The state that wouldn't fail

[RabzonKhan]

A partnership to survive

Dawn
Cyril Almeida
December 10 2010


BY now even his foes grudgingly admit it: Zardari has proved a great survivor. The man friends refer to as the Teflon President has turned out to be a cannier political operator than anyone thought possible.

Learning to turn the other cheek and absorb blows, he`s guided his party through the trickiest of political terrain. WikiLeaks tells us Zardari knows he`s no BB, but what the past couple of years tell us is that may not necessarily be such a bad thing. The Zardari government`s odds of surviving are higher than any other political government`s have been at a similar point in its term.

So should we give the man a medal and a pat on the back? Two and a half years ago, the sensible ones would have said yes. Two and a half years later, the answer is slightly more complicated.

Back in 2008, if anyone had offered the possibility of the government completing its full term and a peaceful, democratic transition of power to the next political government, the sensible ones would have grabbed it with both hands. The governance record would have been considered beside the point — just getting the form of democracy right would have been victory enough.

But it turns out even form can come at a great cost.

Internally, there is only one power which is capable of disrupting the democratic process here: the army. Hence the Pakistani euphemism of a `civil-military imbalance`.

Zardari`s political strategy has worked when it`s come to dealing with the politicians. The Altaf Bhais and maulanas and PML-Fs and Fata MPs of this country always have been and always will be amenable to inducements. They like a man who they can do business with.

But Zardari`s strategy has proved desperately inadequate when applied to the army. Surrendering the national security and foreign policy domains to the army has only emboldened it. Giving a second term to the man soldiers refer to as the chief is … well, the media`s focus on the WikiLeaks-revealed foibles and peccadilloes of the civilians to the virtual exclusion of the army`s own sins tells a tale of its own. If that`s the narrative being pushed in the first week of the second term, then going forward.…

The problem for Zardari has been that the biggest and most powerful political party in the country, the army, doesn`t behave like other politicians do. They consider themselves above the muck of politics, no matter the many, many skeletons piled up in their closets. And they clearly consider themselves superior to politicians.

Which means a political strategy based on sharing the spoils when applied to the army is ultimately unworkable. Why would they be content with sharing when they consider the other side to be venal, unpatriotic and stupid?

So Zardari`s strategy (make plentiful concessions in return for survival in power) which has proved so successful with politicians, has, when applied to the army, only helped facilitate the most astonishing turnaround in the army`s internal position.

Granted, the lows at the end of the Musharraf era were unsustainable and institutional savviness would have engineered some kind of eventual bounce-back. But what we`ve seen under the latest chief is a return to influence and power for the army on a scale and in a timeframe that would have been unimaginable just two years ago.

And that, if you happen to be one of those quaint, democracy-loving folks, is a very grim thing indeed for this country`s future. Completing a full term in office would still be somewhat of an accomplishment for Zardari, but, if the present trajectory continues, few would be able to argue Pakistan would be genuinely more democratic in 2013. What is veneer of power worth if it is hollow from inside?

Could Zardari have done anything differently? Perhaps. It is, though, easy enough to second-guess the past.

If Zardari had picked a more confrontational route with the army, perhaps continuing with his policy of reaching out to India, he would have been pilloried at home as naive and a danger to national security. Or if we had tried harder to subordinate the army to the civilians, he would have been hammered for unnecessarily provoking the 800-pound gorilla.

But going forward Zardari does have an option.

What the WikiLeaks debacle has done is expose the jaundiced view the self-appointed custodians of the national interest have of politicians. (What else can one say about a situation in which the leaders of the two largest parties the country with a combined two-thirds of parliamentary support are dismissed as either unfit or undesirable?)

If this is not news as such, seeing it in black and white does present a political opportunity. For the army there`s none of that business about the enemy`s enemy being a friend — it`s just plain and simple: an enemy is an enemy is an enemy. And the enemies, the unfit and the undesirable, are often, funnily enough, the ones who have genuine electoral support.

Just two years from the last stint of de facto military rule, it has become horribly obvious the beast is not just alive, it`s stalking its prey once again.

Zardari`s got his turn in power. The ineptness on the governance front almost guarantees his party will not return to power at the next election. But the election after that would be just another five years away — half the life of a typical military regime.

Sharif meanwhile is waiting for his turn. It will almost certainly be his turn the next time round — if relatively free and fair elections are held. And when Sharif`s time comes, the last thing he would want is a military which has whetted its appetite by snacking on the previous government.

So there they are, the incentives to cooperate. Zardari and Sharif may not like each other, they may be natural political foes, they may have different ideologies — but cooperation now could serve to extend their political lives.

The alarm has sounded. Apart they could easily sink, together they could swim against the tide. What wasn`t possible earlier because of reasons genuine and artificial, personal and political, is now veering on becoming an imperative.

Zardari is the one in power. He will have to make the first move.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

A partnership to survive

Dawn
Cyril Almeida
December 10 2010


BY now even his foes grudgingly admit it: Zardari has proved a great survivor. The man friends refer to as the Teflon President has turned out to be a cannier political operator than anyone thought possible.

Learning to turn the other cheek and absorb blows, he`s guided his party through the trickiest of political terrain. WikiLeaks tells us Zardari knows he`s no BB, but what the past couple of years tell us is that may not necessarily be such a bad thing. The Zardari government`s odds of surviving are higher than any other political government`s have been at a similar point in its term.

So should we give the man a medal and a pat on the back? Two and a half years ago, the sensible ones would have said yes. Two and a half years later, the answer is slightly more complicated.

Back in 2008, if anyone had offered the possibility of the government completing its full term and a peaceful, democratic transition of power to the next political government, the sensible ones would have grabbed it with both hands. The governance record would have been considered beside the point — just getting the form of democracy right would have been victory enough.

But it turns out even form can come at a great cost.

Internally, there is only one power which is capable of disrupting the democratic process here: the army. Hence the Pakistani euphemism of a `civil-military imbalance`.

Zardari`s political strategy has worked when it`s come to dealing with the politicians. The Altaf Bhais and maulanas and PML-Fs and Fata MPs of this country always have been and always will be amenable to inducements. They like a man who they can do business with.

But Zardari`s strategy has proved desperately inadequate when applied to the army. Surrendering the national security and foreign policy domains to the army has only emboldened it. Giving a second term to the man soldiers refer to as the chief is … well, the media`s focus on the WikiLeaks-revealed foibles and peccadilloes of the civilians to the virtual exclusion of the army`s own sins tells a tale of its own. If that`s the narrative being pushed in the first week of the second term, then going forward.…

The problem for Zardari has been that the biggest and most powerful political party in the country, the army, doesn`t behave like other politicians do. They consider themselves above the muck of politics, no matter the many, many skeletons piled up in their closets. And they clearly consider themselves superior to politicians.

Which means a political strategy based on sharing the spoils when applied to the army is ultimately unworkable. Why would they be content with sharing when they consider the other side to be venal, unpatriotic and stupid?

So Zardari`s strategy (make plentiful concessions in return for survival in power) which has proved so successful with politicians, has, when applied to the army, only helped facilitate the most astonishing turnaround in the army`s internal position.

Granted, the lows at the end of the Musharraf era were unsustainable and institutional savviness would have engineered some kind of eventual bounce-back. But what we`ve seen under the latest chief is a return to influence and power for the army on a scale and in a timeframe that would have been unimaginable just two years ago.

And that, if you happen to be one of those quaint, democracy-loving folks, is a very grim thing indeed for this country`s future. Completing a full term in office would still be somewhat of an accomplishment for Zardari, but, if the present trajectory continues, few would be able to argue Pakistan would be genuinely more democratic in 2013. What is veneer of power worth if it is hollow from inside?

Could Zardari have done anything differently? Perhaps. It is, though, easy enough to second-guess the past.

If Zardari had picked a more confrontational route with the army, perhaps continuing with his policy of reaching out to India, he would have been pilloried at home as naive and a danger to national security. Or if we had tried harder to subordinate the army to the civilians, he would have been hammered for unnecessarily provoking the 800-pound gorilla.

But going forward Zardari does have an option.

What the WikiLeaks debacle has done is expose the jaundiced view the self-appointed custodians of the national interest have of politicians. (What else can one say about a situation in which the leaders of the two largest parties the country with a combined two-thirds of parliamentary support are dismissed as either unfit or undesirable?)

If this is not news as such, seeing it in black and white does present a political opportunity. For the army there`s none of that business about the enemy`s enemy being a friend — it`s just plain and simple: an enemy is an enemy is an enemy. And the enemies, the unfit and the undesirable, are often, funnily enough, the ones who have genuine electoral support.

Just two years from the last stint of de facto military rule, it has become horribly obvious the beast is not just alive, it`s stalking its prey once again.

Zardari`s got his turn in power. The ineptness on the governance front almost guarantees his party will not return to power at the next election. But the election after that would be just another five years away — half the life of a typical military regime.

Sharif meanwhile is waiting for his turn. It will almost certainly be his turn the next time round — if relatively free and fair elections are held. And when Sharif`s time comes, the last thing he would want is a military which has whetted its appetite by snacking on the previous government.

So there they are, the incentives to cooperate. Zardari and Sharif may not like each other, they may be natural political foes, they may have different ideologies — but cooperation now could serve to extend their political lives.

The alarm has sounded. Apart they could easily sink, together they could swim against the tide. What wasn`t possible earlier because of reasons genuine and artificial, personal and political, is now veering on becoming an imperative.

Zardari is the one in power. He will have to make the first move.

Or instead of inane conspiracy theories and confrontational politics, the author could have just advised Zardari and Sharif to improve their governance records.

The weakness of Zardari arises out of the inept performance of his government, not because the military is undermining him. The military, if we are to believe the cable alleging Kiyani considering the option to have Zardari resign, was only contemplating intervention because the civvies were getting ready to drag the country into chaos over their quest for power.

I find fascinating, the lengths to which some Pakistani liberals will go to, in order to deflect blame from the failure of the civilian government at governing, and concoct fanciful conspiracy theories about the Army, and elaborate schemes to cut off the Army's power and influence, instead of doing that which is obvious - improve their governance record.

'Its the Government's performance, stupid!'

Zardari is the one in power. He will have to make the first move.

Yes - how about firing some of his inept ministers and trying to do the job he was elected for properly? Or do we only elect these people so that idiots writing editorials have a chance to promote their 'elaborate conspiracies and military-civilian power struggle theories'?

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Fabrications and plain lies

Daily Times
December 11, 2010

The case of the Adiala Jail missing prisoners has taken a bizarre turn. In the November 24 hearing of this case, the attorney general had stated on behalf of the intelligence agencies that they did not have the prisoners in their custody. These prisoners had been acquitted by the Lahore High Court, but had not been released from Adiala Jail, from where they mysteriously disappeared in May. In a hearing held on the request of the government, the counsel for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) submitted before the Supreme Court (SC) that the two intelligence agencies now have custody of the missing prisoners. Does the tale that they have been arrested during a special operation in the tribal areas conducted after the last hearing of the case sound plausible? Based on the track record of the intelligence agencies, it appears a hastily put together face-saving lie that does not stand up to the test of scrutiny.

It is not a coincidence that the intelligence agencies consider themselves above the law. After independence, it was inevitable that the over-developed state structure inherited from the British in the presence of weak political and social institutions would lead to the dominance of state institutions unaccountable to the public. The protracted authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haq and later Pervez Musharraf made them even more accustomed to acting independently, without any fear of accountability. That this attitude has trickled down to the lowest levels of the law enforcing apparatus could be gauged from the thana culture, where even a station house officer considers himself above the law. It is pertinent to mention that during the hearing of the missing persons’ case in 2007, Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry had said that the Supreme Court could summon the directors general of the intelligence agencies to answer the court and account for the disappeared persons. It is thus entirely likely that the ISI and MI already had custody of the Adiala Jail prisoners, but did not want to admit it at first.

Even if we concede that the ISI-MI lawyer’s submission is correct, it leaves many questions unanswered. Why did the provincial authorities continue to detain these prisoners when the court had ordered their release? How could the jail authorities allow any intelligence agency’s officials, fake or real, to spirit away prisoners? If the intelligence agencies are so efficient as to track down these people within two weeks, why did they wait so long to do it? Can these people be tried under the Army Act in a General Field Court Martial, as the ISI-MI counsel contended before the court, when in the past all civilians involved in terrorism were tried in anti-terrorist courts? The overbearing attitude of the intelligence agencies exhibited in the last two hearings amounts to contempt of court. This is now a question of the judicial system’s prestige because these prisoners were kidnapped from judicial custody. A judiciary restored on the slogan of the rule of law, should not allow a flouting of the law by the law enforcement agencies themselves.

Perhaps the only redeeming feature of Thursday’s hearing was an unconditional admission by the ISI-MI counsel that the intelligence agencies are answerable to the courts and the law. If the military and intelligence agencies are convinced that the detained individuals are indeed involved in various attacks on military targets, they should present evidence in the court. If the existing laws are inadequate and allow terrorists to go scot-free, then perhaps parliament should consider specific legislation aimed at removing the loopholes in the laws concerning terrorist cases. Acting above and beyond the law, and then spinning contradictory stories to get themselves off the hook, as our spooks appear to be doing, is simply unacceptable.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Playing little-boy games

Dawn
Kamran Shafi
Dec 14 2010

THE shenanigans of our Deep State over the past week should have been illuminating for anyone who had the slightest doubt that it was not as blind and deaf and inept and juvenile and goofy and, indeed, downright hopeless as I have repeatedly tried to get across.

It was a double whammy: a very quick one-two landing on the chin of an already helpless, luckless and wretched country reeling under repeated blows.The first was the admission; at last, of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence`s (MI) lawyer that the 11 disappeared prisoners who were allegedly taken away by `agencies` personnel according to the chief secretary of the Punjab (no less), just before they were to be released from Adiyala jail, were indeed in the two agencies` hands.

(How do the ISI and the MI run their `joint ventures` like this one? Out of the 11 prisoners does one hold and interrogate six, and the other five? Do they flip a coin to see who gets to hold the larger number?)

This admission is not the thing that surprised me, however, for I have the highest expectations of utter dastardliness from our spooks; what gobsmacked even me is the story that was spun out for the benefit of the honourable Supreme Court that took the steps that brought the spooks out of their hiding. (Thank you, My Lords.)

And that is that the 11 were `taken away` to an `operational area` (read Fata) by their fellow terrorists who were posing as ISI and MI personnel. I ask you! How pray, did these terrorists manage to pose as `agencies` personnel? Do these two agencies wear pink and bright green uniforms respectively? Do they have horns on their heads? How did the terrorists who spirited them away to the `operational area` pretend that they were `agency` personnel, please, and why did the jail authorities fall for their ruse?

Indeed, if they were as dangerous as we are told they are, why did the agencies not keep them under surveillance while they were Adiyala jail? Especially when they were to be tried under military law, as the Supreme Court is now being told?

Quite frankly, the story spun out defies any sense at all and seems to be a singularly poor attempt by the `agencies` to now wriggle out of the labyrinth into which they have wandered, secure in the knowledge that no law could reach them in their secure headquarters; that no one would have the temerity to challenge them.

It is a measure of the agencies` arrogance that they did not take note of what the newly emboldened Supreme Court was doing in other matters that were placed before it.

They did not note that federal secretaries, chief secretaries of the provinces, inspectors general of police and directors general of the Federal Investigation Agency to name a few most senior officials, presented themselves before the court when ordered to do so. And that strictures were passed against some of them; and warnings issued to clean up their acts or else.

The second quite brazen and absolutely shameful happening was the foolish fake WikiLeaks released to the press by a Pakistani news agency.

Guardian, one of the most respected newspapers in the world, and one of the three that WikiLeaks first leaked to, blew holes the size of a football pitch into the faked story, leaving us Pakistanis with more egg on our faces. By God, the amount of derisory emails I have received! Is this what we Pakistanis are? Fraudsters and con artists extraordinaire? Liars and cheats of the first order? No, no, not all Pakistanis, surely? The actual fraudsters and con artists who stay in the shadows and do their stupidities.

Nor is this all. Those who directed the faking of the so-called WikiLeaks on India, and those who actually faked them, have only shown that they are a puerile and foolish lot. Which is fine by me. What I object to most vociferously is the fact that all of us Pakistanis have been made to look bad because of the shenanigans of those few who do what they do.

And who are they? We do not have to look far beyond the story, and one in one of the English-language newspapers which printed the faked `leaks`.

The fingers appear to point at the security establishment and its paid toadies and hangers-on who we know well from the unsolicited emails we receive by the dozen every single day: yarns spun on God knows what evidence; the most wild allegations and conspiracy theories even a fool would not believe.

We know too that the establishment keeps a veritable stable of what it thinks are whiz kids who not only write the height of nonsense, but also speak the height of nonsense on its behalf. The question we must ask, however, is whether those that run the establishment live in cloud cuckoo land? Do they have no measure of the damage their servants are doing to the country?

We must note that they, fake American accents and all, are not giving up even after the shame of the fake leaks being caught out. The newest spin is that if the real WikiLeaks can badmouth Pakistan why can they not badmouth India? I ask you. Are you listening, gentlemen?

I write this from Kabul where the Fourth Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue is being held. The loudest message our Afghan friends are sending out is that they be left alone … for both Pakistan and India to stop using their country as a chessboard. That if Pakistan is such a friend why does it not allow freer trade between the three countries so Afghan fruit can find its way to Indian markets before it spoils? And, gentlemen, listen closely: Pakistan is the most hated country in Afghanistan today. So, go figure.

 

[RabzonKhan]

COMMENT: The politics of war

Daily Times
Feroz Khan
December 15, 2010


There needs to be a debate in Pakistan questioning the proper balance between the military and the civilian leadership and what should be the role of a civilian-military relationship during a war. There is a discussion underway questioning Pakistan’s role in the war against terrorism, but it does not seem to be asking the questions that need to be answered about the nature of this war. Far more important than ‘what are we fighting for?’ is to ask how to fight and win this war. There seems to be no clue, reason or an idea how the state of Pakistan will triumph over the challenges confronting it. The state of Pakistan appears to be adrift and rudderless and keeps oscillating between indecision and denial, as it appears to be incapable of understanding the existential questions facing it.

This war is being fought for the soul of Pakistan and it is being fought to decide what the final vision of Pakistan will be and how it will ultimately exist as a nation state. To understand the basic premise of this war, which is the attainment and exercise of political power within Pakistan, it must be remembered that the origins of all wars reside in the political reasons for which they are being fought. A war is basically an application of armed violence intended to achieve a political goal and it is the political reasons of a war that then influence the military strategy behind a particular war. Wars are the final arguments in politics and the objective of a war is to convince an adversary to stop resisting the political demands that are being forced upon it. Wars occur when diplomacy, which is the traditional avenue of a political discourse, proves incapable of resolving political issues. Therefore, wars have to be understood as endeavours of a political will designed to revive the diplomatic negotiations from a favourable position and this is the guiding principle behind all wars.

In this sense, the idea of a military victory is only, and must be limited to, how successfully a war can end the diplomatic impasse and revive the political process. Therefore, wars must be fought for clearly defined political reasons and those political reasons then determine the conditions under which the fighting will cease and peace will be restored. Once these reasons are articulated, the military strategy is framed in the context of identifying those points of military value that need to be attacked and defeated in order to end the war as quickly as possible. The rationale of a military strategy must always be in the aid of a political purpose and never in isolation from it. It is this overarching reason that makes for an imperative argument for civilian control of the Pakistani military and why military strategy in Pakistan must always be subservient to the ‘political necessity’. Wars that are fought without political considerations and as entities within their own right and are open-ended in their execution, become self-defeating propositions. Military strategy must be as flexible as the political realities under which it is implemented, and if the political reality changes in the middle of a war, the military strategy must also change and accept the new political realities.

The traditional problem in Pakistan has always been that its military strategy has been crafted in complete disregard of the political reasons and even worse, the idea of a ‘military necessity’ has been periodically imposed on politics. This is the reason that will prove to be the biggest obstacle in Pakistan’s attempts to defeat the Taliban and their al Qaeda patrons and its various militant sectarian supporters. The Pakistani military does not have the capacity to defeat the Taliban and their supporters. The Taliban and their followers, on the other hand, do not have the ability to take over the state of Pakistan. So unless there is a political policy behind this war that can end it, this war will be without an end if fought from a purely military perspective. The only problem, and a very crucial one, is that civilian control of the Pakistani military and its military strategy raises the question about the role of the Pakistani politicians as military strategists and whether they understand the limitations of military power in resolving political problems.

The Pakistani political leadership, if it is to assume the responsibility for this war, needs to take the direction of this war away from the military. The reason the military is dominating the politics of this war is because the civilian leadership of the country has distanced itself from this war and has left the conduct of this war to the generals. This is an unacceptable abdication of political responsibility, because all military plans and strategy have a political consequence to them and if left unattended, they can severely affect a nation’s ability to function as a sovereign power as the military, in pursuit of victory, can commit the nation to new and unwanted policies. Furthermore, a civilian military strategist must understand that the role of the military in this war and its counter-insurgency operations will not defeat the threat, but can only open the negotiating space available to the government to engage the Pakistani Taliban from a more advantageous position.

The manner in which that opportunity is exploited and the political promises extracted and committed, is dependent on upon the dexterity of the civilian leadership and how effectively it occupies the political vacuum created as a result of military operations in weakening the Pakistani Taliban and their resistance to the political demands being imposed on them. In other words, are the Pakistani politicians able to secure political peace following the military operations? The bitter reality of this war is that both the Pakistani military and its civilian leadership are not qualified to seek a lasting end to this war as neither of them really understands their proper role in this war and how to fight it to a successful conclusion. Civilian-military relations in Pakistan have been so distorted by the repeated forays of the military into the civilian realm that in order to effectively wage this war, the correct equilibrium between the military and civilian leadership will have to be created before an effective military strategy emerges in this war.

The challenge facing the state of Pakistan, and for it to emerge successful in this war, is not to defeat the insurgency per se but to create the proper mechanism of a civilian-military response to the threat while fighting a war and reversing the mistakes of the past. In the end, when the fighting finishes, this war will end in a political settlement and the state of Pakistan will be better served if its military rejects its policies of military-political schizophrenia and fights to give the politicians the options that will secure the long-term interests of Pakistan. It is the function of the Pakistani military to ensure that the final peace will benefit the interests of Pakistan as a country and not just the institutional interests of the Pakistani military. The best means of securing this reality is for the politicians in Pakistan to assume the command and direction of this war before it is too late and Pakistan actually ends up losing this war.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

That if Pakistan is such a friend why does it not allow freer trade between the three countries so Afghan fruit can find its way to Indian markets before it spoils?

That is precisely what the new APTTA is designed to do.

So either the Afghan interlocutors Kamran Shafi spoke to are ignorant and ill informed, or Kamran Shafi is, and is making this up as he goes.

The fingers appear to point at the security establishment and its paid toadies and hangers-on who we know well from the unsolicited emails we receive by the dozen every single day: yarns spun on God knows what evidence; the most wild allegations and conspiracy theories even a fool would not believe.

We know too that the establishment keeps a veritable stable of what it thinks are whiz kids who not only write the height of nonsense, but also speak the height of nonsense on its behalf. The question we must ask, however, is whether those that run the establishment live in cloud cuckoo land? Do they have no measure of the damage their servants are doing to the country?

What 'fingers' point to the security establishment? What evidence is Kamran Shafi, or the other liberal extremists, using to validate this 'finger pointing'?

There is no evidence - this is just more of the same from liberal extremists, conspiracy theories galore about the 'agencies' so that they may distract from the inability of the PPP and its allied parties to deliver on governance and their corruption.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Massaging public opinion

Dawn
Cyril Almeida
December 17, 2010

THE Invisible Soldiers are on the march again. Spreading their lies, planting their conspiracy theories, nudging Pakistanis to blame anyone and everyone other than the self-appointed guardians of the national interest for all that ails us.

Look, the dirty Indians are up to their dirty tricks like always. Hey, did you know the Americans are in bed with the dirty Indians and want to destroy us through Afghanistan and Balochistan? Psst, see what the scummy politicians are up as the Americans and Indians and Jews plot against the country.

When the WikiLeaks storm descended on Islamabad, the unease was palpable in certain quarters. Politicians are used to being embarrassed publicly; the army is not. So something was likely to happen.

The logic was apparent to anyone willing to acknowledge it. The WikiLeaks cables contained many embarrassing revelations about the army and its chief. The army jealously guards its public image and has various methods to massage public opinion. Ergo, some way of deflecting attention from the army`s sins exposed by WikiLeaks was likely.

In truth, however, it was not just WikiLeaks. For a while now, it`s been apparent the real movement is on the external front. With the American surge strategy in Afghanistan, the last-chance saloon, faltering, the pressure on Pakistan was certain to ratchet up.

By now, the army has shown its hand. The sooner there is a political solution to Afghanistan which puts power in the hands of the Pakhtuns (read: effectively the Taliban with some of the roughest edges shorn off) and so keeps India`s nose out of Afghanistan, the happier the Pakistan Army will be.

But few outside the army believe Al Qaeda can be separated from the Taliban or that the Taliban can be trusted to abide by their promise if indeed they pledge to renounce Al Qaeda and chase them out of Afghanistan.

Which leaves Pakistan and the US at loggerheads on Afghanistan. What we care about most — power to the Pakhtuns and Indian influence disappearing — and what the Americans care about the most — the end of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Afghan-Pak border and some certainty Afghanistan won`t be used to attack the West — are really incompatible in the current scenario.

But that is only part of the story. The toxic cocktail of militancy in Pakistan`s tribal areas has also been a major source of much tension between the Americans and the Pakistan Army. Unbeknownst to most Pakistanis — again, no coincidence that — the tribal areas have seen the rise of quite literally dozens of militant groups with virulently anti-West agendas.

Given the information blackout, it`s hard to understand fully what`s happening out there in Fata, but it seems fairly clear all manner of nasty characters are linking up with, or trying to link up with, nasty characters there and abroad. Pakistan`s resistance to cleaning up North Waziristan in particular is partly because of the army`s faltering execution of the COIN strategy and partly because of strategic concerns regarding Afghanistan.

So pressure on Pakistan was bound to go up in the months ahead. Through `mil-mil` contacts as the jargon goes, the army could expect to fend off some of the pressure. But other avenues would be needed. And one of the favourite avenues is the so-called `public opinion`.

See what the people are saying, they won`t let us do this. No army can go against its people`s will. We can`t do this ourselves, we need to take the public along. If we do this in the current climate, it will destabilise Pakistan, the people will never accept it.

All true enough — until you stop to ponder how exactly `public opinion` decides it is in favour of something or against it.

The fake WikiLeaks cables give the first public hint about how opinion is being shaped in this country right now. Unpatriotic, secular, godless liberals may sniff about such naked manipulation, but the smart money is on a population raised on a diet of conspiracy and paranoia swallowing it as yet more evidence of external plots against the country.

But that is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Much of the manipulation and winks and the nods is never seen by the public. Islamabad remains a small town, however, and news travels fast.

The secret one-on-one meetings, the selective sharing of information with favoured sons and daughters, the dark hints about plots to undermine sovereignty, national security and the like — when the Invisible Soldiers swing into action, the wider public never gets to hear about it, but in this case if no one is around to hear a tree crashing in the forest, it still makes a very big noise, thank you very much.

Politicians can only dream of having such a sophisticated media-management system at their disposal. But when you see it up close, you can`t help but wonder: are the Invisible Soldiers really that good, or do our media stars make it that much easier for them?

Put a politician in a room full of journalists and the questioning is more often than not tough and intense (smart is another matter, however). The situation often degenerates into rudeness or tension. But a uniform tends to have a peculiar effect on the preening stars in our media firmament. Heads tend to bob in agreement, approving sounds are heard every now and then and sometimes it`s hard to tell if a question is being asked or a paean being sung.

The rumours swirling around the news agency which put the fake WikiLeaks cables on the wire are well known, as is the reputation of the `newspaper` from where the story originated — and yet the story found its way to the front pages of newspapers and as headlines news on TV. How?

Why the easy gullibility on such matters? Imagine if the content had been reversed and the stories were about Pakistani generals. Still think the fake cables would have been headline news?

Actually, you don`t even have to imagine. The real cables have contained damaging enough details, and yet the media narrative has focused on the foibles of the politicians. The coverage of the cable in which Gilani suggested the politicians would protest drone strikes in parliament and then ignore them has been particularly telling.

Read through all the coverage of that cable and try finding anything anywhere which suggests a small-time politician elevated to the slot of prime minister because he was deemed to be the right amount of spineless could possibly authorise American missiles to rain down in Pakistani territory.

Everyone knows there is only one institution with the power to make such decisions in Pakistan. But good luck finding even a hint of that reality in the breathless and shocked reports on the drone-strikes cable.

Yes, the Invisible Soldiers are on the march again, but, even more dangerous, sometimes it`s hard to tell if you`re looking at one.

 

[Bias Neutral]

It did fail, because Pakistani Nationalist said, Pakistan had the 2nd fastest economy in 2004/5.

So to go from that level to current level, is a failure of the state, which includes public and govt.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Lack of a strategy

Dawn
Editorial
December 22, 2010


THREE stories in yesterday`s newspaper sum up the country`s nightmarish security predicament. First, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called on Pakistan to arrest `known terrorists` in the wake of the Muharram bombing in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchestan. Second, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that peace in the region could only come about if Pakistani territory was not used to launch terrorist attacks against India. Third, the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey summit to be held in Turkey this Friday is expected to concentrate on the problem of terrorist `safe havens` in Pakistan`s tribal areas. It is a terribly familiar pattern, with country after country expressing grave concern about the link between global terror and Pakistani terrain. It is not just `enemy` nations or suspicious allies that are worried about Pakistan, even friends continue to do the same. The Chinese premier Wen Jiabao took a measured line on Pakistan`s terrorism problem, but even that has come after years of covert pressure on Pakistan to sever the link between the tribal areas and religious militants from China`s western regions.

The answer to why Pakistan has seemingly become the centre of gravity of global terrorism is a complex one, but at its root lies the reality that Pakistan has never developed a clear policy against terror and militancy in all forms. Survey the landscape of what the state has done to fight militancy in strategic terms, and the answer necessarily must be: not very much. True, thousands of brave soldiers, policemen and other security and state personnel have lost their lives in the fight, but the losses have not forced a fundamental rethink of policies. Specifically, what exactly has the state done to dismantle the infrastructure of jihad in Pakistan? What about the sources of ideological indoctrination and the culture of jihad that has infected swathes of the Pakistani nation? Again, it is true that the state has acted to deny control of physical space to the militants like they managed to acquire in Swat and large parts of Fata, but the militancy threat has not vanished as a result. Arguably, it has only gone underground, hidden from plain sight.

And what of the threat of `Al Qaedaism`, the rabid ideology which views everyone other than adherents of an extremist version of Islam to be deserving of death? The various strands of militancy in Pakistan have evolved until there is an almost indistinguishable lethal cocktail of militancy today. Pakistan needs a strategy to fight all forms of terror, or else it risks being sucked into a future of endemic insecurity or worse.

 

[RabzonKhan]

PENSIEVE: National interest

Daily Times
Farrukh Khan Pitafi
December 23, 2010

Pakistanis are jubilant, as if we have won another cricket final against India. Not only did the Chinese premier decide to come to Pakistan but he reiterated his nation’s support for us while addressing our parliament too. So the situation is not too bad. Or is it? Then perhaps our polite guest could not shatter our hopes by giving us a lecture on the virtues of reality. This of course proves that China indeed is a great friend of Pakistan. But please do believe me when I say that while the Chinese premier did say what we wanted to hear, we should not ignore the fact that the country is in a deeper mess than we have ever thought.

I know many among my friends say that I am being too harsh on this nation. That other nations also fail in their commitments. That countries like the US and Britain also support insurgencies. That we cannot keep trying to please the world. That the Taliban are not our enemies and we should engage with them through dialogue because the US is trying to do the same. That the Blasphemy Law is only one of the laws being abused in this country and similar instances are found abroad too. That if we talk about Indo-Pak peace building today, we are not patriotic enough. That secularism and democracy are alien concepts not suitable to the religiously charged environment of Pakistan.

Let me start answering the intrinsic distrust in all these questions by repeating here my constant refrain before our foreign peers. The only part of the world that I care about is my country. I do not care how or why it was created, what follies its various governments committed. The only thing I care about is that it is my home, I am what I am because of it, I love it, I can die for it and I definitely want to see it improving. It breaks my heart to see such a humungous potential being squandered by a myopic outlook. Trust me, unlike many who will take an instant in declaring me an enemy of the state or a foreign stooge, I take the pain and suffering of this nation quite literally and physically. I am a poor man by choice and anyone who thinks I argue all this because of foreign funds will be deeply disappointed.

As for those who do not want to give up their ideational political contradictions, I have only one thing to say. The founder of this nation, the Quaid-e-Azam, our sole spokesman then, chose democracy as the system of governance for this country. No matter how much he is projected otherwise or quoted out of context, the fact remains that he, essentially, was a secular man. It is hard to imagine that a person of his outlook would envision a state where faith takes precedence over citizen’s rights or civil liberties. Similarly, while it is true that in the 1947 war, especially in Operation Gulmarg, a ragtag band of sub-state actors was used, and the Quaid did at least tolerate their involvement, he never approved proxy wars as a state policy. In 1947 too, we often forget, it was a difficult choice made most likely out of sheer desperation over General Gracey’s insubordination and the birth pangs of the nascent state. If anything it was actually a political reaction to the army’s institutional defiance rather than a policy decision to give the army another tool against its neighbours. It is true that other countries, some of them otherwise quite civilised, I grant you, too fight proxy wars. But clearly no one is foolish enough to create a Frankenstein by equipping the insurgents with a religious cover or narrative.

Those trying to reinvent the strategic depth thesis by claiming that Pakistan has ‘legitimate’ interests in Afghanistan should also try to define these interests. If they are talking of trade interests, such concerns can effectively be managed through effective diplomacy. If all this talk is about the Indian presence in Afghanistan, then let me be very honest with you; the Indian presence there matters to us because there is hostility between the two countries. It is true that the two countries have fought four wars and a cold war continues between the two to date. This can be mitigated through direct dialogue and peace building. I know that there is no shortcut to peace. If there is any process in place it will take its due course. But the biggest problem is the absence of a process. I think there are two bottlenecks in its way. First of course is the pressure from the radical Hindu parties in India, especially following the Mumbai carnage. And the second more serious issue is the perception that a Pakistani civilian government lacks the support of the country’s establishment and something like Kargil may take place once a process starts.

The Pakistan Army may of course have its own reasons. It is widely perceived that our army per chance or choice is India-centric. Many think that once there is genuine peace between the two nations, the army may lose the justification for its existence. Frankly, this perception is deeply flawed. The importance of a standing army in any nation’s defence cannot be overstated. The army will stay put because thanks to the war on terror it has acquired an internal counterinsurgency-related dimension too. The only change may come in defence spending for a bit. Once the country gets breathing space through these means and the economy manages to stand on its feet, the defence budget may also not be such a big burden. India, please note, has grown so beyond us. Rather than wasting more time in trying to control its policy choices, we need to harness its market potential for the greater good.

And this brings us to the final point. This country’s economy needs a genuine boost. It is sad that we still want to play power poker on such crucial national issues. It is sad how we are defeating our national interest by playing partisan. The issue of reformed general sales tax (RGST) is critical to our economic revival and simultaneously the government should be able to work out the details of a growth stimulus. Build the economy and then indulge in imperial hubris as much as you like. But in international relations too, from Nazi Germany to Saddam’s Iraq and Ahmadinejad’s Iran, isolation has never been and will never be anything constructive.

The writer is an independent columnist and a talk show host.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Khaki puppetry

The News
By Babar Sattar
December 28, 2010

Disclosure of information is a good thing not because it is an end in itself but because free flow of information results in greater transparency, debate and accountability. Frequently disclosure of information only confirms what people already know. But it is significant because once backed by facts, conjecture becomes reality. And while no one ought to be held to account on the basis of speculation alone, can an entire nation look the other way when stark facts stare it in the eye? In this regard our response to Wikileaks has been extremely instructive. The ruling elite - civil and military - has conveniently responded to the former US envoy’s cables simply with denial. What they are denying is unclear. Are they saying that the reported conversations never took place, or that they do not reflect the context and thus the whole truth? Or do they believe that Shaggy’s “wasn’t me” is a perfectly legitimate response even in statecraft whenever confronted with incriminating facts?

Would our civil and military leaders have us believe that the former US ambassador was a fabler deliberately misleading her bosses in Washington for the fun of it or that the Wikileaks saga is a mischievous US conspiracy to make our rulers look bad in order to lower them further in public esteem? Equally disturbing has been our collective apathy to digging deeper and confronting the truth. Are we not vying for complete disclosure and accountability because we are now accustomed to leaders being caught with their pants down and getting away Scott-free, or do they manage to get away because of our exhibition of expediency, tolerance or even timidity in face of such unsavory conduct? The overall media response to Wikileaks has also been wanting in a fundamental way: the reporting has been partial in that it has beat down on politicians for nauseating sycophancy and shameful self-interest, without proportionately highlighting and scrutinising the role of the military and especially the army chief that might have waded into the domain of illegality.

The one unmistakable takeaway from Wikileaks is that the already hazardous civil-military imbalance in Pakistan has been further aggravated over the last couple of years. Let us address matters pertaining to propriety, policy and legality in that order. For propriety alone, we don’t even need the help of Julian Assange. The army chief might be the most powerful man in the country, but the protocol list doesn’t reflect that. But we are now past pretensions. Recently, the military guard detailed for the army chief’s security forced two federal ministers to wait for the cavalcade of the army chief to pass through (along with other civilians used to the inconvenience) and interestingly it was the PPP parliamentarians loath to discuss the issue when raised by the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. It is obvious that neither the ruling party nor the army high command feels the need to prop-up the fiction of civilian control of the military.

The issue of policy linked to propriety is more significant. We know as a matter of public record - also confirmed by Wikileaks - that our army chief independently meets with foreign diplomats and important civilian policymakers from other countries. Observers of civil-military relations in Pakistan have long posited that the military not only believes that the country’s security policy falls within its exclusive domain, but also all other aspects of nation policymaking that impinge on internal and external security, including foreign policy. First of all, why does our army chief independently meet with civilian policymakers of foreign countries? Is that not the job of our foreign office? Secondly, are the prescribed procedures for interaction with foreign governments of no relevance when it comes to the military?

The Rules of Business explicitly state that unless an exemption is specifically granted all correspondence with the government of a foreign country shall be conducted through the Foreign Affairs Division. We know from newspapers that our army chief wrote a fourteen-page letter to President Obama highlighting issues he would wish the US to consider in relation to its policy in Afghanistan. Did he seek special permission to correspond directly with the US president? Should the army chief not send such communiqué to the Defense Division, which can then forward it to the prime minister through the Foreign Affairs Division for review and communication to the foreign country if desirable? Or is the preponderant role of the military in all aspects of nation policymaking so firmly entrenched now that ordinary rules and procedures meant to regulate the affairs of the government are not meant to apply to khakis?

And then most disconcerting are disclosures regarding the army chief’s conversations with the US ambassador that squarely fall beyond the zone of legality and are inimical to the cause of constitutionalism, rule of law and democracy in Pakistan. At least two such conversations merit comment. One, the reported discussion that at the peak of the lawyers’ movement the army chief insinuated that he might be forced to ‘persuade’ Asif Zardari to step down as president in the event that the lawyers’ long march gets out of control, and pontificated about appropriate replacements. And two, the reported conversations that our army chief was perturbed by the delay being caused by the PPP government in formalising an immunity deal for General Musharraf and wished the Americans to prod the civilian government to confirm such deal on the promise of which the army chief had sought General Musharraf’s resignation on behalf of the army.

What means, one wonders, would the army chief have to persuade Asif Zardari to resign as president of Pakistan, other than the barrel of a gun and his monopoly over the use of force in the country by virtue of being the army chief? Would such persuasion not be unconstitutional? Further, what does it mean for the army chief to be the guarantor of a deal (with the US Government being a counterparty) that General Musharraf, the former president and army chief, will be offered absolute immunity? What would General Musharraf be immune from? Would he be protected against the ordinary application of the laws of Pakistan? All of us know that General Musharraf broke the law and molested the Constitution for a second time on November 3, 2007, and the Supreme Court has also declared as much. Does the immunity deal mean that no court or civilian government will be allowed to prosecute General Musharaf for adulterating the Constitution? Does it mean that no one can investigate General Musharraf’s role in Benazir Bhutto murder case? Does it also mean that General Musharaf can never be tried for his alleged role in the Bugti murder case?

In his capacity as an officer of the armed forces and army chief, General Kayani swore an oath to protect and defend the Constitution of Pakistan, which promises equality before law to all citizens of the country. Could it have occurred to General Kayani that his efforts to shield his predecessor from the application of the laws of Pakistan (inspired by his sense of camaraderie and allegiance to the army’s institutional interests) might be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution of Pakistan? Has our history of repeated military intervention in politics resulted in the evolution of a concept of military professionalism that does not envision undermining loft conceptions of rule of law, civilian authority and constitutionalism as a vice? How do we go about strengthening rule of law in this country if khaki response to disclosures of legal and procedural impropriety is not regret and introspection, but self-righteousness laced with stubborn denials?

(To be continued)

The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Smokers’ Corner: From Vietnam to Waziristan

Dawn
Nadeem F. Paracha
Jan 01 2011

A friend of mine recently told me a revealing little tale. To film a documentary, he had travelled up north into a tense battle zone where the Pakistan Army is fighting a bloody war against extremists.

There he met a soldier who startled him by saying: “Sir, since you seem to be an educated man I can trust, let me tell you that all these extremists were made by us!” He then added: “We are told so many lies about whom we are fighting. But we know who these people are. These are the people we have been feeding, and now they have turned against us. They kill women and children!”

The soldier was not saying anything new. Because barring, of course, the usual set of so-called ‘patriots’ (the ghairat brigade) who are ever-willing to lie through their teeth just because they believe flying fibs serve the country’s interests, by now most Pakistanis know that the vicious enemy the people of Pakistan and its army are up against are very much a product of our own strategic follies and misplaced arrogance.

Nevertheless, when one hears this coming from a soldier up in the front lines, one is not sure how to react. Whether one should rejoice over the fact that due to what the soldiers have been facing from an animalistic enemy, perhaps many have awaken to a reality that till now has been fed to them wrapped in the usual sheen of anti-India and pro-faith rhetoric; or should we see this as a warning?

The debacles faced by the US army in Vietnam and by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan should be taken as examples to be learnt from. It is much easier raising an army on certain myths about one’s foreign enemies and on an exaggerated sense of patriotism. These can work to charge up the soldiers during a sharp, short war (such as the one Britain fought in the Falklands in the early 1980s). But the post-World War II scenario in this regard is studded with examples where, in a long drawn-out armed conflict, there does come a time when armies involved in guerrilla warfare begin to lose touch with all the ideological hoopla that they were fed during training.

There are numerous accounts of how whole battalions of American marines and Soviet fighters ended up rebelling against their own superiors because after facing the kind of bloodshed and madness on the battlefield they completely lost any worthwhile contact with what they were told by their politicians and generals. All that began to melt away and they found themselves awkwardly exposed to a set of truths that they were conditioned to repress.

These are the kind of truths that a soldier, especially if he is being readied to take on a ruthless bunch of insurgents, should be briefed about up front. As one saw in Vietnam and Afghanistan, all that mythical talk about how the soldiers were fighting for a higher cause simply began to melt away and the soldiers were not only left stranded with a rude reality, but they had no clue what to do about it.

It is a bit unsettling to know that the army is preparing its men for the conflict against armed extremists by using rhetoric it originally devised for a possible war against India. But it is not Indian forces that the soldiers find on the battlefield up north. Instead, it is their own countrymen — legions of fanatics brainwashed to believe that they are the ones serving God and the country, even if that means blowing up women and children and chopping off heads with swords.

The enemy in this context is not the saffron-clad Hindu battalions on mechanical elephants fitted with nuclear warheads. The enemy is very much from amongst us. Most of them are Pakistanis who were given a free passage to breed the kind of vicious, short-fused hatred some of our generals, intelligence agencies and politicians thought would help them gain Kashmir and ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan — and if certain nut-jobs in the electronic media are to be believed, maybe raise the Pakistani flag in New Delhi.

Telling the soldiers the whole truth is better. This means re-orientation with a view to ready them to fight the extremists responsible for killing hundreds of innocent citizens and many soldiers too. They have been slaughtered by a terrible breed of Pakistanis who are not dropping from the sky or rolling in from across the border, but emerging from our very own mountains and cities.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Who will fight back?

Dawn
Cyril Almeida
Jan 07 2011

THE morning of the governor`s assassination, I found myself arguing there are no ideological divisions left in Pakistani politics anymore. `Right` or `Left` have lost all meaning, which is why the PPP can seek alliances with the PML-N, the ANP, the MQM, the JUI-F, the PML-F, Fata MPs and even the PML-Q, the `Qatil` League, to try and cling on in power.

The name of the game is power, and nothing else matters. But I was wrong.

At least in the public imagination, there does exist an ideological divide — and the PPP is on the wrong side of it. la deen`

Godless, secular, `, the PPP and its leaders are everything the Children of Zia loathe. Taseer`s killer, Mumtaz Qadri, born in 1985, is the quintessential child of Zia.

At least at the level of signalling, the PPP does confirm its public reputation. And privately, I find PPP leaders to be among the more sensible and warm, their worldview free of hate, their language couched in a kind of humanism difficult to detect elsewhere.

The ANP and the MQM come closest to the PPP in this regard, but there`s always a lingering suspicion of instrumentalism — about the lack of genuine belief in the values they publicly espouse — and their track records always give pause.

But here`s the difficulty with the PPP, too: even if you believe there is genuine unease in the party at the trajectory the country is on, the PPP has done no more or no less than other mainstream political players to help nudge the country along in that terrible direction.

ZAB of course desperately pandered to the right as the opposition from those quarters mounted. BB`s first term you can write off because it was so brief and she was so completely on the defensive that little blame can genuinely be attributed to her.

But what did she do in the second term? Naseerullah Babar`s notorious boast that `we` created the Taliban — factually incorrect as `we` came to the party after it had begun — quickly became a millstone around the PPP`s neck, and the country`s, too.

As for the great `Islamist` Sharifs? When the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan tried to pop off the brothers during Nawaz Sharif`s second term, they smashed the SSP with the ruthlessness of an us-or-them conviction.

Sure, you could argue that just as the PML-N is more likely to go after `vulgar` plays in Lahore, the PPP is always more likely to issue more liquor permits in Sindh — but that`s not really where the war for the future of Pakistan is being fought.

When it comes to using state power, the major political parties have a pretty equal, and pretty awful, record of opposing the infrastructure of jihad.

Perhaps the worst of the lot so far in this respect has been Asif Zardari. Sure he says all the right things, in his glib, oily way, but what has he really done?

Taseer, his hatchet guy in Punjab against the PML-N, said and did all the right things as far as the boss was concerned, but when the chips were down what did Zardari do?

He didn`t publicly rebuke his flunky, Babar Awan. He issued no orders to prosecute, arrest or even plain investigate the agents of hate. And the friend of friends wasn`t even there to see his loyalist lowered into an early grave. The Guardian

Declan Walsh of has written that Taseer was left “swinging in a lonely wind” after the Aasia Bibi case became a “political football”. “Zardari was powerless to act,” according to Declan.

Possibly. That Zardari is often powerless to act is obvious enough. But at least you can admire a man who fights for something he believes in, who stands up for his friends when it matters.

Instead, we are left with the rumour of a president who is spending a few weeks by the sea at the suggestion of a soothsayer.

Then again, the full horror of what we are confronted with goes far beyond the non-battles of a single leader or political party.

A favourite sparring partner I refer to as a culture warrior has long argued for more public fierceness, for pushing back in ways big and small against those hawking the intolerance and hate the country is awash in.

The hate-mongers in the vernacular media are particularly malign influences. Having seen the ugliness up close and the slyness with which it is foisted off on an unsuspecting public, you can`t help but feel a little ill.

And let`s not forget the original sinners.

A friend who has witnessed up close the country`s slide over the past three decades sent me a note soon after Taseer`s slaying:

“This may be an individual act. But look at this: Governor shot dead by own guard; country in turmoil; Government lost majority two days back but moral authority long ago; Gilani doesn`t have support in parliament; Zardari is corrupt and discredited; economy is in meltdown; Sharif`s unable to provide alternative leadership. Who emerges as the sole survivor? Yes, you guessed it Kayani. Back to square one. (Expletive deleted) patrons of fundos will soon be back.”

Who will or won`t be back is hard to say. Easier, though, it is to find where primary responsibility lies for the horrors Pakistan is facing today: with the self-appointed custodians of the national interest.

And increasingly if there is anything we should fault Asif Zardari for, it should be for surrendering without a fight on that front.

The comeback the army has made, the total control it is exercising over national-security policy, the return to a position of singular prestige in the national imagination, all of that may eventually have come to pass anyway.

But because no meaningful resistance was offered, it has happened in double-quick time.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Biden’s visit

Daily Times
January 14, 2011

Regardless of the troubled history of the Pak-US relationship, the two countries have some common interests in the South Asian region. The most fundamental of these interests is the struggle against extremism, which is thriving unabated and is threatening not only world peace but the very existence of the Pakistani state. Although Pakistan has been harbouring illusions about some extremists being good and others being bad, it is time it took a look at the trajectory that the phenomenon of jihad has taken since the 1970s, when they were first nurtured and then jihad exported to fight against the Soviets. The very jihadis that Pakistan exported first to Afghanistan and later to Kashmir and other neighbouring countries after the first Afghan war ended have come home to roost. The increasing invasion of the public space by extremist forces carefully cultivated in madrassas across Pakistan is evident in the various shades of extremists out in the streets baying for the blood of anyone that dares disagree with their interpretation of Islam. Bombing of targets ranging from high security zones to school vans was not something envisaged by the creators of the jihad policy for short-term strategic objectives. However, there are indicators that, instead of being alarmed, Pakistan’s security establishment continues to treat the jihadis as assets for attaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most telling message that US Vice President Joe Biden delivered during his visit to Pakistan with reference to Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer’s assassination by an extremist was: “Societies that tolerate such actions wind up being consumed by those actions.” This was not a freak incident, but viewed in the context of consistent production of the jihadi mindset through the free rein given to various madrassas and militant networks in the name of serving religion, was almost inevitable. Pakistan is indeed being engulfed by the flames of extremism. And it still turns a blind eye to militant safe havens on its soil that are being used to conduct jihadi activities in Afghanistan.

Not surprisingly, on his brief visit to Pakistan, US Vice President Joe Biden has conveyed his government’s impatience with Pakistan’s reluctance to take action in North Waziristan, a militants’ sanctuary. At the same time, he tried to address Pakistan’s concerns raised in a document handed over to President Obama by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani on the eve of the Strategic Dialogue in Washington. It might be argued that it was business as usual with the old recipe of carrot and stick. In the prevailing circumstances, when the US is increasingly becoming disillusioned by the futility of the war in Afghanistan, there was little else for Pakistan to expect. During his meeting with the US vice president, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani expressed the hope that there will be no new ‘great game’ concerning Afghanistan. Ironically, while cautioning against other’s great games, Pakistan has not given up its ambition of maintaining control over Kabul by playing its own little games. This has proved to be an elusive dream in the past and might well prove so once more, because the erstwhile protégés of Pakistan are known to act independently of their mentors once they achieve the seat of power. What happened in Afghanistan post-9/11 when the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US and what is happening in Pakistan today where all kinds of jihadis have proliferated like rabbits and are now poised to unravel the state of Pakistan, should be enough to awaken those in authority to the reality that it is in our own interest to fight extremism.

 

[Fieldmarshal]

Smokers’ Corner: From Vietnam to Waziristan

Dawn
Nadeem F. Paracha
Jan 01 2011

A friend of mine recently told me a revealing little tale. To film a documentary, he had travelled up north into a tense battle zone where the Pakistan Army is fighting a bloody war against extremists.

There he met a soldier who startled him by saying: “Sir, since you seem to be an educated man I can trust, let me tell you that all these extremists were made by us!” He then added: “We are told so many lies about whom we are fighting. But we know who these people are. These are the people we have been feeding, and now they have turned against us. They kill women and children!”

The army specially the officer corps does not think like that. wt the author is quoting above is nothing more than something hes pulled out of where the sun dont shine.

You need to realise the fact that things dont work in the armed forces like that and that is the only reason why by the grace of ALLAH all the coups have been lead by the coas n not by some col. or maj. like we see in the rest of our extended neighborhood.

TTP r a bunch of thugs that have been trained and funded by cia/raw/mossad/khad, they are not even owned by the afghan taliban and they will be taken care of at the right time.