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Turkish Missile Programs

We already have them, they are called Type 209s

We need border security.


We need security for MAVI VATAN

Aircraft Carrier under protection by Destroyers , Submarines and ASW Helicopters

Type-209s-214s will have to take a lot of risks



We need 1.000+ km hypersonic Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile as like Chinese DF-21D capable of targeting a moving Aircraft Carrier Strike Group from long-range
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We have 1.000+ km CENK Ballistic Missile technology

to add these technologies for anti-ship missile capability
-- active radar guidance
-- maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) with a terminal guidance system

based on 1.000+ km CENK Ballistic Missile
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or based on 560+ km TAYFUN Ballistic Missile
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But we are ready to help Greece in case of. Even if it comes from a supposed friend and member of NATO.


USA Navy is another level
but tiny French Navy could be easy target for the upcoming Turkish Armed Forces

-- Subsonic and Supersonic anti-ship Missiles
-- Hypersonic Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
-- Long range subsonic Kamikaze Drones
-- Kamikaze unmanned naval vehicles with warhead of 200-250 kg
-- Unmanned naval Vehicles armed with anti-ship Missiles and Torpedos
-- ANKA-3 and KIZILELMA unmanned stealth Fighter Jets
-- KAAN stealth Fighter Jet
-- GUR ( Type209 ) modernized Submarines
-- REIS ( Type214TN ) class AIP Submarines
-- ADA class Corvettes
-- HISAR class OPVs
-- ISTIF class Frigates
-- MEKO-200TN modernized Frigates
-- TF-2000 class Destroyers
 
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We need security for MAVI VATAN

Aircraft Carrier under protection by Destroyers , Submarines and ASW Helicopters

Type-209s-214s will have to take a lot of risks



We need 1.000+ km hypersonic Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile as like Chinese DF-21D capable of targeting a moving Aircraft Carrier Strike Group from long-range
View attachment 1015062


We have 1.000+ km CENK Ballistic Missile technology

to add these technologies for anti-ship missile capability
-- active radar guidance
-- maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) with a terminal guidance system

based on 1.000+ km CENK Ballistic Missile
View attachment 1015118
or based on 560+ km TAYFUN Ballistic Missile
View attachment 1015198





USA Navy is another level
but tiny French Navy could be easy target for the upcoming Turkish Armed Forces

-- Subsonic and Supersonic anti-ship Missiles
-- Hypersonic Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
-- Long range subsonic Kamikaze Drones
-- Kamikaze unmanned naval vehicles with warhead of 200-250 kg
-- Unmanned naval Vehicles armed with anti-ship Missiles and Torpedos
-- ANKA-3 and KIZILELMA unmanned stealth Fighter Jets
-- KAAN stealth Fighter Jet
-- GUR ( Type209 ) modernized Submarines
-- REIS ( Type214TN ) class AIP Submarines
-- ADA class Corvettes
-- HISAR class OPVs
-- ISTIF class Frigates
-- MEKO-200TN modernized Frigates
-- TF-2000 class Destroyers
Navies are more vulnerable now with the advancement in missile technology, no ship is 100% protected . With hypersonic missiles u can take down even a carrier
 
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Navies are more vulnerable now with the advancement in missile technology, no ship is 100% protected . With hypersonic missiles u can take down even a carrier
Hypersonic missiles fly much higher and they get detected much earlier, making them easy prey for SM-6 or SM-3

Something like ATMACA is still better.


What Turkey needs is actual border security. Any Afghan with a bag full of cocaine pass through the border.
 
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250 km ATMACA anti-ship Missile is not enough for deterrence against Aircraft Carrier Strike Group


even Iran has anti-ship Ballistic Missile with range of 700 km

We needs 1.000 km anti-ship Missile to cover all Eastern Mediterranean

for example
France can send Aircraft Carrier to South of the island of Crete to block our connection with Libya

and We can engage on French Aircraft Carrier with 1.000 km hypersonic anti-ship Ballistic Missiles

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French Aircraft Carrier armed with 32 x ASTER-15 SAMs but ASTER-15 can not intercept Ballistic Missiles

French HORIZON class Destroyer armed with 48 mix of ASTER-15 and ASTER-30 SAMs

Aster 30 Block 1NT (New Technology) Missile has ballistic missile interception capability
but we can use swarm attack of 50 SUPER SIMSEK Kamikaze Drones to run out of their air defense missiles early

Thanks to 700 km turbojet engined SUPER SIMSEK Kamikaze Drone to do it

then 1.000 km hypersonic anti-ship Ballistic Missiles to turn enemy Aircraft Carrier into scrap of metal in the second wave of attacks


These 2 Missiles will be of vital importance for the protection of our national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean

250-300 km air launched supersonic anti-ship Missile
1.000 km land based hypersonic anti-ship Ballistic Missile
 
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Mutual defence clause​

The Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the solidarity between European Union (EU) Member States in dealing with external threats by introducing a mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union). This clause provides that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States have an obligation to aid and assist it by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

This obligation of mutual defence is binding on all Member States. However, it does not affect the neutrality of certain Member States and is consistent with the commitments of countries that are NATO members.

This clause is supplemented by the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which provides that Member States are obliged to act jointly where one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster.



From the theoretic Point of View it's possible that EU could intervene on behalf of Greece in any future Conflict. It's neccasarry to prepare for an Confrontation with an multinational EU Battlegroups.

This mean to strike Targets far behind enemy Lines and also AC, LHD or LPD which could threaten turkish Interests in eastern Mediterran. Turkey need Hypersonic ASBM and Supersonic AShM, to counter these Threats.
 
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EVERY single component of Türkiye's #SteelDome layered #airdefense architecture is officially "in serial production" with the exception of #Siper Block-2 missiles with 150+km range, for which production will reportedly begin by early 2025.

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The U.S. demand that Turkey turn over its S-400 anti-aircraft batteries for examination represents a significant point of tension between the two NATO allies. The S-400 system, acquired from Russia by Turkey in 2019, has been a major sticking point in U.S.-Turkey relations. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Turkey under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and removed Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program, citing concerns that the presence of the Russian-made system in a NATO country could compromise the security of Western military technology, including the F-35.

Background on the S-400 Acquisition​

Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 air defense system from Russia was a significant move, signaling a shift in its defense procurement policy and deepening ties with Moscow. The deal was seen as controversial because Turkey is a key member of NATO, and the S-400 system is incompatible with NATO’s integrated defense systems. The U.S. argued that operating the S-400 alongside NATO technology, such as the F-35, could allow Russia to gather sensitive information about Western military capabilities.
Despite repeated warnings from the U.S., Turkey went ahead with the purchase, claiming it was driven by national security needs after failed attempts to procure an air defense system from NATO allies. The acquisition led to heightened tensions between Washington and Ankara, ultimately resulting in U.S. sanctions on Turkish defense industries and the expulsion of Turkey from the F-35 program.

U.S. Demands for Examination of the S-400​

The current U.S. demand for Turkey to turn over the S-400 batteries for examination suggests that the U.S. is seeking a technical analysis of the system. By examining the S-400, the U.S. would likely aim to assess its capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential threats to NATO’s military assets. Washington's insistence on such a concession reflects its broader strategy to mitigate the risks associated with Turkey’s possession of the S-400, particularly in the context of NATO security.
The U.S. position is clear: unless Turkey complies and allows the examination of the system, the sanctions imposed under CAATSA will remain in place. The demand also implies that the U.S. seeks to ensure that Turkey does not operationalize the S-400 in ways that could compromise the integrity of NATO’s defense systems. Allowing U.S. access to the S-400 might also reassure Washington that Turkey is not deepening its defense cooperation with Russia in ways that could further undermine NATO unity.

Turkey’s Position and Potential Repercussions​

Turkey has, so far, resisted such demands, emphasizing its sovereign right to choose its defense partners and military equipment. Ankara argues that its acquisition of the S-400 is a matter of national security and that the system will not be integrated into NATO’s networks, mitigating the U.S. concerns. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly affirmed Turkey’s decision to proceed with the S-400, stating that the purchase was final and non-negotiable.
However, the U.S. demand puts Turkey in a difficult position. Complying with the request could potentially lead to the lifting of sanctions, easing the economic pressure on Turkey's defense sector and opening the door to improved relations with Washington. On the other hand, handing over the S-400 batteries to the U.S. for examination could damage Turkey’s relations with Russia, as it would likely be seen as a betrayal of their defense agreement.

Broader Implications for NATO and U.S.-Turkey Relations​

This standoff has broader implications for NATO cohesion and U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkey’s insistence on maintaining the S-400, despite U.S. opposition, has raised concerns within NATO about Ankara’s long-term strategic orientation and its growing ties with Russia. The demand to examine the S-400 is part of Washington’s effort to contain the potential risks posed by Turkey’s alignment with Moscow in the defense sector.
If Turkey refuses to comply, the U.S. could maintain or even escalate sanctions, further isolating Turkey within NATO. On the other hand, Turkey’s willingness to hand over the S-400 batteries for examination could pave the way for improved relations with the U.S., though it might complicate its defense relationship with Russia.

Conclusion​

The U.S. demand for Turkey to turn over its S-400 batteries for examination highlights the deep strains in U.S.-Turkey relations. This request is a critical test of Turkey’s strategic balancing act between maintaining its sovereignty in defense procurement and managing its relationships with both NATO and Russia. If Turkey accedes to U.S. demands, it could see sanctions lifted, but at the potential cost of its relationship with Russia. Refusal, however, could further isolate Turkey within NATO and prolong the sanctions that are already impacting its defense industry.



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