AndrewJin
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Just press ignore button.
The Great Game Changer: Belt and Road Intiative (BRI; OBOR)
- Thread starter Pk_Thunder
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TaiShang
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‘China, Russia to ink twin-aisle jet deal by end of 2015′
September 21, 2015, 7:17 am
China needs 6,330 new planes worth $950 billion in the next two decades, according to Boeing Co. [xinhua]
Russia plans to work with China on a wide-body aircraft that would compete with jetliners from Boeing Co. and Airbus Group SE and aims to sign an accord by the end of this year, Chinese state media said on Monday.
A China Daily report quoted Yury Slyusar, president of Russia’s United Aircraft Corp, as saying the agreement would initially outline profit sharing and responsibilities, with technical requirements to be decided on by March next year.
“So far, the project has proceeded well, and we plan to determine the technical requirements, specifications and outsourcing methods in March,” Slyusar said.
Russia’s United Aircraft Corp. and Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (Comac), are discussing a work plan and obligations as they seek to firm up a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2014.
United Aircraft plans to target market share beyond just Russia and China, a company spokesperson said last month.
Boeing Co. said last month it expects China’s aviation industry to withstand the current financial market turbulence and forecast the nation’s carriers will almost triple their commercial aircraft fleet over the next two decades.
China needs 6,330 new planes worth $950 billion in the next two decades, the planemaker said.
China is forecast to surpass the US as the world’s largest aircraft market within the next 20 years.
China is also forecast to become the world’s biggest air travel market, according to Boeing.
September 21, 2015, 7:17 am
China needs 6,330 new planes worth $950 billion in the next two decades, according to Boeing Co. [xinhua]
Russia plans to work with China on a wide-body aircraft that would compete with jetliners from Boeing Co. and Airbus Group SE and aims to sign an accord by the end of this year, Chinese state media said on Monday.
A China Daily report quoted Yury Slyusar, president of Russia’s United Aircraft Corp, as saying the agreement would initially outline profit sharing and responsibilities, with technical requirements to be decided on by March next year.
“So far, the project has proceeded well, and we plan to determine the technical requirements, specifications and outsourcing methods in March,” Slyusar said.
Russia’s United Aircraft Corp. and Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (Comac), are discussing a work plan and obligations as they seek to firm up a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2014.
United Aircraft plans to target market share beyond just Russia and China, a company spokesperson said last month.
Boeing Co. said last month it expects China’s aviation industry to withstand the current financial market turbulence and forecast the nation’s carriers will almost triple their commercial aircraft fleet over the next two decades.
China needs 6,330 new planes worth $950 billion in the next two decades, the planemaker said.
China is forecast to surpass the US as the world’s largest aircraft market within the next 20 years.
China is also forecast to become the world’s biggest air travel market, according to Boeing.
TaiShang
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Checkmate
29.09.2015
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s message at the UN General Assembly was stark; either sovereign states get together in a broad coalition against all forms of terror, and the principle of statehood is respected as enshrined in the UN charter - or there will be chaos.
This UN General Assembly revealed that the Obama administration's perpetual newspeak does not cut it anymore. A review of UN speeches by both Putin and Obama is almost painful to watch. Putin acted like a serious global statesman. Obama acted like a poseur flunking a screen test.
Putin's key talking points could not but be easily accessible to the Global South — his prime audience, much more than the industrialized West.
1) The export of color — or monochromatic — revolutions is doomed.
2) The alternative to the primacy of statehood is chaos. This implies that the Assad system in Syria may be immensely problematic, but it's the only game in town. The alternative is ISIS/ISIL/Daesh barbarism. There's no credible "moderate opposition" — as there was not in NATO-"liberated" Libya.
3) Only the UN — as flawed as it may be — is a guarantor of peace and security in our imperfect, realpolitik geopolitical environment.
Gotta slay those myths
Washington believed its own Arab Spring myth in 2011, betting that after Tunis and Cairo, Damascus would fall in a flash.
The Beltway believed its own myth of "moderate rebels" taking power.
The Beltway did not listen to Syrian minorities warning about the danger of an extremist Sunni/Salafi-jihadi take over.
Thus the current Syrian tragedy; the end result of a formidably complex power play, political and religious, Syrian, regional and global.
ISIS/ISIL/Daesh — for all its barbarism — may eventually win a few battles, but it won't control the whole of "Syraq".
To defeat the cancer, there's only one possibility: a real military campaign conducted by a real coalition including the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia.
Washington though never joins a coalition that it cannot control at will.
Thus a possible road map of what may lie ahead — as debated by Obama and Putin, face to face, for 90 minutes in New York; a two-headed coalition, one led by the US, the other led by Russia, but "coordinating" on the ground.
Still, Moscow will be struggling to form a wide-ranging coalition duly approved by the UN.
The task is immense. "Syraq" will have to be reconstituted.
That implies an Iraq acceptable for all Iraqis — and that's impossible to accomplish without Iran. And a Syria acceptable to all Syrians — and that's impossible without Iran and Russia.
Washington after all would have never been able to accomplish both in the first place. The Empire of Chaos specializes in nation breaking, not nation building.
Gotta slay that dragon
Gorbachev wanted to integrate the USSR in the European family — aiming for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Post-Soviet Russia though was not even invited to enter the house. What happened was NATO colonization of the former Soviet space.
Gorbachev dreamed that the West would share peace dividends with Russia. What Russia got instead was a neoliberal shock — and a humiliated society treated as a loser of the Cold War. Exceptionalism prevailed.
Under Putin, Russia tried once again a strategic partnership with the EU. Does anyone remember Sergey Lavrov as late as 2011 swearing that modernization of Russia was ready to go as a pan-European project, just as in the time of Peter the Great?
Yet by 2007, Putin had changed the game, and was ready to openly contest the unipolar "order" — and slowly but surely project Russia back to the geopolitical limelight.
Post-Ukraine, still under sanctions, but armed with a strategic partnership with China, the time for a checkmate is now.
In New York, Putin even proposed the lineaments of a New World Order. The genuine article, not that "vision thing" concocted by Daddy Bush post-collapse of the USSR.
It would be an equitable, fair world order — where state sovereignty is respected, sanctions are meaningless, NATO ceases to expand ad infinitum and exceptionalism does not apply.
The devil will be in the (many) details, of course. For instance, if a coalition to fight ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is forged and blessed by the UN, it will need the — virtually impossible — cohabitation of Sunnis and Shi'ites.
And in the near future, Brussels will have to tame visceral internal antagonism to have the European Union interacting with the Russia-led Eurasia Economic Union (EEU), which by that time will be totally integrated with the China-led New Silk Roads.
What's certain — for the overwhelming majority of the Global South — is that the Empire of Chaos made a mess everywhere, from Northern Africa and Southwest Asia to Russia's western borderlands.
Putin now rides into the hellish mess ready to slay the dragon of chaos — and the machinations of the Empire of Chaos. His sword? The UN. No wonder checkmated neocons, neoliberalcons and "humanitarian" imperialists can barely conceal their apoplexy.
29.09.2015
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s message at the UN General Assembly was stark; either sovereign states get together in a broad coalition against all forms of terror, and the principle of statehood is respected as enshrined in the UN charter - or there will be chaos.
This UN General Assembly revealed that the Obama administration's perpetual newspeak does not cut it anymore. A review of UN speeches by both Putin and Obama is almost painful to watch. Putin acted like a serious global statesman. Obama acted like a poseur flunking a screen test.
Putin's key talking points could not but be easily accessible to the Global South — his prime audience, much more than the industrialized West.
1) The export of color — or monochromatic — revolutions is doomed.
2) The alternative to the primacy of statehood is chaos. This implies that the Assad system in Syria may be immensely problematic, but it's the only game in town. The alternative is ISIS/ISIL/Daesh barbarism. There's no credible "moderate opposition" — as there was not in NATO-"liberated" Libya.
3) Only the UN — as flawed as it may be — is a guarantor of peace and security in our imperfect, realpolitik geopolitical environment.
Gotta slay those myths
Washington believed its own Arab Spring myth in 2011, betting that after Tunis and Cairo, Damascus would fall in a flash.
The Beltway believed its own myth of "moderate rebels" taking power.
The Beltway did not listen to Syrian minorities warning about the danger of an extremist Sunni/Salafi-jihadi take over.
Thus the current Syrian tragedy; the end result of a formidably complex power play, political and religious, Syrian, regional and global.
ISIS/ISIL/Daesh — for all its barbarism — may eventually win a few battles, but it won't control the whole of "Syraq".
To defeat the cancer, there's only one possibility: a real military campaign conducted by a real coalition including the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia.
Washington though never joins a coalition that it cannot control at will.
Thus a possible road map of what may lie ahead — as debated by Obama and Putin, face to face, for 90 minutes in New York; a two-headed coalition, one led by the US, the other led by Russia, but "coordinating" on the ground.
Still, Moscow will be struggling to form a wide-ranging coalition duly approved by the UN.
The task is immense. "Syraq" will have to be reconstituted.
That implies an Iraq acceptable for all Iraqis — and that's impossible to accomplish without Iran. And a Syria acceptable to all Syrians — and that's impossible without Iran and Russia.
Washington after all would have never been able to accomplish both in the first place. The Empire of Chaos specializes in nation breaking, not nation building.
Gotta slay that dragon
Gorbachev wanted to integrate the USSR in the European family — aiming for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Post-Soviet Russia though was not even invited to enter the house. What happened was NATO colonization of the former Soviet space.
Gorbachev dreamed that the West would share peace dividends with Russia. What Russia got instead was a neoliberal shock — and a humiliated society treated as a loser of the Cold War. Exceptionalism prevailed.
Under Putin, Russia tried once again a strategic partnership with the EU. Does anyone remember Sergey Lavrov as late as 2011 swearing that modernization of Russia was ready to go as a pan-European project, just as in the time of Peter the Great?
Yet by 2007, Putin had changed the game, and was ready to openly contest the unipolar "order" — and slowly but surely project Russia back to the geopolitical limelight.
Post-Ukraine, still under sanctions, but armed with a strategic partnership with China, the time for a checkmate is now.
In New York, Putin even proposed the lineaments of a New World Order. The genuine article, not that "vision thing" concocted by Daddy Bush post-collapse of the USSR.
It would be an equitable, fair world order — where state sovereignty is respected, sanctions are meaningless, NATO ceases to expand ad infinitum and exceptionalism does not apply.
The devil will be in the (many) details, of course. For instance, if a coalition to fight ISIS/ISIL/Daesh is forged and blessed by the UN, it will need the — virtually impossible — cohabitation of Sunnis and Shi'ites.
And in the near future, Brussels will have to tame visceral internal antagonism to have the European Union interacting with the Russia-led Eurasia Economic Union (EEU), which by that time will be totally integrated with the China-led New Silk Roads.
What's certain — for the overwhelming majority of the Global South — is that the Empire of Chaos made a mess everywhere, from Northern Africa and Southwest Asia to Russia's western borderlands.
Putin now rides into the hellish mess ready to slay the dragon of chaos — and the machinations of the Empire of Chaos. His sword? The UN. No wonder checkmated neocons, neoliberalcons and "humanitarian" imperialists can barely conceal their apoplexy.
TaiShang
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There Is No Folly to Russia's Pivot to China
It just isn't a panacea - but it was never intended as such.
Recently, there has been no shortage of highly pessimistic commentaries published &republished, pointing out the supposed “follies” of Russia’s eastern pivot, by highlighting this year’s decline in Sino-Russian trade, China’s stock market volatility, and its supposedeconomic “weakness”.
The conclusion implied by these articles is clear: “Russia’s economic pivot to China is failing, because increased economic cooperation has not mitigated Russia’s recent economic woes, or the effect of sanctions. China cannot save Russia, and the latter must continue depending on the West.”
This is essentially a straw-man conclusion. One thing should be plainly apparent through even a casual examination of Russia’s biggest recent commercial agreements with China: most of these arrangements with China were NEVER INTENDED to offset the impact of Russia’s current recession, but rather to position Russia’s economy for greater long-term diversification and upward mobility on the global economic value chain.
The deal which draws the most frequent & recent use of this straw-man is the $400 billion Sino-Russian ‘Power of Siberia’ gas deal. What is often overlooked is the fact that implementation was not set to take place until 2018 in the earliest scenario, and more likely closer to 2020 given potential construction delays.
Even then, this is a long-term arrangement that spans 30 years – which at best comes to about $13.4 billion of revenue per year. Bottom line, offsetting the immediate (’14-’16) economic pain of the recession and sanctions was NEVER the intent of this deal, and should not be a success metric.
Another deal that has come under plenty of media fanfare is China’s involvement in the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail. Again, the earliest completion date cited is 2018, meaning Russia’s economy will not reap any productivity gains from faster transportation at least until then.
From an investment point of view, the immediate economic impact is even more negligible. China will partially finance this HSR route, which could total $5 billion over the next 3 years; this means an addition of $1.6-1.7 billion per year into Russia’s economy, which amounts to a paltry ~0.084% of Russia’s $2 trillion GDP.
A third attention-worthy agreement is the Sino-Russian joint-development of wide-body airliners, an endeavor that would usually take 8-20 years before bearing any fruit, if the Boeing 777 is an reasonable benchmark.
Finally, there is the Sino-Russian business incubator in Skolkovo, along with Russia’s plan to establish a Skolkovo branch in Vladivostok. From a pure probability standpoint, this is an endeavor that may NEVER yield any direct benefits.
75-90% of all startups and small businesses are destined to fail, most of those that do not fail after 1-2 years will never have billion-dollar valuations or high-profiled IPOs; we should not expect startups from Skolkovo to perform differently.
Given that most strategic Sino-Russian initiatives will NOT bear fruit for many years, does that mean they are “failures”, or should not be pursued? The answer to that question really depends on how Russians perceive their own strategic priorities and their own future.
It is in Russia’ interests to diversify its trade portfolio, and eventually move away from being Europe’s resource appendage? Is it in Russia’s interests to modernize its transportation infrastructure, so as to stimulate economic development in its eastern regions?
Is it in Russia’s interests to move up the international business value chain, from being solely a natural resources exporter to a competitor in high-tech, high-margin industries such as commercial aviation and robotics? Is it in Russia’s interests to foster entrepreneurship and innovation in an increasingly knowledge-based global economy? Is it in Russia’s interest to be an economically sovereign and independent country?
If the answer to the questions above is ‘yes’, then there is NO DOUBT that Russia should continue these initiatives with China, and continue its eastern pivot strategy.
The harsh reality is that with the exception of a few situations, there is relatively little China can do to ease the pain of current low energy prices and economic sanctions. This is the inevitable consequence of Russia’s 20-year+ over-reliance on resource exports to Europe for its economic development.
In the face of this reality, Russia has two choices: instant gratification by acquiescing to the West in the hope of short-term relief, and continuing down the path of ‘business-as-usual’, or partner with China to diversify and modernize its economy.
The latter involves far more hard work and risk-taking, but is also a far more viable way to move Russia on a path of genuine sovereignty and stable economic modernization.
@vostok , @Project 4202
It just isn't a panacea - but it was never intended as such.
Recently, there has been no shortage of highly pessimistic commentaries published &republished, pointing out the supposed “follies” of Russia’s eastern pivot, by highlighting this year’s decline in Sino-Russian trade, China’s stock market volatility, and its supposedeconomic “weakness”.
The conclusion implied by these articles is clear: “Russia’s economic pivot to China is failing, because increased economic cooperation has not mitigated Russia’s recent economic woes, or the effect of sanctions. China cannot save Russia, and the latter must continue depending on the West.”
This is essentially a straw-man conclusion. One thing should be plainly apparent through even a casual examination of Russia’s biggest recent commercial agreements with China: most of these arrangements with China were NEVER INTENDED to offset the impact of Russia’s current recession, but rather to position Russia’s economy for greater long-term diversification and upward mobility on the global economic value chain.
The deal which draws the most frequent & recent use of this straw-man is the $400 billion Sino-Russian ‘Power of Siberia’ gas deal. What is often overlooked is the fact that implementation was not set to take place until 2018 in the earliest scenario, and more likely closer to 2020 given potential construction delays.
Even then, this is a long-term arrangement that spans 30 years – which at best comes to about $13.4 billion of revenue per year. Bottom line, offsetting the immediate (’14-’16) economic pain of the recession and sanctions was NEVER the intent of this deal, and should not be a success metric.
Another deal that has come under plenty of media fanfare is China’s involvement in the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail. Again, the earliest completion date cited is 2018, meaning Russia’s economy will not reap any productivity gains from faster transportation at least until then.
From an investment point of view, the immediate economic impact is even more negligible. China will partially finance this HSR route, which could total $5 billion over the next 3 years; this means an addition of $1.6-1.7 billion per year into Russia’s economy, which amounts to a paltry ~0.084% of Russia’s $2 trillion GDP.
A third attention-worthy agreement is the Sino-Russian joint-development of wide-body airliners, an endeavor that would usually take 8-20 years before bearing any fruit, if the Boeing 777 is an reasonable benchmark.
Finally, there is the Sino-Russian business incubator in Skolkovo, along with Russia’s plan to establish a Skolkovo branch in Vladivostok. From a pure probability standpoint, this is an endeavor that may NEVER yield any direct benefits.
75-90% of all startups and small businesses are destined to fail, most of those that do not fail after 1-2 years will never have billion-dollar valuations or high-profiled IPOs; we should not expect startups from Skolkovo to perform differently.
Given that most strategic Sino-Russian initiatives will NOT bear fruit for many years, does that mean they are “failures”, or should not be pursued? The answer to that question really depends on how Russians perceive their own strategic priorities and their own future.
It is in Russia’ interests to diversify its trade portfolio, and eventually move away from being Europe’s resource appendage? Is it in Russia’s interests to modernize its transportation infrastructure, so as to stimulate economic development in its eastern regions?
Is it in Russia’s interests to move up the international business value chain, from being solely a natural resources exporter to a competitor in high-tech, high-margin industries such as commercial aviation and robotics? Is it in Russia’s interests to foster entrepreneurship and innovation in an increasingly knowledge-based global economy? Is it in Russia’s interest to be an economically sovereign and independent country?
If the answer to the questions above is ‘yes’, then there is NO DOUBT that Russia should continue these initiatives with China, and continue its eastern pivot strategy.
The harsh reality is that with the exception of a few situations, there is relatively little China can do to ease the pain of current low energy prices and economic sanctions. This is the inevitable consequence of Russia’s 20-year+ over-reliance on resource exports to Europe for its economic development.
In the face of this reality, Russia has two choices: instant gratification by acquiescing to the West in the hope of short-term relief, and continuing down the path of ‘business-as-usual’, or partner with China to diversify and modernize its economy.
The latter involves far more hard work and risk-taking, but is also a far more viable way to move Russia on a path of genuine sovereignty and stable economic modernization.
@vostok , @Project 4202
beijingwalker
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China Joining Russia In Syria Brings Risks Of World War
10/09/2015 06:51 PM E
10/09/2015 06:51 PM E
- American Decline: Chinese forces head to Syria to join with Russia in filling Obama's power vacuum and purportedly fight the Islamic State. A false move involving NATO member Turkey could mean world war.
Russian and Chinese military sources now confirm that Chinese warships are en route to the Middle East to get in on some of the action of humiliating the U.S.
In just a week and a half, Moscow has upended the dynamics of power in the Mideast by taking on the role that President Obama relinquished: acting like a superpower in a regional conflict that has implications extending far beyond the region.
Russian ruler Vladimir Putin launched airstrikes against rebels opposing the terrorist Assad regime in Syria, first with a modest force to gauge the U.S. response and perhaps pull out if threatened. Seeing no threat, Putin has been intensifying Russian operations, even sending in Spetsnaz special forces troops.
China's entry means two major powers are stepping in to do what the U.S. was unwilling to do against IS.
It's a lesson in how fast the tables can turn when America displays weakness — losing wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and proving to be ineffective against IS despite fighting it for a year and three months now.
Our commander-in-chief even admits that he has no strategy against the monstrous caliphate that his very own policies of weakness brought into being.
What is apparently happening now was inconceivable before Obama sent America spiraling into decline: our two Cold War adversaries uniting militarily in an effort that will ultimately give them dominance, at our expense, in the most strategically important part of the world, the oil-rich and politically fragile Middle East.
You can't carry out your objectives there over the course of years with the most advanced military in the world? Fine. Watch us do it, Moscow and Beijing are telling us with their actions. And in months, or perhaps only weeks.
How the next president will dig us out of this hole is hard to fathom. A new post-Cold War Brezhnev Doctrine could come into effect, in which Moscow and Beijing warn that they will not let the U.S. reassert its influence in countries they've "liberated" in the Mideast.
If that turns out to be the case, America will be risking war with both Russia and China if it even tries to return to its pre-Obama influence in the region.
Moreover, with Russia already more than once "accidentally" violating the airspace of Turkey, a NATO member in spite of its current anti-U.S. government, the dangers — Moscow and Beijing engaging in incursions or other provocative actions on the Syria-Turkish border — are clear.
All NATO nations are obligated by treaty to defend against an attack on any individual NATO nation. If Russia and China see what they can get away with, they could expose NATO as impotent.
Or, worse, they could trigger World War III.
Neither Obama nor the many millions who voted for him twice ever thought his policies of weakness could make things this bad.
China Joining Russia In Syria Brings Risks Of World War - Investors.com
- American Decline: Chinese forces head to Syria to join with Russia in filling Obama's power vacuum and purportedly fight the Islamic State. A false move involving NATO member Turkey could mean world war.
AZADPAKISTAN2009
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Great gesture by Chinese to help , with global harmony in these difficult moments when some are arming ISIS
superpower
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Together they will end the crisis .i hope
Fireurimagination
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Damn and the loser of this world war would be innocent syrian people
AZADPAKISTAN2009
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There is no cities anymore all destroyed thank to financing from outside
Like heck ... BRAND NEW TOYATA thundra trucks for ISIS whats up with the supply group
Pakistan has suzuki pickups
Like heck ... BRAND NEW TOYATA thundra trucks for ISIS whats up with the supply group
Pakistan has suzuki pickups
HongWu002
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China's antiterror czar suddenly traveled to Russia to discuss PLA ground troops attack against ETIM bases in Syria.
国家反恐领导小组副组长孙建国上将突然访俄_军事_中华网
国家反恐领导小组副组长孙建国上将突然访俄_军事_中华网
people of west,middle east,asia
Azizam
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The handful of shiny new buildings sprouting out of a barren landscape of dusty steppe and rusting shipping containers is an incongruous sight. One of them, a sparkling tower of marble and glass, is empty aside from a duty-free shop on the ground floor. Next door, a shop sells Russian honey and Chinese ladies’ shoes, displayed side by side.
This is Khorgos, the dividing line between China and Kazakhstan. And while it may not look like much now, China has ambitions to transform this border point at what was once the edge of the Russian empire into a new gateway to the west.
“East meets west. It’s here. This is the linking point,” says Hicham Belmaachi, commercial director of a newly-built dry port at the border, designed to speed up the transit of Chinese goods via Xinjiang on their way to central Asia, Europe or the Middle East.
Khorgos is just one of a ribbon of projects across the region designed to help realise China’s dreams of a new Silk Road — a plan backed by President Xi Jinping that would firmly stamp his country’s authority and influence from Xi’ian to Europe.
With promises of tens of billions of dollars in investment, the Chinese strategy, if realised, could reshape the former Soviet economies of central Asia, which have been battered by falling commodity prices and recession in Russia.
But increasing economic dependence on China at a time of uncertainty over the health of its economy is not universally popular in the central Asian states. And the launch of a regional integration drive has put Beijing on a collision course with Moscow, which has been lobbying countries to join its Eurasian Economic Union. It also raises the stakes for Beijing: as China invests more in this fragile region bordering Afghanistan, it is finding it harder to resist being drawn into political and military affairs.
“This is China’s inadvertent empire. It’s a part of the world where they are clearly becoming the most significant geopolitical player,” says Raffaello Pantucci, a specialist on the region at the Royal United Services Institute. “I don’t think they’ve given consideration to what that means in the longer term.”
Two years ago, Mr Xi stood in Kazakhstan’s futuristic capital of Astana and invoked the memory of Zhang Qian, the diplomat who helped open China’s trade with the world in the 2nd century BC.
“As I stand here and look back at that episode of history, I could almost hear the camel bells echoing in the mountains and see the wisp of smoke rising from the desert,” the Chinese leader said. Describing Kazakhstan as a “magic land”, he called for the creation of a new “economic belt” along the old trade routes.
“The ancient Silk Road has gained fresh vitality,” he said.
Others see parallels with a more recent period in history: the tussle for influence between the Russian and British empires in the 19th century. As China expands its influence in parts of the former Soviet Union, central Asia could become the focus of a new “Great Game” between Beijing, Moscow and possibly Iran, Turkey and western countries.
But as western interest in the region recedes with the military drawdown from Afghanistan, and Russia’s ability to invest is curtailed by its own economic recession, the Great Game in the region may turn out to be one-sided. Over the past two decades China has quietly become the pre-eminent economic power in the region; now many central Asian governments greet the prospect of Chinese investment as their last chance to stave off a downturn that could threaten political stability.
Trade between China and the five post-Soviet central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — has risen from $1.8bn in 2000 to $50bn in 2013, according to IMF data, before dropping slightly amid the decline in commodity prices. That means China has surpassed Russia in recent years to become the region’s single largest trade partner.
“If you look at investment needs in the region, then Chinese participation is very important to say the least,” says Agris Preimanis, central Asia economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a major western investor in the region. “They are increasingly active in all sectors and you just cannot see western capital or Russian capital taking their place.”
In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies own somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of the country’s oil production — about the same proportion as the national oil company. In Turkmenistan, holder of the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, China has replaced Russia’s Gazprom as the dominant buyer of Turkmen gas, accounting for 61 per cent of exports last year. Much of that shift is thanks the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, opened in 2009, which provides the region’s energy-rich economies with a major export route not controlled by Moscow. In the region’s poorer countries, China has also become an economic power. Chinese companies have invested in oil refineries and cement plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and in roads and tunnels across the region.
Data on the scale of Chinese investment are sketchy, as much is done at a bilateral level between Chinese state banks, such as China Development Bank or China Eximbank, and central Asian governments or state companies.
But in one example, the Tajik deputy finance minister last year told the FT that Beijing would invest $6bn in Tajikistan over the next three years — a figure equivalent to two-thirds of the country’s annual gross domestic product.
This economic dominance means that often it seems that China, not Russia, is now the most important patron of central Asian governments. After Kazakhstan allowed its currency to float freely in August, triggering an immediate devaluation of more than a fifth, its first priority was to reassure Beijing.
“Where is the first visit of the Kazakh president after this decision? Where was the first commitment that all the investments are in place? China,” says Kairat Kelimbetov, the central bank governor.
When Tajikistan, the region’s poorest country, was running low on central bank reserves this summer, it signed a swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China worth Rmb3.2bn ($500m).
It is not always smooth travelling on the new Silk Road. In a region that has traditionally felt greater cultural affinities with Russia and Turkey, politicians are frequently suspicious of China. A proposal for China to lease a large area of land for agriculture triggered rare public protests in Kazakhstan in 2010.
Dosym Satpayev, a Kazakh political scientist who heads the Almaty-based Risk Assessment Group, warns: “Any attempt by China to increase influence in Kazakhstan will awake more anti-China sentiment.”
While many see the new Silk Road as more of a formalisation of China’s presence in the region than a specific plan, the fanfare surrounding it has raised hackles among those who see central Asia as part of Russia’s “sphere of influence”. Zhao Huasheng, director of the Centre for Russia and Central Asia studies at Fudan University, says that when the Silk Road strategy was announced, Russian officials saw it as a challenge to Moscow’s own regional integration project, the Eurasian Economic Union.
“China provided a lot of explanation,” he says. “China sees the projects developing in parallel, in a co-operative way.”
In the past, Russia blocked attempts to increase the reach of another Chinese-led regional group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes all the central Asian states apart from Turkmenistan.
Yet when Mr Xi visited Moscow in May, the two countries signed a declaration on co-operation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road project. Alexander Gabuev, senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, a think-tank, says the deal was the result of “painful internal discussions” in Moscow. Analysts say the unspoken agreement between Moscow and Beijing appears to be that Russia will cede economic dominance in central Asia to China, but maintain its military and security heft in the region.
“What the Kremlin is hoping for is a division of labour between Moscow and Beijing in central Asia,” says Mr Gabuev. “In this grand scheme, China will be the major driver for economic development, while Moscow will remain the dominant hard security provider.”
Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army, called central Asia “a rich piece of cake given to today’s Chinese people by heaven” in a 2010 essay that became a kind of manifesto for China’s expansionist policy in the region.
Analysts see two broad motivations behind the dramatic increase in Chinese investment in the region that started in the 1990s.
First, as China’s commodity consumption skyrocketed, central Asia was a nearby source of oil, gas, uranium, copper and gold supplies. Second, Beijing wanted co-operation from the newly-independent states to keep its restive Xinjiang region in check. Xinjiang’s native Uighurs have much in common with the cultures, languages and religion of central Asia, and there is a large Uighur minority in the region.
But China may find it hard to stay out of security matters as its economic interests in the region increase. It has already started providing some military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. “Even though this is an economic project it could create political impact or influence,” says Prof Zhao. “I think China will get more involved in security in the region. But it doesn’t mean China will be involved in that region militarily.”
General Liu writes of the cultural affinities between Xinjiang and the peoples of central Asia, noting: “The advantageous factor is that they all derive great benefits from economic co-operation with China.”
With the launch of the new Silk Road, analysts see a shift in investments towards infrastructure and other sectors. “If before Chinese investment was directed at the oil and gas sector, now it will be in infrastructure, industry, agriculture, tourism and other areas,” says Ding Xiaoxing, director of central Asia studies at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, a government-linked think-tank.
At Khorgos, the Kazakh-Chinese border crossing, this shift is becoming reality. Rows of gleaming new railway tracks stretch into the distance, ready to handle ever-increasing volumes of Chinese cargo. Mr Belmaachi boasts that his team can shift a trainload of cargo from a Chinese to a Kazakh train — the two countries’ railways have different-sized gauges — in just 47 minutes.
The state railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), has invested 245bn tenge ($900m) to build the dry port, which started operations in August and launches officially next Monday. China’s Jiangsu province in September announced an agreement to invest $600m over five years in logistics and industrial zones around Khorgos.
Darryl Hadaway, a former regional head of Deloitte who is starting a logistics business focused on Kazakhstan, says Khorgos can become a hub for regional and international trade, serving the role that Atlanta does in the US.
Already, the number of containers travelling by train between China and Europe via Kazakhstan has increased 18 times between 2011 and 2014, and is on track to double again this year, according to KTZ. The route is attractive to electronics companies such as HP — which has helped to pioneer it — for whom the shorter transit time compared to shipping by sea is worth paying for. The journey from China to Europe takes 14-16 days, compared with a month or more by sea, although the cost of shipping one container is some $9,000 compared with $3,000 by sea.
KTZ is hoping to capture 6 per cent of the trade between China and Europe by 2020; currently 98 per cent goes by sea.
“Companies in Europe and China have never studied this option in detail. People were really busy shipping by sea and not focusing on this route,” says Mr Belmaachi. “I really think this is the next big thing for the supply chain.”
Increasing the number of trains plying the route may also help to open up new trade routes for perishable products, like fruit and vegetables, says Mr Hadaway. “There is a whole range of products coming out of Asia that have never been able to access this market.”
http://m.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d35d34ca-6e70-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html
This is Khorgos, the dividing line between China and Kazakhstan. And while it may not look like much now, China has ambitions to transform this border point at what was once the edge of the Russian empire into a new gateway to the west.
“East meets west. It’s here. This is the linking point,” says Hicham Belmaachi, commercial director of a newly-built dry port at the border, designed to speed up the transit of Chinese goods via Xinjiang on their way to central Asia, Europe or the Middle East.
Khorgos is just one of a ribbon of projects across the region designed to help realise China’s dreams of a new Silk Road — a plan backed by President Xi Jinping that would firmly stamp his country’s authority and influence from Xi’ian to Europe.
With promises of tens of billions of dollars in investment, the Chinese strategy, if realised, could reshape the former Soviet economies of central Asia, which have been battered by falling commodity prices and recession in Russia.
But increasing economic dependence on China at a time of uncertainty over the health of its economy is not universally popular in the central Asian states. And the launch of a regional integration drive has put Beijing on a collision course with Moscow, which has been lobbying countries to join its Eurasian Economic Union. It also raises the stakes for Beijing: as China invests more in this fragile region bordering Afghanistan, it is finding it harder to resist being drawn into political and military affairs.
“This is China’s inadvertent empire. It’s a part of the world where they are clearly becoming the most significant geopolitical player,” says Raffaello Pantucci, a specialist on the region at the Royal United Services Institute. “I don’t think they’ve given consideration to what that means in the longer term.”
Two years ago, Mr Xi stood in Kazakhstan’s futuristic capital of Astana and invoked the memory of Zhang Qian, the diplomat who helped open China’s trade with the world in the 2nd century BC.
“As I stand here and look back at that episode of history, I could almost hear the camel bells echoing in the mountains and see the wisp of smoke rising from the desert,” the Chinese leader said. Describing Kazakhstan as a “magic land”, he called for the creation of a new “economic belt” along the old trade routes.
“The ancient Silk Road has gained fresh vitality,” he said.
Others see parallels with a more recent period in history: the tussle for influence between the Russian and British empires in the 19th century. As China expands its influence in parts of the former Soviet Union, central Asia could become the focus of a new “Great Game” between Beijing, Moscow and possibly Iran, Turkey and western countries.
But as western interest in the region recedes with the military drawdown from Afghanistan, and Russia’s ability to invest is curtailed by its own economic recession, the Great Game in the region may turn out to be one-sided. Over the past two decades China has quietly become the pre-eminent economic power in the region; now many central Asian governments greet the prospect of Chinese investment as their last chance to stave off a downturn that could threaten political stability.
Trade between China and the five post-Soviet central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — has risen from $1.8bn in 2000 to $50bn in 2013, according to IMF data, before dropping slightly amid the decline in commodity prices. That means China has surpassed Russia in recent years to become the region’s single largest trade partner.
“If you look at investment needs in the region, then Chinese participation is very important to say the least,” says Agris Preimanis, central Asia economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a major western investor in the region. “They are increasingly active in all sectors and you just cannot see western capital or Russian capital taking their place.”
In Kazakhstan, Chinese companies own somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of the country’s oil production — about the same proportion as the national oil company. In Turkmenistan, holder of the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, China has replaced Russia’s Gazprom as the dominant buyer of Turkmen gas, accounting for 61 per cent of exports last year. Much of that shift is thanks the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, opened in 2009, which provides the region’s energy-rich economies with a major export route not controlled by Moscow. In the region’s poorer countries, China has also become an economic power. Chinese companies have invested in oil refineries and cement plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and in roads and tunnels across the region.
Data on the scale of Chinese investment are sketchy, as much is done at a bilateral level between Chinese state banks, such as China Development Bank or China Eximbank, and central Asian governments or state companies.
But in one example, the Tajik deputy finance minister last year told the FT that Beijing would invest $6bn in Tajikistan over the next three years — a figure equivalent to two-thirds of the country’s annual gross domestic product.
This economic dominance means that often it seems that China, not Russia, is now the most important patron of central Asian governments. After Kazakhstan allowed its currency to float freely in August, triggering an immediate devaluation of more than a fifth, its first priority was to reassure Beijing.
“Where is the first visit of the Kazakh president after this decision? Where was the first commitment that all the investments are in place? China,” says Kairat Kelimbetov, the central bank governor.
When Tajikistan, the region’s poorest country, was running low on central bank reserves this summer, it signed a swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China worth Rmb3.2bn ($500m).
It is not always smooth travelling on the new Silk Road. In a region that has traditionally felt greater cultural affinities with Russia and Turkey, politicians are frequently suspicious of China. A proposal for China to lease a large area of land for agriculture triggered rare public protests in Kazakhstan in 2010.
Dosym Satpayev, a Kazakh political scientist who heads the Almaty-based Risk Assessment Group, warns: “Any attempt by China to increase influence in Kazakhstan will awake more anti-China sentiment.”
While many see the new Silk Road as more of a formalisation of China’s presence in the region than a specific plan, the fanfare surrounding it has raised hackles among those who see central Asia as part of Russia’s “sphere of influence”. Zhao Huasheng, director of the Centre for Russia and Central Asia studies at Fudan University, says that when the Silk Road strategy was announced, Russian officials saw it as a challenge to Moscow’s own regional integration project, the Eurasian Economic Union.
“China provided a lot of explanation,” he says. “China sees the projects developing in parallel, in a co-operative way.”
In the past, Russia blocked attempts to increase the reach of another Chinese-led regional group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes all the central Asian states apart from Turkmenistan.
Yet when Mr Xi visited Moscow in May, the two countries signed a declaration on co-operation between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road project. Alexander Gabuev, senior associate at the Carnegie Moscow Center, a think-tank, says the deal was the result of “painful internal discussions” in Moscow. Analysts say the unspoken agreement between Moscow and Beijing appears to be that Russia will cede economic dominance in central Asia to China, but maintain its military and security heft in the region.
“What the Kremlin is hoping for is a division of labour between Moscow and Beijing in central Asia,” says Mr Gabuev. “In this grand scheme, China will be the major driver for economic development, while Moscow will remain the dominant hard security provider.”
Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army, called central Asia “a rich piece of cake given to today’s Chinese people by heaven” in a 2010 essay that became a kind of manifesto for China’s expansionist policy in the region.
Analysts see two broad motivations behind the dramatic increase in Chinese investment in the region that started in the 1990s.
First, as China’s commodity consumption skyrocketed, central Asia was a nearby source of oil, gas, uranium, copper and gold supplies. Second, Beijing wanted co-operation from the newly-independent states to keep its restive Xinjiang region in check. Xinjiang’s native Uighurs have much in common with the cultures, languages and religion of central Asia, and there is a large Uighur minority in the region.
But China may find it hard to stay out of security matters as its economic interests in the region increase. It has already started providing some military aid to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. “Even though this is an economic project it could create political impact or influence,” says Prof Zhao. “I think China will get more involved in security in the region. But it doesn’t mean China will be involved in that region militarily.”
General Liu writes of the cultural affinities between Xinjiang and the peoples of central Asia, noting: “The advantageous factor is that they all derive great benefits from economic co-operation with China.”
With the launch of the new Silk Road, analysts see a shift in investments towards infrastructure and other sectors. “If before Chinese investment was directed at the oil and gas sector, now it will be in infrastructure, industry, agriculture, tourism and other areas,” says Ding Xiaoxing, director of central Asia studies at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, a government-linked think-tank.
At Khorgos, the Kazakh-Chinese border crossing, this shift is becoming reality. Rows of gleaming new railway tracks stretch into the distance, ready to handle ever-increasing volumes of Chinese cargo. Mr Belmaachi boasts that his team can shift a trainload of cargo from a Chinese to a Kazakh train — the two countries’ railways have different-sized gauges — in just 47 minutes.
The state railway company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ), has invested 245bn tenge ($900m) to build the dry port, which started operations in August and launches officially next Monday. China’s Jiangsu province in September announced an agreement to invest $600m over five years in logistics and industrial zones around Khorgos.
Darryl Hadaway, a former regional head of Deloitte who is starting a logistics business focused on Kazakhstan, says Khorgos can become a hub for regional and international trade, serving the role that Atlanta does in the US.
Already, the number of containers travelling by train between China and Europe via Kazakhstan has increased 18 times between 2011 and 2014, and is on track to double again this year, according to KTZ. The route is attractive to electronics companies such as HP — which has helped to pioneer it — for whom the shorter transit time compared to shipping by sea is worth paying for. The journey from China to Europe takes 14-16 days, compared with a month or more by sea, although the cost of shipping one container is some $9,000 compared with $3,000 by sea.
KTZ is hoping to capture 6 per cent of the trade between China and Europe by 2020; currently 98 per cent goes by sea.
“Companies in Europe and China have never studied this option in detail. People were really busy shipping by sea and not focusing on this route,” says Mr Belmaachi. “I really think this is the next big thing for the supply chain.”
Increasing the number of trains plying the route may also help to open up new trade routes for perishable products, like fruit and vegetables, says Mr Hadaway. “There is a whole range of products coming out of Asia that have never been able to access this market.”
http://m.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d35d34ca-6e70-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html
Raphael
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I absolute approve of these blueprints for the future Central Asian order. Russia should retain its political and military sphere of influence in the region. In return, China's should be permitted a robust economic footprint in the region. Above all, the two should cooperate to shut out the meddling US interloper.
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