"I am theorizing, since none of us ultimately *know*, but I reckon the US will live with a nuclear Iran. If the only alternative available is war, the US will swallow the bitter pill and hope that a nuclear Iran will be an Iran with more to lose and hence an Iran that has a greater desire for stability."
Indeed you are theorizing-actually guessing without providing supporting arguments to your outcome. You've presumed that we don't see an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat to the region. You've presumed that we don't see proliferation as a possibility or, if so, equally a threat. Finally, you've presumed that the American government would be unable or unwilling to make a case for attacking Iran in the manner I hypothesized.
"If you are implying that the UAE and Saudi Arabia will go nuclear... perhaps. Ultimately Israel will have 5 nuclear capable potential adversaries to contend with."
Perhaps. Possibly six if you're including KSA, Iran, UAE, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey. As to "
adversaries" I'm less assumptive than you to such a possibility. Turkey and Egypt may well be on the sidelines for differing reasons.
"Their conventional superiority will essentially be negated. Demographics will come into play as a means to "settle" the Arab-Israeli conflict. And this is what the Israelis fear."
The demographics of neither UAE nor KSA make a difference. Neither are profound and their armies don't reflect that either. So long as Israel retains the ability to retaliate against all collectively and DESTROY them as they'd be destroyed, any war will be conventionally fought under that umbrella. See NATO/Warsaw Pact.
MAD becomes a strategic checkmate for ALL. So long as the conventional force balance is adequate for Israel, their defense will be assured.
"I suppose there can be several perspectives on the above. Ultimately, the fact remains that Bush did not attack Iran. If he didn't, it is doubtful Obama will."
You appear to offer a false analogy that fails to account for the changed conditions that premised Bush's decision to defer attack and now. It doesn't change whether or not America sees Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons as an existential threat by Bush choosing to follow alternative pathways to preventing such. If those prove a failure as attempted by both Bush and Obama, it remains to be seen whether we will choose an attack as a final recourse.
"This is just my estimation. I might be wrong. But I don't think I am."
You could be correct but the basis for such will be reached independantly based upon existing conditions-not as they were.
"How, then, would you characterize the Clinton sponsored action against 1) OBL's camps in Afghanistan and 2) Against the milk plant/Chemical factory in Sudan?"
You are correct that I shouldn't have offered such an absolute response. It is conditional based upon the perceived threat and the estimated requirement to adequately address the threat. We won't conduct a one-off raid should we attack Iran.
"A lot of "ifs" in the above. You are basically talking about a multi-thousand target war if you are really making the case for neutralizing all that you would need to neutralize."
I am.
"The cost of such a retaliation is unnecessary for the US to bear."
That cost is undefined by you so it is impossible to both assess in absolute terms of effect or relative terms of bearability. Iran may not be able to deliver whatever "
massive" means to you and we may be able to repel or absorb that better than you suggest.
"At this point I believe a nuclear Iran is a reality the US will just have to deal with. And while we might find this strange and surprising, US strategists during the Kennedy era predicted a faster pace of nuclearization than what actually occurred. And as part of their hypothesis of such a future, they concluded that the US would simply have to deal with a large number of nuclear powers. Their estimate was off by several decades, but hey, what's 50 years here or there."
You've made your belief clear. You haven't supported the reason for such adequately IMV. Alluding to thoughts by analysts in the Kennedy era regarding the distant future in the most general terms doesn't strike me as reasonably transferable to the here and now with which we must collectively contend.
"The basic point remains valid."
It's not even fully articulated much less proved valid.
"This is not just about military capability. It is also about selling it to the American public..."
If considered necessary there will be an attack. It may require selling beforehand or after-the-fact. When and to what effect that is done doesn't address the manner in which it shall be done.
"...and dealing with the response that such aggression will beget. There are many theoretical possibilities. This one is incredibly remote."
War may be remote but that doesn't mean it isn't in the range of options nor the progression of events. We'll see if it arises. If so, I provided my view of how it will be attempted.
"You have sketched a very "neat and clean" scenario which will not unfold as planned."
I've sketched a premise to a military campaign. You reject the liklihood of such altogether. That's a separate matter. As to how it unfolds, I've indicated my understanding of assymetry and account for its inherent unpredictability.
"It never does. Hezbollah, Shia parties in Iraq, Iranian influence with the NA, Hamas, Dirty Bombs, C-802s, Quds force's international capabilities, Oil prices, Qassams, Iranian ballistic missiles, attacks on US forces in Europe, ME and Afghanistan etc. etc. are all factors to be considered. This is just a very concise short-list."
This is true. You won't be the only to think of those and its not reasonable, I believe, to have considered that I haven't either. Because you've thought of them, however, doesn't necessarily mean they achieve their desired effect or even be attempted.
"The full list of variables would be far more complex and lengthy, requiring an analysis of first-order, second-order, third-order etc. cause/effect chains."
I am aware of that. So is our CJCS, Adm Mullen-
"Let me be clear: We owe [Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates] and [President Obama] a range of options for this threat. We owe the American people our readiness...But, as I have said many times, I worry a lot about the unintended consequences of any sort of military action. For now, the diplomatic and the economic levers of international power are, and ought to be, the levers first pulled."
So, too, shall be the planning and battle staffs as well as the combatant commanders and their troops.
Mullen Wary Of Attacks On Iran's Nukes-Washington Times Feb. 23, 2010
"Completely agree. America or nobody. And I don't think it's going to be America. Qed, it will be nobody."
You may be correct but a soldier's responsibility is to prepare for the worst. Our armed forces will devise the best plan we might achieve that accounts for every possible reaction by our possible enemy. We have had some demonstrated past success at that. No plan survives first contact has applicability but not totally so. Good plans retain more of their essential elements than poorly conceived.
We've proven far more able at winning wars than winning the subsequent peace.
That's an issue for our diplomats to manage if they fail to achieve our objectives and the President refuses to accede to a fait accompli. The President's decision may be premised upon his acceptance of the military's plan and the manner we've accounted for risks. Neither you nor I will be privy to those discussions.
Thanks.