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As the 50th anniversary year of Chinas 1962 invasion, 2012 should serve as a time of reflection on what lessons that attack still holds for India. Deception and surprise are enduring elements in Chinese strategy, and 1962 was a classic example.
Integral to deception is taking an opponent by surprise, as emphasized in Sun Tzus Art of War some 2,500 years ago. Since the Communists came to power, China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. In all these conflicts, Chinese forces struck with no forewarning.
Indeed, a 2010 Pentagon report points out that China has repeatedly carried out military pre-emption in the name of defense: in 1950 (Tibet invasion, followed immediately by entry into Korean War), 1962, the 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union, and the 1979 attack on Vietnam. According to the report, The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which Chinas leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act. Chinas seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 was another example of offense as defense.
The 1962 attack justified as a defensive act by Beijing, which used Nehrus unguarded remarks (our instructions are to free our territory) to brand India the aggressor stands out for Chinas masterly blending of deception and surprise. The invasion, mounted from two separate fronts, caught India off guard. The stab-in-the-back was best summed up by Nehru, who told the nation that a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods had returned evil for good.
The aggression was cleverly planned and timed. It coincided with the start of the Cuban missile crisis, which put the Soviet Union and the U.S. on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon. And the very day the U.S. quarantine of Cuba was lifted, easing the Cuban missile crisis, China ceased its 32-day aggression against India. The cunning timing just when global attention was focused on averting a nuclear catastrophe ensured that India received no outside help.
The deception began much earlier. One example was Premier Zhou En-lais 1960 New Delhi visit, during which he dangled the carrot of a border settlement without putting his money where his mouth was. Of course, it didnt take much effort to trick the Indians, who had convinced themselves that by merely signing the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, they had bought peace with China. It took a war humiliation for India to wake up to the reality that a nation can get peace only if it is able to defend peace.
Today, as part of its larger game of deception, China identifies Taiwan as the primary focus of its defence strategy. That is to divert international attention from its single-mindedness on achieving broader military goals. Taiwan serves metaphorically as a red carpet on which to invite all the bulls while Beijing busily seeks to accomplish bigger tasks.
If the countries around India have become battlegrounds for Chinas moves to encircle India, it is because Beijing heeds Sun Tzus counsel: Contain an adversary through the leverage of having made its neighbourhood hostile.
China employs deception to also camouflage its refusal to accept the territorial status quo with several of its neighbours. It is disturbing the status quo even on cross-border river flows. The insistence on changing the status quo, coupled with its strategic opacity and penchant to take an adversary by surprise, only increases the unease in Asia over its rise.
As long as the territorial status quo is not accepted, the possibility that the Chinese military will strike again cannot be ruled out. Manmohan Singhs emphatic statement in the Lok Sabha last month that China will not attack India thus seems more than gratuitous. Disturbingly, the more timorous Singh has been, the more belligerent China has become.
India needs to counter the asymmetrical capabilities China is fashioning to take an adversary by surprise. Its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, for example, are being designed to shock and awe in space. China is already waging a quiet cyber-war, as if to underscore its ability to sabotage vital infrastructure in wartime. Moreover, its military is developing a blitzkrieg approach to warfare: a surprise blitz will seek to stun, confound and overwhelm an opponent.
The lasting lesson of 1962 is that India must be ready to repulse any kind of attack, including by undercutting the aggressor where it is the weakest. Otherwise, Chinas Achilles heel Tibet will become a stronger launch-pad for aggressive acts.
Integral to deception is taking an opponent by surprise, as emphasized in Sun Tzus Art of War some 2,500 years ago. Since the Communists came to power, China has been involved in the largest number of military conflicts in Asia. In all these conflicts, Chinese forces struck with no forewarning.
Indeed, a 2010 Pentagon report points out that China has repeatedly carried out military pre-emption in the name of defense: in 1950 (Tibet invasion, followed immediately by entry into Korean War), 1962, the 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union, and the 1979 attack on Vietnam. According to the report, The history of modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which Chinas leaders have claimed military pre-emption as a strategically defensive act. Chinas seizure of the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974 was another example of offense as defense.
The 1962 attack justified as a defensive act by Beijing, which used Nehrus unguarded remarks (our instructions are to free our territory) to brand India the aggressor stands out for Chinas masterly blending of deception and surprise. The invasion, mounted from two separate fronts, caught India off guard. The stab-in-the-back was best summed up by Nehru, who told the nation that a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods had returned evil for good.
The aggression was cleverly planned and timed. It coincided with the start of the Cuban missile crisis, which put the Soviet Union and the U.S. on the edge of a nuclear Armageddon. And the very day the U.S. quarantine of Cuba was lifted, easing the Cuban missile crisis, China ceased its 32-day aggression against India. The cunning timing just when global attention was focused on averting a nuclear catastrophe ensured that India received no outside help.
The deception began much earlier. One example was Premier Zhou En-lais 1960 New Delhi visit, during which he dangled the carrot of a border settlement without putting his money where his mouth was. Of course, it didnt take much effort to trick the Indians, who had convinced themselves that by merely signing the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, they had bought peace with China. It took a war humiliation for India to wake up to the reality that a nation can get peace only if it is able to defend peace.
Today, as part of its larger game of deception, China identifies Taiwan as the primary focus of its defence strategy. That is to divert international attention from its single-mindedness on achieving broader military goals. Taiwan serves metaphorically as a red carpet on which to invite all the bulls while Beijing busily seeks to accomplish bigger tasks.
If the countries around India have become battlegrounds for Chinas moves to encircle India, it is because Beijing heeds Sun Tzus counsel: Contain an adversary through the leverage of having made its neighbourhood hostile.
China employs deception to also camouflage its refusal to accept the territorial status quo with several of its neighbours. It is disturbing the status quo even on cross-border river flows. The insistence on changing the status quo, coupled with its strategic opacity and penchant to take an adversary by surprise, only increases the unease in Asia over its rise.
As long as the territorial status quo is not accepted, the possibility that the Chinese military will strike again cannot be ruled out. Manmohan Singhs emphatic statement in the Lok Sabha last month that China will not attack India thus seems more than gratuitous. Disturbingly, the more timorous Singh has been, the more belligerent China has become.
India needs to counter the asymmetrical capabilities China is fashioning to take an adversary by surprise. Its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, for example, are being designed to shock and awe in space. China is already waging a quiet cyber-war, as if to underscore its ability to sabotage vital infrastructure in wartime. Moreover, its military is developing a blitzkrieg approach to warfare: a surprise blitz will seek to stun, confound and overwhelm an opponent.
The lasting lesson of 1962 is that India must be ready to repulse any kind of attack, including by undercutting the aggressor where it is the weakest. Otherwise, Chinas Achilles heel Tibet will become a stronger launch-pad for aggressive acts.
