kalu_miah
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It is obvious that the US is paying more attention to Asia, because of its Pivot to Asia concept, since Asia is rising in economic as well as geopolitical significance. Here is some interesting ideas about how the US and China can cooperate to reshape and stabilize this region:
Let me introduce this university research center called: MAR or Minorities at Risk project:
MAR | Home
About MAR
Overview
MAR tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present -- identifying where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions. Political significance is determined by the following two criteria:
The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society
The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests
Review additional criteria for defining a "Minority at Risk."
The MAR project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 and has been based at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) since 1988.
The project has developed over four distinct phases:
Phase I covered 227 communal groups which met the criteria for classification as a minority at risk for the years 1945-1990;
Phase II covered 275 groups from 1990-1996;
Phase III covered 275 groups from 1996-1999; and
Phase IV covered 283 groups from 1998-2003.
The last update was completed in February 2005 for the years 2001-2003.
In 2003, Jonathan Wilkenfeld assumed the position of Acting Project Director.
In 2005, the MAR project began a secondary data collection effort, focusing on organizations claiming to represent MAR groups. The Minorities at Risk Organization Behavior dataset currently covers organizations representing MAR groups in the Middle East and North Africa, covering the years 1980-2004. This data was released in September 2008.
Project Staff
Jóhanna Birnir Director jkbirnir@umd.edu
Ted Robert Gurr Founder amar-cidcm@umd.edu
Agatha S. Hultquist Project Coordinator amar-cidcm@umd.edu
Jon Brown Graduate Assistant jbrown@gvpt.umd.edu
Alexander Jonas Web Developer arjonas@umd.edu
Advisory Board Members
In 1999, the Minorities at Risk Project staff established a panel of interested scholars to provide oversight and advice on the project's future directions and help ensure its continuity. Current MAR Advisory Board members include:
Victor Asal SUNY-Albany (Rockefeller College)
Jóhanna K. Birnir CIDCM (University of Maryland)
Mary Caprioli University of Minnesota-Duluth
Page Fortna Columbia University
Richard Garfield Columbia University
Ted Robert Gurr University of Maryland
John Ishiyama University of North Texas
Erin K. Jenne Central European University
Michael Johns Laurentian University at Georgian College
Stephen M. Saideman McGill University
Zeynep Taydas Clemson University
Monica Duffy Toft Harvard (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs)
Peter Trumbore Oakland University
Barbara Walter University of California, San Diego
Stefan Wolff University of Nottingham
MAROB Data
The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset is a subsidiary of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project. Initiated in 2005, the purpose of this project is to answer fundamental questions focusing on the identification of those factors that motivate some members of ethnic minorities to become radicalized, to form activist organizations, and to move from conventional means of politics and protest into violence and terrorism. Focusing initially on the Middle East and North Africa, the MAROB project provides information on the characteristics of those ethnopolitical organizations most likely to employ violence and terrorism in the pursuit of their perceived grievances with local, national, or international authority structures.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Kachins in Burma
Assessment for Kachins in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Kachin have three of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration, a high level of group organization, and government repression. Factors that could limit future rebellion include the junta's negotiation of ceasefire agreements with three prominent Kachin organizations Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Democratic Army Kachin (NDA-K), and Kachin Defense/Democratic Army (KDA) coupled with its superior military force, which has severely limited the activities of the few remaining non-ceasefire organizations. The ceasefire deals have provided the ethnic groups with some local control and promises of economic development. Whether these provisions are fulfilled or not will also likely influence the prospects of future anti-state actions.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Karens in Burma
Assessment for Karens in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Karen have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; recent government repression; and a generally high level of group organization. However, given the major counterinsurgency campaign that has been underway in Karen state in recent years, it is not clear if the Karen National Union can still pose a significant threat. It is likely that the KNU will be reduced to low to moderate-level rebellion along the Thai-Burmese border.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Mons in Burma
Assessment for Mons in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Mon have three of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration; recent repression by state authorities; and a generally high level of group organization. Since the late 1980s, more than 15 ethnic groups, including the Mon, have reached ceasefire deals with the military junta. These agreements generally provide for some local control and promises of economic development, though the junta discontinued provision of economic aid to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in September 2005. Whether these provisions are resumed and increased will also likely influence the prospects of future rebellion.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma
Assessment for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Rohingyas have two of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration and recent government repression. Since the late 1980s, the military junta has negotiated ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups, including the All Burma Muslim Union, which was once supported by the Rohingya community but has ceased to be active since the late 1990s. The group is now represented primarily by militant organizations, the most prominent of which is the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). Given the severe political, economic, and cultural discrimination against the Rohingyas, it is likely that low-level resistance will reemerge in the near future.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Shans in Burma
Assessment for Shans in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Shan have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; high levels of support for group organizations; and widespread repression by state authorities. Since the late 1980s, the military junta has negotiated ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups including the Shan State Army. At least two Shan rebel groups remain militarily active. However, given the major counterinsurgency campaign that has been underway in Shan state for the past several years, they have been limited in their ability to undertake militant actions.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Zomis (Chins) in Burma
Assessment for Zomis (Chins) in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Chin, who also refer to themselves as Zomi, have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion, territorial concentration, high levels of group cohesion, and recent government repression. Although it is likely that there will continue to be low-level resistance, the military junta's success in reaching ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups by the mid-1990s coupled with its suppression of the remaining rebel groups does not bode well for the future status of the Chin.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Tripuras in India
Assessment for Tripuras in India
Risk Assessment
The Tripuras exhibit several factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; repression by state authorities; a history of lost autonomy; and generally high levels of group organization. Factors that could inhibit rebellion include Indias history of democratic government and its tradition of attempting to reach settlements with groups seeking autonomy or independence.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Nagas in India
Assessment for Nagas in India
Risk Assessment
The Nagas in India have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; repression by the government; and lost autonomy due to their inclusion in the Indian union in 1947. Factors that could possibly inhibit future militant actions include the Naga populace's desire for an end to violence and the government's promotion of economic development. In addition, India has a tradition of negotiating agreements that provide various separatist groups with some degree of autonomy. In 2000 India was also able to convince Burma to start closing down NSCN bases, further constraining rebel activities.
The most violent conflict currently involving Nagas is the internecine rivalry between the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. A third faction, the NSCN-Unification, was formed in 2007 in an attempt to unify the divided Naga insurgents. However, such efforts were rejected by the NSCN-IM. As such, continuing violence between the Naga rivals is likely to continue.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Mizos in India
Assessment for Mizos in India
Risk Assessment
The Mizos in India have three of the factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration; a high level of group support for organizations representing their interests; and a history of lost autonomy. Factors that could inhibit future rebellion include: India's history as a stable democracy; persistent federal government efforts to negotiate settlements with groups seeking autonomy; and the lack of transnational support for the Mizos despite ongoing armed conflicts in neighboring countries like Burma.
It appears that Mizo desires for self-determination were largely satisfied with the creation of a separate state of Mizoram in 1986. Mizoram remains one of the few states in India's northeast that has remained relatively free of violence in the past 15 years. The major issue confronting its residents is the relationship between the Mizos and the Reangs (also called Bru) and whether Reang desires for greater autonomy can be incorporated within Mizoram without the occurrence of further violence.
The Bru National Liberation Front has been at odds with the offical government of Mizoram since 1996 and has a primary objective as the protection of rights and dignity of Bru (Reangs). It has also demanded a separate Reang homeland in Mizoram. Subsequently, it transformed its stand and aimed to achieve a separate Autonomous District Council (ADC), and reservation in the Mizoram Legislative Assembly for the community. Only recently, it has agreed to tone down its demand for an ADC and settle for a regional council.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Bodos in India
Assessment for Bodos in India
Risk Assessment
Bodos have a moderate risk for rebellion, with three risk factors. They are territorially concentrated north of the Brahmaputra River in Assam and have a history of protest and violence against the state. Factors mitigating the risk of rebellion include efforts at negotiation and accommodation of Bodos demands. Two militant Bodo organizations have reached ceasefires with government officials, including in 2005 a ceasefire between the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and government. Final resolution of the conflict will depend on implementation of accords over the next several years and on eased competition between Bodo and Assamese organizations for political dominance.
Bodo protest will likely continue at low to moderate levels in the near future. Numerous Bodo political organizations continue to mobilize the community, in particular students. The democratic nature of India's government also makes protest a relatively low-cost form of political resistance.
Because the agreement reached in 2003 for the Bodo Territorial Council did not take the needs of all Bodo groups into consideration, there is still a great possibility for conflict between these groups as well as uprising by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, the groups most radical organization. This is especially true if the talks among the NDFB and the government do not end positively.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Assamese in India
Assessment for Assamese in India
Risk Assessment
The Assamese have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; generally high levels of group organization; and repression by state authorities. Factors that could inhibit rebellion include India's stable history of democratic rule, Indian-Bhutanese cooperation to limit cross-border sanctuary for ULFA members, and India's tradition of attempting to reach settlements with groups seeking autonomy or independence.
My recommendation:
China should actively support insurgency in India and NE India, with the goal of eventually liberating NE India as an independent state, so it can become a part of ASEAN. USA should help with this effort.
USA should also actively support insurgency in Myanmar with help of neighboring states, so that the minority states can be made independent and separated from Bamar rule and to liberate them from Bamar oppression. A contagious state with many minority states joined together can become a viable new entity separated from a majority Bamar state, mainly in the upper/middle area near Bagan/Pagan where they originally created their kingdom.
Ava Kingdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The above will stabilize South as well as South East Asia for the foreseeable future, in my opinion.
Let me introduce this university research center called: MAR or Minorities at Risk project:
MAR | Home
About MAR
Overview
MAR tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present -- identifying where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political significance" in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions. Political significance is determined by the following two criteria:
The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society
The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests
Review additional criteria for defining a "Minority at Risk."
The MAR project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 and has been based at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) since 1988.
The project has developed over four distinct phases:
Phase I covered 227 communal groups which met the criteria for classification as a minority at risk for the years 1945-1990;
Phase II covered 275 groups from 1990-1996;
Phase III covered 275 groups from 1996-1999; and
Phase IV covered 283 groups from 1998-2003.
The last update was completed in February 2005 for the years 2001-2003.
In 2003, Jonathan Wilkenfeld assumed the position of Acting Project Director.
In 2005, the MAR project began a secondary data collection effort, focusing on organizations claiming to represent MAR groups. The Minorities at Risk Organization Behavior dataset currently covers organizations representing MAR groups in the Middle East and North Africa, covering the years 1980-2004. This data was released in September 2008.
Project Staff
Jóhanna Birnir Director jkbirnir@umd.edu
Ted Robert Gurr Founder amar-cidcm@umd.edu
Agatha S. Hultquist Project Coordinator amar-cidcm@umd.edu
Jon Brown Graduate Assistant jbrown@gvpt.umd.edu
Alexander Jonas Web Developer arjonas@umd.edu
Advisory Board Members
In 1999, the Minorities at Risk Project staff established a panel of interested scholars to provide oversight and advice on the project's future directions and help ensure its continuity. Current MAR Advisory Board members include:
Victor Asal SUNY-Albany (Rockefeller College)
Jóhanna K. Birnir CIDCM (University of Maryland)
Mary Caprioli University of Minnesota-Duluth
Page Fortna Columbia University
Richard Garfield Columbia University
Ted Robert Gurr University of Maryland
John Ishiyama University of North Texas
Erin K. Jenne Central European University
Michael Johns Laurentian University at Georgian College
Stephen M. Saideman McGill University
Zeynep Taydas Clemson University
Monica Duffy Toft Harvard (Weatherhead Center for International Affairs)
Peter Trumbore Oakland University
Barbara Walter University of California, San Diego
Stefan Wolff University of Nottingham
MAROB Data
The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset is a subsidiary of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project. Initiated in 2005, the purpose of this project is to answer fundamental questions focusing on the identification of those factors that motivate some members of ethnic minorities to become radicalized, to form activist organizations, and to move from conventional means of politics and protest into violence and terrorism. Focusing initially on the Middle East and North Africa, the MAROB project provides information on the characteristics of those ethnopolitical organizations most likely to employ violence and terrorism in the pursuit of their perceived grievances with local, national, or international authority structures.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Kachins in Burma
Assessment for Kachins in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Kachin have three of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration, a high level of group organization, and government repression. Factors that could limit future rebellion include the junta's negotiation of ceasefire agreements with three prominent Kachin organizations Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), New Democratic Army Kachin (NDA-K), and Kachin Defense/Democratic Army (KDA) coupled with its superior military force, which has severely limited the activities of the few remaining non-ceasefire organizations. The ceasefire deals have provided the ethnic groups with some local control and promises of economic development. Whether these provisions are fulfilled or not will also likely influence the prospects of future anti-state actions.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Karens in Burma
Assessment for Karens in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Karen have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; recent government repression; and a generally high level of group organization. However, given the major counterinsurgency campaign that has been underway in Karen state in recent years, it is not clear if the Karen National Union can still pose a significant threat. It is likely that the KNU will be reduced to low to moderate-level rebellion along the Thai-Burmese border.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Mons in Burma
Assessment for Mons in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Mon have three of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration; recent repression by state authorities; and a generally high level of group organization. Since the late 1980s, more than 15 ethnic groups, including the Mon, have reached ceasefire deals with the military junta. These agreements generally provide for some local control and promises of economic development, though the junta discontinued provision of economic aid to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in September 2005. Whether these provisions are resumed and increased will also likely influence the prospects of future rebellion.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma
Assessment for Rohingya (Arakanese) in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Rohingyas have two of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration and recent government repression. Since the late 1980s, the military junta has negotiated ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups, including the All Burma Muslim Union, which was once supported by the Rohingya community but has ceased to be active since the late 1990s. The group is now represented primarily by militant organizations, the most prominent of which is the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO). Given the severe political, economic, and cultural discrimination against the Rohingyas, it is likely that low-level resistance will reemerge in the near future.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Shans in Burma
Assessment for Shans in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Shan have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; high levels of support for group organizations; and widespread repression by state authorities. Since the late 1980s, the military junta has negotiated ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups including the Shan State Army. At least two Shan rebel groups remain militarily active. However, given the major counterinsurgency campaign that has been underway in Shan state for the past several years, they have been limited in their ability to undertake militant actions.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Zomis (Chins) in Burma
Assessment for Zomis (Chins) in Burma
Risk Assessment
The Chin, who also refer to themselves as Zomi, have four of the five factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: current rebellion, territorial concentration, high levels of group cohesion, and recent government repression. Although it is likely that there will continue to be low-level resistance, the military junta's success in reaching ceasefire agreements with 15 ethnic groups by the mid-1990s coupled with its suppression of the remaining rebel groups does not bode well for the future status of the Chin.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Tripuras in India
Assessment for Tripuras in India
Risk Assessment
The Tripuras exhibit several factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; repression by state authorities; a history of lost autonomy; and generally high levels of group organization. Factors that could inhibit rebellion include Indias history of democratic government and its tradition of attempting to reach settlements with groups seeking autonomy or independence.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Nagas in India
Assessment for Nagas in India
Risk Assessment
The Nagas in India have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; repression by the government; and lost autonomy due to their inclusion in the Indian union in 1947. Factors that could possibly inhibit future militant actions include the Naga populace's desire for an end to violence and the government's promotion of economic development. In addition, India has a tradition of negotiating agreements that provide various separatist groups with some degree of autonomy. In 2000 India was also able to convince Burma to start closing down NSCN bases, further constraining rebel activities.
The most violent conflict currently involving Nagas is the internecine rivalry between the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. A third faction, the NSCN-Unification, was formed in 2007 in an attempt to unify the divided Naga insurgents. However, such efforts were rejected by the NSCN-IM. As such, continuing violence between the Naga rivals is likely to continue.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Mizos in India
Assessment for Mizos in India
Risk Assessment
The Mizos in India have three of the factors that increase the chances of future rebellion: territorial concentration; a high level of group support for organizations representing their interests; and a history of lost autonomy. Factors that could inhibit future rebellion include: India's history as a stable democracy; persistent federal government efforts to negotiate settlements with groups seeking autonomy; and the lack of transnational support for the Mizos despite ongoing armed conflicts in neighboring countries like Burma.
It appears that Mizo desires for self-determination were largely satisfied with the creation of a separate state of Mizoram in 1986. Mizoram remains one of the few states in India's northeast that has remained relatively free of violence in the past 15 years. The major issue confronting its residents is the relationship between the Mizos and the Reangs (also called Bru) and whether Reang desires for greater autonomy can be incorporated within Mizoram without the occurrence of further violence.
The Bru National Liberation Front has been at odds with the offical government of Mizoram since 1996 and has a primary objective as the protection of rights and dignity of Bru (Reangs). It has also demanded a separate Reang homeland in Mizoram. Subsequently, it transformed its stand and aimed to achieve a separate Autonomous District Council (ADC), and reservation in the Mizoram Legislative Assembly for the community. Only recently, it has agreed to tone down its demand for an ADC and settle for a regional council.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Bodos in India
Assessment for Bodos in India
Risk Assessment
Bodos have a moderate risk for rebellion, with three risk factors. They are territorially concentrated north of the Brahmaputra River in Assam and have a history of protest and violence against the state. Factors mitigating the risk of rebellion include efforts at negotiation and accommodation of Bodos demands. Two militant Bodo organizations have reached ceasefires with government officials, including in 2005 a ceasefire between the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and government. Final resolution of the conflict will depend on implementation of accords over the next several years and on eased competition between Bodo and Assamese organizations for political dominance.
Bodo protest will likely continue at low to moderate levels in the near future. Numerous Bodo political organizations continue to mobilize the community, in particular students. The democratic nature of India's government also makes protest a relatively low-cost form of political resistance.
Because the agreement reached in 2003 for the Bodo Territorial Council did not take the needs of all Bodo groups into consideration, there is still a great possibility for conflict between these groups as well as uprising by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, the groups most radical organization. This is especially true if the talks among the NDFB and the government do not end positively.
MAR | Data | Assessment for Assamese in India
Assessment for Assamese in India
Risk Assessment
The Assamese have four of the factors that increase the likelihood of continuing rebellion: current rebellion; territorial concentration; generally high levels of group organization; and repression by state authorities. Factors that could inhibit rebellion include India's stable history of democratic rule, Indian-Bhutanese cooperation to limit cross-border sanctuary for ULFA members, and India's tradition of attempting to reach settlements with groups seeking autonomy or independence.
My recommendation:
China should actively support insurgency in India and NE India, with the goal of eventually liberating NE India as an independent state, so it can become a part of ASEAN. USA should help with this effort.
USA should also actively support insurgency in Myanmar with help of neighboring states, so that the minority states can be made independent and separated from Bamar rule and to liberate them from Bamar oppression. A contagious state with many minority states joined together can become a viable new entity separated from a majority Bamar state, mainly in the upper/middle area near Bagan/Pagan where they originally created their kingdom.
Ava Kingdom - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The above will stabilize South as well as South East Asia for the foreseeable future, in my opinion.
.Just goes to show how this treacherous little , ungrateful nation has such designs for its neighbours . Forget about dreaming of dismembering India , I will ask you to be very careful about having such plans for Myanmar as well . They have a long standing relationship with China and now their relations with both India and the west are also improving . You may just end up finding your own country split into pieces one morning when you wake up to reality .
