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US Drone strikes in Pakistan are illegal under international law.

The media softening its stand on Predator attacks is perhaps a sign that the nation of Pakistan has collectively begun its transition from denial to acceptance. I can’t help thinking the attack on the visiting Sri Lankan team somehow accelerated this transition. While it is important to co-ordinate Predator strikes to minimize civilian causality I think the current approach of the PA also needs urgent review. I make the following comment after watching footage of the PA in action posted here on this forum. I question the effectiveness of tanks and helicopters against the Taliban, several smaller teams of elite soldiers acting independently with specific objectives may yield better results?

You pay the bill and we will send the elite soldiers to the Tribal Areas.
 
You pay the bill and we will send the elite soldiers to the Tribal Areas.

I think India has a large role to play (an issue we are discussing elsewhere) in increasing the number of military resources we can apply. Therefore there is a significant geopolitical aspect revolving around Pakistan's national security concerns that is part of the equation, and not merely a matter of money, unless its money used for capacity building of the FC, and increasing their size.
 
I think India has a large role to play (an issue we are discussing elsewhere) in increasing the number of military resources we can apply. Therefore there is a significant geopolitical aspect revolving around Pakistan's national security concerns that is part of the equation, and not merely a matter of money, unless its money used for capacity building of the FC, and increasing their size.

But tell me, and I ask this with an open mind, besides the fact that India has engaged Pakistan's resources to an extent on it's east side, there is nothing else that Pakistan could do to improve the situation? More effective patrolling, combing operation ( I realize it is a huge area and a difficult place to comb but as I said I am just asking these questions with an open mind and not suggesting that it must be done.)

Regards,
Anoop.
 
But tell me, and I ask this with an open mind, besides the fact that India has engaged Pakistan's resources to an extent on it's east side, there is nothing else that Pakistan could do to improve the situation? More effective patrolling, combing operation ( I realize it is a huge area and a difficult place to comb but as I said I am just asking these questions with an open mind and not suggesting that it must be done.)

Regards,
Anoop.

I honestly do not think that without a significant increase in men and material operations wil have much effect.

When you talk about 'effective patrolling' you perhaps have the current kashmir situation in mind, or perhaps even the Afghanistan situation.

Neither of those, especially Kashmir, apply to the environment Pakistan will have to conduct operations in.

The battle for Bajaur provides some insight into the kinds of resources and opposition Pakistan will face. Initially small units were deployed, and the got decimated, because unlike Kashmir and Afghanistan, the Taliban in Bajaur actually fought like a conventional infantry cum guerrilla force. Thousands of Taliban reinforced by another thousand from across the border in Afghanistan (Qari Ziaur Rehman - an Afghan Taliban commander brought his men to fight in Bajaur). Hit and run guerrilla tactics were utilized, but they were also entrenched in heavily fortified buildings in villages and towns. The latter required essentially a full fledged conventional operation with entire towns evacuated and artillery and airstrikes used to neutralize these fortified structures.

Waziristan will likely be more of the same, magnified several times over, and IMO will require full fledged military operations to dislodge the various components of the TTP.
 
Thanks. And what about US' involvement? How do they fit in the equation? Do they want to have more participation in combating it?

Regards,
Anoop.
 
Thanks. And what about US' involvement? How do they fit in the equation? Do they want to have more participation in combating it?

Regards,
Anoop.

Support in terms of heli gunships, light artillery, other equipment and resources is how I see them best contributing, and sealing off their side of the border, which is where the militants will run once put under pressure.

In fact the operation in Bajaur was backed by an ISAF operation on the other side of the border to prevent escape routes, so the template for cooperation in this manner exists.
 
I think India has a large role to play (an issue we are discussing elsewhere) in increasing the number of military resources we can apply. Therefore there is a significant geopolitical aspect revolving around Pakistan's national security concerns that is part of the equation, and not merely a matter of money, unless its money used for capacity building of the FC, and increasing their size.

That's something that the Americans will have to keep in mind. I know that the FC is ill-equipped and not properly trained to tackle the terrorists. However, we will never send our elite commando's just because some people demand us to do so. They are needed else where. The people that demand us to do more should pay the bill and supply the necessary equipment so that the FC and other regiments can cope with the insurgents. Otherwise, one shouldn't have any expectations. Also, the Indian problem should be dealt with by the Americans.
 
U.S. Plans New Drone Attacks in Pakistan

By JAY SOLOMON, SIOBHAN GORMAN and MATTHEW ROSENBERG

U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials are drawing up a fresh list of terrorist targets for Predator drone strikes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, part of a U.S. review of the drone program, according to officials involved.

Pakistani officials are seeking to broaden the scope of the program to target extremists who have carried out attacks against Pakistanis, a move they say could win domestic support.
The Obama administration is weighing the effectiveness of the program against the risk that its unpopularity weakens an important ally.

Underlining the fragility of the situation, the U.S. believes Pakistan's top intelligence agency is directly supporting the Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, even as the U.S. targets those groups, says a person close to the deliberations.

The Central Intelligence Agency's drone program is important to Washington because areas of Pakistan remain a haven for Taliban and al Qaeda militants operating in Afghanistan.

The Obama administration is reviewing how it uses missile strikes to target militants on the border, according to national-security officials, as part of a broad review of its strategy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The administration considers the program a success, and the program isn't expected to be significantly curtailed. But officials familiar with the review say it could change the pace and size of the program, and make some technical refinements in an effort to hit targets faster. The review seeks to determine under what circumstances drones should be used, the officials say.

The broader reassessment could be announced as soon as Friday, according to people familiar with the matter. The review is believed to address plans for increasing troops and combating drug trafficking in Afghanistan, as well as strategies for strengthening institutions of civil government and building the economies in both countries.

President Barack Obama has declared the war in Afghanistan is a key foreign-policy priority, and the U.S. is sending an additional 17,000 troops to amplify U.S. efforts there.

Spokesmen for the White House's National Security Council, which is conducting the review, and the CIA said they couldn't confirm or comment on the review.

Officials reviewing the drones policy are assessing how destabilizing the strikes could be for Pakistan's government, which was elected last year.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani have quietly supported the attacks even though the strikes have stirred domestic unrest -- largely because they have killed some civilians, and many Pakistanis see al Qaeda as a greater threat to the U.S. than to Pakistan.

But Mr. Zardari's government has been shaky in recent weeks. Large-scale protests forced him last week to allow the reinstatement of Pakistan's Supreme Court chief justice, a major concession to his opponents that left him politically weakened.

Mr. Zardari was pressed by senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to resolve the conflict peacefully -- pressure that included a warning that his resistance could hurt the prospects of getting foreign aid for his country.

But stability in Mr. Zardari's government is seen in Washington as important to maintain support for U.S. efforts to strike at terrorist targets. Washington also wants to get Islamabad to take stronger steps against militants on the border.

If the Zardari government were to fall, U.S. officials say they would be unsure of the next government's support. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and opposition leader Nawaz Sharif have been publicly critical of the strikes, though what support they might offer the U.S. behind the scenes if they gain more power is uncertain, U.S. officials say.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials say they are continuing to find evidence Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency continues to support militant groups in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, and groups run by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. "There is definite unhappiness that the U.S. is still finding direct links between the ISI and those three organizations, which are operating in Afghanistan," said a person working on the issue. Mr. Haqqani's network has been targeted in drone attacks, as has Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the person said.

Pakistani officials say they only maintain contacts with some elements of the Taliban and no longer directly support the militants.

U.S. officials say that telecommunications intercepts showed ISI officials were in contact with Mr. Haqqani's operatives when they bombed the Indian embassy in Kabul last July.

The Predators are seen to have hurt al Qaeda's leadership in the near term. U.S. and Pakistani officials say more than half of an initial list of 20 high-value targets have been either killed or captured over the past six months. But there remains a fear among U.S. allies that the strikes could fuel a political backlash in Pakistan that in the long run aids Islamist extremists.

"At some point, a line needs to be drawn" on the scope of the program, said a European official briefed on the review.

The review is examining ways to reduce the time it takes between identifying a target and when the Predators fire -- now less than 45 minutes -- said a former CIA official.

President Barack Obama concluded that the drones have been an effective weapon against al Qaeda since President George W. Bush accelerated the missile strikes last year. U.S. officials have seen evidence of disruption as militants devote more time to operational security, choose to sleep in orchards instead of buildings, and take more care about the people with whom they interact, said a person familiar with the evidence.

Already, the campaign has apparently stepped up attacks on the network of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who is believed to be behind the 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was Mr. Zardari's wife. In the fourth of a series of recent attacks targeting Mr. Mehsud's network, a drone attack Wednesday killed at least eight militants along the Pakistan-Afghan border, according to two Pakistani officials.

The intensified campaign could help win domestic support for the strikes because it shows that the drone attacks are targeting direct threats to Pakistan, said a Pakistani official.

There is a discussion about whether to expand the strikes to outside Pakistan's tribal areas, such as the province of Baluchistan. U.S. intelligence officials say they believe many of the Taliban's senior leaders, such as Mullah Omar, operate openly in the provincial capital of Quetta. The idea of going that far has prompted concern in Islamabad that such strikes will greatly increase the numbers of civilian casualties and further fuel unrest.
—Zahid Hussain in Islamabad contributed to this article.

U.S. Plans New Drone Attacks in Pakistan - WSJ.com
---------------

Well this is interesting - apparently Pakistan is looking to broaden the strikes against targets its considers a major threat.

P.S: Is this the Jay Solomon (solomon2) who posts on this forum?
 
sealing off their side of the border, which is where the militants will run once put under pressure.
Why wouldn't the militants just drop their guns, pretend to be civilians, and flee to Quetta or Karachi instead?
 
Why wouldn't the militants just drop their guns, pretend to be civilians, and flee to Quetta or Karachi instead?

Good question, in fact leads to a point I disagree with S-2 over, that the "Taliban Army'' found sanctuary in Pakistan - the majority of the Afghan Taliban likely melted away into the Afghan countryside as they were defeated.

However, if adequate forces are used, IMO the numbers escaping the War Zone into Pakistan could be minimized. In any case, blocking escape routes into Afghanistan is imperative - If you remember, during the bajaur operation NATO and US officials stated that they were seeing substantially greater infiltration as militants fled the fighting in Bajaur.
 
"...the majority of the Afghan Taliban likely melted away into the Afghan countryside as they were defeated."

Here's how it went-

It's late November, 2001 in Kandahar. The city is in chaos. Taliban have been packing offices and loading pickup trucks even as U.S. Army forces arrive at Kandahar airfield. The city is in an uproar and some taliban even find themselves fending for their lives from locals.

Omar is rumored gone and commanders don't know who to talk to nor what to tell their men. The platoons and companies make hasty agreements and leave the city for quieter environs-maybe somewhere in the boonies that has a water source, maybe a smaller village up in the hills. Lots of these decisions being made...just buy time to think and see...but they're moving now and everything is temporary.

Meanwhile families of these men are tugging. Some in Pakistan, more in Afghanistan and as the unit moves the families become further away and less able to fend. Perhaps they too are under threat from other locals.

Commanders feel these tugs and pressures...units fragment-some heading south to families in the 1,000,000 refugees around Quetta. Others to their families and villages in Afghanistan. With or without weapons, they'll rise again, networks will re-establish, leaders sans troops will recruit in the camps and return to pick their men still behind in Afghanistan.

I think that there was that pattern of events replicated all along the border region. Those with families in Afghanistan likely stayed and farmed until their old cronies showed back up in the neighborhoods again.

Think of them as stay-behind deep reconnaissance.

Others went to Pakistan, gathered money, weapons, and new recruits and re-established contacts with their stay-behinds...and slowly began returning.

There certainly weren't staged withdrawals and coherant units falling back on the border-leapfrogging to safety. I know that. Nor did I ever suggest that many didn't stay behind. And frankly, not all of those who did went back to farms. Some went to old and deep recluses within Afghanistan to begin their work anew.

If you think that narrative is markedly wrong, wail away...

All of this is an effort to dissemble the central premise that Afghanistan is under assault from Pakistan. An afghan insurgency couldn't possess any viability without support from the lands and people of Pakistan. Immensely large numbers of men are now in FATA and engaged in making war on Afghanistan and it's been so to that degree since 2006. At this point they are Afghani, Pakistani, uzbeks, chechans, Egyptians, Saudis and possibly Bosnians for all we know. They are married into your communities, often by coercion and they are part and parcel to the fabric of those lands. Indeed, at this point and in the absence of eradicated tribal leaders and cowardly government officials-THEY ARE THE LAW, such as it is. This is in addition to the rise of criminal brigandry and narcotics facilitation. It had been growing to those levels since the day the taliban gov't fell in Afghanistan.

It is for this reason you may feel free to use your army here. The Frontier Crimes laws no longer have bearing. You've no tribal leaders of note to hold accountable except for the new breed.

The old ways are gone. Use that to your advantage.
 
Here's how it went-

It's late November, 2001 in Kandahar. The city is in chaos. Taliban have been packing offices and loading pickup trucks even as U.S. Army forces arrive at Kandahar airfield. The city is in an uproar and some taliban even find themselves fending for their lives from locals.

Omar is rumored gone and commanders don't know who to talk to nor what to tell their men. The platoons and companies make hasty agreements and leave the city for quieter environs-maybe somewhere in the boonies that has a water source, maybe a smaller village up in the hills. Lots of these decisions being made...just buy time to think and see...but they're moving now and everything is temporary.

Meanwhile families of these men are tugging. Some in Pakistan, more in Afghanistan and as the unit moves the families become further away and less able to fend. Perhaps they too are under threat from other locals.

Commanders feel these tugs and pressures...units fragment-some heading south to families in the 1,000,000 refugees around Quetta. Others to their families and villages in Afghanistan. With or without weapons, they'll rise again, networks will re-establish, leaders sans troops will recruit in the camps and return to pick their men still behind in Afghanistan.

I think that there was that pattern of events replicated all along the border region. Those with families in Afghanistan likely stayed and farmed until their old cronies showed back up in the neighborhoods again.

Think of them as stay-behind deep reconnaissance.

Others went to Pakistan, gathered money, weapons, and new recruits and re-established contacts with their stay-behinds...and slowly began returning.

There certainly weren't staged withdrawals and coherant units falling back on the border-leapfrogging to safety. I know that. Nor did I ever suggest that many didn't stay behind. And frankly, not all of those who did went back to farms. Some went to old and deep recluses within Afghanistan to begin their work anew.
Largely agree sir!

Now if you had only said that to begin with, we would not have had months worth of arguments and back and forth over a position that was obviously misunderstood.

This is the sort of redundant loop I was trying to get the Drone Strike discussion out off.
 
So AM, reading your last news flash of "U.S. Plans New Drone Attacks in Pakistan".
We can assume that our government has been playing tricks and have been lieing their arses off against the Pakistani public and the rest of the world in general?
If so, what credibility does our government have, and second, is it now widely accepted that these Predators are here to stay and that these drone strikes will occur often? Is it accepted by our people or our government for that matter? Or is our ISI more powerful then our own government?
 
I don't like how the article is phrased either. It seems a load of bull to me.

So US and Pakistani planners are drawing up a list of targets.

Fair enough.

Let's assume it's true. What does it mean?

A madrassah exists. Some of the students will go onto be Taliban some are just there to eat. They do not know they're being targeted. In comes a drone, blasts the whole place apart, no warning. Goodbye some bad students and a lot of innocent people.

Unacceptable.

Alternative: Surround the place with Army personnel (use a batch of US commandoes, I'm sure they'll be willing). Offer them the choice to surrender the people inside. If not blow the whole place apart.

Acceptable.

Another scenario.

Intelligence exists that militant A is hiding at location A. It is believed he will be there at time X since he regularly goes. However, it's not known who else is in the vicinity. Since he is on the run from the government, he operates covertly. Again, lots of innocent people are killed perhaps in this scenario. Unacceptable.

Alternative: Surround the place with troops, offer them the chance to surrender. Then shoot the place up.

If the drone strikes are getting more accurate, that's great. I won't believe that until I've seen what locals are saying. So far, they're not too happy with the civilian casualties from the drone strikes.
 
‘They are having an affect (but) whether they continue or not will be up to the Pakistani government and our government working side by side in a collaborative way,’ said the general.

‘The attacks have done a couple of things: One, they have been targeted very specifically against al Qaeda, two, they produce very low collateral damage,’ he said.

This marks the first time a senior US official spoke on record on the drone attacks. US officials usually do not acknowledge their involvement in these attacks and instead urge journalists to contact Pakistani authorities whenever such an attack takes place.

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect...news/world/drone-strikes-are-effective-us--bi

Interesting - does Gen. Jones's statement here suggest that the US might be willing to reconsider the drone strikes if the GoP has deep objections to them?

Or looked at differently, his defense of the efficacy of the attacks and seemingly flexible attitude might be due to the fact that the earlier report about the GoP looking to cooperate and expand the drone strikes is true.

And on the possibility of expanded strikes or 'boots on the ground';

Meanwhile, another US official, Assistant State Secretary Richard Boucher, assured Pakistan that his country had no plans to send American troops inside the Pakistani territory.

Mr Boucher said Pakistanis, a US ally in the fight against terrorism, were operating on their side of the border. ‘We operate differently on the other side of the border.’

The US, he said, understood that the Pakistanis did not want American forces inside Pakistan. ‘We’ll respect that, but at the same time we want to make sure we are them supporting properly,’ he said.

Another US official charged with implementing US policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, acknowledged frustrations, calling the fight to bring stability to Pakistani border areas ‘the most daunting challenge’ of the new regional plan because Pakistan had imposed a ‘red line.’

‘The red line is unambiguous and stated publicly by the Pakistani government —no foreign troops on our soil,’ he said.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect...news/world/drone-strikes-are-effective-us--bi
 

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