Time to shun the past
By Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Wednesday, 22 Jul, 2009
A policy of confrontation with India contains within itself the seeds of our destruction and must be avoided like the plague. It has become a millstone around our neck. At the heart of Pakistans foreign and security policies lies India and at the heart of our India policy lies Kashmir, Pakistans jugular vein as the countrys founder described it.
Kashmir has bedeviled Pakistan-India relations, is the source of insecurity and instability in the region and a cause of serious concern for the international community.
India reneged on its commitments to Pakistan, the United Nations and the Kashmiris to the holding of a plebiscite in the state. Six rounds of Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks, focused entirely on Kashmir, in 1962-3, proved inconclusive. The negotiations took place in the wake of Indias Himalayan debacle at the hands of China and on the serious prodding of the United States and Great Britain.
Having exhausted the path of diplomacy with an intransigent India, Pakistan embarked on a strategy to bring India to the table in a serious and meaningful engagement on the dispute. In 1965 Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in a bid to get Kashmiris to rise against their Indian occupiers. That did not happen. Instead, Pakistan and India got involved in a full-scale war, which neither could afford. After 17 days both were exhausted.
Whatever implications the war might have had for India, its consequences for Pakistan were disastrous. The perceived economic growth that Pakistan had been enjoying for several years and which was widely quoted as a model for Third World countries came to an abrupt halt. Western sanctions were imposed on Pakistan; East Pakistanis were extremely disenchanted leading Mujibur Rahman to launch his six-point programme and the country was engulfed in political turmoil. Six years later Pakistan was embroiled in another war with India. Its outcome was the disintegration of the country.
The East Pakistan tragedy should have prompted an earnest and urgent review of our policy towards India. The security establishment, however, was successful in having recommendations of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report, which called for the trial of Gen Yahya and his confederacy of generals, shelved. It also managed to have high priority assigned and substantial resources allocated to the rebuilding of the armed forces. After all, East Pakistan had to be avenged.
The military, once again, began to loom large in Pakistans politics leading to its logical conclusion. Not only was the democratic government overthrown in a coup détat, but Pakistans most popular and accomplished prime minister was dispatched to the gallows.
The Indian factor again played a major role in Pakistans reaction to the Soviet Unions invasion of Afghanistan. The military dictator, who had usurped power on July 5, 1977, enthusiastically embraced the US which lent a new lease of life to his shaky and sanctioned government. The uni-dimensional military-based relationship with the US improved the military balance vis-à-vis India.
The victory of the Mujahideen against a superpower prompted him and his coterie of generals to (a) adopt the strategic depth doctrine by ensuring that the new regime in Kabul should be so ingratiated to Pakistan as to invariably do its bidding; (b) employ the CIA-ISI Mujahideen model, successfully used in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, against India in occupied Kashmir. The former strategy led to the emergence of the Taliban Frankenstein; the latter to such jihadi outfits as the Lashkar-i-Taiba, Jaish-i-Mohammad and the Harkat-ul-Ansar.
It did not take long for Al Qaeda, the Taliban and others to establish a nexus for the use of terror against their adversaries. Neither were the Taliban able to provide strategic depth, nor were the jihadis able to coerce India into settling the Kashmir dispute. The policy, in fact, dangerously backfired, with these battle-hardened and self-sustaining militants posing an existentialist threat to Pakistan itself.
As if the failure of our strategy was not enough of a setback, an emboldened military embarked upon a course that brought serious embarrassment and disgrace to the country. The overthrow in October 1999 of a legally constituted, democratically elected popular government was a direct consequence of the Kargil episode once again the outcome of our policy of confronting India.
The multiple wars and skirmishes with India (futile at best) and the ensuing instability and insecurity in the region have adversely impacted on the internal political dynamics of Pakistan. The imbalance of a powerful military and a fragile democracy has seriously undermined the political process and impaired the healthy growth of civil institutions. The pursuit of highly ambitious and inherently unrealistic policies of strategic depth and coercive diplomacy have overstretched our limited resources and subjected our foreign relations to avoidable stresses.
A policy of confrontation with India and its close cousins militancy and coup détats contains within itself the seeds of our destruction and must be avoided like the plague. It has become a millstone around our neck.
The real threat to Pakistan comes not from India, but from militant extremism. The second biggest source of instability emanates, also not from India, but from the widespread poverty and the low levels of human development that characterise our society. We need to divert the enormous time and resources that we continue to invest in our confrontation with India towards fighting militancy and getting rid of the all-pervasive poverty, ignorance and disease.
Pakistans history and its present precarious condition demand a serious and honest appraisal of its traditional India policy with the objective of establishing a close, cooperative and tension-free relationship. Realpolitik and sound common sense dictate that Pakistan and India should live in peace and friendship.
The proposed change in our India policy is not tantamount to an acceptance of Indias hegemony. On the contrary, an economically vibrant, politically stable, socially cohesive nuclear Pakistan with 170 million economically empowered, healthy and educated citizens should be able to exude enough confidence and maturity to deter any entity contemplating domination.
Where do I begin?
A policy of confrontation with India contains within itself the seeds of our destruction and must be avoided like the plague.
What Pakistan has is a defense policy, a policy of actively countering Indian hegemony in South Asia. In fact, this in itself contributes a lot to regional peace, the fact that we have a powerful military allows for negotiations and peace time. So, the answer is not to cut back on military spending especially at a crucial juncture in this historical period and the threats we are facing, WoT, Baluchistan separatism, and foreign covert aggression, and as always Kashmir liberation.
Six years later Pakistan was embroiled in another war with India. Its outcome was the disintegration of the country.
The East Pakistan tragedy should have prompted an earnest and urgent review of our policy towards India.
Pakistan did not instigate this event nor was it the provocateur (1971) war. Indian RAW was covertly supporting, training, and arming Mukti Bahini and East Pakistani insurgents years before 1971, this is an act of War by India. The article tries to present this event as if it was caused by "Pakistan's policy of confrontation."
The overthrow in October 1999 of a legally constituted, democratically elected popular government was a direct consequence of the Kargil episode once again the outcome of our policy of confronting India.
Or maybe this was an outcome of bad political leadership and corrupt practices. Besides, the Kargil event help give Gen. Musharraf an opportunity to rise to Presidential Power, which brought positive economic growth rate, economic recovery, foreign investment, foreign aid, Gwadar project initialization and development. Though I understand historian will see this event as the exception and not the rule, Nonetheless my earlier point is accurate as well.
The real threat to Pakistan comes not from India, but from militant extremism. The second biggest source of instability emanates, also not from India, but from the widespread poverty and the low levels of human development that characterise our society. We need to divert the enormous time and resources that we continue to invest in our confrontation with India towards fighting militancy and getting rid of the all-pervasive poverty, ignorance and disease."
Intelligence agency, media, journalist, and Army personnel have suggested and indicated that many of the Militants receive support-weaponry, funding, and more from Indian RAW. So the point the author makes is flawed and illogical.
No one is denying economic hardship and low levels of human development are harmful to the Nation's health, but I am sick and tired of this pathetic and illogical argument that the reason we have low levels of human development, poverty, and 50% literacy, is because of our defense procurements and expenditure. Pakistan spends around 4-5% of it's National GDP on military expenditure this amount is simply not enough to cause a lack of funding for education, health care, infrastructure, schools, and more.
Pakistan can maintain it's military expenditure and still invest significantly in other areas of national development.
We need to divert the enormous time and resources that we continue to invest in our confrontation with India towards fighting militancy and getting rid of the all-pervasive poverty, ignorance and disease."
Yes we should divert enormous time and resources, but this does not come at the expense of challenging Indian hegemony. I understand this may seem as a dilemma for some, but the problem is bad leadership and lack of visionary leaders with discipline and greatness.
Is it time to shun the past? I don't agree with the premise of this question, because these are contemporary issues.
I would like to add, I understand fatigue is growing but previous Muslim generations when confronted with an enemy a kaffir enemy especially they had struggled with that enemy for decades. I'm sure others said let's just make peace or let's just quit fighting, but wise people prevailed and understood that it is not time to put away the Sword.
We are locked in a long strategic confrontation. The sooner people understand this the better.
Understand that Jerusalem was occupied by the Crusaders (in 1099 c.e) for proximately a hundred years before the Muslims recaptured the city under Gen. Salahuddin (may Allah be pleased with him).
People need to learn it takes time, and it will take time.
I would like to remind the Muslim members an interesting quote by a great Muslim leader, you really ought to think about the principal he is promoted that led him and the Muslims to victory in their "policy of confrontation"...
Around the period of 1111-1112 (Siege of Tyre), the Crusaders launched an offensive to capture the Muslim city of Tyre. The people of Tyre specifically Imams and Army personnel there asked Zahir al-Din Atabek The Governor General of Damascus for help in defending Tyre from the Franks-Crusaders, understanding this would put a tremendous burden and strain on Damascus and Zahir al-Din Atabek militarily and financially they promised to give the city of Tyre to him.
After the siege and battle, Crusaders were defeated. Gov. Gen. Zahir Al-Din successfully defended the Muslim city of Tyre from the kaffirs, he was praised as a hero and champion. Not only did he defeat the Crusaders but he dealt a crushing blow to the enemy around 2,000 Crusaders killed and the Muslims suffered 400 deaths...After the victory, the people of Tyre did not give up the city to Zahir al-Din Atabek as promised. Zahir Al-Din Atabek humbly suggested he did not want that either.
And do you know what he said?
"What I have done I have done only for the sake of Allah and the Muslims, nor out of desire for wealth and kingdom. -Gov. Gen. Zahir Al-Din Atabek
He then returned to Damascus, after many bloody engagements and with financial, military, and health hardships...
P.S I know there are some difference between the two situations but the fundamentals are quite relevant.
