What's new

To No End: Why China’s Corruption Crackdown Won’t Be Stopping Soon

Harper Lecture with John J. Mearsheimer: Can China Rise Peacefully?

It's the strategic intent of the US that puts it in conflict with China. Whether economic integration would be the deciding factor is really questionable.

I watched the vid long ago. The dude is THE master on pracmatism of Chicago uni. He also had a web debate with a Chinese professor from Tsinghua ,who had poor command of English with wierd accent and somehow poor logic as well, so lost the debate.

My opinion: he sucks actually. I can debate him and win.
 
.
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen Have you read the Shandong Study (linked below in the article)? Can you please summarize the findings? It sounds fascinating. The article alludes to a system that encourages self-promotion over good policy decision-making, but doesn't the CCP's human resources branch (sorry, can't remember the name) serve as an effective check on this sort of behavior?

---

Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push - China Real Time Report - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • September 5, 2014, 7:00 PM HKT
Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push
By Russell Leigh Moses

BN-EK396_Xi_G_20140905051559.jpg

China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Reuters
The recent study examining the lives and labors of Communist party cadres in Shandong province is noteworthy not only because it shows that many Chinese officials have a tough time staying clean.

It’s also a telling example of the tension within China’s political circles about the best way to wage war against corruption.

The Xi leadership’s preferred approach thus far has followed two complementary tracks.

The first track has featured well-publicized takedowns of “tigers”–high-ranking party officials and even military commanders who have felt the wrath of the anticorruption crusade and will likely face trial. Making examples out of once-powerful figures like former security czar Zhou Yongkang shows both the public and party ranks that Beijing is dead serious about stopping graft.

The second part of Xi’s strategy is shaking up the way party cadres work. By pushing officials to focus on making policies that actually matter to people, Xi is also striving to “make cadres more honest and pragmatic simply by carrying out activities that will reflect better on them.” Those who don’t change their work style are subject to rectification campaigns and risk becoming political road kill.

That’s hardline stuff. It shows officials who behave badly that they can’t hide or run away.

But there are others who aren’t so sure that the current emphasis on cracking down by punishing officials will bring good results. Those skeptics say that there may be more effective ways of fighting graft in the system. One way is to look more critically at some of the ways China’s political system operates.

That’s a major reason why the Shandong study was so prominently featured across state media in the past few days. It supports a more complex view of China’s corruption problem. Specifically, it suggests that cadres might not immediately begin behaving badly. Instead, they become susceptible to a political system built more for self-promotion than sound policy-making.

According to the Shandong findings, the way forward isn’t so much reconnecting cadres to citizens. Rather, it suggests that officials should be able to rejoin their families and build a better social life. The “new normal” that Xi and his allies like to refer to isn’t normal at all, the study suggests. In fact, it’s putting pressure on officials to work even harder—leaving the root causes of corruption in the system long after the current crusade has expired.

Others voices in China are calling for different approaches.

One group favors a simple zero-tolerance policy where gifts of any sort are concerned, blaming officials for simply not being moral enough to resist enticement.

Some others want the party to stop being so concerned about what cadres do in the darkness and to start looking at what government isn’t doing well in the daytime.



More In Anticorruption


For example, as one essay has it, Beijing should worry less about monitoring public opinion for dissent and focus more on acting on the reasons for discontent. Expressions of disgust from netizens aren’t signs of instability, this argument goes, but echoes of important work left undone. Castigating cadres for being corrupt has merit, this argument goes, but what’s really ailing the Chinese body politic isn’t graft but bad governance. Slapping down cadres and citizens might solve one challenge, but it leaves other social problems to smolder.

Another alternative approach calls for the party to move away from relying on abrupt inspections designed to catch cadres committing crimes. Instead it appeals for building better institutions and procedures, such as more regular audits and oversight. Combating corruption is fine, this argument goes, but clean government should be aiming to create better governance, not just cowed cadres.

After all, Beijing has historically been woefully reactive when it comes to enforcing its authority, believing that punishment after the fact solves problems. According to this point of view, fear is the best force for forward progress in the long run.

These dissents from the party line aren’t dangerous departures, but part of a larger debate about reforms in China. That’s the good news, because Xi’s leadership represents a general recognition in the Communist party that China needs new thinking to face new challenges.

The bad news is that the debate still has sharp boundaries, at least where activists are concerned. Restricting public input of any sort hampers Beijing’s ability to brainstorm other ways of tackling China’s corruption problem.

That even semi-official alternative analyses such as the Shandong study are appearing at all in the state media is a further sign that Xi’s rule isn’t dictatorial.

But it’s also a caution. It suggests that there are some who still believe Xi’s anticorruption crusade won’t ultimately do enough to stamp out the problem, and who want other options for political change placed on the table for discussion. That’s a debate that Xi surely doesn’t want.

Will reply later, on a trip now, no service found, wifi is rare, no laptop. :sick:
 
. .
Corruption happens, not because of how bad or greedy a person happens to be, not always. The system itself has flaws, would American system be better? You tell me.

Accepting bribes, is not simply due to greed, sometimes, if you don't accept, people think it's not enough, and they try again, if you still don't, they will think are you working against me? This money then goes to plot against you.

Then there is the fact, your boss if corrupt, and most likely is due to the circumstances, would want you to be corrupt as well, or at least have no way of shielding you, and thus makes you more vulnerable to corruption.
Corruption in modern China reached a level that astonished legal scholars the world over. The US system of governance is not perfect, but the corruption within pales in comparison to modern China.

For what you are talking about, that bribery reached a certain degree of acceptance that it is abnormal to be honest, such acceptance could not exist unless there are persistent character flaws within the system itself. How far back do you want to go and to what degree ? How about 18th century Heshen, reportedly that when he was ordered (allowed) to commit suicide, instead of being executed, his wealth was at least the equal of the Imperial treasury, but more likely greater. That is like saying one of the US President's Cabinet Secretary, not the President himself, have more wealth than the entire US Dept. of Treasury.

Forward to today and using the PLA as example, commanders wield their powers of assignments and official praises for personal gains, up and down the chain of command in a pyramid scheme to the point where a one-star general could literally take in one million yuan in cash in both payments from those below him and in business connections that he could direct. This is where the largest denomination is 100 yuan. To maintain his 'face', the general could not have his millions in the bank(s) where he can be audited, so his patronage is transacted in cash. In the US, a one-star general does not even rate his own parking spot at the Pentagon. For the PLA, its equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be earning tens of millions in yuan cash in bribes from below and from outside the military.

Senior officials guilty of 'moral corruption' - China - Chinadaily.com.cn
The other four senior officials accused of "moral corruption" are: Liu Tienan, former vice-director of the National Development and Reform Commission, Ni Fake, former vice-governor of Anhui province, Ji Jianye, former mayor of Nanjing, and Chen Baihuai, former vice-chairman of Hubei province's top advisory body.

Among the eight officials, seven were also accused of seeking profits for others through their power and accepting bribes through their family members.
It is said that the NDRC building is companioned by gift shops where people could buy gifts for public officials. The petitioners would enter loaded and leave empty handed. For the bureaucrats, if any of them could not use those gifts, he/she would often sell them back to the gift shops, for cash, who would put those items back on the shelves again, ready for next day's shoppers.

You think am making this shit up ?

Economist Mao Yushi on what really goes on behind the gates of the National Development and Reform Commission: Shanghaiist
"There are indeed many problems going on at the National Development and Reform Commission. I live just opposite their building and can see what's going on very clearly. On our road, you'll find many gift shops. All these people coming from out-of-town enter the building with big and small bags, and later leave empty-handed. At the end of the day, NDRC officials leave the building with big and small bags. They can't use all the stuff, so they sell them back to the gift shops, who in turn resell them to others who have come to Beijing on a mission. So that's what's happened to our street."
It is said that high end luxury stores usually run out of stock whenever the National People's Congress is in session. The rise of sale of the liquor brand Kweichow Moutai is reportedly a sign of fortune, since it means more of the People's Deputies are being courted.

The US is a much more open society than your China and while it does not guarantee that American public officials are absolutely honest, it keeps American governmental corruption low level, in terms of effects on policies and 'bennies' exchanged.
 
.
Corruption in modern China reached a level that astonished legal scholars the world over. The US system of governance is not perfect, but the corruption within pales in comparison to modern China.

For what you are talking about, that bribery reached a certain degree of acceptance that it is abnormal to be honest, such acceptance could not exist unless there are persistent character flaws within the system itself. How far back do you want to go and to what degree ? How about 18th century Heshen, reportedly that when he was ordered (allowed) to commit suicide, instead of being executed, his wealth was at least the equal of the Imperial treasury, but more likely greater. That is like saying one of the US President's Cabinet Secretary, not the President himself, have more wealth than the entire US Dept. of Treasury.

Forward to today and using the PLA as example, commanders wield their powers of assignments and official praises for personal gains, up and down the chain of command in a pyramid scheme to the point where a one-star general could literally take in one million yuan in cash in both payments from those below him and in business connections that he could direct. This is where the largest denomination is 100 yuan. To maintain his 'face', the general could not have his millions in the bank(s) where he can be audited, so his patronage is transacted in cash. In the US, a one-star general does not even rate his own parking spot at the Pentagon. For the PLA, its equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be earning tens of millions in yuan cash in bribes from below and from outside the military.

Senior officials guilty of 'moral corruption' - China - Chinadaily.com.cn

It is said that the NDRC building is companioned by gift shops where people could buy gifts for public officials. The petitioners would enter loaded and leave empty handed. For the bureaucrats, if any of them could not use those gifts, he/she would often sell them back to the gift shops, for cash, who would put those items back on the shelves again, ready for next day's shoppers.

You think am making this shit up ?

Economist Mao Yushi on what really goes on behind the gates of the National Development and Reform Commission: Shanghaiist

It is said that high end luxury stores usually run out of stock whenever the National People's Congress is in session. The rise of sale of the liquor brand Kweichow Moutai is reportedly a sign of fortune, since it means more of the People's Deputies are being courted.

The US is a much more open society than your China and while it does not guarantee that American public officials are absolutely honest, it keeps American governmental corruption low level, in terms of effects on policies and 'bennies' exchanged.

I don't even like to argue these anymore, it's pointless, you are not exactly wrong, but you didn't touch on anything that really matters. Anyone who reads your post can only come away with one thing, American democracy is so much superior in terms of combating corruption, I'm not sure if efficiency is also at stake here in your post, but obviously where PLA is concerned it is, as that have been your go to since I first started here.


But I must remind you democracy doesn't just exist in America. You can argue the validity of those other country's system, but I doubt even you would argue the fairness of such a system in terms of election, division of power and more that matches the US.

Yet, America, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Korea, are few and far between.

But I don't like to argue systems, it's just a system, for a person that keeps on saying how Chinese pilots are crap and how important the person factor is, you sure have a hard time grasping that in terms of other situations.
 
.
I don't even like to argue these anymore, it's pointless, you are not exactly wrong, but you didn't touch on anything that really matters. Anyone who reads your post can only come away with one thing, American democracy is so much superior in terms of combating corruption, I'm not sure if efficiency is also at stake here in your post, but obviously where PLA is concerned it is, as that have been your go to since I first started here.


But I must remind you democracy doesn't just exist in America. You can argue the validity of those other country's system, but I doubt even you would argue the fairness of such a system in terms of election, division of power and more that matches the US.

Yet, America, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Korea, are few and far between.

But I don't like to argue systems, it's just a system, for a person that keeps on saying how Chinese pilots are crap and how important the person factor is, you sure have a hard time grasping that in terms of other situations.
It was you who asked if the American political system is better in terms of dealing with corruption. One way to give the answer is to point out China's battles with corruption and see if the same scope exists in the American system.

Democracy does not guarantee honesty, it only expect openness, and when you have openness, as in transparency, corruption can be confined to low level and low intensity. That is the best we can hope for and achieve. But no matter how transparent the political system may be, the ingenuity of man will find ways -- plural -- to get around the laws and to justify misdeeds in order to profit personally via the system and its mechanisms and soft power contain within. Cash is not the only way to gain access and profits. The reason why cash is preferred is because cash is easily translatable into services and things. I pay for repairs to my house and for my clothes, simple as that. Once cash is exchanged, it is difficult to take it back or to render the physical money worthless. Stock options are essentially promisory notes and can be devalue by the market, year to year or even week to week. Beyond these two currencies of corruption, things get increasingly uncertain in terms of benefits.

As for the PLA, the military is my area of interest, as everyone here know by now. So why should I not focus on the PLA ? After all, the military, any military, is a microcosm, a reflection, of the larger society from which it sources its manpower, and with people comes personalities.

Rotting From Within
...Liu is more worried about what the PLA, which hasn't seen significant combat since a militarily disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979, is doing to itself in times of peace. In his February speech, he described the army beset by a disease of "malignant individualism" where officers follow only orders that suit them, advance on the strength of their connections, and openly sell their services at "clearly marked prices."
It is a delicious irony we see before us.

For the free America, much of her men and women are willing to suppress their individuality and much of their sense of self to serve a higher cause and stronger call under an oppressive hierarchy -- the US military institution. I lived that way for 10 yrs and I regret nothing of that time. Whereas in China, her men and women found opportunities to express their individuality in the Chinese military institution where power is constrained by the vagaries of personalities, not by morals and laws.

Did you know that when the J-20 debuted, it was done by the will of the military independent of the civilian leadership mainly to embarrass the visiting US SecDef Robert Gates ?

Amazon.com: Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (9780307959478): Robert M Gates: Books
Chapter 14 At War to the Last Day

I said I was worried that the U.S. press would present the test as a negative development in the relationship and asked the president of China to advise me on how to explain the test to them. Hu laughed nervously as he turned to his military aides and asked, Is this true ? A furious discussion broke out on the Chinese side involving Liang, his deputy General Ma, and others. The Chinese civilians in the room had known nothing about the test. A Chinese admiral seated farthest from Hu passed word back up the line that it had been "scientific research project." After several minutes of chatter on the Chinese side, Hu adamantly assured me that the rollout had been a "previously scheduled scientific test" having nothing at all to do with my visit -- or his. I suspect the PLA would have given me a different explanation. That the PLA would pull such a politically portentous stunt without telling Hu in advance was worrying, to say the least.
This was not a slip of the tongue by an incompetent spokesman or a bad day at the office or a scheduling conflict. The decision to test flight the J-20 on that day was two fold: To embarrass the US and to assert the 'behind closed doors' status of independence of the PLA from the country's civilian leadership.

If the military, any military, is a microcosm and reflection of the larger society from which it sources its soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and given the decision by the PLA to publicly embarrass its own (allegedly) commander-in-chief, Hu Jintao, what does that say about the Chinese society ? We are not talking about drunken soldiers misbehaving but about the minds and attitudes of men upon whose metaphorical shoulders rests the defense of the nation. Americans were embarrassed when one of our generals was caught with adultery and the criticisms, inside and outside the military, were severe, mocking, and public. But for China ? Business as usual.

The military is where there are the highest concentrations of power: political, moral, and physical, of any organization and hierarchy yet created by man. It is where the wise and brilliant can more swiftly accomplish great things for the nation but the stupid and petty can equally swiftly destroy what the former created. The military is the 'In Case Of Emergency Break Glass' kind of institution where if the danger is great so must be equally great the response. Then once the danger is eliminated, it should be back in its case again. What the PLA did to embarrass US indicated to the world that for China, the danger is with her own roving military.

YOU dismiss this at your own peril.
 
.
It was you who asked if the American political system is better in terms of dealing with corruption. One way to give the answer is to point out China's battles with corruption and see if the same scope exists in the American system.

Democracy does not guarantee honesty, it only expect openness, and when you have openness, as in transparency, corruption can be confined to low level and low intensity. That is the best we can hope for and achieve. But no matter how transparent the political system may be, the ingenuity of man will find ways -- plural -- to get around the laws and to justify misdeeds in order to profit personally via the system and its mechanisms and soft power contain within. Cash is not the only way to gain access and profits. The reason why cash is preferred is because cash is easily translatable into services and things. I pay for repairs to my house and for my clothes, simple as that. Once cash is exchanged, it is difficult to take it back or to render the physical money worthless. Stock options are essentially promisory notes and can be devalue by the market, year to year or even week to week. Beyond these two currencies of corruption, things get increasingly uncertain in terms of benefits.

As for the PLA, the military is my area of interest, as everyone here know by now. So why should I not focus on the PLA ? After all, the military, any military, is a microcosm, a reflection, of the larger society from which it sources its manpower, and with people comes personalities.

Rotting From Within

It is a delicious irony we see before us.

For the free America, much of her men and women are willing to suppress their individuality and much of their sense of self to serve a higher cause and stronger call under an oppressive hierarchy -- the US military institution. I lived that way for 10 yrs and I regret nothing of that time. Whereas in China, her men and women found opportunities to express their individuality in the Chinese military institution where power is constrained by the vagaries of personalities, not by morals and laws.

Did you know that when the J-20 debuted, it was done by the will of the military independent of the civilian leadership mainly to embarrass the visiting US SecDef Robert Gates ?

Amazon.com: Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (9780307959478): Robert M Gates: Books

This was not a slip of the tongue by an incompetent spokesman or a bad day at the office or a scheduling conflict. The decision to test flight the J-20 on that day was two fold: To embarrass the US and to assert the 'behind closed doors' status of independence of the PLA from the country's civilian leadership.

If the military, any military, is a microcosm and reflection of the larger society from which it sources its soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and given the decision by the PLA to publicly embarrass its own (allegedly) commander-in-chief, Hu Jintao, what does that say about the Chinese society ? We are not talking about drunken soldiers misbehaving but about the minds and attitudes of men upon whose metaphorical shoulders rests the defense of the nation. Americans were embarrassed when one of our generals was caught with adultery and the criticisms, inside and outside the military, were severe, mocking, and public. But for China ? Business as usual.

The military is where there are the highest concentrations of power: political, moral, and physical, of any organization and hierarchy yet created by man. It is where the wise and brilliant can more swiftly accomplish great things for the nation but the stupid and petty can equally swiftly destroy what the former created. The military is the 'In Case Of Emergency Break Glass' kind of institution where if the danger is great so must be equally great the response. Then once the danger is eliminated, it should be back in its case again. What the PLA did to embarrass US indicated to the world that for China, the danger is with her own roving military.

YOU dismiss this at your own peril.

Adultery in communist country like ours, if exposed, I mean exposed not rumors, then he will be dismissed, adultery is a crime in Maoist era and very serious now as it damages the party's reputation, even during Hu's era it was very serious.

So we don't just laugh, we kick them out of the party and military.


It was indeed me who asked, but more... it doesn't matter, anyways, you didn't really answer anyways, you just said what would happen in America, not what would happen everywhere. In case you didn't know, everywhere is not America.


Maybe Hu has less power than Xi or Jiang, but the more likely explanation is he planned it or at least didn't stop it. Many like to say Chinese military gone rogue, that's what China wants people to think, so we have the benefit of having a military that can go further without putting responsibility on the state, worse come to worse, just dismiss a few guys and give them a good civilian sector job.

Plausible deniability is very important to China right now, because our goal isn't to change the rule book, but to change who should benefit more from it. Which means not all of our moves should be seen in the light as a challenge by the Chinese leadership, as most rules we don't want to change.

For example spying, we want to keep it actually, but just to tie you down enough with negotiations, and put some doubts into your minds, when we finish more spy ships, subs, and planes, we will stop all this and start sending them all against who we like like you are now.

Hard to do that if it seems changing the rule seemed like the original intention. So that's where the "Rogue" comes from.


Chinese military not constrained by laws? Two sides to every coin, For a long time, China can't build good ships, or buy, partly because of technical issues, but mostly, not enough sailors that can sail it, and officers that can command it. Ships wait for people, cause no talent.

Chinese military isn't on the edge of innovation yet, so while it seems to you or another American like insubordination, but in reality, the guys who got a bachelors, masters, and PHD, and who been trained in the West, have to fight for dear life just to make minor changes and bring the Chinese military into the 21st century.

You might think this is a big problem for Chinese military, actually this is a huge problem for all militarizes other than America and a few of her WESTERN allies who constantly go to war.

But you can see the result now, a professional Blue army that can pretty much defeat the always victorious red armies on the training field, pilots from across the country think ways to improve their ability, promotion based on innovation, and organization, no more subjective evaluation, all objective ones, and "publicly" done in the military and much more.

All this is the result of this "individualism" in the army. Also why I have less and less worry about China going to war with any of our neighbors, because due to their willingness to follow orders and norms, they still got massive problems that we use to face or still currently face.
 
.
Adultery in communist country like ours, if exposed, I mean exposed not rumors, then he will be dismissed, adultery is a crime in Maoist era and very serious now as it damages the party's reputation, even during Hu's era it was very serious.

So we don't just laugh, we kick them out of the party and military.
You missed the point. It looks like what we are talking about is over your head.

Corruption is actually worse than adultery in terms of scale and scope of effects. Generally, a person will self restrained to only one extramarital affair -- one person. The ties in the affair are very personal and often emotional. As such, 99.999% of extramarital affairs involves just one other person. But for corruption, 99.999% of the time the person will have multiple affairs, to use the word as the best descriptor for what it is.

No matter if I am a civilian or a military member, I am an agent of the government and I am sworn to be be faithful to the government. A corrupt official does not risk any emotional ties to his suitors and usually the benefits are immediate. All the more reasons to invest in multiple affairs. From one suitor, I can ask for cash, from another suitor: a new car for my wife, and from another suitor: that he pay for my son's college education. Three suitors: three immediate benefits. I am still faithful to my wife. And if I happen to be an agent of an authoritarian government -- like the Chinese government -- I can use the security apparatus of the state to intimidate those who would threatens me and my sources of benefits. Only other agents of the state that have more political powers than me can do me harm, but why should they do me harm when I am one of their suitors/benfactors/suppliers/etc ?

My point was that Americans are embarrassed by infidelity to spouse while your Chinese government and society tolerates the greater infidelity -- to the people. In your China, everything I said in the above paragraph occurs daily and with full knowledge and understanding of everyone involved, from the common man/woman in the outer provinces to all the way to the top -- the President of China and the Party Secretary.

It was indeed me who asked, but more... it doesn't matter, anyways, you didn't really answer anyways, you just said what would happen in America, not what would happen everywhere. In case you didn't know, everywhere is not America.
I did answered, but if you want it clearer: Yes, the US is better than your China in terms of exposure, shaming, and punishment of corruption.

Notice I did not say 'criminalization' of corruption. I said punishment. Every government, even as despotic like Iraq's, have laws against corruption. But punishment do not always follow criminalization because without the active pursuit of corruption, there can be no punishment. It does not matter if the government is totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic. Any lack of pursuit of corruption renders any and all laws regarding corruption worthless in the eyes of the people. The difference here is that under a democratic system where there is an independent press and judicial branch, it is easier to confine corruption to low level and low intensity. In your China, the press and judges obeys the Party and when agents of the Party are active in corruption, why should they let lose the leashes of the dogs that could threaten their fortunes ?

Maybe Hu has less power than Xi or Jiang, but the more likely explanation is he planned it or at least didn't stop it. Many like to say Chinese military gone rogue, that's what China wants people to think, so we have the benefit of having a military that can go further without putting responsibility on the state, worse come to worse, just dismiss a few guys and give them a good civilian sector job.

Plausible deniability is very important to China right now, because our goal isn't to change the rule book, but to change who should benefit more from it. Which means not all of our moves should be seen in the light as a challenge by the Chinese leadership, as most rules we don't want to change.
You are welcome to believe that. But the reality is that no one like to deal with a government that does not have full control of its military. The President of that country may come from a military coup and installed himself as President, but as long as he demonstrate that the entire government is under his authority and control, we can live with that. It does not matter if the perception that the PLA is a rogue in China equal to factual truth, because unless we are privy to what goes on inside Beijing, perception is all we outsiders have and our relationships with China will include that perception.

Here is what you seems NOT to understand...

When there are contestant authority figures in a country, the odds of internal strife, aka civil war, increases. Not guaranteed, just increased odds. And if the perception is common that there are contestant authority figures in China: The PLA vs the civilians, other countries will alter their foreign policies to maximize benefits and minimize risks to themselves. Business investments may decrease because political instability threatens long term profits, for example. In my industry -- semiconductor manufacturing -- it takes 2-3 yrs to construct a fab, not including the individual machines to do the work of production. Then once everything is in place, certified as ready for production, 5 yrs passed and tens of billions invested. To recoup this investment, the place must be running for at least 10 yrs. That means there should be at least a projection of 20 yrs of political stability before anyone will invest in a country, be it China or Zimbabwe or Timbuktu. If the perception is wrong, who loses ? Not the investors because there will always be some place else with more political stability. Labor and resources may cost more but at least they will have their factories up and running.

Perceptions have consequences, pal.

Chinese military not constrained by laws?
No, the PLA is not constrained by laws and/or morals. Its systemic corruption is proof of that.
 
.
@Chinese-Dragon @Edison Chen Have you read the Shandong Study (linked below in the article)? Can you please summarize the findings? It sounds fascinating. The article alludes to a system that encourages self-promotion over good policy decision-making, but doesn't the CCP's human resources branch (sorry, can't remember the name) serve as an effective check on this sort of behavior?

---

Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push - China Real Time Report - WSJ

  • wsj_print.gif
  • September 5, 2014, 7:00 PM HKT
Doubters Question China’s Corruption Push
By Russell Leigh Moses

BN-EK396_Xi_G_20140905051559.jpg

China’s President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Reuters
The recent study examining the lives and labors of Communist party cadres in Shandong province is noteworthy not only because it shows that many Chinese officials have a tough time staying clean.

It’s also a telling example of the tension within China’s political circles about the best way to wage war against corruption.

The Xi leadership’s preferred approach thus far has followed two complementary tracks.

The first track has featured well-publicized takedowns of “tigers”–high-ranking party officials and even military commanders who have felt the wrath of the anticorruption crusade and will likely face trial. Making examples out of once-powerful figures like former security czar Zhou Yongkang shows both the public and party ranks that Beijing is dead serious about stopping graft.

The second part of Xi’s strategy is shaking up the way party cadres work. By pushing officials to focus on making policies that actually matter to people, Xi is also striving to “make cadres more honest and pragmatic simply by carrying out activities that will reflect better on them.” Those who don’t change their work style are subject to rectification campaigns and risk becoming political road kill.

That’s hardline stuff. It shows officials who behave badly that they can’t hide or run away.

But there are others who aren’t so sure that the current emphasis on cracking down by punishing officials will bring good results. Those skeptics say that there may be more effective ways of fighting graft in the system. One way is to look more critically at some of the ways China’s political system operates.

That’s a major reason why the Shandong study was so prominently featured across state media in the past few days. It supports a more complex view of China’s corruption problem. Specifically, it suggests that cadres might not immediately begin behaving badly. Instead, they become susceptible to a political system built more for self-promotion than sound policy-making.

According to the Shandong findings, the way forward isn’t so much reconnecting cadres to citizens. Rather, it suggests that officials should be able to rejoin their families and build a better social life. The “new normal” that Xi and his allies like to refer to isn’t normal at all, the study suggests. In fact, it’s putting pressure on officials to work even harder—leaving the root causes of corruption in the system long after the current crusade has expired.

Others voices in China are calling for different approaches.

One group favors a simple zero-tolerance policy where gifts of any sort are concerned, blaming officials for simply not being moral enough to resist enticement.

Some others want the party to stop being so concerned about what cadres do in the darkness and to start looking at what government isn’t doing well in the daytime.



More In Anticorruption


For example, as one essay has it, Beijing should worry less about monitoring public opinion for dissent and focus more on acting on the reasons for discontent. Expressions of disgust from netizens aren’t signs of instability, this argument goes, but echoes of important work left undone. Castigating cadres for being corrupt has merit, this argument goes, but what’s really ailing the Chinese body politic isn’t graft but bad governance. Slapping down cadres and citizens might solve one challenge, but it leaves other social problems to smolder.

Another alternative approach calls for the party to move away from relying on abrupt inspections designed to catch cadres committing crimes. Instead it appeals for building better institutions and procedures, such as more regular audits and oversight. Combating corruption is fine, this argument goes, but clean government should be aiming to create better governance, not just cowed cadres.

After all, Beijing has historically been woefully reactive when it comes to enforcing its authority, believing that punishment after the fact solves problems. According to this point of view, fear is the best force for forward progress in the long run.

These dissents from the party line aren’t dangerous departures, but part of a larger debate about reforms in China. That’s the good news, because Xi’s leadership represents a general recognition in the Communist party that China needs new thinking to face new challenges.

The bad news is that the debate still has sharp boundaries, at least where activists are concerned. Restricting public input of any sort hampers Beijing’s ability to brainstorm other ways of tackling China’s corruption problem.

That even semi-official alternative analyses such as the Shandong study are appearing at all in the state media is a further sign that Xi’s rule isn’t dictatorial.

But it’s also a caution. It suggests that there are some who still believe Xi’s anticorruption crusade won’t ultimately do enough to stamp out the problem, and who want other options for political change placed on the table for discussion. That’s a debate that Xi surely doesn’t want.

I think the Shandong Study actually contributes very limited value, the author only delineated some superficial points, such as to care more about official's true state of mind, the lives of their children and spouses, and the morality in officialdom. But she made some very correct points as well, such as "China is a society built on networking, the legal system is not well organized yet, the mechanism of structure doesn't work well". But she doesn't know networking exists in every country. In the end, she recommended reconstruct the official evaluation system, I think this is, for now, the most feasible and practical way we can do, but she talked nothing but to evaluate the moral sense of officials. Morality is not a factor that can be quantified. I understand her, due to her job and identity (associate director of communism research center), she can't talk about things that beyond her reach or betray her discipline.

I am a loyal believer of system construction. Xi's anti corruption storm could be a good sign, but it's only a beginning. What if Xi retires after 10 years, will the pullback is a temporary compromise, will those corrupted Communist party cadres make a comeback? I mean it could be really bad that if they are terrified by Xi and Central Discipline Inspection Commission's power. The CDIC is a CCP organization that overrides the any legal process, but now it becomes an effective way to crack down corruption with less interference from law. I call it "quench a thirst with poison", it could respite the worsening situations momentarily, but there is some volatile factor inside - like I said, what if Xi and Li's cabinet retires after 10 years. And the existence of CDIC itself is a serious departure from the law, because it trumps Supreme Judicial Court. But, Xi has to do this, the anti-corruption law doesn't work well, you got to totally destroy the old system gingerly, and carry out some top level design.
 
.
I think the Shandong Study actually contributes very limited value, the author only delineated some superficial points, such as to care more about official's true state of mind, the lives of their children and spouses, and the morality in officialdom. But she made some very correct points as well, such as "China is a society built on networking, the legal system is not well organized yet, the mechanism of structure doesn't work well". But she doesn't know networking exists in every country. In the end, she recommended reconstruct the official evaluation system, I think this is, for now, the most feasible and practical way we can do, but she talked nothing but to evaluate the moral sense of officials. Morality is not a factor that can be quantified. I understand her, due to her job and identity (associate director of communism research center), she can't talk about things that beyond her reach or betray her discipline.

I am a loyal believer of system construction. Xi's anti corruption storm could be a good sign, but it's only a beginning. What if Xi retires after 10 years, will the pullback is a temporary compromise, will those corrupted Communist party cadres make a comeback? I mean it could be really bad that if they are terrified by Xi and Central Discipline Inspection Commission's power. The CDIC is a CCP organization that overrides the any legal process, but now it becomes an effective way to crack down corruption with less interference from law. I call it "quench a thirst with poison", it could respite the worsening situations momentarily, but there is some volatile factor inside - like I said, what if Xi and Li's cabinet retires after 10 years. And the existence of CDIC itself is a serious departure from the law, because it trumps Supreme Judicial Court. But, Xi has to do this, the anti-corruption law doesn't work well, you got to totally destroy the old system gingerly, and carry out some top level design.

Excellent points. We won't know how well this anti-corruption process works until well into the future. Your comments on the CDIC are also insightful, because it can use its extralegal powers abusively. What if some of these "tiger hunts" are really just cover for purging political rivals? We can only hope it is sincere, but hope isn't a great basis for political stability.

Edit: thank you for the summary of the Shandong study. Much appreciated.
 
Last edited:
.
in exercise, there's no one dies. everything would be fine.

American system is more corrupt. Governments working for the betterment of corporations and not the common folks. China have some issues but i think it's overblown. I don't even know why the American political system allow lobbyists.

Face your problem, they are still there while you showing the same in other countries.
 
.
Anti-trust probe expands, with 6 fines topping 100 mln yuan

U470P886T1D133987F12DT20140911132905.jpg

This combo photo shows the industries that China has probed in anti-monopoly campaign. (Photo source: Chinanews.com)

(ECNS) – China has levied a total of 3 billion yuan ($500 million) in anti-monopoly fines since the beginning of 2013. Each of the six biggest fines exceeded 100 million yuan ($16 million).

Experts anticipate that China's anti-trust probes will be carried out more frequently and more broadly, not targeting any specific sector or company.

In January 2013, six television makers including Samsung were fined 353 million yuan ($57 million) for price fixing. Two months later, China's top liquor companies Maotai and Wuliangye were fined 449 million yuan ($72 million). In August that year, six milk powder companies including MeadJohnson, Abbott and Fonterra were fined 669 million yuan ($108 million).

In August 2014, China levied a record fine of 1.235 billion yuan ($200 million) on 12 Japanese auto companies. In September, more than 20 insurance companies were fined 110 million yuan ($17 million). The latest move was on Sept 9, when China fined three cement companies 114.39 million yuan ($18 million).


Chamber of Commerce analyst Bai Ming said probes into these various sectors show that China's anti-monopoly effort is widening. Bai anticipated even more probes in the future.

The public has been hailing the moves, calling for probes into areas such as natural gas, real estate, electricity and banking.
 
.
1. Xi is the 2nd-gen Communist, his family have some Political Allies inside CPC.

2. Hu was no any family background there, he was selected by Deng XiaoPing from Tibet, but his teacher was the Hu YaoBang. Deng selected Hu as future CPC leader, but he's younger than Jiang, so Deng arranged Jiang as leader first then Hu.

3. U have to know, Deng never selected Jiang as his successor, Jiang was selected by Cheng Yun and there's no any better candidate in turbulent time of 1980s. Deng just had only one requirement, Jiang must support & insist of Deng's "reform and opening policies".

4. 1997 Deng gone, 2003 Jiang should peacefully transmit the chairman to Hu, but Jiang arranged & promoted many his men into Zhong NanHai of CPC and PLA. During 10 years Hu as the president of CPC just a puppet, around him most r Jiang's gang members. They were making money & corruption insde CPC and PLA.

5. Hu was the least powerful president of PRC, Jiang was behind him. Hu no any power in PLA, PLA controlled by Jiang's generals like Yu YongBo, Xu CaiHou, Guo BoXiong etc.

6. Xi tried to save CPC, what he do today is kicking Jiang's members off. Hu is Xi's friend and helper.

Today China is not that Mao's Red China, i think CPC more like KMT. Just watching Xi will do within 2014, they only have one chance.
please make me understand how can be CCP today more like KMT?
 
.
I think we can see where Xi is trying to lead both the party and the nation.

China in the era of Mao was a typical collectivist economy. Whole economy was virtually controlled by state and it was a very typical autarky that only made limited trade with it's allies (the eastern block). The problem experienced with that model was stagnant economic growth, due to lack of competition among stakeholders, inefficiency of an economy run from a single center, unable to challenge the wrong policies due to lack of democracy and free speech. The list can get longer and longer with more arguments yet still I guess I made my point about an autarky. By the way no autarky survived in the history of humanity.

However Mao was an important leader in Chinese history, because he was the first leader who could create a true nation from Chinese people with a mutual identity and a common "standardized" culture. In order to become a true nation people should have some common points and feel some form of "attachment" to all people living among the nation. Therefore despite Mao's great failure in the "great leap forward", he is a very important figure in Chinese history.

Deng Xiaoping was the leader who reformed the economy that was destined to stagnate with Mao's policies. He simply destroyed the Chinese collectivist economy in favor of state and individual capitalism (reforms) and destroyed the autarky to make trade with the whole world (opening up).

What we've seen in Chinese economy after Deng Xiaoping reforms was a Mixed Economy, relies on FDI, very limited domestic consumption with phenomenal saving rates. Main growth engines are : FDI, Exports, Infrastructure projects, SOE's. This model let China what it is today. It has a GDP per capita close to 7000$, it's the world's second largest economy, the country that broke the record for lifting the most of it's population from poverty in a single generation.

But is it maintainable? Definitely not, that's the point where Xi comes into play.

This anti-corruption campaign has two faces. The first face is really anti-corruption which is a Western argument against Chinese economy that has solid background (I know a great deal of arguments coming from western hemisphere to developing countries are baseless and biased and fuels a lot of stereotypes but this is not one of those). In order to protect the worldwide prestige of the Chinese economy this effort is a must.

Second face is crippling the inner-party resistence to Xi's reforms for getting to the 3rd phase of reforms. Remember Deng Xiaopeng's reforms started a chain of reaction and huge public resistence and that led to events at Tiananmen. Xi's reforms are also seeing resistence.

@LeveragedBuyout - In Xi's reforms you can see that he is promoting personal capitalism [1] [2]. Reform for leaving out the Mixed Economy and becoming a true Capitalist Economy is what Xi trying to do right now. Is it a solid policy improvement for corruption? Of course yes. Chinese SOE's are making trillions of dollars in revenues in a year. Of course the SOE's are "professionally" managed and they are being traded in various stock markets which makes the companies prestigious. However I think this trillions of dollars in revenue (billions in profit) makes the actual monetary motivation for corruption. Passing to personal capitalism will sure bring out some other forms of corruptions but those problems will be the problems of the next leadership.

- Mao brought China to early 19th century West (Nationalization)
- Deng Xiaoping brought China to early 20th century West (Mixed Economy)
- Xi is trying to bring China to post 1950's West (Personal Capitalism, Neoliberalism)

After Xi's reforms China will probably be transformed into a true bourgeois dictatorship just like US is right now. If China even can go the extra mile after 3-4 decades and strike a true balance between the power of elite and power of people it could end up being like Northern Europe (In my subjective opinion, currently the most developed state of the human society).

After Xi's reforms China's growth engines would be : More Infrastructure, FDI, Exports, Domestic Consumption, Private Companies, Innovation.

This model could at least save China for 3-4 decades if they could manage to transform to it. But so far they've done great.
 
.
I think we can see where Xi is trying to lead both the party and the nation.

China in the era of Mao was a typical collectivist economy. Whole economy was virtually controlled by state and it was a very typical autarky that only made limited trade with it's allies (the eastern block). The problem experienced with that model was stagnant economic growth, due to lack of competition among stakeholders, inefficiency of an economy run from a single center, unable to challenge the wrong policies due to lack of democracy and free speech. The list can get longer and longer with more arguments yet still I guess I made my point about an autarky. By the way no autarky survived in the history of humanity.

However Mao was an important leader in Chinese history, because he was the first leader who could create a true nation from Chinese people with a mutual identity and a common "standardized" culture. In order to become a true nation people should have some common points and feel some form of "attachment" to all people living among the nation. Therefore despite Mao's great failure in the "great leap forward", he is a very important figure in Chinese history.

Deng Xiaoping was the leader who reformed the economy that was destined to stagnate with Mao's policies. He simply destroyed the Chinese collectivist economy in favor of state and individual capitalism (reforms) and destroyed the autarky to make trade with the whole world (opening up).

What we've seen in Chinese economy after Deng Xiaoping reforms was a Mixed Economy, relies on FDI, very limited domestic consumption with phenomenal saving rates. Main growth engines are : FDI, Exports, Infrastructure projects, SOE's. This model let China what it is today. It has a GDP per capita close to 7000$, it's the world's second largest economy, the country that broke the record for lifting the most of it's population from poverty in a single generation.

But is it maintainable? Definitely not, that's the point where Xi comes into play.

This anti-corruption campaign has two faces. The first face is really anti-corruption which is a Western argument against Chinese economy that has solid background (I know a great deal of arguments coming from western hemisphere to developing countries are baseless and biased and fuels a lot of stereotypes but this is not one of those). In order to protect the worldwide prestige of the Chinese economy this effort is a must.

Second face is crippling the inner-party resistence to Xi's reforms for getting to the 3rd phase of reforms. Remember Deng Xiaopeng's reforms started a chain of reaction and huge public resistence and that led to events at Tiananmen. Xi's reforms are also seeing resistence.

@LeveragedBuyout - In Xi's reforms you can see that he is promoting personal capitalism [1] [2]. Reform for leaving out the Mixed Economy and becoming a true Capitalist Economy is what Xi trying to do right now. Is it a solid policy improvement for corruption? Of course yes. Chinese SOE's are making trillions of dollars in revenues in a year. Of course the SOE's are "professionally" managed and they are being traded in various stock markets which makes the companies prestigious. However I think this trillions of dollars in revenue (billions in profit) makes the actual monetary motivation for corruption. Passing to personal capitalism will sure bring out some other forms of corruptions but those problems will be the problems of the next leadership.

- Mao brought China to early 19th century West (Nationalization)
- Deng Xiaoping brought China to early 20th century West (Mixed Economy)
- Xi is trying to bring China to post 1950's West (Personal Capitalism, Neoliberalism)

After Xi's reforms China will probably be transformed into a true bourgeois dictatorship just like US is right now. If China even can go the extra mile after 3-4 decades and strike a true balance between the power of elite and power of people it could end up being like Northern Europe (In my subjective opinion, currently the most developed state of the human society).

After Xi's reforms China's growth engines would be : More Infrastructure, FDI, Exports, Domestic Consumption, Private Companies, Innovation.

This model could at least save China for 3-4 decades if they could manage to transform to it. But so far they've done great.

Excellent analysis. As @Genesis suggested, China will not model itself on the US, and that is perfectly fine. Instead, as I have discussed with @Chinese-Dragon and @Edison Chen , I believe that China will eventually come to resemble Singapore, with an authoritarian leadership, a capitalist society, and a nominal democracy. China has, for the most part, accomplished the first and second conditions. Its experiments in Hong Kong will eventually refine a system that will enable it to implement the third across the mainland. I agree that in making this transition, it will secure the next phase of development for decades to come.
 
.
Back
Top Bottom