gambit
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It is shocking to the poor man, especially when it is clear his argument is based more on ignorance and emotions than on a clear head with critical thinking skills.That is right, it may appear shocking to you but every sovereign nation has plans to counter every known or potential adversary. It is not peculiar to the US.
Am going to quote again from the same book...The only difference is that the US is more open about their strategies, they research, debate and discuss about these strategies a lot and most of this stuff is available in the public domain. That is how their system works, nothing wrong about it.
Amazon.com: War Games (9780425116470): Thomas B. Allen: Books
A wise military leadership will continue to assess its forces regarding doctrines, numbers, capabilities, technologies, intelligence, and training. The same wisdom will compel planning for potential wars because it is the responsibility of the military to think pessimistically. Diplomats are inherent optimists. We want both. We want to negotiate our ways out of difficult problems but we must do it in ways that potential adversaries in their cost versus benefits analysis will concede that their costs will be too great.Chapter 3
Measuring War: The Men, Methods, and History
The author was Major General Edward B. Atkeson, former director of the Army Concepts Analysis Agency, the Army's built-in think tank that makes contributions to the SIOP and produces most of the Army's war games and models. Atkenson wrote that many wargaming simulations "were as perforated with logic holes as a sieve." In war games, he said, NATO tankers kill three or four tanks for every one lost, but doubters can search in vain for the hard facts that back up these paper victories that "emerge from the analytical process via the bowels of a computer."
Like Dupuy, Atkeson wanted analysis to look beyond numbers. "You can play the Iraq-Iran war, where one side is using just a sort of rabble in arms and the other side is harvesting them," Atkeson, recently retired, said in an interview. "But if one side outnumbers the other, the numbers will count. Well, of course, Israel couldn't survive that way. So there are some quantitative differences that someone has to take int account that perhaps theh purest mathematicians - particularly the Rand types - wouldn't be comfortable with.
"I don't know anyone who can do it in such away that his colleagues would agree, with the exception of Trevor Dupuy's approach. Trevor says, 'Look and see what actually happened.' War wasn't invented yesterday. There have been a lot of them, and most of these kinds of issues have come up in one way or another.
"The Soviets will take a campaign or a battle and they will dissect it to its individual parts: what happened to an engineering company on the third day of the engagement if they had to cross a stream and it only had fourteen guys to build a bridge that normally takes sixteen to build? And the stream was going at this certain rate of flow? All those little factors. They will take history and break it down to its particulars, file them away in computers, so that when you come to a situation, and you know that part of your campaign involves an engineering company crossing a bridge with only fifteen guys to do it, the computer will search through these compilations and aggregations of previous experiences and seize them and say, 'Here is a norm for you.' You don't have to follow that, but if you deviate very strongly and you're a colossal failure, you better go home and shoot yourself.
"We consider that there is a scientific aspect to warfare, but fundamentally it's an art. And we train artists to manage their resources. We tell the artist to do as he pleases. He can follow doctrine. It's easier if he follows doctrine because then he won't screw up his neighbors. If he's successful, we won't mind what he does. If he's unsuccessful, we'll fire him and get somebody else. The Soviets have a different view. They tend to emphasize the scientific dimension, and they look for historic principle as sort of the first determinant. Of course, they will take into consideration technological advances and the great compilations of nuclear weapons and aircraft speeds. But they have essential norms. They know how fast they expect their forces to operate under certain circumstances and they know how much it takes to accomplish something.
This article is nothing more than an inflammatory piece. This sort of speculating, planning, simulating, and finally war game exercises have been going on for thousands of years in mankind's history. Why is this speculative one between US and China any different?
In case anyone thinks am just pulling these excerpts out of my butt...
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Edward_B._Atkeson
Major General Edward B. Atkeson, USA (Ret.) "is a senior fellow at the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. During his distinguished military career he served as Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe, and later as a member of the National Intelligence Council under the Director of Central Intelligence. He also served with the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, and as a commander of the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency. General Atkeson is a frequent writer and speaker on military affairs, having contributed over 100 articles to military journals and other publications. He is the author of four books: The Final Argument of Kings: Reflections of the Art of War (1988); A Military Assessment of the Middle East 1991-1996 (1992); The Powder Keg: An Intelligence Officer's Guide to Military Forces in the Middle East 1996-2000 (1996); and, A Tale of Three Wars (1997)."
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/09/obituaries/trevor-n-dupuy-79-prolific-military-historian.html
Trevor N. Dupuy, a prolific military historian and battlefield theorist whose expertise extended over 5,000 years of warfare, from the conflicts of ancient Egypt to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, took his life on Monday, three weeks after learning that he was terminally ill. He was 79 and lived in Vienna, Va.