Thank you for your very comprehensive analysis. It is a privilege for me to engage in such constructive and intellectual discourse.
I agree with these observations. It is definitely correct that China stood by Russia through economic action although, verbally it maintained the usual rhetoric. Military is of course out of question. Certainly, actions speak louder than words, and, in that, US decision makers must have written off China as one of bear-friendly. But from international law perspective, China has never been obliged to assist the US sanctions against Russia. For that, they need to pass a resolution at the UNSC. In that sense, US-EU move to punish Russia is still a unilateral action, not multilateral or international.
China is important for Russia, but it is not the only important country, by the way. Therefore, it would still be difficult for the US to single out China as the sole savior of Russia -- even if we admit Russia does need a savior.
In
2014:
1. China Total trade with China reached $52 billion - 11% of all Russian trade. This is 4.6% higher than last year. China and Russia have set themselves a target of $200 billion annually by 2020. They are expected to beat that easily after announcing deals this year worth over a trillion dollars.
2. Netherlands
Total trade with Netherlands reached $45 billion representing 9.6% of all Russian trade. This is 0.1% lower than last year. Historically Netherlands has been Russia's largest European trading partner due to a very strong bilateral investment treaty.
3. Germany
Total trade with Germany reached $41 billion representing 8.7% of all Russian trade. This is 0.2% lower than last year. German companies such as Siemens are very large exporters as machinery is the most important German export component to Russia.
4. Italy
Total trade with Italy reached $30 billion representing 6.4% of all Russian trade. This is 2.2% lower than last year. Italian-Russian trade relations have historically been very good. Should South Stream come to fruition trade will rise further.
That's a very interesting observation which brings a whole new dimension to the debate. It would not be impossible entirely. What I agree 100% is that the US has constantly been in search of an enemy and China appears to be the next one although I am not sure how they would be able to justify the losses from such potential confrontation given that even the war on terror and a limited number of human loss on part of the US created such strong anti-war movements.
Don't you think this is an expected historical phenomenon? The China of 1990s was a lot different from the China of 2010. Accordingly, US official viewpoint has also changed. I believe that those decision makers, too, are susceptible to historical developments. This, however, does not rule out the fact that the lack of Middle East in early and mid-Obama presidency has been recently replaced by a stronger re-focus on the region. I believe these policy postures are ever changing. I agree that China looms large and they will squeeze every drop of juice from China threat theory, but, that is in a sense unavoidable whether China stands by Russia or entirely abondanes it.
That's also an interesting observation. There must be a certain action-reaction pattern in inter-state relations. All I can say here is that just as US moves (pre-planned/staged or not) create certain reaction on part of China, the vice versa might be true, as well. It then all comes down to the ability of strategy-making.
I see China's policy to be less US-centric and more Eurasia-centric over the years. It is not really entirely an Asian/Eastern shift. And Europe is not a monolithic entity. There are eastern areas that are still pretty much under Russia's influence. And there is Africa and Latin America. I certainly agree that China is decoupling from the US-led hardcore Western alliance, but, its face is turned toward a larger landmass than the East.
I agree on that. Especially in terms of economic and cultural interests, China's private industries and institutions need to better marketing and PR in the US to win certain members of the Congress or governors and mayors. These people are there to ensure their position and Chinese entities can take advantage of the monied-politics of the US. That's probably something that China lacks miserably.
I agree. I guess I misunderstood the entire "influencing US opinion" argument of yours. I definitely concur that China needs to utilize more secondary power in the form of institutions and companies. Certain steps are being taken and China's diaspora is being engaged more successfully these days. I guess, in that regard, Turkey itself, which has a huge diaspora, can offer some lessons to China. In the face of intense propaganda and demonization, China needs to utilize every available tools to change perceptions and winning battles with minimum cost.
I would say that future is always a tricky beast. China might be seen to have the upper hand. Still, Russia cannot be underestimated.
By among equals, I did not mean "equals in real power," but equals "in terms of their relationship." The Western concept of alliance is often the stronger having the last say in any grouping. When it comes to China, it is a bit different. Inequality in size/scale/capacity does not always translate into inequality in social relationship. The charter of the AIIB or the SCO's decision making proves. This is actually the Asian way of consensus-based action. That's why China and Russia do not pursue a NATO-like hard alliance. They should, in my opinion, and China must be the final decision maker, but, I think neither leadership thinks the time is ripe for that.