The Great Game Changer: Belt and Road Intiative (BRI; OBOR)

[TaiShang]

China’s Railway Diplomacy in the Balkans
Publication: China Brief Volume: 14 Issue: 20
October 23, 2014
By: Dragan Pavlićević


Hungarian, Serbian and Chinese leaders shake hands at the ceremony announcing their agreement for the new Hungaro-Serbian High-Speed Railway (HSR) project.


In November 2013, China, Serbia and Hungary signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the construction of the Hungaro-Serbian High-Speed Railway (HSR), connecting Belgrade and Budapest by rail to facilitate transporting Chinese exports from Greek ports to European markets. First proposed by Beijing in February 2013, the contract is expected to be finalized during the China-Central and Eastern European (CEE) Summit in Belgrade this December, with construction set to begin in 2015 and finish by 2017 (Dnevnik, February 22, 2013; Government of Republic of Serbia, September 11). The two billion euro ($2.5 billion) project, financed by soft loans from China’s Export-Import Bank and built by state-owned China Railway and Construction Corporation (CRCC), represents the changing face of China’s relations with CEE countries and will serve as a staging ground for greater Chinese access to Western Europe, for both commerce and infrastructure projects (Tanjug, September 9; Politika, September 11).

Ticket to Ride

The Hungaro-Serbian HSR project is an important part of China’s strategy to extend its Maritime Silk Road (MSR) into Europe via land routes (see China Brief, October 10). The maritime terminus of the MSR is the Greek port of Piraeus, which is partially owned by China’s state-owned shipping giant COSCO and is now the main entry point for Chinese goods to Europe, though Beijing has also shown interest in developing and utilizing other Greek ports in Thessaloniki and Igoumentsia, as well as several Adriatic ports, including Bar in Montenegro (People’s Daily, December 21, 2012). Furthermore, railway infrastructure and technology projects financed with Chinese export loans enable Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to gain a foothold in overseas markets and test their technology and know-how in less-developed European countries on the way to lucrative markets in Western Europe.

Keeping Chinese imports competitive in the European market requires reduced shipping times to offset the rising costs of production in China, and the HSR project will accomplish this by dramatically reducing the time required to transport exports between the Suez Canal and Western Europe. According to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, directing exports bound for Europe to the Greek port of Piraeus, “the pearl port” of the Mediterranean Sea, already shortens the total shipping time from China to Europe by at least one week compared to traditional routes (China Daily, June 20). Previously, Chinese exports were shipped through the Suez Canal, then sailed around Europe to ports on the northwestern coast, including Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, and finally taken by rail to inland cities. Now that Chinese exports can sail through the Suez directly to Greece and be taken by train through CEE countries to Western Europe, the total transit time is estimated to decrease from roughly 30 to 20 days. The Hungaro-Serbian HSR, along with other regional transportation infrastructure projects, will further reduce shipping times within the European continent, as HSR trains will average at least between 100 and 125 miles-per-hour (mph), instead of the current 45 mph (Ekathimerini, June 20; Železnice Srbije, November 26, 2013; B92, May 12). This will reduce the time by rail between Belgrade and Budapest alone from the current eight hours down to a mere three hours.

China’s Railway Diplomacy: Present and Future

The HSR project adds to a number of recent Chinese-led projects in the Balkans that have either upgraded or built new regional transportation networks, particularly railway infrastructure and technology, which are financed by Chinese banks and fulfilled by Chinese construction SOEs. These projects are part of a coherent Chinese strategy to create a distribution infrastructure that will facilitate the movement of Chinese goods from several ports in southern Europe—Piraeus, Thessaloniki and Bar—via the Balkans to northern Europe.

In Serbia, Beijing features prominently in the country’s development agenda through China’s involvement in myriad capital projects. In December 2012, China’s Chinese Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and the Serbian Ministry of Transport signed an MoU for the improvement of several neglected sections of the country’s north-south railway axis. The north-south railway, including the Serbian part of the Hungaro-Serbian HSR route, transits from Serbia’s borders with Croatia and Hungary in the north to Bulgaria and Macedonia in the south. CCCC will also repair 300 miles of railway connecting Serbia and Montenegro from Belgrade to Bar (Xinhua, December 18, 2012). In July 2013, Serbian Railways reached a 78 million euro ($100 million) agreement with Huawei, backed by favorable bank loans ensured by Huawei, to modernize Serbia’s railway telecommunication infrastructure along 275 miles of the same north-south railway line (Železnice Srbije, July 17, 2013). Serbian Railways is also negotiating a Chinese loan of approximately 400 million euros ($510 million) for the reconstruction of rail lines to Serbian ports on the Danube River. China is interested in harnessing the potential of these ports along the Danube to serve as free-trade zones and transit points for Chinese goods on their way up the river toward European markets, an idea recently embraced warmly by the Serbian government (Government of Republic of Serbia, September 11). The loan could also be used to fund the construction of a new terminal on the north-south railway route, and would be paid back through exports of unspecified Serbian commodities to China (InSerbia, April 14). These projects altogether reflect a further deepening in Serbia’s strategic partnership with China, and Serbia’s role anchoring as a key transport hub for Chinese exports.

In Hungary, which borders the Balkans to the north, the government reached an agreement in February with CRCC, financed through the China Development Bank, to build a 70-mile railway ring around Budapest (Budapest Business Journal, March 31). The estimated 1.2 billion euro ($1.5 billion) project will enable railway traffic to cross Hungary in one day, down from the current five days, by reaching speeds of 125 mph and avoiding the railway bottleneck in Budapest that significantly slows transit. Of note, Hungary originally sought funding from the European Union (EU), but was turned down.

China is pursuing other rail infrastructure projects in the CEE region. They include a high-speed railway from Romania to Moldova using Chinese financing and technology, and a comprehensive effort to upgrade Greece’s railway system. China’s focus in Greece is the northern route to Macedonia through Thessaloniki and the Macedonian railway line that would connect Greek lines to the upgraded north-south route in Serbia and the Hungaro-Serbian HSR route, effectively extending the high-speed rail connection all the way from Piraeus to Budapest when the projects are all completed. Furthermore, there are Chinese plans to upgrade both railway and road infrastructure from Bar through Montenegro to the border of Serbia (Agerpress, September 2; Government of Montenegro, April 11; BalkanInsight, September 19). Once completed, these projects will significantly improve the transportation infrastructure in CEE countries, while at the same time allowing for a more cost-efficient transfer of Chinese goods from several cargo nodes northward to the European market.

Building Europe’s Railroad Dream for Brussels

China’s willingness to finance and deliver these projects provides opportunities for CEE countries, especially Serbia and Hungary, to keep their economies afloat and complete strategic development projects that the EU has so far neglected. CEE countries, whose economies largely depend on cash inflows from the EU that have dried up since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, view these projects as a valuable opportunity to close the infrastructure gap with Western Europe, and thus become more competitive with Europe and the rest of the world. For example, the last upgrade of the Serbian section of the HSR line was completed in 1980, and has been at the top of the priority list since 2010 for Serbia’s railway planning strategy (Železnice Srbije, February 20). While the EU did offer limited funding to Serbia for this rail line, the EU’s plan called for a moderate modernization, not the dramatic technological leap forward to the HSR that China has decided to support.

Beyond the local economic benefits for CEE countries, China’s determination to finance and build these railways also facilitates the EU’s own development strategy for the CEE region, most notably the Pan-European Corridor 10 plan. The route of the Hungaro-Serbian HSR, as well as most of the other aforementioned railway and road projects, support Corridor 10, a part of the network of ten planned pan-European transport corridors. The EU envisions these corridors as key projects for European integration, as they aim to facilitate the efficient flow of goods, people and capital across Europe. Therefore, the Hungaro-Serbian HSR is not only crucial for the integration of Hungary and Serbia into Europe’s transportation, and thus commercial, networks, but also of strategic importance to Brussels for drawing the Balkans region closer to the EU politically. This is one substantial example of the mutually beneficial “win-win” emerging out of European economic cooperation with China that both medias tout. Indeed, China also benefits from more efficient transport routes and better access to Europe’s interior markets.

Yet, Chinese projects do not receive universal support in CEE countries. For example, the Serbian business community has a less favorable view of Chinese investment and projects, as business elites feel threatened by Chinese competition. This is in contrast to the general public’s belief that the projects create employment and economic growth in their countries, both in the short and long term. Although the agreements stipulate that Serbian enterprises should receive up to 50 percent of the project’s value, the non-transparent process of the selection of contractors breeds the perception amongst business elites that domestic enterprises are excluded from the projects. Although Serbian enterprises do not have the technology and experience required for building and maintaining the HSR, Serbian companies and workers readily posses the necessary technology and skills for normal transportation infrastructure, such as the construction and maintenance of bridges, regular railways and roads, as well as the production of railway equipment and machinery for the HSR. Also, the “importing” of Chinese laborers—when Serbia boasts a high number of unemployed yet skilled laborers—frustrates workers who otherwise see China as a job creator. There are also widespread concerns that Chinese construction falls short of expected quality and technological standards (Author’s Interviews, Serbia, March–July).

Beijing Displacing Brussels in the Balkans

Despite these concerns, China’s infrastructure projects in CEE countries are diminishing Brussels’ traditional ability to dominate regional proceedings and reconfiguring regional power relations that have existed since the end of the Cold War. As of the early 1990s, Brussels has been able to guide the development of Balkan countries because they were integrated into the EU’s economic and political structures. However, China’s emergence as an important partner during the financial crisis quickly positioned Beijing to challenge Brussels’ role in the region.

In recent years, a number of CEE countries have adopted pro-China measures and policies. Some CEE countries have been vocal supporters of abolishing the EU’s weapons embargo against China, and some have followed China’s lead on international issues. For example, Serbia effectively boycotted the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, and voted against EU-supported United Nations resolutions criticizing Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe and North Korea (European Council for Foreign Relations, July 2011; China Policy Institute, April 2011).

Brussels has sought to counter Beijing’s rising influence in the Balkans, but to little effect. According to local reporting, the EU attempted to persuade Hungary, Serbia and Romania to each reconsider moving forward with their respective HSR deals with China through both official and informal channels, under the guise of ensuring that the projects “adhere to the EU’s policies” (Budapest Business Journal, March 31; Politika, June 3; Business Review, September 2). The Balkans may well be the front lines of Beijing’s competition for influence in Europe, as China seeks to muscle its way into a larger role in its biggest export market at a time when the EU is at its weakest in living memory.

Concluding Thoughts

Beijing appears to be following a strategic plan to establish a transportation infrastructure network in the Balkans in order to bolster Chinese exports to Europe and support its “going out” policy for Chinese SOEs. This infrastructure strategy is welcomed by CEE countries, as it provides much-needed development opportunities and a competitive edge for their economies. It is therefore likely that some other European countries will be pressed into considering HSR and other infrastructure development projects themselves in order to remain competitive and to secure developmental opportunities, opening the way for further projects delivered by Chinese SOEs and financed by Chinese banks—a one-two punch that the EU is evidently unable to match at home or abroad in its current economic fragility.

As briefly discussed above, China’s emergence as a financial backer and operator of development projects not only carries significant benefits for recipient countries and the EU, but also presents some possible challenges. On one hand, the host countries must ensure that these projects benefit local business communities and meet the necessary quality standards. On the other hand, although China’s loans to developing countries are famously touted as coming without conditions, it remains to be seen whether they are used in the future as leverage to sway the policies of recipient countries in China’s favor, potentially disturbing the current status-quo in the region. With similar deals expected to follow elsewhere, the world should pay attention to how China performs its railway diplomacy in the Balkans, as it may be a telling sign of things to come on a global scale.

 

[jhungary]

NATO and Serbia discuss how to move relationship forward

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with the Serbian First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ivica Dačić and with the Serbian Minister of Defence Bratislav Gašić at NATO
Headquarters on Wednesday (18 March 2015) for talks on the development of the NATO-Serbia relationship.

During the meeting, the Secretary General praised the Serbian government's ongoing efforts to enhance Serbia's role as an active and reliable partner within the international community, including with respect to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The Secretary General also praised the excellent cooperation between KFOR and Serbia and said that NATO remains committed to stability in the Western Balkan region. He welcomed Serbia's EU ambitions and Serbia’s 2015 OSCE Chairmanship.

The Secretary General said that new Individual Partnership Action Plan between NATO and Serbia will provide for new opportunities for cooperation.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dačić and Minister of Defence Gašić also addressed the North Atlantic Council.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_118263.htm

 

[TaiShang]

China's Silk Road in Europe: Not Just Hungary
Hungary became the first country to sign a Silk Road MoU, but various other European states are already on board.

June 09, 2015

Hungary has become the first European country to sign a memorandum of understanding with China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, China media report. The MoU was signed on Sunday, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’svisit to Budapest, where he met with Prime Minister Viktor Orban. In a statement on the occasion, Wang said he hopes more European countries will join in.

Hungary may be the first country in Europe to officially sign an MoU relating to China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy, but the subject has cropped up repeatedly during Chinese interactions with Europe. When Xi Jinping toured Europe in April 2014, with stops in The Netherlands, France, Germany, and Belgium, he urged the EU and China to work togetherto combine EU policies with China’s Belt and Road. When Li Keqiang attended the China-Central and Eastern European (CEE) Leaders’ Meeting in Serbia in December 2014, he also highlighted the role Europe has to play in the Belt and Road – and the role China can play in completing infrastructure and energy projects in Central and Eastern Europe under the aegis of that initiative.

More recently, during Xi’s visits to Russia and Belarus this May, both countries agreed to work with China on the Silk Road Economic Belt. Belarus agreed to the project hoping to win Chinese infrastructure investments, while Russia promised to link its new Eurasia Economic Union with China’s Belt and Road.

While the Belt and Road are often discussed primarily in the context of China’s near neighbors – particularly Southeast and Central Asia – Beijing has long been clear about the importance of Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, to the project. A few months after Xi Jinping first unveiled the twin Belt and Road concepts in speeches in Kazakhstan (September 2013) and Indonesia (October 2013), Li extended the Belt and Road all the way to Europe during a November 2013 visit to Romania.

Likewise, the official action plan for the Belt and Road, issues by Chinese government agencies in March 2015, described the Silk Road as “a new Eurasian Land Bridge” that “focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe.” That means the Belt and Road, by China’s own definition, will be incomplete without buy-in from European countries. And Central and Eastern European countries in particular have a special role to play. As Xinhua put it on Monday, “CEE nations will be essential links in the Belt and Road Initiative.”

European countries, like many of the Asian supporters of the Belt and Road, are primarily focused on the economics. “Chinese firms have invested more than 5 billion U.S. dollars in CEE countries in sectors such as energy, infrastructure and machinery,” Xinhua reports. In coming years, China will build a high-speed railwayconnecting Hungary and Serbia and construct two nuclear reactors at a Romanian nuclear power plant. According to U.S. law firm Baker and McKenzie, Chinese investment in Europe doubled from 2013 to 2014, reaching $18 billion.

In other words, the Silk Road in Europe was alive and well before Hungary signed the MoU on Sunday – and it will only continue to grow as more government agreements officially tie existing investments and initiatives to China’s Belt and Road strategy.

 

[jhungary]

Serbia’s relations with NATO: the other (quieter) game in town

By Milan Nič and Ján Cingel
10. Jan 2014 | Security and Defence, Western Balkans | Serbia | Policy briefs
While all eyes are set on the formal opening of the EU membership talks with Serbia on 21 January 2014, this policy brief explores the prospects for Belgrade’s closer cooperation with NATO. While the EU’s accession process is the force majeure dominating current political and economic development in the Western Balkans, the regional security architecture is still based on NATO. EU and NATO integration are still considered as mutually reinforcing processes. The main focus in Serbia has shifted to “soft security” issues such as rule of law, justice affairs and fight against corruption, where the EU is in the driving seat.

NATO’s continuous engagement in the region has been vital for substantial progress in defence reforms, regional cooperation among national armed forces, and the increasing degree of security ownership among Balkan countries. This applies, above all, to Serbia and Kosovo. Their April 2013 agreement opened the door to the integration of the Serb-dominated northern part of Kosovo under Pristina’s jurisdiction - a huge step forward for regional peace and security. Brokered by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, it has also indirectly strengthened the NATO’s role (through its KFOR mission) to provide overall security on the ground as this historic deal is being implemented. In fact, Belgrade’s leadership specifically requested KFOR’s involvement, as it deems it is the only military protection of the Kosovo Serbs. By this, KFOR has become security guarantor of the April agreement. Serbia strongly objects to KFOR phase-out plans and hopes that NATO will stay engaged there in a long term.

What does it all mean for Serbia’s relations with the Alliance? What are the realistic prospects to intensify their practical cooperation and political relationship this year? To what extent is it linked with Serbia’s accession talks with the EU?

Partners, not enemies anymore

Serbia is certainly the most complicated but also one of the most relevant NATO partners in the region. It is the only Balkan country which is neither a NATO member nor interested in becoming one in the near future. Officially, Belgrade’s declared goal is military neutrality.

Serbia’s relations with NATO have been continuously haunted by the legacy of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 over Kosovo. The Alliance is still hugely unpopular in the country1. This puts a limit on the Serbian politicians’ ability to publicly acknowledge the real extent and character of the country’s evolving partnership with NATO.

On the other hand, as the largest and centrally located Balkan country with the largest professional army in the Western Balkans, Serbia needs to work closely with NATO to protect its interests, modernise its armed forces, and to increase its international profile as a reliable partner and security provider. Another crucial factor is geography: all of Serbia’s neighbours are either NATO members (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) or aspire to join the Alliance in the near future (Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Belgrade even supports the NATO membership bids of its three neighbours, and seeks the inter-operability of its defence systems with those of NATO members and candidates.

In 2006, Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) becoming a NATO’s partner country. Belgrade thus gained access to a number of NATO Committees as well as to its programmes, and became eligible to get support from a range of NATO Funds. It has also joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP), which is the basic tool within the PfP through which the partners can reform their armed forces, adopt NATO standards and achieve higher interoperability. On its part, NATO opened its Military Liaison Office in Belgrade and pledged to support Serbia in achieving its Partnership goals.

Over time, political and military cooperation between NATO and Serbia have evolved with varying speed and intensity. Serbian defence reforms and modernisation of its armed forces (SAF) have been carried out with NATO’s advice and assistance. Selected SAF units2 have already been certified according to NATO’s standards, achieving increased inter-operability for potential deployments in international crisis management operations. Besides Serbia - NATO Defence Reform Group set up by embassies of several members in Belgrade, the Alliance has been active and visible in Serbia through several Trust Funds covering projects addressing several pressing military safety issues (such as liquidation of land mines and, most recently, surplus ammunition) and implemented several projects under the Science for Peace and Security Programme, and Public Diplomacy grants.

The key subject in the Serbia-NATO dialogue has been Kosovo. Serbia’s leaders have vowed never to recognise its independence. The NATO-led KFOR mission is responsible for Kosovo’s security. On the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244, KFOR is mandated to ensure a safe and secure environment, including freedom of movement to all people in Kosovo. In effect, it means that KFOR protects the ethnic Serb minority and religious places in the enclaves to the south of the Ibar River. On this basis, Belgrade and SAF have been developing constructive relations with KFOR, including simultaneous and coordinated patrols along the administrative border. On the other hand, Belgrade continues to view with suspicion KFOR’s assistance in developing the KosovoSecurity Force (KSF).

Serbia’s involvement in PfP was put on hold in early 2008 as a reaction to Kosovo’s declaration of independence, which was actively supported by the United States and most (although not all) NATO members. It was resumed one year later. Serbia appointed its first Ambassador to NATO - Branislav Milinković, and opened its mission at the NATO HQ in Brussels in 2010. A few months later, the North Atlantic Council approved Serbia’s request to develop its first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) defining its defence reform goals and areas for intensified bilateral cooperation for the next two years. Under the IPAP, more political consultations and practical cooperation were to take place. Once adopted the IPAP will upgrade the nature of existing cooperation from purely military to a political one.

In the 2011 - 2012 period, bilateral relations with NATO were gradually gaining momentum. The Serbian President Tadić, himself a former minister of defence (MoD), had been supportive of moving Serbia closer to NATO. At the same time, he was extremely careful and ambiguous about this issue in public, unwilling to challenge the official doctrine of military neutrality. His MoD Dragan Šutanovac was more outspoken in public, explaining that Serbia and NATO are not enemies anymore, but partners seeking the best models of cooperation3. At times, Šutanovac seemed frustrated with the lack of political mandate and unity within the government in terms of what Serbia really wants to achieve in its relations with NATO. By the end of his tenure, the Serbian Ministry of Defence was using the full toolbox of existing programmes developing a substantive track record of bilateral cooperation. In 2012 alone, 119 military and expert activities were implemented (out of 151 planned). At the same time, the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was careful to note that all of the activities were in line with Serbia's doctrine of military neutrality4, while actively using diplomatic channels to develop the political side of this relationship (at lower levels of officials).

Reluctance to develop political dialogue

This trajectory was interrupted by the change of governments in Belgrade. In May 2012, Serbian President Boris Tadić lost elections to the nationalist candidate Tomislav Nikolić. In parallel, his Democratic Party was replaced in the government by the Nikolić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which used to be openly critical about Serbia’s cooperation with NATO and whose voter constituency is instinctively anti-NATO. Under its current leader, the powerful first Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, the SNS has been the backbone of the coalition government with the smaller Socialist Party, whose leader Ivica Dačić managed to secure the premiership. When the new government came to power in mid-2012, there was general expectation that quiet drive towards closer relations with NATO would go into reverse. That has clearly not happened. The biggest break-through has been on Kosovo. Under EU facilitation (and with tough conditionality on starting the EU accession talks), the Dačić government has made huge progress in political dialogue with Kosovo, and sought security guarantees from NATO for gradual integration of four Serb-dominated municipalities into Kosovo’s legal system.

In the meantime, a more nuanced picture has emerged vis-á-vis NATO, with the following elements:

• There is now more reluctance in Belgrade to develop a political dialogue with the Alliance than two years ago. This was confirmed at the formal meeting between Serbian President Nikolić with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2013. It mostly focused on KFOR and situation in Kosovo. As for bilateral cooperation, Secretary General Rasmussen underlined that NATO is ready to expand practical military cooperation and political dialogue with Serbia step by step. In his press statement, President Nikolić hinted that Serbia is open to more cooperation but at the same time, it “would not like to choose sides” and prefers to keep political distance from the Alliance.5

• This has been accompanied by a clear shift in political rhetoric. Previous talk of moving towards a closer partnership with NATO in Belgrade is gone. For most of 2013, the Serbian government has focused on getting the green light to start the EU accession talks. Its leaders tried hard to explain the fulfilment of tough EU conditionality on Kosovo to the public as a necessary concession that will bring long-term benefits for Serbia, and save it from economic collapse. That is one more reason why Serbian leaders have been more careful to go against public sentiment in other sensitive foreign policy and security issues, including closer cooperation with NATO. President Nikolić, in particular, has repeatedly emphasised military neutrality as the key political guideline in relations with NATO. At the same time, however, Serbia has continued to develop its practical cooperation with the Alliance, albeit with less enthusiasm for political dialogue than before.

• Vučić (who until August 2013 also held the position of MoD) has been trying to balance developing cooperation with NATO by intensified political and military contacts with Russia, including in arms procurement. Earlier in 2013, Serbia became an observer at the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation. However, the current level of Serbia-NATO cooperation remains significantly greater than the level of military cooperation with Moscow. In November 2013, Vučić tried hard to fend off concerns of the visiting Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, over continuous cooperation with NATO and assured him that Serbia’s goal is not to join the Alliance.6

• All programs of military-technical cooperation between Serbia and NATO are still moving ahead (up to 160 activities were planned for 2013), and even new ones are being started. In July 2013, a new Trust Fund led by the United Kingdom was launched to assist the SAF to liquidate decommissioned surplus ammunition.7 It is being implemented in the Technical Overhaul Institute Kragujevac (KRZK). In parallel, the pace of security sector reforms at the Ministry of Defence is slowing down. But rather than a result of political decisions, it might well be just a side effect of two issues: the change of personnel and more limited financial resources on both sides. Cuts in defence cooperation programs of NATO member countries also played a role in slight reduction of new activities.

On the other hand, the IPAP – as the key guideline for bilateral cooperation – has yet to be finalised. It is important to note that the current Serbian government decided to submit its updated version to the North Atlantic Council last year. The new IPAP draft has been bouncing back and forth among involved government institutions in Belgrade, and between Serbia and NATO. Now it has reached the final stages of the formal approval procedure, set to be adopted in early 2014. The main areas of future Serbia - NATO cooperation have been envisaged as follows: political and security framework; defence and military issues; public diplomacy, scientific cooperation, crisis management and emergency planning system and the protection of classified information.

This leads to an impression that as NATO is interested to see a gradual build-up of strong relationship, the current Serbian leadership is divided over this issue. In particular, the SNS leadership has been reluctant to move beyond the status quo. As Serbian politics is wheeling up for snap parliamentary election in 2014, this year might bring not only formal advancement of the Serbia - NATO cooperation but perhaps also a more ambitious Minister of Defence allowed to come up with creative ideas about how to move this quiet partnership forward.

Conclusions

• In 2014, NATO should encourage Belgrade to deliver on tangible short-term steps palatable to the public opinion and coalition parties constituencies, such as nominating a new Serbian ambassador to NATO (after the tragic death of Ambassador Milinković, his job has been vacant for more than a year). It is very likely that Serbia will first enter the EU (in 2020 at the earliest) and only then decide about its potential membership in NATO. However, in the meantime it will need to develop practical vision of how to use its relationship with NATO for strategic advancement of Serbia’s role in international security and military missions out of Europe. Hopes are that the first IPAP might be approved and its implementation started in 2014.

• The new momentum in Serbia’s cooperation with NATO could be generated by the EU accession talks, since it will also include the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) agenda. Relevant Serbian state institutions – the Ministry of Defence in particular – are already mapping what changes will be required. Practical needs for growing interoperability with the EU partners (while most of them are also in NATO) might result in a new push for modernisation of Serbian army as well as in a dramatic increase in Serbian military personnel participation in international peace-keeping operations under the EU or UN flag. Currently, Serbia is involved in number of UN missions as well as the EU’s counter-piracy naval force operation Atalanta around Somalia and its medical team has been part of the EUTM training mission in Somalia.

• In Kosovo, the international security set-up might soon undergo major changes as the EULEX’s mandate expires in June 2014, and its renewal by the Kosovo government is far from certain. As the security situation continues to improve, some NATO members advocate for an additional KFOR troop reductions and scaling down its duties to prepare for future withdrawal from Kosovo (under the so-called Gate 3 option). By mid-2014, 300 French soldiers will leave KFOR as decided by the French President Holland at the end of the last year. Serbia strongly rejects the Gate 3 option and would like to see KFOR troops remaining at the current levels even after the announced French withdrawal. If Pristina gets its way and the EULEX’s role is set to diminish, it will be more difficult for some NATO members to argue for further KFOR troop reductions. Such development could strengthen political dialogue between Belgrade and NATO on Kosovo.

• In terms of public diplomacy, it is time for a new discourse with more realism“message constituency”, and long-term approach. As shown during the recent “Partnership Tour” co-organised by the Slovak Atlantic Commission and the Atlantic Council of Serbia in towns across the country, more attention needs to be turn to the significance of NATO in providing security for the Serbian community in Kosovo, aid in reforming the Serbian Armed Forces, and to the recent experience of the new NATO members. The Alliance is doing a lot of partnership activities in Serbia which make a real difference and help both Serbian Armed Forces as well as civilians. Serbia belongs to one of the most active NATO partners in Building Integrity Initiative aimed at fighting corruption in the defence sector as well as implementation of the UN SC Resolution No. 1325 on gender equality in armed forces. However, these activities are not publicised effectively in Serbia and very little is known about them outside of Belgrade. NATO as well as Serbia could do more in informing the public about their joint projects and activities.

Serbia’s relations with NATO: the other (quieter) game in town | cepolicy.org

 

[TaiShang]

China-CEE agriculture cooperation centre to be established in Bulgaria
26 June 2015 | 07:28 | FOCUS News Agency

Picture: Focus Information Agency

Sofia. Major principles of the establishment and functioning of a centre for encouragement of the cooperation in the field of agriculture between China and the Central and East European countries will be officially signed on Friday. The signing ceremony will set the start of the work of the centre, which will be a structure within the Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and Food, the press office of the ministry announced.

The official signing ceremony will take place in the frames of a meeting between the agriculture ministers of China and 16 CEE countries, which will be held in the Bulgarian capital city Sofia.

The event will be opened by Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food Vasil Grudev.

The decision on the establishment of the cooperation centre was agreed on October 29, 2014 in Bucharest Romania, when Bulgaria and China’s ministries of agriculture inked a memorandum of understanding.

 

[Aepsilons]

Good that the Balkans have a pragmatic view ! Cooperation with the EU community , cooperation with China, too!

 

[TaiShang]

Good that the Balkans have a pragmatic view ! Cooperation with the EU community , cooperation with China, too!

China's engagement is mostly development-oriented. Balkans is a strategic leg in the One Belt One Road scheme.

 

[Aepsilons]

Absolutely buddy. And the Balkans as well as Eastern European region need all the investment they can get. Be they from the European Community, China, Japan, U.S. Et al...it's great for them.

 

[jhungary]

EU relations with Serbia

In December 2009 Serbian citizens were granted the right to travel without a visa to the Schengen Area. Serbia applied for EU membership in the same month.
The EU facilitates dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, with the aim of

• promoting cooperation;
• achieving progress on the path to the European Union;
• improving people's lives.

Since October 2012, High Representative Catherine Ashton has been personally involved in facilitating a High-Level Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina which resulted in the historic "First agreement of principles governing the normalisation of relations" reached on 19 April 2013. This agreement and its implementation are a breakthrough in relations between both sides and led to concrete changes on the ground.

In June 2013, the European Council decided to start membership negotiations with Serbia.
In September 2013 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement

(SAA) - a comprehensive contractual framework between Serbia and the EU – entered into force.

In January 2014 the EU and Serbia held their 1st Intergovernmental Conference, thereby formally starting accession negotiations.

The European Commission issues an annual Progress Reportassessing Serbia's progress towards EU accession.

For further information, see:

- Council conclusions

European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service) | EU relations with Serbia


The Bulgarian institutions exchanged experience with experts from Poland, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and Germany for sound management of financial instruments

Structural funds of the EU in Bulgaria :: News

30.06.2015
On 30 of June 2015 in Boyana Residence a workshop was held, dedicated to the management of financial instruments, co-financed by the European Structural and Investment Funds. It's the first seminar, by which the start has been put of a new Initiative of the European Commission for partnership and exchange of experience between experts from EU Member States. The aim is that the investment resource from the European cohesion policy is better managed. The initiative is based on the experience and the infrastructure of the TAIEX instrument for exchange. In the new instrument's framework public administrations from Member States can receive expertise from experts of other Member States' administrations, as well as provide their own experts to deliver experience and know how in the framework of the EU.

Active part in the event was taken by experts from the managing authorities of the programmes "Regions for Growth", "Environment", "Innovation and Competitiveness", "Human Resources Development" and the Programme for Rural Development, which are expected to use financial instruments in the new programming period. Among the participants were also representatives from the Central Coordination Unit, the Certifying and the Audit Authorities for the EU funds, the key units in the Ministry of Finance responsible for horizontal policies as state aid and cooperation with the international financial institutions, as well as the National Association of the Municipalities as one of the major beneficiaries. The workshop was also attended by the nationally represented business and banks organizations, without which the realization of financial engineering instruments could not be effective.

Mrs Dobrinka Krasteva from the Central Coordination Unit at the Council of Ministers and national contact point for the Initiative opened the event, underlining that the Instrument is a valuable opportunity for sharing of experience of how countries with similar objectives and priorities cope with the challenges of implementation. A large number of experts could make use of this opportunity in future, given that many of the issues have a horizontal nature.

Mr Lazar Todorov from Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Accession Negotiations of the Commission presented the Instrument and explained the forms of support it offers, the conditions for applying and exchange. In the framework of the workshop the national authorities' experts got familiar with some successful models of management and control of financial instruments in the fields of urban development and regeneration, small and medium sized enterprises and environment, and discussed with their counterparts from Slovenia, Germany, United Kingdom and Poland best practices in the respective areas.
For more information about the Initiative of the European Commission:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index.cfm/en/policy/how/improving-investment/taiex-regio-peer-2-peer/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/cretu/blog/full-steam-ahead-regio-peer-2-peer-platform-taking_en?

Presentations from the Workshop

 

[XiangLong]

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I see that, despite having been an English colony, the English of these people, like certain people on this forum, are just as horrible and illogical as the convictions they stand for.

 

[Zarvan]

Countries are trade partners with a shared goal of challenging US hegemony, but past disputes and competing interests make the relationship more complex.

Forget euro summits and G7 gatherings: for the countries that like to style themselves as the world’s rising powers, the real summitry takes place this week in central Russia, where Vladimir Putin will hold court.

Leaders of the Brics countries (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) will meet Putin in Ufa on Wednesday, then make way for the Asian powers grouped in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Russia and China are the common denominators, as in so much geopolitics these days. The UN security council, Apec, the G20 - Russia and China are the ever-presents, a powerful pairing whose interests coincide more often than not.

Moscow and Beijing have lots in common apart from a 2,500-mile border, economies dominated by state-run firms and oligarchies that can enrich themselves as long as they play by the prevailing political mood of the day.

Officially, Putin is dismissive about suggestions of a new eastern alliance. “We are not creating a military alliance with China,” he said last month. “We are not creating a bloc-based approach, we are trying to create a global approach.”

And yet both countries share a desire to limit American power; they enjoy a burgeoning trade relationship in which, in essence, hydrocarbons are swapped for cheap consumer goods; and they have a mutual interest in promoting an alternative model to western diplomacy.

Trade has increased sixfold over the past decade. Last year they trumpeted the biggest gas deal in history. The summer will be bookended by two striking events: Russian and Chinese warships puttering about together in the eastern Mediterranean in May, gaming war; and Russian and Chinese presidents standing shoulder to shoulder in Beijing for the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war in September.


So how robust is the Russia-China axis?
Geopolitics ::
For China, one of the main attractions of closer relations with Russia is the potential for challenging Washington’s still dominant global position.

“In China, where until recently the official line was ‘non-alignment’, some prominent scholars have started to make unambiguous calls for a comprehensive strategic alliance with Russia,” Alexander Korolev, at the National University of Singapore’s centre on Asia and globalisation, argued recently. “[They are] arguing on the pages of the CCP [Communist party] central party school’s internal publications that ‘China-Russia strategic relations are the most substantive ones’ and elsewhere that ‘China will be unable to shift the world from unipolarity to bipolarity unless it forms a formal alliance with Russia.’”

But often cooperation and tension are two sides of the same coin. Take Central Asia. China’s president, Xi Jinping, has set his sights on a “new silk road”, using China’s billions to help neighbours and regional allies to develop, indirectly supporting growth at home and the expansion of Chinese soft power.

However, this is also Russia’s traditional sphere of influence and any Chinese presence that goes beyond commercial dealings is likely to raise hackles in Moscow.

“It’s totally possible for China to develop its relations with central Asian countries without challenging Russia,” said Liu Jun, a Russian studies expert at East China Normal University. “It’s true that Russia would be concerned if China’s influence in Central Asia grew too much, but the concerns are not mainstream in the bilateral relations – there are more benefits in cooperation than otherwise.”

Russia shares the strategic goal of challenging US hegemony in favour of a more multipolar world, and the two powers often find themselves on the same side in the UN security council, where they wield vetoes as permanent members.

No deal on regulating Iran’s nuclear programme can be made without Russia and China, which have staunchly backed its atomic expansion in the past, and the two countries’ support is largely the reason Bashar al-Assad has been able to hold on to power in Syria. Recently, Russia has been making political and economic overtures to North Korea, which relies on food, arms and energy from its key ally, China, to survive.

As they support the idea of a multipolar world against American dominance, Moscow and Beijing will also tacitly back each others’ attempts to defend their own spheres of influence, said Dmitry Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. In the past two years, Russia has annexed Crimea and backed a separatist campaign to frustrate Ukraine’s turn to the west, and China has been disputing islands with western allies in the South China Sea.

“China admits de facto that Russia has interests in eastern Europe, Russia admits that China has interests around the perimeter of its borders, and even though neither will actively help its partner in Ukraine or the South China Sea, both will observe an advantageous neutrality,” Trenin said. “There won’t be criticism of each other in the areas of their core interests.”


Leadership ::
Government enthusiasm for warmer ties with Russia is summed up by a recent video from the state-controlled Xinhua news agency entitled What Do Chinese People Think About Russia?”

It features Chinese children describing Russia as “even bigger than China”, an old man praising Russia’s strength, demands for more investment, gas sales, a high-speed train, and plenty of airtime given to adulation of the Russian president.

Putin has long been popular in China, where he is seen as a strong leader who has bolstered national pride, and is not a little admired for his topless photo shoots. “Putin you’re a handsome man,” says one middle-aged woman on being asked what message she would like to send to Moscow.

There is also an overt comparison to Xi, who has fostered a personality cult of bold leadership that has echoes of the Russian leader’s (though with less bare flesh). “Putin is the same as our ‘Papa Xi’,” says one young man, using a government endorsed affectionate term for the president.

For their part, Russians are more ambivalent about Xi, who has a far lower profile in Russia than does his counterpart in China.


Trade ::
China’s interest in Russian exports has until now been largely focused on natural resources and military hardware. Beyond that they do not make natural partners. Russia can offer little by way of famous brands or innovation in consumer technology to tempt ordinary Chinese customers.

“It’s a good thing that there is political will behind the business cooperation. Without it, a lot of things won’t happen,” Liu said. “Most big projects are backed by the governments and the volume of trade along the border is quite small.”

The imbalance of the relationship can be seen in the breakdown of their bilateral trade, worth around $100bn a year. China is Russia’s second largest trading partner after the EU, while Russia only just scraped into a list of China’s top 10 trading partners, accounting for barely 3% of the country’s total trade volume.

Moscow is also hoping Beijing will help with finance for businesses, after western funds dried up last year. Some Chinese firms have seen the Russian economic wobble as an opportunity to make capital investments in the country.


Energy ::
China and Russia should make natural partners in energy deals, but in reality they have struggled to turn past agreements into real supply deals; pipelines announced last decade have still not been built because of disagreements over pricing and other conditions.

Earlier this year, Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of oil to China for the first time, with Russian exports to China more than doubling since 2010. But Beijing is accustomed to shopping around for energy and driving a very cheap bargain with its suppliers, while Russia is used to controlling prices for European customers with few other options.

The expansion of shale gas production may have weakened Russia’s hand by improving global supply, but China is also increasingly concerned about climate change and needs to wean itself off the dirty coal that still provides well over half its energy.

Since Russia has rarely agreed to sell stakes in strategic land-based deposits to western companies, Putin’s offer of a stake in state oil champion Rosneft’s biggest production asset, the Vankor oilfields, to China in September underlined the new direction the country’s energy policy is taking.

The offer was made at a ceremony to start construction of Russia’s $55bn Power of Siberia pipeline, a breakthrough project that is planned to deliver an annual 38bn cubic metres of gas to eastern China over the next 30 years. In November, the two countries also signed a framework agreement for an Altai gas pipeline to potentially supply 30bn cubic metres of gas to western China each year for 30 years.

But neither pipeline deal appears to have been completely finalised, and economic sanctions and a weak rouble will probably make financing the huge projects difficult for Russia’s Gazprom.

“It seems like at every meeting there’s some sort of document signed and hailed as another big agreement … but Gazprom will need to develop large fields and construct the pipelines,” said Grigory Birg, an analyst at Investcafe. “I think in the current environment securing the finances is the major holdup, and we don’t have any indication as to the economics of the project.”

Although Birg estimated the rate of return on the Power of Siberia investment to be a modest 9% to 10% when the deal was signed, the profitability is likely to be even less if global oil prices remain weak. Beijing will, by all appearances, be able to drive an even harder bargain for the gas price under the proposed Altai pipeline to western China, a region that has less demand than the industrialised east of the country and already receives cheap gas from nearby Turkmenistan.

Nonetheless, analysts expect energy cooperation to continue to grow as Russia seeks alternatives to the politically thorny European market, and China addresses growing demand and problems with pollution and blackouts. Last year, China replaced Germany as Russia’s biggest buyer of crude oil. “China is the major alternative market and is easily accessible for Russia given the [location of energy] reserves and the geopolitical partnership, so it’s an obvious fit,” Birg said. “But the timing at which it is happening is not in favour of Russia.”


Currency ::
Both Russia and China have an interest in loosening the US dollar’s dominance in global trade as the world’s reserve currency. Russia now accepts yuan for oil payments (something that other oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, don’t do).

Following the imposition of sanctions, Russian companies and banks – traditionally reliant on dollar-denominated syndicated loans – started to look to China for a financial escape route. The rouble-yuan currency pair reached records in trading volumes last summer.

Russian companies are not new to the renminbi market, nor to the issuing of “dim sum bonds” – bonds denominated in Chinese yuan and largely issued by entities based in China or Hong Kong. In the past these options represented a cheaper source of funding. Now they’re a necessity. However, yields on Russian corporate bonds denominated in yuan have increased as the list of sanctions started mounting up.


Military ::
Russian arms sales to China have been estimated at $1bn a year, the Russians were previously hesitant to give advanced weaponry to the Soviet Union’s one-time military rival. But the recent announcement by Russia’s state arms exporter of a deal to supply China with its S-400 surface-to-air missile systems has taken their relationship to a new level at a time when Beijing is seeking new air and naval defence technologies.

The higher-level arms sales have been accompanied by greater military cooperation, which was on display in May with the war games in the Mediterranean Sea. Such exercises in what has traditionally been a “Nato pond” are designed to expand the Chinese navy’s reach while showing the United States that Russia is a potentially important military partner, according to Trenin.

Following the Ukraine crisis, which soured relations with the west, he said the main considerations behind Russia’s “entente” with China were political. “Now Russia has an important stimulus to grow relations with China, because relations with the west are troubled, and China is the only large player in the world that can be considered as economic, political and to a certain extent military ally,” Trenin said.

Both sides, meanwhile, are concerned that the unrest in Pakistan and Afghanistan could spill over into their territory, or serve as incubators for militants who may one day return home.

But none of that means that either side has forgotten past disputes or present differences. Russia is nervous about China sapping its revenue by reverse engineering the equipment it buys, and is also monitoring Beijing closely for any attempts to project military power into central Asia.

“China and Russia’s strategic partnership is a result of the times, but it is totally different from a military alliance such as the one between the US and Japan,” the Global Times, a Chinese nationalist tabloid, said in a recent editorial.

“China and Russia have repeatedly stated that they will become partners, not allies. They do mean that. China also cares about relations with western countries. Russia does not want to see relations with the west become a deadlock.”


Cyber Security ::
Both Russia and China share a concern over the US domination of the internet. In January, Russia, China and a number of central Asian dictatorships jointly submitted a new proposal for an international code of conduct on information security to the UN general assembly.

In a clause clearly aimed at the US, the document calls for countries “not to use information and communications technologies and … networks to interfere in the internal affairs of other states or with the aim of undermining their political, economic and social stability”.

At a recent internet security forum in Moscow, officials from both countries called for a new approach to online security.

“It’s great they [the US] invented the iPhone but when you open your iPhone and see the camera you have to guess whether it’s photographing you at that moment or not,” said Konstantin Malofeyev, a controversial businessman known for his backing for the Russian Orthodox church and the pro-Russian separatist movement in east Ukraine. “Russia went into space first and Antarctic first but we don’t control those things, they are controlled by international charters. Why should the US control the internet?”

Chinese official Chen Xiaohua said: “We should join hands to build cyberspace order. Various countries share a consistent vision of enhancing the governance of cyberspace … following the principles of mutual trust and mutual respect.”

In the meantime, Beijing and Moscow signed a landmark cyber-security deal recently that could bolster defence against external attack as well as allowing them to share technology for domestic control.

The two countries have poured resources into managing the internet, aiming to curb its potential as a platform for dissent. Beijing’s “great firewall” is a powerful and sophisticated filter of the online world, but is still porous enough that most people inside China do not need to bother trying to evade it.

Both countries also field armies of both hackers and paid pro-government commenters, known in China as the “50 cent” group, because of how much they are paid for each post. However, experts say their focus on internal controls may have come at the expense of security.

“Prioritising political information control over technical cyber defence also damages China’s own cybersecurity,” Jon Lindsay of Harvard University’s Belfer centre for science and international affairs said in a recent briefing. “Lax law enforcement and poor cyber defences leave the country vulnerable to both cyber criminals and foreign spies.”


Business Mood ::
Among some business people, there is a fear that the enforced turn to the east will mean Russia selling out from a position of weakness.

“The downturn in relations with the west is bad for Russia and bad for the west; the only beneficiary is China,” one top Russian businessman said. “The number of Chinese delegations coming to Russia has gone up tenfold, and the Chinese will only enter the market when they see the conditions are very beneficial to them.”

Russian media have been told to play up links with China and other non-western countries, and companies have felt pressure from the government to look eastwards even if it makes little business sense. But what initially seemed pointless may be starting to bear some fruit.

“It started as theatre, but now there are some companies out there really getting stuff done,” said Tom Blackwell, CEO of EM, a consultancy firm that has worked with a number of major Russian companies on exploring the Chinese market. “Chinese investment funds have very little experience or knowledge about Russia and it’s a hard sell. But the strategy seems to be to do the big state deals first and assume smaller ones will follow. Slowly, real things are happening.”

Russia’s federal migration service is especially wary of an influx of Chinese migrants across the Russia-China border. It has stated that Chinese could become the largest ethnic group in Russia’s far east by the 2020s or 2030s; last summer a border official said that 1.5 million Chinese illegally entered the region from January 2013 to June 2014.

 

[TaiShang]

Ufa summits sign of shift in Eurasian geopolitics
By Yang Jin Source:Global Times Published: 2015-7-8 0:43:01

The summits of the BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will be held from Wednesday in the Russian city of Ufa. They are the most important meetings of the two regional organizations this year. Leaders of both the BRICS and the SCO will gather to discuss global affairs such as the world economy, regional cooperation, the formulation of security norms and institutional buildup.

It is the first time that the two major events will be held one after the other in the same city. It is both a coincidence and inevitable. The joint convention will not only save costs for venue construction and organization, but also reduce the time costs for state leaders and boost efficiency. Meanwhile, under the current international landscape, the agendas of the two summits have a lot in common. The joint convention will help the countries find more common ground and expand the clout of the two summits.

In addition, both China and Russia are important participants of the two mechanisms. India belongs to the BRICS group, and is actively seeking a membership in the SCO. As the two meetings will be held in Ufa, it reflects a profound change in the Eurasian geopolitical situation.

First of all, changes are taking place in Eurasia's geopolitical architecture which was led by Western powers in the past. Due to the rapid development of emerging economies, international power has been shifting to emerging countries which have an increasing say in rule-making. The topics featured in the two summits will not be limited to regional topics but will extend to global subjects.

Second, given the current state of international relations, emerging countries are more willing than ever to seek common development. The available mechanisms for cooperation are improving and having an impact on the new international structure. Cooperation and joint governance will become the mainstream of major power competitions.

Third, against the background of a global financial crisis that has yet to end and the ongoing European debt crisis, there is a growing need for emerging countries, including Eurasian countries, to deepen cooperation. The Ufa summits will unite the participating countries in political, economic and security areas by covering richer and more pragmatic subjects.

Fourth, as the Ukrainian crisis is far from over and Russia is still being contained by Western countries, the two summits may provide possibilities for solving the crisis and promoting regional peace.

Last but not the least, the China-proposed Silk Road economic belt and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will be among the major topics during the two summits. China's support and participation will guarantee the sustainable development of the two mechanisms.

According to Russian media, a "BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy" will likely be passed in the BRICS summit. A BRICS development bank and an emergency reserve fund will possibly see some breakthroughs. This shows that BRICS nations have reached an agreement on the future strategy of this mechanism. The primary conditions for closer economic relations and integration have taken shape.

As for the SCO, it has borne rich fruits after years of development and come to the critical moment for deepening this institution. The Ufa summit is expected to pass a development strategy up to 2025, which will undoubtedly become a milestone in this organization's development. This guiding document will expand the cooperation of member countries in various fields such as security, economy and humanitarian efforts. Cooperation measures in trade, investment, energy and finance will also be announced.

The SCO may also embrace new members. How to ensure transparency and efficiency in the expansion of its membership has always bothered SCO member states. Consensus may be achieved in concrete topics such as how to list India and Pakistan as new members.

It is expected that the Ufa summits will make achievements and represent the concerted efforts of emerging countries to participate in international and regional affairs. The two mechanisms will push pragmatic cooperation and extend their global influence, which bears a landmark significance.

The author is an associate research fellow of the Institute of Russian, Eastern European, Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

 

[haviZsultan]

Anything that gets rid of the US or downgrades them from a power position is welcome. So all hail to the China Russia axis.

 

[Providence]

They don't know what US can do until we mess with them

 

[Economic superpower]

They don't know what US can do until we mess with them

Russia took back Crimea and the US couldn't do a damn thing to stop Russia taking over Crimea
China took back the Scarborough Shoal from the Pinoys despite the US legally obliged to help the Pinoys. US couldn't do a damn thing to stop China taking over the Scarborough Shoal
China is building in the South China Sea and the US can't do a damn thing to stop the construction

Where is the big 'untouchable' soooooper powaaaaaa United States to stop all that?