Bratva
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
- Joined
- Jun 8, 2010
- Messages
- 13,832
- Reaction score
- 67
- Country
- Location
Yes. My mistake, i should have corrected it.
The Untold Story | The Real Father of Pakistan's Nuclear Progarm.
- Thread starter Chanakyaa
- Start date
Yes. My mistake, i should have corrected it.
Manticore
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jan 18, 2009
- Messages
- 10,115
- Reaction score
- 114
- Country
- Location
Pakistan's Nuclear Past as Prologue
Frank Klotz
|
March 12, 2013
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb.
The rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to be cause for serious concern. Since partition in 1947, the two countries have fought one another in three major wars and clashed in a number of more limited military engagements. Disputes over territory and a host of other issues persist. Earlier this year, skirmishes on the “line of control” in Kashmir reportedly left three Pakistani and two Indian soldiers dead. Political leaders in both New Delhi and Islamabad predictably responded with angry rhetoric. It is after all an election year in Pakistan—and campaigning is practically a year-round activity in India’s huge federal system.
Because both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states, the stakes of any armed conflict between the two countries are potentially enormous. Scholars disagree on the extent to which the very existence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent may have lowered the prospects for all-out war during the past decade or so. Yet, even if nuclear weapons have had a deterrent effect, the potential for interstate violence nevertheless remains—and, with it, the ever-present possibility that some future crisis could escalate out of control regardless of what national leaders might actually intend. The consequences could be horrific not only for the region, but for the entire world.
Both India and Pakistan espouse a policy of “minimum deterrence”—though neither side has precisely defined what this actually means. Today, they each possess a stockpile of roughly one hundred nuclear weapons—with Pakistan having slightly more than its neighbor. While these are relatively modest numbers compared to those of the United States and Russia, the two countries are currently expanding their respective nuclear capabilities beyond their existing nuclear-capable fighter aircraft and medium-range land-based missiles. India is now conducting sea trials for its first indigenously produced nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (the Arihant). Less than a year ago, it also tested a ballistic missile (the Agni V) capable of reaching Beijing. For its part, Pakistan is said to be developing tactical nuclear warheads to mount atop a new, sixty kilometer-range mobile missile, the Nasr. Both sides are also reportedly taking steps to expand their capabilities to produce fissile materials.
These new programs reflect differing assessments of the threat each country faces. China’s economic rise and growing ability to project military power beyond its borders loom large in India’s strategic calculations. While both China and India have a “no-first-use” policy regarding nuclear weapons, Indian strategists have for years cited China’s nuclear capability as the principal rationale for developing Indian nuclear weapons—though perhaps they would be as much a symbol of national power as a deterrent force. Pakistan, on the other hand, seems most concerned about mitigating the imbalance in conventional military power created by India’s advantages in manpower and resources.
The Relevance of History
But weapons-development programs are not just a function of perceived threats. The momentum of past decisions also plays a role. This has certainly been the case in the United States. Choices made a half-century ago concerning the size and nature of the American nuclear forces, as well the complex of nuclear-weapon laboratories and production plants, continue to affect and constrain U.S. nuclear-weapons policy today. The same no doubt holds true for India and Pakistan. Their separate nuclear legacies will influence the course of the arms competition between them, as well as the prospects for confidence-building measures that could help avert a nuclear confrontation.
For this reason, an understanding of South Asia’s nuclear past is essential to assessing its nuclear future. The history of India’s nuclear-weapons program has been well documented. Though first published over a decade ago, George Perkovich’s India's Nuclear Bomb, remains essential reading for its comprehensive and compelling account of India’s often ambivalent pursuit of nuclear weapons. More recent works, especially retired Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara’s Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, provide informed and insightful updates on the current status of India’s nuclear forces. Until recently, however, one would have been hard pressed to find a full account of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program between the covers of a single book. While several studies have dealt with specific aspects of the story, such as A. Q. Khan’s notorious nuclear-proliferation network, or provided details on current policies and capabilities, a single, comprehensive history had yet to be written.
Fortunately, Feroz Hassan Khan’s Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb fills this gap in the literature. In this important and impressive new work, Khan traces the development of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program from partition to the present, examining, in his own words, “how and why Pakistan managed to overcome the wide array of obstacles that stood between it and nuclear weapons.”
Khan, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, confesses that chronicling Pakistan’s nuclear history was no easy task. Aside from the highly classified nature of many aspects of the program, the author also had to contend with the conflicting narratives offered by rival personalities, laboratories and institutions. Fortunately, Khan succeeds admirably in sifting through published accounts and weaving in details and anecdotes from his numerous interviews with key participants. Though he personally denies that the book is an “insider account,” his background as a former brigadier in the Pakistani army and a former director in the Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Services Headquarters—which essentially controls Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal—obviously served him well in assembling the pieces of the puzzle into an intelligible whole, as well as a highly readable narrative.
From Reluctance to Resolve
The book takes its title from a 1965 quote attributed to then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that if India developed an atomic bomb, then Pakistan would follow suit “even if we have to feed on grass and leaves…” But as Feroz Khan points out, not everyone in Pakistan initially shared Bhutto’s fervor. Rather, for most of the 1950s and 1960s, a period dominated by the leadership of President Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s approach was decidedly cautious.
Fearing the potential political and economic repercussions of overtly pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani government and nuclear establishment concentrated instead on training a cadre of scientist and engineers and on developing the capability to indigenously build power plants. The Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program, including the opportunity for Pakistanis to study in American universities, played a crucial role in this regard. While such efforts could be considered necessary precursors to an active nuclear weapons program, that apparently was not Pakistan’s principal objective at the time. As Feroz Khan puts it, “… Ayub never explicitly rejected the bomb option. He simply decided not to decide.”
The catalyst for changing course was the shattering defeat Pakistan suffered at the hands of the Indian army in the 1971 war, during which Pakistan lost half of its territory (when East Pakistan broke away to become Bangladesh). Khan argues that a sense of “never again” and a corresponding inability (or unwillingness) to rely upon allies have been powerful motivators for some countries to “go nuclear,” most notably China and Israel. The same held true for Pakistan. It also made a difference that Bhutto came to power in the war’s immediate aftermath. Almost immediately, he abruptly changed the leadership of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and set it on a path to developing a nuclear weapon. After India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974, there was essentially no turning back for Pakistan.
The Pakistani program, however, was beset by a host of challenges. Sectarian prejudices, particularly against members of the Ahmadi sect, meant that some highly capable nuclear scientists and engineers were deliberately excluded from important segments of the program. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 also thinned the ranks of trained and experienced specialists. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States and other nations became increasingly concerned with the potential danger of nuclear proliferation and began to progressively restrict the flow of enabling technologies to would-be proliferators. Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were completed in 1968.
Thus, by the time Bhutto launched a nuclear-weapon program in earnest, Pakistan was forced, in Feroz Khan’s words, to “tap into any and every source that would help Pakistan complete its fuel cycle. Where rules were lax, critical supplies were procured from the West, and when nonproliferation barriers increased, those supplies were found by other, less explicit means.” Chinese assistance with materials and designs at various stages also played a pivotal role. The author, however, rejects the notion that Pakistan’s ultimate success was simply the result of a “stolen program.” He argues instead that indigenous intellectual capital and making do with existing technologies—which he characterizes with the Punjabi term joogaardh—were indispensable elements of Pakistan’s overall effort.
Perhaps one of the more fascinating aspects of Eating Grass is its description of the intense institutional rivalries that plagued the Pakistani program. The author calls this chapter of the story the “clash of the Khans,” involving Munir Ahmad Khan, chairman of the PAEC from 1972 to 1991, and the now infamous A.Q. Khan, director of the Engineering (later renamed Khan) Research Laboratory (KRL) from 1976 to 2001. Intense personal jealousies led to bickering and constant maneuvering for political favor. The two organizations also differed on substantive technical issues, including the best path to developing a weapon (reprocessing plutonium versus enriching uranium) and the best approach to developing ballistic missiles (solid-fuel versus liquid-fuel).
In some respects, the competition may have helped provide the impetus needed to overcome numerous obstacles. But while the KRL played a crucial role in providing the enriched uranium the program used in its weapon design, the PAEC came out ahead in the end. When Pakistan ultimately decided to test nuclear weapons in May 1998—a decision the author asserts was forced by India’s nuclear weapons tests just days before—the Pakistani army assigned PAEC the lead, while the KRL team played only a supporting role.
The 1998 tests were by no means the end of the story. Pakistan still faced the challenge of transforming a demonstrated capability into an operational deterrent. Feroz Khan provides a detailed account of this process, drawing upon his firsthand knowledge as an original member of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). On several occasions, the author directly refers to the role he and his erstwhile colleagues played, thus giving rise to some concerns about objectivity. On the other hand, Khan is able to supply detail and nuance that may not otherwise be clear from the available record. He concludes that the establishment and growth of the SPD professionalized Pakistan’s nuclear capability, by providing “systematic control over strategic organizations” and establishing measures to protect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and guard against unauthorized use. He also credits the SPD’s increasing oversight of all aspects of the nuclear weapon program, including its finances, for ultimately unraveling A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network and his dismissal as KRL director in April 2001.
Prospects for the Future
In Feroz Khan’s view, in a country riven by sectarian and ethnic divisions, the need for nuclear weapons is the one thing upon which all Pakistanis agree. While most countries reacted with considerable dismay to the 1998 tests, the Pakistanis were jubilant. Their country had overcome long odds to build a nuclear weapon, despite starting with a weak technological base and facing strong countervailing pressure from the West. Moreover, Pakistanis felt they now had an answer to India’s larger conventional military capabilities.
But it is worth asking whether the national-security benefits gained from having a bomb were commensurate with the cost incurred in building it. As noted earlier, nuclear weapons may arguably have played a role in deterring another major war with neighboring India. Yet Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have not fundamentally redressed the conventional military imbalance between the two countries, which may grow even more lopsided as India continues its significant modernization effort. It is also not clear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will deter a major Indian military response to another terrorist incident, such as the 2008 attack in Mumbai, especially if that response is deliberately tailored not to cross any presumed Pakistani nuclear “red lines.” Finally, nuclear weapons do not deal with other pressing threats to Pakistan’s stability, which Feroz Khan describes as “domestic dissension and internal conflict” resulting from a failure “to bring harmony and nationalism to a religiously homogenous but ethnically and linguistically diverse people.”
Ironically, the sense of humiliation and isolation that gave rise to its nuclear-weapons program in the first place, may also still be a factor in Pakistan’s thinking, though in a different guise than before. Pakistan has clearly chafed at the U.S. civil nuclear agreement with India and its subsequent efforts to integrate India into international nuclear-control regimes—while not making similar overtures toward Pakistan. Aside from hardening Pakistan’s opposition to a multilateral ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, it perpetuates Pakistan’s sense that it is isolated and forced to rely solely upon itself in protecting its national security.
Under these conditions, the prospects for Pakistan limiting or even scaling back its nuclear program must be considered remote, particularly as long as the potential for major conflict with India persists. Indeed, given current trends, the more likely near-term outcome is for a continued build up and increasing diversification of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan is widely reputed to have the fastest-growing nuclear-weapon stockpile in the world. Given reported plans to expand its plutonium production capacity with additional nuclear reactors at Khushab and completion of the Chashma reprocessing facility, Pakistan clearly looks to be in the nuclear-weapons business for the long haul.
Feroz Khan’s account clearly demonstrates that Pakistanis in the end did have to “eat grass” to build the bomb. The resources devoted to the nuclear-weapons program came at the expense of investment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure. The increasingly onerous sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries adversely impacted economic and military assistance, as well as overseas educational opportunities for Pakistani scientists. Pakistan’s current plans mean that the sacrifice of lost investment opportunities will continue. For unless and until its nuclear ambitions are tempered by a more circumscribed approach to “minimum deterrence” and actual progress in adopting both conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures with India, Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon program will consume precious resources for years to come.
Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret.) is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, and the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
Commentary: Pakistan's Nuclear Past as Prologue | The National Interest
Frank Klotz
|
March 12, 2013
Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb.
The rivalry between India and Pakistan continues to be cause for serious concern. Since partition in 1947, the two countries have fought one another in three major wars and clashed in a number of more limited military engagements. Disputes over territory and a host of other issues persist. Earlier this year, skirmishes on the “line of control” in Kashmir reportedly left three Pakistani and two Indian soldiers dead. Political leaders in both New Delhi and Islamabad predictably responded with angry rhetoric. It is after all an election year in Pakistan—and campaigning is practically a year-round activity in India’s huge federal system.
Because both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states, the stakes of any armed conflict between the two countries are potentially enormous. Scholars disagree on the extent to which the very existence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent may have lowered the prospects for all-out war during the past decade or so. Yet, even if nuclear weapons have had a deterrent effect, the potential for interstate violence nevertheless remains—and, with it, the ever-present possibility that some future crisis could escalate out of control regardless of what national leaders might actually intend. The consequences could be horrific not only for the region, but for the entire world.
Both India and Pakistan espouse a policy of “minimum deterrence”—though neither side has precisely defined what this actually means. Today, they each possess a stockpile of roughly one hundred nuclear weapons—with Pakistan having slightly more than its neighbor. While these are relatively modest numbers compared to those of the United States and Russia, the two countries are currently expanding their respective nuclear capabilities beyond their existing nuclear-capable fighter aircraft and medium-range land-based missiles. India is now conducting sea trials for its first indigenously produced nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (the Arihant). Less than a year ago, it also tested a ballistic missile (the Agni V) capable of reaching Beijing. For its part, Pakistan is said to be developing tactical nuclear warheads to mount atop a new, sixty kilometer-range mobile missile, the Nasr. Both sides are also reportedly taking steps to expand their capabilities to produce fissile materials.
These new programs reflect differing assessments of the threat each country faces. China’s economic rise and growing ability to project military power beyond its borders loom large in India’s strategic calculations. While both China and India have a “no-first-use” policy regarding nuclear weapons, Indian strategists have for years cited China’s nuclear capability as the principal rationale for developing Indian nuclear weapons—though perhaps they would be as much a symbol of national power as a deterrent force. Pakistan, on the other hand, seems most concerned about mitigating the imbalance in conventional military power created by India’s advantages in manpower and resources.
The Relevance of History
But weapons-development programs are not just a function of perceived threats. The momentum of past decisions also plays a role. This has certainly been the case in the United States. Choices made a half-century ago concerning the size and nature of the American nuclear forces, as well the complex of nuclear-weapon laboratories and production plants, continue to affect and constrain U.S. nuclear-weapons policy today. The same no doubt holds true for India and Pakistan. Their separate nuclear legacies will influence the course of the arms competition between them, as well as the prospects for confidence-building measures that could help avert a nuclear confrontation.
For this reason, an understanding of South Asia’s nuclear past is essential to assessing its nuclear future. The history of India’s nuclear-weapons program has been well documented. Though first published over a decade ago, George Perkovich’s India's Nuclear Bomb, remains essential reading for its comprehensive and compelling account of India’s often ambivalent pursuit of nuclear weapons. More recent works, especially retired Vice Admiral Verghese Koithara’s Managing India’s Nuclear Forces, provide informed and insightful updates on the current status of India’s nuclear forces. Until recently, however, one would have been hard pressed to find a full account of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program between the covers of a single book. While several studies have dealt with specific aspects of the story, such as A. Q. Khan’s notorious nuclear-proliferation network, or provided details on current policies and capabilities, a single, comprehensive history had yet to be written.
Fortunately, Feroz Hassan Khan’s Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb fills this gap in the literature. In this important and impressive new work, Khan traces the development of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program from partition to the present, examining, in his own words, “how and why Pakistan managed to overcome the wide array of obstacles that stood between it and nuclear weapons.”
Khan, a lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, confesses that chronicling Pakistan’s nuclear history was no easy task. Aside from the highly classified nature of many aspects of the program, the author also had to contend with the conflicting narratives offered by rival personalities, laboratories and institutions. Fortunately, Khan succeeds admirably in sifting through published accounts and weaving in details and anecdotes from his numerous interviews with key participants. Though he personally denies that the book is an “insider account,” his background as a former brigadier in the Pakistani army and a former director in the Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Services Headquarters—which essentially controls Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal—obviously served him well in assembling the pieces of the puzzle into an intelligible whole, as well as a highly readable narrative.
From Reluctance to Resolve
The book takes its title from a 1965 quote attributed to then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that if India developed an atomic bomb, then Pakistan would follow suit “even if we have to feed on grass and leaves…” But as Feroz Khan points out, not everyone in Pakistan initially shared Bhutto’s fervor. Rather, for most of the 1950s and 1960s, a period dominated by the leadership of President Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s approach was decidedly cautious.
Fearing the potential political and economic repercussions of overtly pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani government and nuclear establishment concentrated instead on training a cadre of scientist and engineers and on developing the capability to indigenously build power plants. The Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” program, including the opportunity for Pakistanis to study in American universities, played a crucial role in this regard. While such efforts could be considered necessary precursors to an active nuclear weapons program, that apparently was not Pakistan’s principal objective at the time. As Feroz Khan puts it, “… Ayub never explicitly rejected the bomb option. He simply decided not to decide.”
The catalyst for changing course was the shattering defeat Pakistan suffered at the hands of the Indian army in the 1971 war, during which Pakistan lost half of its territory (when East Pakistan broke away to become Bangladesh). Khan argues that a sense of “never again” and a corresponding inability (or unwillingness) to rely upon allies have been powerful motivators for some countries to “go nuclear,” most notably China and Israel. The same held true for Pakistan. It also made a difference that Bhutto came to power in the war’s immediate aftermath. Almost immediately, he abruptly changed the leadership of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and set it on a path to developing a nuclear weapon. After India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974, there was essentially no turning back for Pakistan.
The Pakistani program, however, was beset by a host of challenges. Sectarian prejudices, particularly against members of the Ahmadi sect, meant that some highly capable nuclear scientists and engineers were deliberately excluded from important segments of the program. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 also thinned the ranks of trained and experienced specialists. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the United States and other nations became increasingly concerned with the potential danger of nuclear proliferation and began to progressively restrict the flow of enabling technologies to would-be proliferators. Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were completed in 1968.
Thus, by the time Bhutto launched a nuclear-weapon program in earnest, Pakistan was forced, in Feroz Khan’s words, to “tap into any and every source that would help Pakistan complete its fuel cycle. Where rules were lax, critical supplies were procured from the West, and when nonproliferation barriers increased, those supplies were found by other, less explicit means.” Chinese assistance with materials and designs at various stages also played a pivotal role. The author, however, rejects the notion that Pakistan’s ultimate success was simply the result of a “stolen program.” He argues instead that indigenous intellectual capital and making do with existing technologies—which he characterizes with the Punjabi term joogaardh—were indispensable elements of Pakistan’s overall effort.
Perhaps one of the more fascinating aspects of Eating Grass is its description of the intense institutional rivalries that plagued the Pakistani program. The author calls this chapter of the story the “clash of the Khans,” involving Munir Ahmad Khan, chairman of the PAEC from 1972 to 1991, and the now infamous A.Q. Khan, director of the Engineering (later renamed Khan) Research Laboratory (KRL) from 1976 to 2001. Intense personal jealousies led to bickering and constant maneuvering for political favor. The two organizations also differed on substantive technical issues, including the best path to developing a weapon (reprocessing plutonium versus enriching uranium) and the best approach to developing ballistic missiles (solid-fuel versus liquid-fuel).
In some respects, the competition may have helped provide the impetus needed to overcome numerous obstacles. But while the KRL played a crucial role in providing the enriched uranium the program used in its weapon design, the PAEC came out ahead in the end. When Pakistan ultimately decided to test nuclear weapons in May 1998—a decision the author asserts was forced by India’s nuclear weapons tests just days before—the Pakistani army assigned PAEC the lead, while the KRL team played only a supporting role.
The 1998 tests were by no means the end of the story. Pakistan still faced the challenge of transforming a demonstrated capability into an operational deterrent. Feroz Khan provides a detailed account of this process, drawing upon his firsthand knowledge as an original member of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). On several occasions, the author directly refers to the role he and his erstwhile colleagues played, thus giving rise to some concerns about objectivity. On the other hand, Khan is able to supply detail and nuance that may not otherwise be clear from the available record. He concludes that the establishment and growth of the SPD professionalized Pakistan’s nuclear capability, by providing “systematic control over strategic organizations” and establishing measures to protect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and guard against unauthorized use. He also credits the SPD’s increasing oversight of all aspects of the nuclear weapon program, including its finances, for ultimately unraveling A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network and his dismissal as KRL director in April 2001.
Prospects for the Future
In Feroz Khan’s view, in a country riven by sectarian and ethnic divisions, the need for nuclear weapons is the one thing upon which all Pakistanis agree. While most countries reacted with considerable dismay to the 1998 tests, the Pakistanis were jubilant. Their country had overcome long odds to build a nuclear weapon, despite starting with a weak technological base and facing strong countervailing pressure from the West. Moreover, Pakistanis felt they now had an answer to India’s larger conventional military capabilities.
But it is worth asking whether the national-security benefits gained from having a bomb were commensurate with the cost incurred in building it. As noted earlier, nuclear weapons may arguably have played a role in deterring another major war with neighboring India. Yet Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have not fundamentally redressed the conventional military imbalance between the two countries, which may grow even more lopsided as India continues its significant modernization effort. It is also not clear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will deter a major Indian military response to another terrorist incident, such as the 2008 attack in Mumbai, especially if that response is deliberately tailored not to cross any presumed Pakistani nuclear “red lines.” Finally, nuclear weapons do not deal with other pressing threats to Pakistan’s stability, which Feroz Khan describes as “domestic dissension and internal conflict” resulting from a failure “to bring harmony and nationalism to a religiously homogenous but ethnically and linguistically diverse people.”
Ironically, the sense of humiliation and isolation that gave rise to its nuclear-weapons program in the first place, may also still be a factor in Pakistan’s thinking, though in a different guise than before. Pakistan has clearly chafed at the U.S. civil nuclear agreement with India and its subsequent efforts to integrate India into international nuclear-control regimes—while not making similar overtures toward Pakistan. Aside from hardening Pakistan’s opposition to a multilateral ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, it perpetuates Pakistan’s sense that it is isolated and forced to rely solely upon itself in protecting its national security.
Under these conditions, the prospects for Pakistan limiting or even scaling back its nuclear program must be considered remote, particularly as long as the potential for major conflict with India persists. Indeed, given current trends, the more likely near-term outcome is for a continued build up and increasing diversification of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Pakistan is widely reputed to have the fastest-growing nuclear-weapon stockpile in the world. Given reported plans to expand its plutonium production capacity with additional nuclear reactors at Khushab and completion of the Chashma reprocessing facility, Pakistan clearly looks to be in the nuclear-weapons business for the long haul.
Feroz Khan’s account clearly demonstrates that Pakistanis in the end did have to “eat grass” to build the bomb. The resources devoted to the nuclear-weapons program came at the expense of investment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure. The increasingly onerous sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries adversely impacted economic and military assistance, as well as overseas educational opportunities for Pakistani scientists. Pakistan’s current plans mean that the sacrifice of lost investment opportunities will continue. For unless and until its nuclear ambitions are tempered by a more circumscribed approach to “minimum deterrence” and actual progress in adopting both conventional and nuclear confidence-building measures with India, Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon program will consume precious resources for years to come.
Lt Gen Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret.) is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, and the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command.
Commentary: Pakistan's Nuclear Past as Prologue | The National Interest
W.11
BANNED
- Joined
- Jan 20, 2011
- Messages
- 15,032
- Reaction score
- -32
- Country
- Location
the conclusion is everybody played his vital part in the development of nuclear bomb for pakistan these low life indians can try to undermine our people but they are all equally respectable
the low lives who had nothing better in their lives then to be salesmen like some peole here have no idea how much dedicated their efforts were for developing us as nuclear power
so i dont care if it was munir A khan or abdul qadeer khan, every body played his role equally well
the low lives who had nothing better in their lives then to be salesmen like some peole here have no idea how much dedicated their efforts were for developing us as nuclear power
so i dont care if it was munir A khan or abdul qadeer khan, every body played his role equally well
qamar1990
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 25, 2012
- Messages
- 5,930
- Reaction score
- -4
- Country
- Location
aq khan is not a scape goat cheapster
becuase of him and his uranium program we were able to test ours at the right time.
he is one of the father of our nuclear program and better pakistani then you will ever be in your life.
Umair Nawaz
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 10, 2012
- Messages
- 13,407
- Reaction score
- -20
- Country
- Location
The comment from a typical ignorant man.
SBD-3
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 19, 2008
- Messages
- 15,120
- Reaction score
- -9
- Country
- Location
Ma Tayya used to work in PAEC and he was also of the view that the role of Dr AQ khan at KRL was to enrich uranium to fuel the bomb and the way he took the sole credit for the bomb was a source of great dis-grunt in PAEC since the bomb design, mining and all other facilities were completed by PAEC. He told me that PAEC had been able to achieve enormously from a very bleak picture. For Pakistanis the subject of Nuclear physics and allied branches had been forbidden for Docs and Post-Docs in Europe and US. Even the Dr.Abdus Salam's institute didn't accept Pakistani applicants and the institution was mainly dominated by Indian students. PAEC's attempts to convert the bomb to Plutonium (by building Khushab reactor) are nothing short of a marvel in itself.
The standards of PIEAS are so rigorous that one of my cousin refused to accept their offer. When he told me, i was kind of shocked and asked him why is he doing so? He plainly replied me,"I Dont wana spend a life where I am expected to take a book along with me even to toilet." Though I don't agree with his exaggeration but PAEC has really set herself some standards.
The standards of PIEAS are so rigorous that one of my cousin refused to accept their offer. When he told me, i was kind of shocked and asked him why is he doing so? He plainly replied me,"I Dont wana spend a life where I am expected to take a book along with me even to toilet." Though I don't agree with his exaggeration but PAEC has really set herself some standards.
Nuclear Spirit
FULL MEMBER
New Recruit
- Joined
- Jul 23, 2013
- Messages
- 4
- Reaction score
- 0
There are no fathers and mothers of any programe but rather a team effort. A nuclear fuel cycle requires literally thousands of process which require thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians. A.Q was the head of only one part i.e. uranium enrichment. To call him the father is grssly misleading.
On another note A.Q Khan never stole URENCO's centrifuge technology. He was tried in the dutch court however he was honourably set free of all such blames. The centrifuge technology was already published in many scientific journals since 1930's. Although
Althoug it is well know A.Q Khan has a habit of show boasting and claiming credit for others.
On another note A.Q Khan never stole URENCO's centrifuge technology. He was tried in the dutch court however he was honourably set free of all such blames. The centrifuge technology was already published in many scientific journals since 1930's. Although
Althoug it is well know A.Q Khan has a habit of show boasting and claiming credit for others.
JawadSatti
FULL MEMBER
New Recruit
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2013
- Messages
- 1
- Reaction score
- 0
i think do little research about your Nuclear Program India Also Take Technology From US Govt So why China Give His Technology to Pakistan
XYON
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 20, 2008
- Messages
- 1,719
- Reaction score
- 2
- Country
- Location
Munir Ahmed Khan was an American covert deep implant in the PAEC from the beginning. His wife was a foreigner (as that of AQ Khan) and his prime purpose was to keep Pakistan Nuclear Program at a threshold not exceeding weaponization. When things got out his hand and decision was made at the top for advancement of weaponization in nukes, he started filtering inside information to the US CIA. This is the reason that Pakistani nuclear program faced a lot of problems post 1980's in import of dual use technologies from the US. It was his information that lead to many of the Pakistani nuke equipment purchase operatives working around the world were arrested by the US and other European Governments.
He was not the father of the nuke program rather a snake in the armpits of Pakistan! Dr. A Q Khan was his nemesis and which is the reason why Bhutto encouraged A Q Khan to set up the KRL labs as an independent entity. With all his short comings I have more respect for A Q Khan than I have for Munir Ahmed Khan. One was a spy with no trace of his family in Pakistan; and the other is still a patriot living amongst his own people!
He was not the father of the nuke program rather a snake in the armpits of Pakistan! Dr. A Q Khan was his nemesis and which is the reason why Bhutto encouraged A Q Khan to set up the KRL labs as an independent entity. With all his short comings I have more respect for A Q Khan than I have for Munir Ahmed Khan. One was a spy with no trace of his family in Pakistan; and the other is still a patriot living amongst his own people!
Kompromat
ADMINISTRATOR
- Joined
- May 3, 2009
- Messages
- 40,366
- Reaction score
- 416
- Country
- Location
Interesting thing, to say none the less. Is it a 'fact' or an 'opinion presented as a fact' ? - If it is the former than one must require substantiated evidence of this theory to believe it.
The Deterrent
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jan 7, 2011
- Messages
- 3,168
- Reaction score
- 39
- Country
- Location
XYON;4609048 One was a spy with no trace of his family in Pakistan;[B said:
Please.. save us the sermon. There were bigger leaks than him.. A.Q Khan was an opportunist who was making his buck selling our centrifuges to other countries(in collusion with some khakis and others). He only stuck around because he was assured he would still be minting money through re-branded KRL as long as he took the fall.
Dr. Strangelove
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 20, 2011
- Messages
- 5,208
- Reaction score
- 14
- Country
- Location
my dear who told u this s**T
