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The GCC and Iran: What kind of a deal?
For the US, a nuclear Tehran is a direct national security threat, but for the Gulf states, its foreign policy in nearly all of its key positions is a threat
By Muath Al Wari, Special to Gulf NewsPublished: August 17, 2013
Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, below, speaks as the Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, center, listens, during the debate on proposed Cabinet at the parliament, in Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Aug. 15, 2013.
The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) might soon have to confront the prospect of a compromise with Iran. The current American administration seems allergic to large-scale military interventions, and as evident by its Syria and recent approach to the Middle East conflict, it would rather delegate tricky issues to the State Department to address. Hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran were renewed by the election of Hassan Rouhani as president a pragmatist, at least in the context of Iranian politics. The Obama administration has already extended some olive branches, and if reciprocated and unobstructed by Congress, they may lead to some kind of breakthrough. The Gulf should evaluate and if necessary modify its approach to the Iranian problem accordingly.
Gone are the bravado days of the George W. Bush administration, which didnt need much convincing of the threat Iran posed. For perspective, Bushs ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, seemed to never wake up on a day he didnt think was appropriate for striking Iran, while the current White House has responded to the election of Rouhani by easing restrictions on medical equipment exported to Iran. More importantly however, the White House has registered its opposition to the Iran sanctions bill pushed by Congressional hawks that would, if passed by the Senate, seriously constrain the ability to manoeuvre in any future negotiations. The traditional European pro-diplomacy chorus has found a home in the American capital with its message echoed by journalists, academics, think-tanks, and as expressed in a letter to Obama more than 130 lawmakers.
Tehran too, has been cautiously flirting with a diplomatic resolution. Rouhani has not shied from stressing the need to break with the confrontational posturing of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, vowing to pursue constructive engagement with the world. The return of former UN ambassador Mohammad Zarif as foreign minister is a noteworthy reflection of Rouhanis intentions, for at least in this early stage, he seems to be extending his own olive branch.
However, both he and Obama will have to face an entrenched domestic opposition deeply suspicious of compromise or rapprochement with the other side. For Rouhani, things are complicated by the influence of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who has the final say on the nuclear programme, and controls the powerful Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, established by his predecessor as a check on the regular military. Khamenei had warned, at an iftar function attended by Rouhani, that the US is not trustworthy. In late June, Khamenei stressed that the true intention of the West in the negotiations is regime change in Tehran. While, in Washington, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (Aipac), was quick to warn against placing too much faith in Rouhanis ability to deliver and proceeded quickly to lobby for passage of the new sanctions bill despite opposition from the White House and its allies in Congress. The bill, if passed, would certainly make it very difficult for Rouhani to deliver.
But inspite of these obstacles to a diplomatic solution, efforts will be made. The stakes are too high for allowing the stalemate to continue. Rouhani was elected largely to address an Iranian economy falling apart due in some part to the sanctions regime. Obama, on the other hand, will try as he should everything to avert a military showdown with Tehran, especially as Syria is imploding on his watch. So, what should the Gulf make of all of this? Is the deal America willing to accept any different from the resolution sought by the GCC? Do Washington and its allies see eye-to-eye on the parameters of an agreement with the Iranians? Due to the sensitivity of the matter it is not particularly clear what the GCC will accept. At face value, a civilian nuclear energy programme with rigorous inspection and the suspension of all weapons-capability building components and activities will be acceptable to the international community. But, would the Gulf tolerate even that, considering its history with the Islamic Republic, or more appropriately, should it?
At the same time, the Gulf will also have to consider the possibility that a western-Iranian rapprochement might exclude discussions on matters beyond the nuclear programme. If a deal is at hand, there is no reason to believe Washington will place the resolution of such thorny issues like Hezbollah, Iranian regional policy, the disputed UAE islands (Abu Mousa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) or even Syria on the table. Sanctions placed on Tehran are directly tied to the nuclear programme, steps towards the resolution of which will probably be rewarded with alleviating sanctions. For the US, a nuclear Iran is a direct national security threat. However, an Iran that is meddling in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen; or is in a dispute with the UAE over the three islands; or ensuring the survival of Al Assads regime is not a national security threat. For the Gulf states, Irans foreign policy in nearly all of its key positions is a threat the Iran file they have is much thicker than the one in Washington.
Considering all of that, should the GCC states accept an American-sponsored deal that shies away from the grand bargain required to truly de-escalate tensions in the region?
The GCC and Iran: What kind of a deal? | GulfNews.com
For the US, a nuclear Tehran is a direct national security threat, but for the Gulf states, its foreign policy in nearly all of its key positions is a threat
By Muath Al Wari, Special to Gulf NewsPublished: August 17, 2013
Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, below, speaks as the Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, center, listens, during the debate on proposed Cabinet at the parliament, in Tehran, Iran, Thursday, Aug. 15, 2013.
The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) might soon have to confront the prospect of a compromise with Iran. The current American administration seems allergic to large-scale military interventions, and as evident by its Syria and recent approach to the Middle East conflict, it would rather delegate tricky issues to the State Department to address. Hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran were renewed by the election of Hassan Rouhani as president a pragmatist, at least in the context of Iranian politics. The Obama administration has already extended some olive branches, and if reciprocated and unobstructed by Congress, they may lead to some kind of breakthrough. The Gulf should evaluate and if necessary modify its approach to the Iranian problem accordingly.
Gone are the bravado days of the George W. Bush administration, which didnt need much convincing of the threat Iran posed. For perspective, Bushs ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, seemed to never wake up on a day he didnt think was appropriate for striking Iran, while the current White House has responded to the election of Rouhani by easing restrictions on medical equipment exported to Iran. More importantly however, the White House has registered its opposition to the Iran sanctions bill pushed by Congressional hawks that would, if passed by the Senate, seriously constrain the ability to manoeuvre in any future negotiations. The traditional European pro-diplomacy chorus has found a home in the American capital with its message echoed by journalists, academics, think-tanks, and as expressed in a letter to Obama more than 130 lawmakers.
Tehran too, has been cautiously flirting with a diplomatic resolution. Rouhani has not shied from stressing the need to break with the confrontational posturing of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, vowing to pursue constructive engagement with the world. The return of former UN ambassador Mohammad Zarif as foreign minister is a noteworthy reflection of Rouhanis intentions, for at least in this early stage, he seems to be extending his own olive branch.
However, both he and Obama will have to face an entrenched domestic opposition deeply suspicious of compromise or rapprochement with the other side. For Rouhani, things are complicated by the influence of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who has the final say on the nuclear programme, and controls the powerful Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, established by his predecessor as a check on the regular military. Khamenei had warned, at an iftar function attended by Rouhani, that the US is not trustworthy. In late June, Khamenei stressed that the true intention of the West in the negotiations is regime change in Tehran. While, in Washington, the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (Aipac), was quick to warn against placing too much faith in Rouhanis ability to deliver and proceeded quickly to lobby for passage of the new sanctions bill despite opposition from the White House and its allies in Congress. The bill, if passed, would certainly make it very difficult for Rouhani to deliver.
But inspite of these obstacles to a diplomatic solution, efforts will be made. The stakes are too high for allowing the stalemate to continue. Rouhani was elected largely to address an Iranian economy falling apart due in some part to the sanctions regime. Obama, on the other hand, will try as he should everything to avert a military showdown with Tehran, especially as Syria is imploding on his watch. So, what should the Gulf make of all of this? Is the deal America willing to accept any different from the resolution sought by the GCC? Do Washington and its allies see eye-to-eye on the parameters of an agreement with the Iranians? Due to the sensitivity of the matter it is not particularly clear what the GCC will accept. At face value, a civilian nuclear energy programme with rigorous inspection and the suspension of all weapons-capability building components and activities will be acceptable to the international community. But, would the Gulf tolerate even that, considering its history with the Islamic Republic, or more appropriately, should it?
At the same time, the Gulf will also have to consider the possibility that a western-Iranian rapprochement might exclude discussions on matters beyond the nuclear programme. If a deal is at hand, there is no reason to believe Washington will place the resolution of such thorny issues like Hezbollah, Iranian regional policy, the disputed UAE islands (Abu Mousa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) or even Syria on the table. Sanctions placed on Tehran are directly tied to the nuclear programme, steps towards the resolution of which will probably be rewarded with alleviating sanctions. For the US, a nuclear Iran is a direct national security threat. However, an Iran that is meddling in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen; or is in a dispute with the UAE over the three islands; or ensuring the survival of Al Assads regime is not a national security threat. For the Gulf states, Irans foreign policy in nearly all of its key positions is a threat the Iran file they have is much thicker than the one in Washington.
Considering all of that, should the GCC states accept an American-sponsored deal that shies away from the grand bargain required to truly de-escalate tensions in the region?
The GCC and Iran: What kind of a deal? | GulfNews.com
