomb the shit out of them in retaliation. Even the stupidest idiot should have realized that this was going to result in a lot of anger within the country.
What did Pakistan get for its troubles?
- Over $100 Billion in losses
- US spies roaming the country with two published cases (i.e. R. Davis and J. Coxx) of them murdering citizens within our border and smuggling arms/ammo through our airports
- The Invasion of Pakistan's sovereign territory by armed US troops
- Repeated violations of the countries sovereignty via bombing of populated urban areas via drones
- The murder of our soldiers (ex. Salala) which the US refused to even apologize for even though an apology means nothing.
- An Afghanistan that is not only a narco state but a country where the drug trade, which fuels crime and addiction within Pakistan, has grown exponentially since 2001 after the Taliban eliminated it by banning poppy production in 2000 (something the current Afghan government which the occupation put in place hasn't been able to do in 13 years which isn't surprising considering the Afghan government NATO transit through Pakistan helped put in power have inducted drug lords or have familial ties with them).
- A neighbor we now have frequent border clashes with and even drops mortars on villages on our side of the border when pre-2001 US invasion these incidences were virtually non-existent.
- An Afghan government that is harboring and even training BLA rebels alongside India (ex. they sheltered Brahamdagh Bugti for years in Kabul) long cited by the ISI, confirmed by released US documents and even alluded to by current US defense secretary Chuck Hagel.
Furthermore, Pakistan's lax laws based on British laws established during colonialism accomplish nothing (they have failed to eliminate corruption, drug trafficking, kidnappings, murder, etc...). Look at the failing legal systems in the US, Canada, Britain, etc... where overcrowded prisons (where criminals are given free health care, sheltered and fed while the homeless and honest families living in dire poverty are barely able to get by) are literally leading to less severe punishments and criminals being let out of prison early or not having to go at all because there is simply no room or money to deal with them which just encourages more crime (ex. since 1960 the US population has increased by about 75% but rapes and aggravated assaults have increased by 390%, larceny and robbery by 230%, burglary by 130% and auto thefts by 120%). As per PEW's public opinion poll, and correlated with Pakistan's own demographic information, 80 to 82% of the country wants Sharia punishments/laws instituted (though they don't explicitly state how many are opposed to it based on other opinion polls I've read I suspect about 12% are not in favor) so why hasn't any government since Zia reformed the legal system? Oh wait, I forgot they're basically all thieves themselves so why would they want a legal framework where the punishment for their crimes would result in them losing a hand or being lashed in public.
Had Zia not died Pakistan would have been a lot better off.
However, that said I actually agree with Musharraf's decision to allow NATO transit via Pakistan in 2001. Tensions were high, the US was blood thirsty and completely insane and there was simply no point in endangering Pakistan for barren fields and deserted mountains. I'm not sure if what took place was intentional but the strategy employed is reminiscent of an ancient Asian war tactic which involved allowing an enemy to enter a booby trapped castle making it easier to dispatch them. However, by no latter than 2005 Pakistan should have refused transit (except as a point of exit) and disengaged from the US all together forcing them to compromise and pursue peace deals in Afghanistan even if they didn't like the result.
Lets make two things clear . I am not trying to tell you that U.S.S.R. wasn't an enemy of Pakistan or that nothing needed to be done in Afghanistan , of course the country on the other side of the Khyber Pass wasn't to be left alone , there was much at stake . What I disagree with of course , is what was done and what did it result into - manifest today in , the consequences . While many people would laud Zia-ul-Haq to be a brave man who faced the Reds in Afghanistan - though technically with American backing and the massive support - of all kinds imaginable - from the Arab world and a man who defeated and broke the U.S.S.R. which again wouldn't be entirely true , because the Union had a lot of other factors for its disintegration . The fact does remain that the short term thinking , policies and actions of the Commander of the Faithful , continued with much zeal and fervor by his successors until the attack on twin towers , have resulted in increased sectarianism , radicalization , extremism and subsequent terrorism - the damage to the country's otherwise tolerant and peaceful had been catastrophic . The damage to the country itself and all that we stand for has been catastrophic . How dare we discount and rationalize the reality on ground ? What wisdom ever lay in importing a radical and extremist ideology and fighters from the world over , training them on Pakistani soil , forcing Islamization one that aimed to change the identity of the country down people's throats , indoctrinating the population with a ideology both violent and intolerant of others and taking the burden of Afghan refugees - whose influx and arrival with guns and drugs wasn't checked and allowed to spread into every part of Pakistan with impunity ? Do you see what we have lost today to gain a few objectives back then , suffice to say which could have taken care of , with much lesser resources and impact on the country itself ?
Remember , that since our independence we always had dealt with problems arising from Afghanistan easily and effectively without involving ourselves directly and without that much concentrated effort and ruining our country during the process by using low-risk assets , what had changed so much in war torn , unstable and faced with public uprising with the arrival of the Soviets ? Maybe the idea of the warm waters was there before , the capability sure wasn't at the time of invasion . Contrary to the popular belief , the Reds having initially refused to help their comrades of Kabul were very reluctant to act in that country , the politburo's mood was one of non-intervention and the army only crossed the borders to provide some stability to the communist regime . Can this U.S.S.R. later be expected to try to invade Pakistan when it was in doubt and uncertainty about the involvement in Afghanistan ? Militarily , Pakistan was no pushover , it wasn't the submissive Govt of Kabul and had a fairly strong conventional military . The Soviet Union which didn't want to face the public in Afghanistan couldn't have dared to face the resistance in this country , there was simply no way at all to come to warm waters . Even though , the Kremlin issued threatening statements towards Pakistan from time to time but its economy , the geopolitical complexities and the ground realities in Afghanistan , clearly sent the message that the U.S.S.R. was in no position to " deal with Pakistan " . The USSR due to its economic policies and huge military spending vis a vis U.S was already on the verge of decline . The myth of the " warm waters " , unfortunately , has been propagated too long and to exaggerated levels and raised to ' divine truth ' without ay logic and reason and without taking the realities of that time into account . The short term economic gains bolstered by huge influx of aid during the Afghan Jihad was a bubble , which burst afterwards in the 90's and I need not tell you the economic situation of the country after it .
The opposition for " entering forces in Afghanistan " came from the top brass itself . " We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things ; Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers . Similar concerns would be raised by other Soviet leaders that " full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies ; both yours and ours " - Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet head of state warned .
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sent a letter to the Soviet embassy in Kabul noting that "to fight in Afghanistan with the basmachi [armed Muslim guerrillas who fled from Soviet Central Asia] and the White Guard would mean provoking a war in Central Asia, which would be to the advantage of Germany and Japan. It would undercut our prestige in the East and destabilize the territories behind the Red Army's front lines. Therefore, neutralization of Afghanistan and cooperation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, along with strengthening relations with Yemen are the main tasks of our policy in this region." A KGB delegation headed by chief of First Directorate (intelligence) Vladimir Kryuchkov ("V .A. Alexandrov") visited Afghanistan in the same time period . The impressions of one member of the delegation, KGB General Oleg Kalugin, are that Taraki "did not have the physical strength or the backing to continue to lead the country for long" and that Amin "was a far more impressive figure."
On March 17-19, 1979 - The Soviet Politburo met in three extended sessions during the height of the Herat crisis to discuss pleas from Taraki and Amin to send troops. The next day, however, even though the situation in Herat has worsened, Kosygin, Andropov and others still advocated staying away from a commitment of troops. Gromyko delivered a detailed rundown of the reasons why such a commitment would be a mistake . He also pointed out that the conflict is an internal Afghan affair. A verbatim transcript of the politburo discussion has become available in the public domain . Yuri Andropov : Comrades , I have thought this issue over very thoroughly since yesterday and have concluded that we should consider very, very seriously whether it would make sense to send troops into Afghanistan . The economy is backward , the Islamic religion predominates , and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate . I do not think we can uphold the revolution in Afghanistan with the help of our bayonets. The idea is intolerable and we can not risk it.
Andrei Gromyko in the Politburo told the committee " I fully support Comrade Andropov;s view that we should exclude the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan . The Afghan army is unreliable and our army would become an aggressor. With whom will it fight? With the Afghan people! Our Army would have to shoot them! To be blunt, the Afghan [communist] leaders have made many mistakes and haven't got the support of their own people . Andrei Kirilenko : Tanks and armored vehicles cannot rescue them [the PDPA]. I think that we must frankly tell them that. We must say that we will support them to the hilt, we shall give them all of the aid that we have promised to give , but we cannot send troops . In Late September 1979 - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan summoned the chief of the military advisory group, Gorelov, and KGB representative Ivanov to Moscow on short notice. Questioned separately, Gorelov again strongly contended that it would not be a good idea to increase the Soviet military presence in the country .
Contrary to the popular belief , even for the Soviets , the Afghanistan wasn't the much hyped strategic prize , it was always thought to be . This is reinforced by the Soviet General Secretary in his initial encounter with Afghan President Babrak Karmal, where Gorbachev made clear his determination to end the war: Karmal would have to defend his own country, Gorbachev told him in no uncertain terms, by the summer of 1986. According to recently disclosed Russian documents, Gorbachev said that Karmal was shocked by this news. "[He] was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we needed Afghanistan more than he did, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever,"
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above. First,it is clear that Soviet leaders had a very low opinion of their Afghan friends with whom they had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation earlier , allowing them to call the Soviet troops if need arose , the PDPA's Govt lack of popularity and leadership skill was fully recognized in Moscow . Second, there is no evidence from this meeting that Soviet officials regarded Afghanistan as a strategic prize that would project communist influence into the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean regions. Finally, there can be little doubt that the Politburo members were not enthusiastic about the prospect of invading Afghanistan.Soviet reluctance to intervene gradually changed, however, primarily due to internal events within Afghanistan, combined with a substantial measure of blunder and mis-perception .
Look at the current situation of the country , look at the blunders done and the catastrophic consequences that we have to endure today , all because of fighting a superpower's war and short term benefits . At least , the Zia-ul-Haq had a choice , Musharraf didn't enjoy the same luxury . Whilst the former had many option , the latter only had two and he chose the lesser of the two evils . Can I say the same about the Zia-ul-Haq who chose to embrace the insanity and take the country into oblivion ?
