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The foreign hand
BABAR SATTAR
Published at
2013-10-07 08:04:05
FISHING in troubled waters is the
unfortunate rule and not the
exception in strategic thinking. Add
to that the concept that an enemy
of an enemy is a friend. And that in
a nutshell explains our foreign
hand problem.
Pakistan is in the eye of the storm.
To not think that shadowy outfits of
all hues from around the world are
stirring trouble in our midst to
pursue their own strategic interests
would be naïve. Are CIA and RAW
creating assets within our terror
syndicate and funding them?
Probably yes. Are they the only
ones? Probably not.
Steve Colls Ghost Wars was a
riveting read for it narrated how
complex, entwined and self-
conflicted the business of proxy wars
is, wherein there are layers within
layers of alliance of interests
between adversaries and layers
within layers of conflicts between
allies.
To assert that because the US might
secretly be funding terror groups in
Pakistan, critics of the pro-talks
policy are foreign agents interested
in forestalling peace reflects the
denial, paranoia and utter
foolishness of our political class
honing a flawed national security
narrative.
Since the OBL operation is there any
doubt that the US has a well-
entrenched intelligence network
within Pakistan? Doesnt the success
of the US drones programme depend
not just on superior technology but
also human intelligence? Maybe the
US relies on ISIs intelligence when
it comes to the Tehreek-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). But would it not seek
to double-check such information
apart from gathering intelligence on
the Afghan Taliban and the ISI
itself? It would be remarkable if the
worlds sole superpower didnt fund
clandestine activities in a war it has
a direct stake in and not the other
way round.
The fishing-in-troubled-waters part
is easy to understand. All countries
with ambitious national security
interests and the ability or desire to
pursue them do so. Is Pakistan an
exception? Do we have an interest in
other countries whether India,
Bangladesh or Afghanistan
pursuing certain policies? We do. Do
we fund groups within these
countries to realise our goals? We
probably do. Remember Ghulam
Nabi Fai who was charged and
convicted in the US for concealing
funds received from the ISI for trying
to influence the US position on
Kashmir?
Acknowledging evil is not the same
as endorsing it. The point is that
states fund clandestine activities in
other states. It is the efficacy of the
national security policy of a state
that determines whether or not the
subversive acts of other states
succeed.
In that regard there are three sets
of problems with the foreign hand
argument in our terror debate: its
use is selective; it projects
facilitation as cause; and it is a
product of (and further entrenches)
a sense of disempowerment rooted
in denial of human agency within
Pakistanis.
India and the US have an interest in
funding clandestine acts within
Pakistan, but so do Saudi Arabia,
Iran and other Arab friends. That
our Arab friends funded jihad
factories in Pakistan is a historical
fact. There is no evidence that such
funding has dried up or that we
have acquired control over funding
channels. That Saudi Arabia was a
key driver instigating US-led armed
action in Syria is before us. Thus, to
present the foreign hand as a
subset of the Western imperialist
design against Pakistan is
intellectually dishonest.
Whether funding of suicide attacks
is a manifestation of US designs to
pre-empt government-TTP talks,
Indian desire to sow confusion and
discord, Saudis paying us back for
our position on Syria or difference of
opinion between pro and anti-talk
factions within the TTP, well never
know with certainty.
What we must understand, however,
is that the designs or plans of
foreign states would never succeed if
it were not for the presence of an
armed and motivated militia that
sees the state and fellow citizens as
legitimate targets of terrorism.
What we have in the form of the
TTP-led terror syndicate is a loaded
weapon. Now whether the weapon is
being guided exclusively by
indigenous merchants of terror or
occasionally also by our foreign
enemies (or allies) is a moot point.
To the extent that the loaded
weapon exists and is lying around, it
will remain susceptible to abuse.
And such use or abuse might not be
the inadvertent outcome of poor
simple Taliban being misled by the
conniving US-Euro-Zino-Hindu-
imperialist nexus. It could be by
design: the enemy of the enemy is a
friend.
So to stop those pillaging our state
and society, is the best strategy to
start with the world-at-large casting
an evil eye on us, or with the means
being used to carry out the evil
designs? Should acquiring control
over flow of money that funds terror
be a part of our anti-terrorism
policy? It must. Should tweaking our
foreign policy to deter states funding
terrorism within Pakistan be part of
our national security policy? It must.
But should we do so without
disassembling the terror
infrastructure being greased by the
foreign funding were complaining
about?
The most devastating aspect of the
pro-talks argument that justifies
terrorism as a foreign conspiracy or a
reaction to acts of foreign states
(drones or US war in Afghanistan) is
that it conceives citizen as devoid of
human and moral agency. Can an
abettor be more guilty than the
perpetrator himself? The foreign
hand argument has hidden within it
a dehumanising aspect: as enemy
states are funding acts of terror, the
militants themselves are not
cognisant of the choices they make
in killing fellow citizens and thus not
liable for the consequences of such
choices.
No human society or justice system
is conceivable without the basic
organising principle that able-
minded adults ought to be
responsible for the choices they
make. The pro-talks argument is
morally flawed for it places the
responsibility for loss of innocent
Pakistani lives not on those citizens
willingly carrying our terrorist
attacks will full comprehension of
their consequences, but on foreign
actors whose actions are projected to
have angered these terrorists into
believing that fellow citizens are
legitimate proxy targets.
The writer is a lawyer.
sattar@post.harvard.edu
Twitter: @ babar_sattar
source. dawn.com
--------------------------------------------------------
plz dnt make comment if you dnt read article fully with care.
BABAR SATTAR
Published at
2013-10-07 08:04:05
FISHING in troubled waters is the
unfortunate rule and not the
exception in strategic thinking. Add
to that the concept that an enemy
of an enemy is a friend. And that in
a nutshell explains our foreign
hand problem.
Pakistan is in the eye of the storm.
To not think that shadowy outfits of
all hues from around the world are
stirring trouble in our midst to
pursue their own strategic interests
would be naïve. Are CIA and RAW
creating assets within our terror
syndicate and funding them?
Probably yes. Are they the only
ones? Probably not.
Steve Colls Ghost Wars was a
riveting read for it narrated how
complex, entwined and self-
conflicted the business of proxy wars
is, wherein there are layers within
layers of alliance of interests
between adversaries and layers
within layers of conflicts between
allies.
To assert that because the US might
secretly be funding terror groups in
Pakistan, critics of the pro-talks
policy are foreign agents interested
in forestalling peace reflects the
denial, paranoia and utter
foolishness of our political class
honing a flawed national security
narrative.
Since the OBL operation is there any
doubt that the US has a well-
entrenched intelligence network
within Pakistan? Doesnt the success
of the US drones programme depend
not just on superior technology but
also human intelligence? Maybe the
US relies on ISIs intelligence when
it comes to the Tehreek-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). But would it not seek
to double-check such information
apart from gathering intelligence on
the Afghan Taliban and the ISI
itself? It would be remarkable if the
worlds sole superpower didnt fund
clandestine activities in a war it has
a direct stake in and not the other
way round.
The fishing-in-troubled-waters part
is easy to understand. All countries
with ambitious national security
interests and the ability or desire to
pursue them do so. Is Pakistan an
exception? Do we have an interest in
other countries whether India,
Bangladesh or Afghanistan
pursuing certain policies? We do. Do
we fund groups within these
countries to realise our goals? We
probably do. Remember Ghulam
Nabi Fai who was charged and
convicted in the US for concealing
funds received from the ISI for trying
to influence the US position on
Kashmir?
Acknowledging evil is not the same
as endorsing it. The point is that
states fund clandestine activities in
other states. It is the efficacy of the
national security policy of a state
that determines whether or not the
subversive acts of other states
succeed.
In that regard there are three sets
of problems with the foreign hand
argument in our terror debate: its
use is selective; it projects
facilitation as cause; and it is a
product of (and further entrenches)
a sense of disempowerment rooted
in denial of human agency within
Pakistanis.
India and the US have an interest in
funding clandestine acts within
Pakistan, but so do Saudi Arabia,
Iran and other Arab friends. That
our Arab friends funded jihad
factories in Pakistan is a historical
fact. There is no evidence that such
funding has dried up or that we
have acquired control over funding
channels. That Saudi Arabia was a
key driver instigating US-led armed
action in Syria is before us. Thus, to
present the foreign hand as a
subset of the Western imperialist
design against Pakistan is
intellectually dishonest.
Whether funding of suicide attacks
is a manifestation of US designs to
pre-empt government-TTP talks,
Indian desire to sow confusion and
discord, Saudis paying us back for
our position on Syria or difference of
opinion between pro and anti-talk
factions within the TTP, well never
know with certainty.
What we must understand, however,
is that the designs or plans of
foreign states would never succeed if
it were not for the presence of an
armed and motivated militia that
sees the state and fellow citizens as
legitimate targets of terrorism.
What we have in the form of the
TTP-led terror syndicate is a loaded
weapon. Now whether the weapon is
being guided exclusively by
indigenous merchants of terror or
occasionally also by our foreign
enemies (or allies) is a moot point.
To the extent that the loaded
weapon exists and is lying around, it
will remain susceptible to abuse.
And such use or abuse might not be
the inadvertent outcome of poor
simple Taliban being misled by the
conniving US-Euro-Zino-Hindu-
imperialist nexus. It could be by
design: the enemy of the enemy is a
friend.
So to stop those pillaging our state
and society, is the best strategy to
start with the world-at-large casting
an evil eye on us, or with the means
being used to carry out the evil
designs? Should acquiring control
over flow of money that funds terror
be a part of our anti-terrorism
policy? It must. Should tweaking our
foreign policy to deter states funding
terrorism within Pakistan be part of
our national security policy? It must.
But should we do so without
disassembling the terror
infrastructure being greased by the
foreign funding were complaining
about?
The most devastating aspect of the
pro-talks argument that justifies
terrorism as a foreign conspiracy or a
reaction to acts of foreign states
(drones or US war in Afghanistan) is
that it conceives citizen as devoid of
human and moral agency. Can an
abettor be more guilty than the
perpetrator himself? The foreign
hand argument has hidden within it
a dehumanising aspect: as enemy
states are funding acts of terror, the
militants themselves are not
cognisant of the choices they make
in killing fellow citizens and thus not
liable for the consequences of such
choices.
No human society or justice system
is conceivable without the basic
organising principle that able-
minded adults ought to be
responsible for the choices they
make. The pro-talks argument is
morally flawed for it places the
responsibility for loss of innocent
Pakistani lives not on those citizens
willingly carrying our terrorist
attacks will full comprehension of
their consequences, but on foreign
actors whose actions are projected to
have angered these terrorists into
believing that fellow citizens are
legitimate proxy targets.
The writer is a lawyer.
sattar@post.harvard.edu
Twitter: @ babar_sattar
source. dawn.com
--------------------------------------------------------
plz dnt make comment if you dnt read article fully with care.
